G.R. No. 70403 July 7, 1989
SANTIAGO SYJUCO, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH LXXXV, QUEZON CITY, THE CITY SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CITY REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, EUGENIO LIM, ARAMIS LIM, MARIO LIM, PAULINO LIM, LORENZO LIM, NILA LIM and/ or THE PARTNERSHIP OF THE HEIRS OF HUGO LIM and ATTORNEY PATERNO P. CANLAS, respondents.
Doroteo B. Daguna and Felix D. Carao for petitioner.
Paterno Canlas for private respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
This case may well serve as a textbook example of
how judicial processes, designed to promote the swift and efficient
disposition of disputes at law, can be so grossly abused and manipulated
as to produce precisely the opposite result; how they can be utilized
by parties with small scruples to forestall for an unconscionably long
time so essentially simple a matter as making the security given for a
just debt answer for its payment.
The records of the present proceedings and of two
other cases already decided by this Court expose how indeed the routine
procedure of an extrajudicial foreclosure came by dint of brazen forum
shopping and other devious maneuvering to grow into a veritable thicket
of litigation from which the mortgagee has been trying to extricate
itself for the last twenty years.
Back in November 1964, Eugenio Lim, for and in his
own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of his mother, the widow Maria Moreno
(now deceased) and of his brother Lorenzo, together with his other
brothers, Aramis, Mario and Paulino, and his sister, Nila, all
hereinafter collectively called the Lims, borrowed from petitioner
Santiago Syjuco, Inc. (hereinafter, Syjuco only) the sum of P800,000.00.
The loan was given on the security of a first mortgage on property
registered in the names of said borrowers as owners in common under
Transfer Certificates of Title Numbered 75413 and 75415 of the Registry
of Deeds of Manila. Thereafter additional loans on the same security
were obtained by the Lims from Syjuco, so that as of May 8, 1967, the
aggregate of the loans stood at P2,460,000.00, exclusive of interest,
and the security had been augmented by bringing into the mortgage other
property, also registered as owned pro indiviso by the Lims under two
titles: TCT Nos. 75416 and 75418 of the Manila Registry.
There is no
dispute about these facts, nor about the additional circumstance that
as stipulated in the mortgage deed the obligation matured on November 8,
1967; that the Lims failed to pay it despite demands therefor; that
Syjuco consequently caused extra-judicial proceedings for the
foreclosure of the mortgage to be commenced by the Sheriff of Manila;
and that the latter scheduled the auction sale of the mortgaged property
on December 27, 1968. 1 The
attempt to foreclose triggered off a legal battle that has dragged on
for more than twenty years now, fought through five (5) cases in the
trial courts, 2 two (2) in the Court of Appeals, 3 and three (3) more in this Court, 4 with the end only now in sight.
1. CIVIL CASE NO. 75180, CFI MANILA, BR.5; CA-G.R. NO. 00242-R; G.R. NO. L-34683
To stop the
foreclosure, the Lims — through Atty. Marcial G. Mendiola, who was
later joined by Atty. Raul Correa — filed Civil Case No. 75180 on
December 24,1968 in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch 5). In
their complaint they alleged that their mortgage was void, being
usurious for stipulating interest of 23% on top of 11 % that they had
been required to pay as "kickback." An order restraining the auction
sale was issued two days later, on December 26,1968, premised inter
alia on the Lims' express waiver of "their rights to the notice and
re-publication of the notice of sale which may be conducted at some
future date." 5
On November 25,1970, the Court of First Instance (then presided over by Judge Conrado M. Vasquez 6
rendered judgment finding that usury tained the mortgage without,
however, rendering it void, declaring the amount due to be only
Pl,136,235.00 and allowing the foreclosure to proceed for satisfaction
of the obligation reckoned at only said amount . 7
Syjuco
moved for new trial to enable it to present additional evidence to
overthrow the finding of usury, and the Court ordered the case reopened
for that purpose. The Lims tried to negate that order of reopening in
the Court of Appeals, the proceedings being docketed as CA-G.R. No.
00242-R. They failed. The Court of Appeals upheld the Trial Court. The
Lims then sought to nullify this action of the Appellate Court; towards
that end, they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. L-34683. But here, too, they failed; their petition was dismissed. 8
Thereafter,
and on the basis of the additional evidence adduced by Syjuco on remand
of the case from this Court, the Trial Court promulgated an amended
decision on August 16, 1972, reversing its previous holding that usury
had flawed the Lims' loan obligation. It declared that the principal of
said obligation indeed amounted to P2,460,000.00, exclusive of interest
at the rate of 12% per annum from November 8, 1967, and, that obligation
being already due, the defendants (Syjuco and the Sheriff of Manila)
could proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage given
to secure its satisfaction. 9
2. APPEAL FROM CIVIL CASE NO. 75180; CA-G.R. NO. 51752; G.R. NO. L-45752
On
September 9, 1972, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas entered his appearance in
Civil Case No. 75180 as counsel for the Lims in collaboration with Atty.
Raul Correa, and on the same date appealed to the Court of Appeals from
the amended decision of August 16, 1972. 10 In
that appeal, which was docketed as CA G.R. No. 51752, Messrs. Canlas
and Correa prayed that the loans be declared usurious; that the
principal of the loans be found to be in the total amount of
Pl,269,505.00 only, and the interest thereon fixed at only 6% per annum
from the filing of the complaint; and that the mortgage be also
pronounced void ab initio. 11
The appeal met with no success. In a decision promulgated on October 25,1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the Trial Court's amended decision. 12
The
Lims came to this Court seeking reversal of the appellate Court's
decision. However, their petition for review-filed in their behalf by
Canlas, and Atty. Pio R. Marcos, and docketed as G.R. No. L-45752-was
denied for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated August 5, 1977.
The Lims' motion for reconsideration was denied and entry of judgment
was made on September 24,1977. 13 Here the matter should have ended; it marked only the beginning of Syjuco's travails.
3. CIVIL CASE NO.112762, CFI MANILA BRANCH 9
Syjuco then
resumed its efforts to proceed with the foreclosure. It caused the
auction sale of the mortgaged property to be scheduled on December 20,
1977, only to be frustrated again by another action filed by the Lims on
December 19, 1977, docketed as Civil Case No. 112762 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. 14
The action sought to stop the sale on the ground that the notice of
foreclosure had not been republished; this, notwithstanding that as
earlier stressed, the restraining order of December 26, 1968 issued in
Civil Case No 75180 explicitly declared itself to be predicated on the
Lims' waiver of "their rights to the notice and republication of the
notice of sale which may be conducted at some future date." 15 An
order restraining the sale issued in the case, although the petition
for preliminary injunction was subsequently denied. A supplemental
complaint was also filed by the Lims seeking recovery of some Pl million
in damages allegedly suffered by reason of said lack of republication. 16
4. CIVIL CASE NO. 75180
That very same claim — that there had been no republication of the notice of sale,
which was the foundation of the Lims' action in Civil Case No. 112762
as aforesaid — was made by the Lims the basis of an urgent motion filed
on December 15, 1977 in Civil Case No. 75180, in which, as earlier
narrated, the judgement authorizing the foreclosure had been affirmed by
both the Court of Appeals and this Court, and had become final and
executory. And that motion sought exactly the same remedy prayed for in
Civil Case No. 112762 (filed by the Lims four [4] days later, on
December 19, 1977), i.e., the prevention of the auction sale. The Court
-- Branch 5, then presided over by Judge Jose H. Tecson — granted the
restraining order on December 19, 1977, 17
the very same day that the Lims commenced Civil Case No. 112762 in the
same Court and in which subsequent action they asked for and obtained a
similar restraining order.
The Lims'
counsel thus brought about the anomalous situation of two (2)
restraining orders directed against the same auction sale, based on the
same ground, issued by different courts having cognizance of two (2)
separate proceedings instituted for identical objectives. This situation
lasted for all of three (3) years, despite the republication of the
notice of sale caused by Syjuco in January, 1978 in an effort to end all
dispute about the matter, and despite Judge Tecson's having been made
aware of Civil Case No. 112762. It should have been apparent to Judge
Tecson that there was nothing more to be done in Civil Case No. 75180
except to enforce the judgment, already final and executory, authorizing
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, a judgment sanctioned,
to repeat, by both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court; that
there was in truth no need for another publication of the notice since
the Lims had precisely waived such republication, this waiver having
been the condition under which they had earlier obtained an order
restraining the first scheduled sale; that, in any event, the
republication effected by Syjuco had removed the only asserted
impediment to the holding of the same; and that, finally, the Lims were
acting in bad faith: they were maintaining proceedings in two (2)
different courts for essentially the same relief. 18
Incredibly, not only did Judge Tecson refuse to allow the holding of
the auction sale, as was the only just and lawful course indicated by
the circumstances, 19 he authorized the Lims to sell the mortgaged property in a private sale, 20 with
the evident intention that the proceeds of the sale, which he directed
to be deposited in court, would be divided between Syjuco and the Lims;
this, in line with the patently specious theory advocated by the Lims'
counsel that the bond flied by them for the postponement of the sale,
set at P6 million by the Court (later increased by P 3 million) had
superseded and caused novation of the mortgage. 21
The case lay fallow for a year, certain other, incidents arising and
remaining unresolved on account of numerous postponements.
5. G.R. No. L-56014
Finally, on January 28, 1981, Syjuco betook itself to
this Court, presumably no longer disposed to await Judge Tecson's
pleasure or the Lims' convenience. It filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. L-56014, alleging that in Civil
Case No. 75180, Judge Tecson had gravely abused discretion in:
(1) unreasonably delaying the foreclosure of the mortgage;
(2) entertaining the Lims' motion to discharge
said mortgage grounded on the theory that it had been superseded and
novated by the Lims' act of filing the bond required by Judge Tecson in
connection with the postponement of the foreclosure sale, and
unreasonably delaying resolution of the issue; and
(3) authorizing the Lims to negotiate and
consummate the private sale of the mortgaged property and motu proprio
extending the period granted the Lims for the purpose, in disregard of
the final and executory judgment rendered in the case.
By judgment rendered on September 21, 1982, after due proceedings, this Court 22
issued the writ prayed for and nullified the orders and actuations of
Judge Tecson in Civil Case No. 75180. The judgment declared that:
(1) the republication by Syjuco of the notice of
foreclosure sale rendered the complaint in Civil Case No. 112762 moot
and academic; hence, said case could not operate to bar the sale;
(2) the Lims' bonds (of P 6 million and P 3
million), having by the terms thereof been given to guarantee payment of
damages to Syjuco and the Sheriff of Manila resulting from the
suspension of the auction sale, could not in any sense and from any
aspect have the effect of superseding the mortgage or novating it;
(3) in fact, the bonds had become worthless when,
as shown by the record, the bondsman's authority to transact non-life
insurance business in the Philippines was not renewed, for cause, as of
July 1, 1981.
The
decision consequently decreed that the Sheriff of Manila should proceed
with the mortgage sale, there being no further impediment thereto. 23
Notice
of the decision was served on the Lims, through Atty. Canlas, on
October 2, 1982. A motion for reconsideration was filed, 24 but the same was denied with finality for lack of merit and entry of final judgment was made on March 22,1983. 25
6. THE SECRET ACTION CIVIL CASE NO. Q-36845 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO, PRESIDING
Twelve (12) days after the Lims were served, as above
mentioned, with notice of this Court's judgment in G.R. No. 56014, or
on October 14,1982, they caused the filing with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City of still another action, the third, also designed, like
the first two, to preclude enforcement of the mortgage held by Syjuco.
This time the complaint was presented, not in their
individual names, but in the name of a partnership of which they
themselves were the only partners: "Heirs of Hugo Lim." The complaint
advocated the theory that the mortgage which they, together with their
mother, had individually constituted (and thereafter amended during the
period from 1964 to 1967) over lands standing in their names in the
Property Registry as owners pro indiviso, in fact no longer belonged to
them at that time, having been earlier deeded over by them to the
partnership, "Heirs of Hugo Lim", more precisely, on March 30, 1959,
hence, said mortgage was void because executed by them without authority
from the partnership.
The complaint was signed by a lawyer other than Atty.
Canlas, but the records disclose that Atty. Canlas took over as counsel
as of November 4,1982. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-39295,
was assigned to Branch 35 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, then
presided over by Judge Jose P. Castro.
Judge Castro issued a restraining order on October
15, 1982. Then, Sheriff Perfecto G. Dalangin submitted a return of
summons to the effect that on December 6, 1982 he —
..
served personally and left a copy of summons together with a copy of
Complaint and its annexes x x upon defendant's office formerly at 313
Quirino Ave., Paranaque, Metro-Manila and now at 407 Dona Felisa Syjuco
Building, Remedios St., corner Taft Avenue, Manila, through the Manager,
a person of sufficient age and discretion duly authorized to receive
service of such nature, but who refused to accept service and signed
receipt thereof. 26
A
vaguer return will be hard to find. It is impossible to discern from it
where precisely the summons was served, whether at Quirino Avenue,
Paranaque, or Taft Avenue, Manila; and it is inexplicable that the name
of the person that the sheriff had been able to identify as the manager
is not stated, the latter being described merely as "a person of
sufficient age and discretion." In any event, as it was to claim later,
Syjuco asserts that it was never so served with summons, or with any
other notice, pleading, or motion relative to the case, for that matter.
On February
10, 1983, Atty. Canlas filed an ex-parte motion to declare Syjuco in
default. The order of default issued the next day, also directing the
plaintiff partnership to present evidence ex parte within three (3)
days. On February 22, 1983, judgment by default was rendered, declaring
void the mortgage in question because executed by the Lims without
authority from the partnership which was and had been since March
30,1959 the exclusive owner of the mortgaged property, and making
permanent an injunction against the foreclosure sale that had issued on
January 14,1983. 27 Service
of notice of the default judgment was, according to the return of the
same Sheriff Perfecto Dalangin, effected on the following day, February
23, 1983. His return is a virtual copy of his earlier one regarding
service of summons: it also states the place of service as the
defendant's office, either at its former location, 313 Quirino Avenue,
Paranaque, or at the later address, 407 Dona Felisa, Syjuco Building,
Taft Avenue, Manila; and it also fails to identify the person on whom
service was made, describing him only as "the clerk or person in charge"
of the office. 28
Unaccountably,
and contrary to what might be expected from the rapidity with which it
was decided-twelve (12) days from February 10, 1983, when the motion to
declare defendant Syjuco in default was filed-the case was afterwards
allowed by Atty. Canlas to remain dormant for seventeen (17) months. He
made no effort to have the judgment executed, or to avail of it in other
actions instituted by him against Syjuco. The judgment was not to be
invoked until sometime in or after July, 1984, again to stop the
extrajudicial mortgage sale scheduled at or about that time at the
instance of Syjuco, as shall presently be recounted.
7. Other Actions in the Interim:
a. CIVIL CASE No. 83-19018, RTC MANILA
While the
Lims, through their partnership ("Heirs of Hugo Lim"), were prosecuting
their action in the sala of Judge Castro, as above narrated, Syjuco once
again tried to proceed with the foreclosure after entry of judgment had
been made in G.R. No. 56014 on March 22, 1983. It scheduled the auction
sale on July 30, 1983. But once again it was frustrated. Another
obstacle was put up by the Lims and their counsel, Atty. Canlas. This
was Civil Case No. 83-19018 of the Manila Regional Trial Court. The case
was filed to stop the sale on the theory that what was sought to be
realized from the sale was much in excess of the judgment in Civil Case
No. 75180, and that there was absence of the requisite notice. It is
significant that the judgment by default rendered by Judge Castro in
Civil Case No. Q-36485 was not asserted as additional ground to support
the cause of action. Be this as it may, a restraining order was issued
on July 20,1983 in said Civil Case No. 83-9018. 29
b. CIVIL CASE NO. Q-32924, RTC QUEZON CITY
What the
outcome of this case, No. 83-19018, is not clear. What is certain is (1)
that the auction sale was re-scheduled for September 20, 1983, (2) that
it was aborted because the Lims managed to obtain still another
restraining order in another case commenced by their lawyer, Atty.
Canlas: Civil Case No. Q-32924 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City, grounded on the proposition that the publication of the notice of
sale was defective; and (3) that the action was dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court on February 3, 1984. 30
No
other salient details about these two (2) cases are available in the
voluminous records before the Court, except that it was Atty. Canlas who
had filed them. He admits having done so unequivocally: "Thus, the
undersigned counsel filed injunction cases in Civil Case No. 83-19018
and Civil Case No. 39294, Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon
City. ... " 31
7. RE-ACTIVATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. Q-36485, RTC, Q QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XXXV
Upon the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 39294, Syjuco once more resumed its efforts
to effect the mortgage sale which had already been stymied for more than
fifteen (15) years. At its instance, the sheriff once again set a date
for the auction sale. But on the date of the sale, a letter of Atty.
Canlas was handed to the sheriff drawing attention to the permanent
injunction of the sale embodied in the judgment by default rendered by
Judge Castro in Civil Case No. Q- 36485. 32
Syjuco lost no time in inquiring about Civil Case No. Q-36485, and was
very quickly made aware of the judgment by default therein promulgated
and the antecedent events leading thereto. It was also made known that
on July 9, 1984, Judge Castro had ordered execution of the judgment;
that Judge Castro had on July 16, 1984 granted Atty. Canlas' motion to
declare cancelled the titles to the Lims' mortgaged properties and as
nun and void the annotation of the mortgage and its amendments on said
titles, and to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue new
titles, in lieu of the old, in the name of the partnership, "Heirs of
Hugo Lim." 33
On July
17,1984, Syjuco filed in said Civil Case No. Q-36485 a motion for
reconsideration of the decision and for dismissal of the action,
alleging that it had never been served with summons; that granting
arguendo that service had somehow been made, it had never received
notice of the decision and therefore the same had not and could not have
become final; and that the action should be dismissed on the ground of
bar by prior judgment premised on the final decisions of the Supreme
Court in G.R. No. L-45752 and G.R. No. 56014.
Two other
motions by Syjuco quickly followed. The first, dated July 20, 1984,
prayed for abatement of Judge Castro's order decreeing the issuance of
new certificates of title over the mortgaged lands in the name of the
plaintiff partnership. 34
The second, filed on July 24, 1984, was a supplement to the motion to
dismiss earlier filed, asserting another ground for the dismissal of the
action, i.e., failure to state a cause of action, it appearing that the
mortgaged property remained registered in the names of the individual
members of the Lim family notwithstanding that the property had
supposedly been conveyed to the plaintiff partnership long before the
execution of the mortgage and its amendments,-and that even assuming
ownership of the property by the partnership, the mortgage executed by
all the partners was valid and binding under Articles 1811 and 1819 of
the Civil Code. 35
The
motions having been opposed in due course by the plaintiff partnership,
they remained pending until January 31, 1985 when Syjuco moved for their
immediate resolution. Syjuco now claims that Judge Castro never acted
on the motions. The latter however states that that he did issue an
order on February 22, 1985 declaring that he had lost jurisdiction to
act thereon because, petitio principii, his decision had already become
final and executory.
8. G.R.NO.L-70403; THE PROCEEDING AT BAR
For the third time Syjuco is now before this Court on
the same matter. It filed on April 3, 1985 the instant petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. It prays in its petition that the
default judgment rendered against it by Judge Castro in said Civil Case
No. Q-36485 be annulled on the ground of lack of service of summons, res
judicata and laches, and failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action; that the sheriff be commanded to proceed with the foreclosure of
the mortgage on the property covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Numbered 75413, 75415, 75416 and 75418 of the Manila Registry; and that
the respondents the Lims, Judge Castro, the Sheriff and the Register of
Deeds of Manila, the partnership known as "Heirs of Hugo Lim," and Atty.
Paterno R. Canlas, counsel for-the Lims and their partnership-be
perpetually enjoined from taking any further steps to prevent the
foreclosure.
The comment
filed for the respondents by Atty. Canlas in substance alleged that (a)
Syjuco was validly served with summons in Civil Case No. Q-36485,
hence, that the decision rendered by default therein was also valid and,
having been also duly served on said petitioner, became final by
operation of law after the lapse of the reglementary appeal period; (b)
finality of said decision removed the case from the jurisdiction of the
trial court, which was powerless to entertain and act on the motion for
reconsideration and motion to dismiss; (c) the petition was in effect an
action to annul a judgment, a proceeding within the original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals; (d) the plea of res judicata came
too late because raised after the decision had already become final;
moreover, no Identity of parties existed between the cases invoked, on
the one hand, and Civil Case No. Q-36485, on the other, the parties in
the former being the Lims in their personal capacities and in the
latter, the Lim Partnership, a separate and distinct juridical entity;
and the pleaded causes of action being different, usury in the earlier
cases and authority of the parties to encumber partnership property in
the case under review; (e) the plea of laches also came too late, not
having been invoked in the lower court; and (f) the property involved
constituted assets of the Lim partnership, being registered as such with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. 36
On
his own behalf Atty. Canlas submitted that he had no knowledge of the
institution of Civil Case No. Q-36485 (though he admitted being
collaborating counsel in said case); that he did not represent the Lims
in all their cases against Syjuco, having been counsel for the former
only since 1977, not for the last seventeen years as claimed by Syjuco;
and that he had no duty to inform opposing counsel of the pendency of
Civil Case No. Q-36485. 37
Respondent Judge Castro also filed a comment 38 disclaiming
knowledge of previous controversies regarding the mortgaged property.
He asserted that Syjuco had been properly declared in default for having
failed to answer the complaint despite service of summons upon it, and
that his decision in said case which was also properly served on Syjuco
became final when it was not timely appealed, after which he lost
jurisdiction to entertain the motion for reconsideration and motion to
dismiss. He also denied having failed to act on said motions, adverting
to an alleged order of February 22, 1985 where he declared his lack of
jurisdiction to act thereon.
The
respondent Register of Deeds for his part presented a comment wherein he
stated that by virtue of an order of execution in Civil Case No.
Q-36485, he had cancelled TCTs Nos. 75413, 75415, 75416 and 75418 of his
Registry and prepared new certificates of title in lieu thereof, but
that cancellation had been held in abeyance for lack of certain
registration requirements and by reason also of the motion of Syjuco's
Atty. Formoso to hold in abeyance enforcement of the trial court's order
of July 16, 1984 as well as of the temporary restraining order
subsequently issued by the Court. 39
It is time to write finis
to this unedifying narrative which is notable chiefly for the
deception, deviousness and trickery which have marked the private
respondents' thus far successful attempts to avoid the payment of a just
obligation. The record of the present proceeding and the other records
already referred to, which the Court has examined at length, make it
clear that the dispute should have been laid to rest more than eleven
years ago, with entry of judgment of this Court (on September 24, 1977)
in G.R. No. L-45752 sealing the fate of the Lims' appeal against the
amended decision in Civil Case No. 75180 where they had originally
questioned the validity of the mortgage and its foreclosure. That
result, the records also show, had itself been nine (9) years in coming,
Civil Case No. 75180 having been instituted in December 1968 and, after
trial and judgment, gone through the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R. No.
00242-R) and this Court (in G.R. No. 34683), both at the instance of the
Lims, on the question of reopening before the amended decision could be
issued.
Unwilling, however, to concede defeat, the Lims moved
(in Civil Case No. 75180) to stop the foreclosure sale on the ground of
lack of republication. On December 19,1977 they obtained a restraining
order in said case, but this notwithstanding, on the very same date they
filed another action (Civil Case No. 117262) in a different branch of
the same Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the foreclosure
sale on the same ground of alleged lack of republication. At about this
time, Syjuco republished the notice of sale in order, as it was later to
manifest, to end all further dispute.
That move met with no success. The Lims managed to
persuade the judge in Civil Case No. 75180, notwithstanding his
conviction that the amended decision in said case had already become
final, not only to halt the foreclosure sale but also to authorize said
respondents to dispose of the mortgaged property at a private sale upon
posting a bond of P6,000,000.00 (later increased by P3,000,000.00) to
guarantee payment of Syjuco's mortgage credit. This gave the Lims a
convenient excuse for further suspension of the foreclosure sale by
introducing a new wrinkle into their contentions-that the bond
superseded the mortgage which should, they claimed, therefore be
discharged instead of foreclosed.
Thus from the final months of 1977 until the end of
1980, a period of three years, Syjuco found itself fighting a legal
battle on two fronts: in the already finally decided Civil Case No.
75180 and in Civil Case No. 117262, upon the single issue of alleged
lack of republication, an issue already mooted by the Lims' earlier
waiver of republication as a condition for the issuance of the original
restraining order of December 26,1968 in Civil Case No. 75180, not to
mention the fact that said petitioner had also tried to put an end to it
by actually republishing the notice of sale.
With the advent of 1981, its pleas for early
resolution having apparently fallen on deaf ears, Syjuco went to this
Court (in G.R. No. L-56014) from which, on September 21, 1982, it
obtained the decision already referred to holding, in fine, that there
existed no further impediment to the foreclosure sale and that the
sheriff could proceed with the same.
Said decision, instead of deterring further attempts
to derail the foreclosure, apparently gave the signal for the
clandestine filing this time — by the Partnership of the Heirs of Hugo
Lim -on October 14,1982 of Civil Case No. Q-36485, the subject of the
present petition, which for the first time asserted the claim that the
mortgaged property had been contributed to the plaintiff partnership
long before the execution of the Syjuco's mortgage in order to defeat
the foreclosure.
Syjuco now maintains that it had no actual knowledge
of the existence and pendency of Civil Case No. Q-36485 until
confronted, in the manner already adverted to, with the fait accompli
of a "final" judgment with permanent injunction therein, and nothing in
the record disabuses the Court about the truth of this disclaimer.
Indeed, considering what had transpired up to that denouement, it
becomes quite evident that actuations of the Lims and their lawyer had
been geared to keeping Syjuco in the dark about said case. Their filing
of two other cases also seeking to enjoin the foreclosure sale (Civil
Case No. 83-19018, Regional Trial Court of Manila in July 1983, and
Civil Case No. Q-32924, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in September
of the same year) after said sale had already been permanently enjoined
by default judgment in Civil Case No. Q-36485, appears in retrospect to
be nothing but a brace of feints calculated to keep Syjuco in that
state of ignorance and to lull any apprehensions it mat may have
harbored about encountering further surprises from any other quarter.
Further credence is lent to this appraisal by the
unusually rapid movement of Civil Case No. Q-36485 itself in its earlier
stages, which saw the motion to declare Syjuco in default filed, an
order of default issued, evidence ex parte for the plaintiffs
received and judgment by default rendered, all within the brief span of
twelve days, February 10-22, 1983. Notice of said judgment was "served"
on February 23, 1983, the day after it was handed down, only to be
followed by an unaccountable lull of well over a year before it was
ordered executed on July 9, 1984 — unaccountable, considering that
previous flurry of activity, except in the context of a plan to rush the
case to judgment and then divert Syjuco's attention to the Lims' moves
in other directions so as to prevent discovery of the existence of the
case until it was too late.
The Court cannot but condemn in the strongest terms
this trifling with the judicial process which degrades the
administration of justice, mocks, subverts and misuses that process for
purely dilatory purposes, thus tending to bring it into disrepute, and
seriously erodes public confidence in the will and competence of the
courts to dispense swift justice.
Upon the facts, the only defense to the foreclosure
that could possibly have merited the full-blown trial and appeal
proceedings it actually went through was that of alleged usury pleaded
in Civil Case No. 75180 and finally decided against the respondent Lims
in G.R. No. L-45752 in September 1977. The other issues of failure to
republish and discharge of mortgage by guarantee set up in succeeding
actions were sham issues, questions without substance raised only for
purposes of delay by the private respondents, in which they succeeded
only too well. The claim urged in this latest case: that the mortgaged
property had been contributed to the respondent partnership and was
already property of said partnership when the individual Lims
unauthorizedly mortgaged it to Syjuco, is of no better stripe, and this,
too, is clear from the undisputed facts and the legal conclusions to be
drawn therefrom.
The record shows that the respondent partnership is
composed exclusively of the individual Lims in whose name all the cases
herein referred to, with the sole exception of Civil Case No. Q-36485,
were brought and prosecuted, their contribution to the partnership
consisting chiefly, if not solely, of the property subject of the Syjuco
mortgage. It is also a fact that despite its having been contributed to
the partnership, allegedly on March 30, 1959, the property was never
registered with the Register of Deeds in the name of the partnership,
but to this date remains registered in the names of the Lims as owners
in common. The original mortgage deed of November 14,1964 was executed
by the Lims as such owners, as were all subsequent amendments of the
mortgage. There can be no dispute that in those circumstances, the
respondent partnership was chargeable with knowledge of the mortgage
from the moment of its execution. The legal fiction of a separate
juridical personality and existence will not shield it from the
conclusion of having such knowledge which naturally and irresistibly
flows from the undenied facts. It would violate all precepts of reason,
ordinary experience and common sense to propose that a partnership, as
commonly known to all the partners or of acts in which all of the
latter, without exception, have taken part, where such matters or acts
affect property claimed as its own by said partnership.
If, therefore, the respondent partnership was
inescapably chargeable with knowledge of the mortgage executed by all
the partners thereof, its silence and failure to impugn said mortgage
within a reasonable time, let alone a space of more than seventeen
years, brought into play the doctrine of estoppel to preclude any
attempt to avoid the mortgage as allegedly unauthorized.
The principles of equitable estoppel, sometimes called estoppel in pais,
are made part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code. Coming under
this class is estoppel by silence, which obtains here and as to which it
has been held that:
...
an estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words. 'Estoppel by
silence' arises where a person, who by force of circumstances is under a
duty to another to speak, refrains from doing so and thereby leads the
other to believe in the existence of a state of facts in reliance on
which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may support an estoppel whether
the failure to speak is intentional or negligent.
Inaction
or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation
and concealment of the facts, so as to raise an equitable estoppel. When
the silence is of such a character and under such circumstances that it
would become a fraud on the other party to permit the party who has
kept silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe
and act on, it will operate as an estoppel. This doctrine rests on the
principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he ought to
speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought
to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be
heard to speak when he should be silent. 40
And more to the point:
A property owner who knowingly permits another to
sell or encumber the property, without disclosing his title or objecting
to the transaction, is estopped to set up his title or interest as
against a person who has been thereby misled to his injury.
x x x
An
owner of real property who stands by and sees a third person selling or
mortgaging it under claim of title without asserting his own title or
giving the purchaser or mortgagee any notice thereof is estopped, as
against such purchaser or mortgagee, afterward to assert his title; and,
although title does not pass under these circumstances, a conveyance
will be decreed by a court of equity. Especially is the rule applicable
where the party against whom the estoppel is claimed, in addition to
standing by, takes part in malting the sale or mortgage. 41
More
specifically, the concept to which that species of estoppel which
results from the non-disclosure of an estate or interest in real
property has ordinarily been referred is fraud, actual or constructive.
... Although fraud is not an essential element of the original conduct
working the estoppel, it may with perfect property be said that it would
be fraudulent for the party to repudiate his conduct, and to assert a
right or claim in contravention thereof. 42
Equally
or even more preclusive of the respondent partnership's claim to the
mortgaged property is the last paragraph of Article 1819 of the Civil
Code, which contemplates a situation duplicating the circumstances that
attended the execution of the mortgage in favor of Syjuco and therefore
applies foursquare thereto:
Where
the title to real property is in the names of all the partners a
conveyance executed by all the partners passes all their rights in such
property.
The term
"conveyance" used in said provision, which is taken from Section 10 of
the American Uniform Partnership Act, includes a mortgage.
Interpreting
Sec. 10 of the Uniform Partnership Act, it has been held that the right
to mortgage is included in the right to convey. This is different from
the rule in agency that a special power to sell excludes the power to
mortgage (Art. 1879). 43
As
indisputable as the propositions and principles just stated is that the
cause of action in Civil Case No. Q-36485 is barred by prior judgment.
The right subsumed in that cause is the negation of the mortgage,
postulated on the claim that the parcels of land mortgaged by the Lims
to Syjuco did not in truth belong to them but to the partnership.
Assuming this to be so, the right could have been asserted at the time
that the Lims instituted their first action on December 24, 1968 in the
Manila Court of First Instance, Civil Case No. 75180, or when they filed
their subsequent actions: Civil Case No. 112762, on December 19, 1977;
Civil Case No. 83-19018, in 1983, and Civil Case No. Q-39294, also in
1983. The claim could have been set up by the Lims, as members composing
the partnership, "Heirs of Hugo Lim." It could very well have been put
forth by the partnership itself, as co-plaintiff in the corresponding
complaints, considering that the actions involved property supposedly
belonging to it and were being prosecuted by the entire membership of
the partnership, and therefore, the partnership was in actuality, the
real party in interest. In fact, consistently with the Lims' theory,
they should be regarded, in all the actions presented by them, as having
sued for vindication, not of their individual rights over the property
mortgaged, but those of the partnership. There is thus no reason to
distinguish between the Lims, as individuals, and the partnership
itself, since the former constituted the entire membership of the
latter. In other words, despite the concealment of the existence of the
partnership, for all intents and purposes and consistently with the
Lims' own theory, it was that partnership which was the real party in
interest in all the actions; it was actually represented in said actions
by all the individual members thereof, and consequently, those members'
acts, declarations and omissions cannot be deemed to be simply the
individual acts of said members, but in fact and in law, those of the
partnership.
What was
done by the Lims — or by the partnership of which they were the only
members-was to split their cause of action in violation of the well
known rule that only one suit may be instituted for a single cause of
action. 44 The
right sought to be enforced by them in all their actions was, at
bottom, to strike down the mortgage constituted in favor of Syjuco, a
right which, in their view, resulted from several circumstances, namely
that the mortgage was constituted over property belonging to the
partnership without the latter's authority; that the principal
obligation thereby secured was usurious; that the publication of the
notice of foreclosure sale was fatally defective, circumstances which
had already taken place at the time of the institution of the actions.
They instituted four (4) actions for the same purpose on one ground or
the other, making each ground the subject of a separate action. Upon
these premises, application of the sanction indicated by law is caned
for, i.e., the judgment on the merits in any one is available as a bar
in the others. 45
The
first judgment-rendered in Civil Case No. 75180 and affirmed by both
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 51752) and this Court (G.R. No.
L-45752) should therefore have barred all the others, all the requisites
of res judicata being present. The judgment was a final and executory
judgment; it had been rendered by a competent court; and there was,
between the first and subsequent cases, not only identity of
subject-matter and of cause of action, but also of parties. As already
pointed out, the plaintiffs in the first four (4) actions, the Lims,
were representing exactly the same claims as those of the partnership,
the plaintiff in the fifth and last action, of which partnership they
were the only members, and there was hence no substantial difference as
regards the parties plaintiff in all the actions. Under the doctrine of
res judicata, the judgment in the first was and should have been
regarded as conclusive in all other, actions not only "with respect to
the matter directly adjudged," but also "as to any other matter that
could have been raised in relation thereto. " 46
It being indisputable that the matter of the partnership's being the
owner of the mortgaged properties "could have been raised in relation"
to those expressly made issuable in the first action, it follows that
that matter could not be re-litigated in the last action, the fifth.
Though
confronted with the facts thus precluding the respondent partnership's
claim to the property under both the principle of estoppel and the
provisions of Article 1819, last paragraph, of the Civil Code, as well
as the familiar doctrine of res judicata, the respondent Judge refused
to act on Syjuco's motions on the ground that he no longer had
jurisdiction to do so because they were filed after judgment by default
against Syjuco, which failed to answer the complaint despite valid
service of summons, had been rendered and become final. The sheriffs
return, however, creates grave doubts about the correctness of the
Judge's basic premise that summons had been validly served on Syjuco.
For one thing, the return 47
is unspecific about where service was effected. No safe conclusion
about the place of service can be made from its reference to a former
and a present office of Syjuco in widely separate locations, with
nothing to indicate whether service was effected at one address or the
other, or even at both. A more serious defect is the failure to name the
person served who is, with equal ambiguity, identified only as "the
Manager" of the defendant corporation (petitioner herein). Since the
sheriffs return constitutes primary evidence of the manner and incidents
of personal service of a summons, the Rules are quite specific about
what such a document should contain:
SEC.
20. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons shall be made
in writing by the server and shall set forth the manner, place and date
of service; shall specify any papers which have been served with the
process and the name of the person who received the same; and shall be
sworn to when made by a person other than a sheriff or his deputy. 48
In the case of Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing 49 it was held that:"
(a) strict compliance with the mode of service is
necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The
officer upon whom service is made must be one who is named in the
statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. So, where the statute
requires that in the case of a domestic corporation summons should be
served on 'the president or head of the corporation, secretary,
treasurer, cashier or managing agent thereof, service of summons on the
secretary's wife did not confer jurisdiction over the corporation in the
foreclosure proceeding against it. Hence, the decree of foreclosure and
the deficiency judgment were void and should be vacated (Reader vs.
District Court, 94 Pacific 2nd 858).
The
purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure
that the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
served on him. In other words, 'to bring home to the corporation notice
of the filing of the action'. (35 A C.J.S. 288 citing Jenkins vs. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 48 F. Supp. 848; MacCarthy vs. Langston, D.C. Fla., 23
F.R.D. 249).
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and
utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the
manner in which summons should be served on a domestic corporation (U.S.
vs. Mollenhauer Laboratories, Inc., 267 Fed. Rep. 2nd 260).'
The
rule cannot be any less exacting as regards adherence to the
requirements of proof of service, it being usually by such proof that
sufficiency of compliance with the prescribed mode of service is
measured. Here the only proof of service of summons is the questioned
sheriff's return which, as already pointed out, is not only vague and
unspecific as to the place of service, but also neglects to Identify by
name the recipient of the summons as required by Rule 20, Section 14, of
the Rules of Court. Where the sheriffs return is defective the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions will
not lie. 50 The
defective sheriffs return thus being insufficient and incompetent to
prove that summons was served in the manner prescribed for service upon
corporations, there is no alternative to affirming the petitioner's
claim that it had not been validly summoned in Civil Case No. Q-36485.
It goes without saying that lacking such valid service, the Trial Court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioner Syjuco, rendering null
and void all subsequent proceedings and issuances in the action from the
order of default up to and including the judgment by default and the
order for its execution. 51
The
respondents' contention that the petition is in effect an action to
annul a judgment which is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals 52 has already been answered in Matanguihan vs. Tengco 53
where, by declaring that an action for annulment of judgment is not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, this Court in effect affirmed that
certiorari is an appropriate remedy against judgments or proceedings
alleged to have been rendered or had without valid service of summons. 54
Respondent
Judge Castro begged the question when, instead of resolving on the
merits the issue of the invalidity of his default judgment and of the
proceedings leading thereto because of absence of valid service of
summons on the defendant, which had been expressly raised in the
defendant's motion for reconsideration, he simply refused to do so on
the excuse that he had lost jurisdiction over the case. This refusal
was, in the premises, a grave abuse of judicial discretion which must be
rectified.
What has been said makes unnecessary any further
proceedings in the Court below, which might otherwise be indicated by
the consideration that two of the postulates of petitioner's unresolved
motions which the Court considers equally as decisive as res judicata,
to wit: estoppel by silence and Article 1819, last paragraph, of the
Civil Code, do not constitute grounds for a motion to dismiss under rule
16, of the Rules of Court. Such a step would only cause further delay.
And delay has been the bane of petitioner's cause, defying through all
these years all its efforts to collect on a just debt.
The undenied and undisputable facts make it perfectly
clear that the claim to the mortgaged property belatedly and in
apparent bad faith pressed by the respondent partnership is foreclosed
by both law and equity. Further proceedings will not make this any
clearer than it already is. The Court is clothed with ample authority,
in such a case, to call a halt to all further proceedings and pronounce
judgment on the basis of what is already manifestly of record.
So much for the merits; the consequences that should
attend the inexcusable and indefensible conduct of the respondents Lims,
the respondent partnership and their counsel, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas,
should now be addressed. That the Lims and their partnership acted in
bad faith and with intent to defraud is manifest in the record of their
actuations, presenting as they did, piecemeal and in one case after
another, defenses to the foreclosure or claims in derogation thereof
that were available to them from the very beginning — actuations that
were to stave off the liquidation of an undenied debt for more than
twenty years and culminated in the clandestine filing and prosecution of
the action subject of the present petition.
What has
happened here, it bears repeating, is nothing less than an abuse of
process, a trifling with the courts and with the rights of access
thereto, for which Atty. Canlas must share responsibility equally with
his clients. The latter could not have succeeded so well in obstructing
the course of justice without his aid and advice and his tireless
espousal of their claims and pretensions made in the various cases
chronicled here. That the cause to which he lent his advocacy was less
than just or worthy could not have escaped him, if not at the start of
his engagement, in the years that followed when with his willing
assistance, if not instigation, it was shuttled from one forum to
another after each setback. This Court merely stated what is obvious and
cannot be gainsaid when, in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 55 it
held that a party's lawyer of record has control of the proceedings and
that '(w)hatever steps his client takes should be within his knowledge
and responsibility."
In Prudential Bank vs. Castro, 56
strikingly similar actuations in a case, which are described in the
following paragraph taken from this Court's decision therein:
Respondents'
foregoing actuations reveal an 'unholy alliance' between them and a
clear indication of partiality for the party represented by the other to
the detriment of the objective dispensation of justice. Writs of
Attachment and Execution were issued and implemented with lightning
speed; the case itself was railroaded to a swift conclusion through a
similar judgment; astronomical sums were awarded as damages and
attorney's fees; and topping it all, the right to appeal was foreclosed
by clever maneuvers," and which, the Court found, followed a pattern of
conduct in other cases of which judicial notice was taken, were deemed
sufficient cause for disbarment.
Atty. Canlas even tried to mislead this Court by claiming that he became the Lims' lawyer only in 1977, 57 when
the record indubitably shows that he has represented them since
September 9, 1972 when he first appeared for them to prosecute their
appeal in Civil Case No. 75180. 58 He
has also quite impenitently disclaimed a duty to inform opposing
counsel in Civil Case No. Q-39294 of the existence of Civil Case No.
Q-36485, as plaintiffs' counsel in both actions, even while the former,
which involved the same mortgage, was already being litigated when the
latter was filed, although in the circumstances such disclosure was
required by the ethics of his profession, if not indeed by his lawyer's
oath.
A clear
case also exists for awarding at least nominal damages to petitioner,
though damages are not expressly prayed for, under the general prayer of
the petition for "such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under
the premises," and the action being not only of certiorari and
prohibition, but also of mandamus-in which the payment of "damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant' is expressly authorized. 59
There
is no question in the Court's mind that such interests as may have
accumulated on the mortgage loan will not offset the prejudice visited
upon the petitioner by the excruciatingly long delay in the satisfaction
of said debt that the private respondents have engineered and fomented.
These very same considerations dictate the imposition of exemplary damages in accordance with Art. 2229 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, so that complete justice may be dispensed
here and, as far as consistent with that end, all the matters and
incidents with which these proceedings are concerned may be brought to a
swift conclusion:
(1) the assailed judgment by default in Civil Case
No.Q-36485, the writ of execution and all other orders issued in
implementation thereof, and all proceedings in the case leading to said
judgment after the filing of the complaint are DECLARED null and void
and are hereby SET ASIDE; and the complaint in said case is DISMISSED
for being barred by prior judgment and estoppel, and for lack of merit;
(2) the City Sheriff of Manila is ORDERED, upon
receipt of this Decision, to schedule forthwith and thereafter conduct
with all due dispatch the sale at public auction of the mortgaged
property in question for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt of the
respondents Lims to petitioner, in the principal amount of P2,460,000.00
as found in the amended decision in Civil Case No. 75180 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, interests thereon at the rate of twelve
(12%) percent per annum from November 8, 1967 until the date of sale,
plus such other and additional sums for commissions, expenses, fees,
etc. as may be lawfully chargeable in extrajudicial foreclosure and sale
proceedings;
(3) the private respondents, their successors and
assigns, are PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from taking any action whatsoever to
obstruct, delay or prevent said auction sale;
(4) the private respondents (the Lims, the
Partnership of the Heirs of Hugo Lim and Atty. Paterno R. Canlas) are
sentenced, jointly and severally, to pay the petitioner P25,000.00 as
nominal damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as treble
costs; and
(5) let this matter be referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation
insofar as the conduct of Atty. Canlas as counsel in this case and in
the other cases hereinabove referred to is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
2 Civil Cases Numbered 75180 (CFI, Manila), 112762 (CFI, Manila), 83-19018 (RTC, Manila), Q-32924 (RTC, QC), and Q- 36485 (RTC, QC).
3 CA-G.R. No. 00242-R; CA-G.R. No. 51752.
4 G.R. No. L-34683; G.R. No. L-45752; G.R. No. L-56014.
5 Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 1-13, 32, 33; Rollo G.R. No.L-45752, p. 197.
6 Later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Ombudsman.
7 Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, pp. 316-338.
8 Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752. pp. 211-214.
9 Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 683-737; Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, p. 197.
10 Record on Appeal, Civil Case No. 75180, pp. 737-740; Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, p. 197.
11 Rollo, G.R. No. L-45752, p. 198.
12 Id., pp. 105-134.
13 Id., at pp. 244 et seq.
14 Branch 9, presided over by Hon. Manuel Reyes, later Associate Justice, C.A.
15 SEE footnote 5 at p. 3, supra.
16 Rollo, G.R. No. L-56014, p. 5.
17 Referred to in the later Order of February 19,1979 in Civil Case No. 75180; Rollo, G.R. No. 56014, p. 27.
18 His Honor was made aware of Civil Case No. 112762 when the Lims filed a motion for the consolidation of that case with Civil Case No. 75180.
19 Rollo, G.R. No. 56014, p. 27 (Order, Feb. 19,1979, supra; p. 28 (order March 6,1979).
20 Id., pp. 103-106 (Order, Aug. 10, 1979); pp. 151-152 (Orders, Nov. 26, 1979 and Jan. 28, 1980)
21 Id., pp. 89-93, 94-97.
22 Second Division, per Barredo, J.
23 Rollo, G.R. No. 56014, pp. 415-423.
24 Id., pp- 424-442.
25 Id., pp- 498-500.
26 Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 65.
27 Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, pp. 66-68 (Annex E, Petition).
28 Id., p. 69.
29 Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 222.
30 Id., p. 223.
31 His comment dated June 7,1986; Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 226.
32 Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, p. 9.
33 Rollo, G.R. No. 70403, pp. 191-194.
34 Id., pp. 83-85.
35 Id., pp. 86-93.
36 Rollo, G.R. No. L-70403, pp. 221-250.
37 Id., at pp. 223, 225, 227.
38 Id., pp. 265-271.
39 Rollo, G.R. No. L-70403, pp. 171-172.
40 31 C.J.S. pp. 490-494.
41 Id., pp. 498-499.
42 28 Am. Jur. 2d pp. 727.
43 Padilla, Civil Code, 1987 ed., Vol. VI, p. 153; see also Tolentino, Civil Code, 1959 ed., Vol. V, p. 303, citing Bosler vs. Sealfon, 82 Pa. Sup. Ct., 254.
44 Sec. 3, Rule 2, Rules of Court.
45 Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court.
46 Sec. 49, Rule 39, Rules of Court, which provides that the effect of a judgment rendered by a court having jurisdiction is, in proceedings other than those in rem, "with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity."
47 SEE footnote 26 at p. 12, supra.
48 Rule 14, Rules of Court (Italics supplied).
49 70 SCRA 598, 602-603.
50 Venturanza vs. CA, 156 SCRA 305, 313.
51 I Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 ed., p. 435, citing Salmon, et al. vs. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556, Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware Co., 51 Phil. 980, and Reyes vs. Paz, 60 Phil. 440; see also Keister vs. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209, citing Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761, Gov't. vs. Bator, 69 Phil. 130, Caneda vs. CA, 116 Phil. 283, and Trimica, Inc. vs. Polaris Marketing Corp., 60 SCRA 321-325; I Francisco's Revised Rules of Court, 2nd ed., p. 761.
52 Sec. 9 (2) B.P. 129, The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
53 95 SCRA 478, 485.
54 See also the following cases where the Court took cognizance of, and resolved, similar petitions without regard to the question of whether or not an action for annulment was the appropriate recourse; Ang vs. Navarro, 81 SCRA 458; Olar vs. Cuna, 90 SCRA 114; Cavili vs. Vamenta, Jr., 114 SCRA 343; and Filmerco Commercial Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 149 SCRA 193.
55 31 SCRA 1, 23.
56 155 SCRA 604, 621.
57 Rollo, G.R. No. L-70403, p. 225.
58 SEE footnote 10 on p. 5, supra.
59 Rule 65, Sec. 3, Rules of Court.
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