jaan lacaya's digest

ALANO VS. PLANTER'S DEVELOPMENT BANK, AS SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF MAUNLAD SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC.

Facts:

            June 30, 1988, petitioner executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing his brother to sell their property in Manila.  From the proceeds of the sale, the brothers purchased on September 22, 1988 a residential house located at No. 60 Encarnacion St., BF Homes, Quezon City. The title of the Quezon City property, however, was not immediately transferred to them because the duplicate and original copies of the title were destroyed by a fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall Building.

On June 27, 1990, Agapito V. Alano, Jr. died leaving behind his wife, Lydia J. Alano (Lydia), and four legitimate children, who adjudicated to themselves the property in Quezon City.  Consequently, title to the said property was reconstituted as Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 18990 and registered solely in the names of Lydia and her four children.  his prompted petitioner to execute an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which was annotated on TCT No. 18990. But because of the assurance of his nieces that they would put things right, petitioner agreed to delay the filing of a case in court.

Meanwhile, Lydia filed with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City an Affidavit of Cancellation of Adverse Claim,  which caused the cancellation of the adverse claim annotated on TCT No. 18990.  Thereafter, by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by her children in her favor, TCT No. 18990 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. 90388, was issued solely in her name.

On April 20, 1994, petitioner filed a Complaint against Lydia, Melecio A. Javier, Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 92. Petitioner sought the cancellation of TCT No. 90388, the issuance of a new title in his name for his one-half share of the Quezon City property, and the nullification of real estate mortgage insofar as his one-half share is concerned.

Issue:

Whether defendant Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. was an innocent mortgagee in good faith

Ruling:

Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. is not a mortgagee in good faith.

The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of them. Imbued with public interest, they "are expected to be more cautious than ordinary individuals."  Thus, before approving a loan, the standard practice for banks and other financial institutions is to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered to be mortgaged and verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner or owners thereof. Failure to do so makes them mortgagees in bad faith.

In this case, petitioner contends that Maunlad Savings and Loan Association, Inc. failed to exercise due diligence in inspecting and ascertaining the status of the mortgaged property because during the ocular inspection, the credit investigator failed to ascertain the actual occupants of the subject property and to discover petitioner's apartment at the back portion of the subject property.

CLARA M. BALATBAT, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES JOSE REPUYAN AND AURORA REPUYAN, RESPONDENTS. 

Facts:

            It appears that on June 15, 1977, Aurelio A. Roque filed a complaint for partition docketed as Civil Case No. 109032 against Corazon Roque, Alberto de los Santos, Feliciano Roque, Severa Roque and Osmundo Roque before the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX. Defendants therein were declared in default and plaintiff presented evidence ex-parte. On March 29, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff Aurelio A. Roque, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"From the evidence, it has been clearly established that the lot in question covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51330 was acquired by plaintiff Aurelio Roque and Maria Mesina during their conjugal union and the house constructed thereon was likewise built during their marital union. Out of their union, plaintiff and Maria Mesina had four children, who are the defendants in this case. When Maria Mesina died on August 28, 1966, the only conjugal properties left are the house and lot above stated of which plaintiff herein, as the legal spouse, is entitled to one-half share pro-indiviso thereof. With respect to the one-half share pro-indiviso now forming the estate of Maria Mesina, plaintiff and the four children, the defendants here, are each entitled to one-fifth (1/5) share pro-indiviso. The deceased wife left no debt.

Issues:

            Whether or not the alleged sale to the private respondents was merely executor and not a consummated transaction

            Whether or not there was a double sale as contemplated under art. 1544 of the civil code

            Whether or not petitioner was a buyer in good faith and for value

Ruling:

            A contract of sale  being consensual, it is perfected by the mere consent of the parties. Delivery of the thing brought or payment of the price is not necessary for the perfection of the contract; and failure of the vendee to pay the price after the execution of the contract does not make the sale null and void for lack of consideration but results at most in default on the part of the vendee, for which the vendor may exercise his legal remedies.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code provides:

"If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

"Should it be movable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession and in the absence thereof, to the people who present the oldest title, provided there is good faith

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that in case of double sale of an immovable property, ownership shall be transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.^[34]

In the case at bar, vendor Aurelio Roque sold 6/10 portion of his share in TCT No. 135671 to private respondents Repuyan on April 1, 1980. Subsequently, the same lot was sold again by vendor Aurelio Roque (6/10) and his children (4/10), represented by the Clerk of Court pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, on February 4, 1982. Undoubtedly, this is a case of double sale contemplated under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.

Petitioner cannot be considered as a buyer in good faith. In the complaint for rescission filed by vendor Aurelio Roque on August 20, 1980, herein petitioner filed a motion for intervention on May 20, 1982 but did not file her complaint in intervention; hence, the decision was rendered adversely against her. If petitioner did investigate before buying the land on February 4, 1982, she should have known that there was a pending case and an annotation of adverse claim was made in the title of the property before the Register of Deeds and she could have discovered that the subject property was already sold to the private respondents. It is incumbent upon the vendee of the property to ask for the delivery of the owner’s duplicate copy of the title from the vendor. A purchaser of a valued piece of property cannot just close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith and under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor. Good faith or the want of it is not a visible, tangible fact that can be seen or touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens or signs