If a person gets married while the petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage is ongoing, can he be charged with bigamy?

If a person gets married while the petition for declaration of nullity of his first marriage is ongoing, can he be charged with bigamy?

Related issues:

[1] What if the first marriage is declared null and void? Will this make the second marriage valid?

[2] What if the second marriage was declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity? Will this be a defense against a charge of bigamy?

What is bigamy?

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states that bigamy is committed when “a person contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. The penalty for bigamy is prision mayor (minimum of six years and one day to a maximum of twelve years). Bigamy is a public crime which means that anyone who knows of the bigamous marriage can file the criminal complaint.

People in a void marriage cannot take the law into their own hands and by themselves declare that their marriage is void

Please take note that under Article 40 of the Family Code, people in a void marriage cannot take the law into their own hands and by themselves declare that their marriage is void. Article 40 states that “the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void”. Simply stated, if the marriage is void, either or both spouses must file a petition asking the court to declare the marriage void.

If the court declares the marriage null and void, can there be a subsequent marriage immediately?

Some people got married immediately after they received the copy of the court’s decision granting the petition for declaration of nullity of their first marriage. This is wrong. At what point in time can a subsequent marriage take place? Please take note of Sections 21 to 23 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Only when these sections have been complied with can a subsequent marriage take place.

Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes. - Upon entry of the judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

Sec. 22. Issuance of Decree of Declaration of Absolute Nullity or Annulment of Marriage.-

(a) The court shall issue the Decree after:

(1) Registration of the entry of judgment granting the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage in the Civil Registry where the marriage was celebrated and in the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is located;

(2) Registration of the approved partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, in the proper Register of Deeds where the real properties are located; and

(3) The delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes in cash, property, or sound securities.

(b) The court shall quote in the Decree the dispositive portion of the judgment entered and attach to the Decree the approved deed of partition.

Except in the case of children under Articles 36 and 53 of the Family Code, the court shall order the Local Civil Registrar to issue an amended birth certificate indicating the new civil status of the children affected.

Sec. 23. Registration and publication of the decree; decree as best evidence. –

(a) The prevailing party shall cause the registration of the Decree in the Civil Registry where the marriage was registered, the Civil Registry of the place where the Family Court is situated, and in the National Census and Statistics Office. He shall report to the court compliance with this requirement within thirty days from receipt of the copy of the Decree.

(b) In case service of summons was made by publication, the parties shall cause the publication of the Decree once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(c) The registered Decree shall be the best evidence to prove the declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage and shall serve as notice to third persons concerning the properties of petitioner and respondent as well as the properties or presumptive legitimes delivered to their common children.

The Supreme Court ruled in Mercado vs. Tan, Tenebro vs. CA, and in Abunado vs. People, respectively, that:

[1] The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

[2] A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”

[3] The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Mercado vs. Tan (G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000)

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Tenebro vs. CA, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004

We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.

On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.

The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.

This argument is not impressed with merit. Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.

As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.

Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage.

In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities.Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.

Abunado vs. People, G.R. No. 159218, March 30, 2004

Petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioner’s assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.