1) Mr. X is an owner of a land fronting the Sulu Sea. By the action of the waves of the sea, sand and silt were deposited, increasing his land area to about 2,000 square meters. Mr. X then planted coconut trees on said land, and applied for registration of said land before the DENR. Questions: (1) What law shall govern this accretion caused by the action of the sea? (2) Per jurisprudence, what kind of “owner” is Mr. X with respect to the alluvial deposit? (3) Shall you consider X as the owner ipso facto of the accretion? (4) In essence, who owns the accretion? (5) Is there a possibility for X to own the accretion? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. The Spanish Law Of Waters of 1866 shall govern the accretion caused by the actions of the sea.
2. Per jurisprudence, Mr. X is considered as a littoral owner .
3. X cannot be considered as ipso facto owner of the accretion.
4. The accretion in this case is owned by the state because land added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain.
5. Yes, there could be a possibility for X to own the accretion. When the accretion are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for establishment of special industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
2) Mr. Y owns a land bounded by Laguna de Bay. By the gradual action of the waves, his land area increased to three hectares. He planted some fruit trees therein, and built a house for his son. His occupation or possession has already lasted for more than thirty years.
Questions: (1) Is Y considered the owner of the accretion? (2) What law shall govern regarding this matter? (3) Can he own the land by prescription? (4) If Y’s registered land was bounded by the Manila Bay, will your answer be the same? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. Yes, Y is considered the owner of the accretion.
2. This matter shall be governed by Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which states that: Laguna de Bay is a lake, the accretion on which belongs to the owner of the land contiguous thereto.
3. Yes, he can own the land by prescription.
4. If Y’s registered land is bounded by the Manila Bay, it is considered as a foreshore and therefore the accretion forms part of the patrimonial property of the State.
3) (a) Is accretion a mode of acquiring property? (b) What are the requisites of accretion? (c) Distinguish accretion from alluvium (d) Can an alluvium be automatically registered in the name of the riparian owner?
ANSWERS:
a. Yes, accretion is a mode of acquiring ownership.
b. The following are requisites of accretion as a mode of acquiring ownership:
1. the accumulation of soil and sediment must be gradual and imperceptible,
2. that it be the result of the actions of waters of the river, and
3. that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
ANSWERS:
1. The land is considered as a public land since the accretion because it was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust. The accretion was man-made or artificial, not a result of the actions of the waters of the river.
2. Since the land is a public land, it cannot be registered on Mr. B’s name.
5. What is a foreshore land? Is it capable of private ownership or registration?
ANSWER: A foreshore land is that which can be reached by the waves of the sea. It is also known as a seashore. A foreshore is not capable of private ownership or registration because it is a public domain.
6. By reason of the typhoon which caused the overflowing of the Cagayan River, a portion of the land of Jose Santos was separated from his estate. The river changed course and divided his land into two parts. The other part seemingly formed part of the estate of Mrs. Luisa Cruz, at the other side of the bank.
Question: Who owns the other half of the land which was created by the current of the river? Explain.
ANSWER: The other half of the land is still owned by Jose Santos. Under Article 459 of
the New Civil Code, it states: Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it.
7. It is a legal principle that accretions belong to the riparian owners upon whose land the alluvial deposits were made. What is the reason for this principle?
ANSWER: The rationale of this principle is to provide some kind of compensation to the owners of the land continually exposed to the destructive force of water and subjected to various easements.
8. Mr. X is an agent of Real Estate Development Corporation. Jose Tayag bought Lot 9 with an area of 800 sq.m.. He was accompanied by Mr. X who, with his engineer, pointed to Mr. Tayag, the location of Lot 9 who then built his house (worth 800t) on said lot. He resided on said lot for more than 10 years already.
Mr. D also bought Lot 10 which has an area of 600 sq. m.
When another relocation survey was made, it turned out that Lot 10 is actually the lot occupied by Mr. Tayag.
Mr. D now demands, upon discovery of the error, that Mr. Tayag should vacate and remove his house thereon.
Questions: (a) Is Mr. Tayag a builder in good faith? (b) If you were the judge, how would you settle the rights of the parties?
ANSWERS:
a. Yes, Mr. Tayag is a builder in good faith because he merely relied on the expertise of the land surveyor who was more equipped or experienced in the field of land surveying.
b. Since Mr. Tayag is a builder in good faith and Mr. D is the owner of the land. Mr. D can choose between appropriating the building by paying Mr. Tayag the proper indemnity or obliging him pay the price of the land, unless its value is more than 800,000, in which case, Mr. Tayag shall pay the reasonable rent. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof.
9. A, B and C are co-owners of a lot which has an area of 6,000 square meters. A used to work in America and comes back to his hometown to build a house on a lot co-owned with B and C. They executed a Deed of Partition giving each an equal share of 2,000 square meters. A and B became adjacent owners. After the survey, it was found out that the kitchen of B encroached upon the share of A, to an extent of 65 square meters.
A wants B to remove the encroaching kitchen as it will destroy the view of his new house.
Questions: (1) Is B considered a builder in good faith? (2) Before partition what law shall be applied? (3) After partition, what law shall be applied in that particular situation? (4) State the rights of A and B.
ANSWERS:
1. Yes, B is considered a builder in good faith because he is a co-owner of the property where the house was built.
2. Before partition, the law on co-ownership shall govern.
3. After partition, the law on accession particularly Article 448 of the New Civil Code shall apply..
4. A as the owner of the land has the option to acquire the kitchen of B after payment of proper indemnity, or to oblige B to pay him for the land or to pay the proper rent. It is the land owner ( A ) who is authorized to exercise the option, because by principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing. The rights of B under Article 448, NCC is that, instead of being outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the landowner to make a choice between two options: (1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity required by law: or (2) to sell the land to the builder. A cannot refuse to exercise either option and compel B instead to remove the kitchen from the land.
10. Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road, Quezon City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid.
Pecson challenged the validity of the auction sale before the RTC of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-41470. In its Decision, dated February 8, 1989, the RTC upheld the spouses’ title but declared that the four-door two-storey apartment building was not included in the auction sale. This was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals and thereafter by this Court, in its Decision dated May 25, 1993, in G.R. No. 105360 entitled Pecson v. Court of Appeals.On June 23, 1993, by virtue of the Entry of Judgment of the aforesaid decision in G.R. No. 105360, the Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter commercial lot.
As a result, the Nuguid spouses moved for delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment building.
Questions: (1) Do the Nuguid spouses have such right? (2) Can the Nuguid spouses demand that the rentals of the apartment be now given to them? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. Yes, the Nuguid spouses have the right to demand delivery of the possession of the lot and the apartment building on the condition that they should reimburse Pedro Pecson the value of the two-storey building.
2. No, the Nuguid spouses cannot demand the rentals until the full payment of the value of the building because the builder in good faith has the right of retention until full reimbursement is made.
11. Depra and Dumlao are neighbors. Dumlao who has lots of money after winning the Lotto, built big mansion worth 20 million complete with a swimming pool and a garage. Depra also won the lotto and would like to build his 30 million mansion. He caused a relocation survey of his land. It was discovered that the garage of Dumlao encroached upon Depra’s property to an extent of 100 sq.m.Written demands were made for Dumlao to remove his garage, yet Dumlao did not take heed. Hence, a case for unlawful detainer was filed, inter alia praying that Dumlao should remove his encroachment.
Question: If you were the judge handling the case, what shall you determine to fully adjudicate the rights of the parties?
ANSWER: If I were the judge in this case, I will dismiss it because unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy. The proper remedy is an action for Quieting of Title. Article 448 of the New Civil Code shall be applied in adjudicating the rights of the parties in this case. Pursuant to the provision of Article 448, NCC, Depra has the option either to pay the encroaching part of Dumlao’s garage or to sell the encroached 100 sq.m. lot to Dumlao. He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the garage and refuse also to sell the lot. Dumlao cannot be ordered to remove the building unless Depra has chosen to sell the lot and Dumlao failed to pay.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot as respondents here did refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land. the other party fails to pay for the same.
To fully adjudicate the rights of the parties the following shall be determined:
a) the present fair price of DEPRA's 34 square meter area of land;
b) the amount of the expenses spent by DUMLAO for the building of the garage;
c) the increase in value ("plus value") which the said area of 100 square meters may have acquired by reason thereof, and
d) whether the value of said area of land is considerably more than that of the garage built thereon.
12. What is a “forced lease”? Of what relevance is this under Art. 448 of the civil code? How is the fairness of Art. 448 explained by Manresa?
ANSWER:
A “ forced lease” is a mandatory lease. It is a lease contract between parties created by operation of law where one is required to pay rent for a certain property owned by another.
Under article 448, if the value of the land is more than the value of the building, the builder in good faith cannot be forced by the owner to buy the land. The remedy is a forced lease.
The rationale of Article 448, NCC is that where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
13. Teofilo C. Villarico, is the owner of a lot in La Huerta, Parañaque City, Metro Manila with an area of sixty-six (66) square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T.) No. 95453 issued by the Registry of Deeds, same city.
His lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her husband Beth Del Mundo, had a building constructed on a portion of said government land. In November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by Andok’s Litson Corporation and Marites’ Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents. Eventually, the Sarmiento’s have caused the registration of said land in their names.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30 square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.
Because of the buildings constructed thereon, Teofilo’s right of way was blocked. It his only access toward the Highway. He now demands that the right of way be maintained.
Question: (1) Is Teofilo correct on this matter? (2) On the part of the Sarmiento’s will you consider them as owners of the land by reason of their registration titles? (3) Granting that the Sarmiento’s had already resided on said land for 40 years, can they be considered as owners thereto? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. Teofilo is not correct in demanding that the right of way be maintained.
2. No. The Sarmiento’s cannot be considered as owners of the land by reason of their registration titles because the land was for public use.
3. Even if the Sarmiento’s had already resided on the said land for 40 years, they cannot be considered as its owners because properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by private individuals by prescription.
14. Morandarte filed an application for free patent, dated December 5, 1972, before the Bureau of Lands, Dipolog City District Land Office (BOL for brevity), covering a parcel of land located at Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City with an area of 4.5499 hectares and described as a portion of Lot 1038 of Dipolog Cadastre No. 85.
On July 27, 1976, the District Land Officer of the BOL approved the free patent application of Morandarte and directed the issuance of a free patent in his favor. Accordingly, Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 for Lot No. 7, Csd-09-05-00078-D was issued in the name of Morandarte. On September 20, 1976, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte issued the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. (P-21972) 5954.
Subsequently, Morandarte caused a subdivision survey of the lot, dividing the same into Lot No. 6781-A, with an area of 13,939 square meters, and Lot No. 6781-B, with an area of 32,819 square meters. As a result of the subdivision survey, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-1835 and T-1836 covering Lots 6781-A and 6781-B, respectively, were issued in favor of Morandarte on May 12, 1980 by the Registry of Deeds of Dipolog City.
On May 22, 1981, Morandarte and his wife, Marina Febrera, executed a real estate mortgage over Lot 6781-B, subject of TCT No. 1836, in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Dipolog City branch (DBP for brevity), in consideration of a loan in the amount of P52,160.00.
More than ten years after the issuance of the OCT in Morandarte’s name, or on March 19, 1987, respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic for brevity), represented by the Director of Lands, filed before the RTC a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Reversion against the Morandarte spouses, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City, and DBP, docketed as Civil Case No. 3890.
The Republic alleged that the BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the Miputak River which cannot be validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of the BOL to dispose of. It claimed that the Morandarte spouses deliberately and intentionally concealed such fact in the application to ensure approval thereof. Considering that the Morandarte spouses are guilty of fraud and misrepresentation in the procurement of their title, the Republic stressed that their title is void.
Questions: (1) Is Morandarte here guilty of fraud? (2) If he is guilty of fraud, does the State have the right to have the whole lot reverted as part of public domain? (3) Can Morandarte say that his title cannot be anymore cancelled it being that after ten years the same has become indefeasible? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. No, Morandarte is not guilty of fraud. Fraud and misrepresentation are never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence;33 mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. No fraud and misrepresentation attended. The original survey plan submitted by Morandarte to the BOL reflected the true state of the Miputak River. This error could have been discovered through a thorough ocular inspection of the property claimed under the free patent application.
2. A different rule would apply if fraud is convincingly shown. It will invalidate the entire title of the Morandarte spouses. If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a public domain, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title alone, become the owner of the land or property illegally included. Otherwise stated, property of the public domain is incapable of registration and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title.
3. No. Morandarte cannot say that the title cannot anymore be cancelled it being that after 10 years the same has become indefeasible. It is a settled rule that unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person, that piece of land remains part of the public domain. Hence, Antonio A. Morandarte's occupation thereof, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
15. Miss Y worked in the U.S. for 20 years. She is very generous to her relatives in Davao City. She bought a city property worth 5 million with an area of 6,000 sq. m., and accommodated her cousin Mr. X to build his house thereon.
Mr. X built a house worth 300t. Before the house was built, Miss Y, had them agree in writing that any relative can use the land for free, build whatever structure they can afford and that they must maintain a good relationship, otherwise, they shall all be evicted from the land.
When Miss Y retired, she returned to the Philippines and lived in the house of Mr. X. Soon, disagreements arose, to an extent that their relationship turned sour and irreconciliable.
Miss Y then demanded that Mr. X vacate her land. Mr. X refused and will vacate only if he is reimbursed the present market value of his house which had already been assessed at 500t.
Questions: (1) In essence, what law governs their relationship? (2) Will you consider Mr. X as a builder in good faith? (3) Is Miss Y correct in evicting Mr. X from her land? (4) Is Mr. X correct in demanding that he will not vacate unless he is reimbursed the value of his house? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. The Law on Usufruct particularly Article 579 of the NCC shall govern the relationship Miss Y and Mr. X.
“ Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (487) “
2. Mr. X cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he knew that has no title of ownership over the land where he built the house.
3. Yes, Miss Y is correct in evicting Mr. X because he violated the conditions of the usufruct.
4. No, Mr. X cannot demand for reimbursement of the value of the house because he is not a builder in good faith. Pursuant to Article 579 of the New Civil Code. The usufructuary shall have no right to be indemnified on the improvements on the property held in usufruct. He may however remove such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property.
16. Can a usufruct of a certain real property be constituted by the government in favor of a corporation? If in the affirmative, for how many years will it last? How can it be extinguished?
ANSWER:
Yes, a real property can be constituted by the government in favor of a corporation. Under Article 605 of the Civil Code, a usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation or association for more than fifty ( 50 ) years. The usufruct granted to a corporation shall be extinguished upon its dissolution.
17. It is a legal principle that a usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. In other words, what are also the duties/ or obligations of the usufructuary?
ANSWER: The duties/ or obligations of the usufructuary are enumerated under Article 583 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
The usufructuary, before entering upon the enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
(1) To make, after notice to the owner or his legitimate representative, an inventory of all the property, which shall contain an appraisal of the movables and a description of the condition of the immovables;
(2) To give security, binding himself to fulfill the obligations imposed upon him in accordance with this Chapter.
18. Tuatis bougth a 300 square meter land from Tuatis for P10,000 on installment basis. She paid only P4,000. The condition of the sale is that she will pay a down payment of P3,000 and the balance shall be paid on monthly installment until the whole consideration is paid.
Meanwhile, Tuatis built a P500,000 worth of house on said strip.
As Tuatis did not pay the whole amount, Visminda the owner of the lot, demanded that Tuatis should vacate the land, and remove her concrete house thereon.
Tuatis on the other hand, demanded that she will pay the balance price of P6,000 but Visminda refused to receive the amount, as another buyer is willing to buy the land at P300,000.
Accordingly, Vizminda has two options. What are these two options under the law? Discuss each option.
ANSWER:
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Deed of Sale by Installment and Article 448 of the Civil Code, Visminda has the following options:
Under the first option, Visminda may appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after indemnifying Tuatis for the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said building, as provided in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present or current fair value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment , shall no longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory, and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Still under the second option, if the present or current value of the land, the subject property herein, turns out to be considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged to pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise, the court will fix the terms.
19. Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired Lot No. 997-D-1 situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (T-19393)-2325, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986, petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale.
On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners.
Questions: (1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent valid?
ANSWERS:
1. The subject lot is not an exclusive property of Florentino but considered as a conjugal property of the spouses because the lot was acquired during their marriage.
All property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or wife.
2. Since the lot is a conjugal property, the sale by Florentino without Elisera’s consent is not valid. Under Article 166 of the New Civil Code. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent, unless the wife has been declared a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction, or is confined in a leprosarium.
However, the sale was not void ab initio, it is merely voidable.
20. In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part of Lot No. 666, (plan II-5121 Amd.2) situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac. Upon the latter’s death, the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely, Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered. Esteban, however, was unable to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son, Clemente. Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own name, and did not include his father’s brother and sister, nor his cousins. Despite having registered the lot in his name, Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to the time of his death.
Questions: (1) Is the registration of the lot in Clemente’s name make him the sole owner of the property? (2) Clemente posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of title issued in his favor, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance, hence, it can no longer be challenged.Is he correct? (3) He further asserts that the ownership claimed by his cousins is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. Is he correct ?
ANSWERS:
1. No, the registration of the lot under Clemente’s name did not make him the sole owner of the property. He has no right of ownership over the entire property.
2. Clemente is not correct in claiming that the certificate of title in his favor has became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance under Sec 32 of PD 1529 ( the Property Registration Decree ).
3. Clemente is not correct in asserting that the ownership claimed by his cousins is barred by prescription and laches. If the plaintiffs are in possession of the property, the action to quiet title does not prescribe because the owner is given the continuing aid by the court to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on their title. They can wait until their possession is disturbed and attacked before taking steps to vindicate their right. Possession is a continuing right as is the right to defend such possession.
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