res judicata

Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit.⁵

The elements of res judicata are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there must be, between the first and the second action, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.⁶

For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites must exist.

Since, the decision rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D (declaring the Juntos liable for the damage sustained by petitioners) had become final, there existed a final and executory judgment in favor of petitioners rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. But this was only insofar as Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was concerned.

Civil Case No. 6754 was an entirely different story. The Court agrees with both the trial court (in Civil Case No. 6754) and the appellate court that there was neither identity of parties nor identity of subject matter, much less identity of cause of action between Civil Case No. 97-02055-D and Civil Case No. 6754.

There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same or there is privity between them or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.⁷

Clearly, there was, in the two cases, no identity of parties. The owner of the Shell tanker truck was never a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D. Neither was the private respondent insurance company a party therein. Since private respondent insurance company, whose cause of action was legal subrogation to the rights of the owner of the Shell tanker, was not a party in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, it was not barred from filing Civil Case No. 6754. Res judicata clearly did not apply to it.

On the issue of identity of subject matter, the subject of an action is defined as the matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which a wrong has been done.⁸

In Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, the subject matter was the collision between the Isuzu Elf van owned by the Juntos and the Petron tanker truck owned and operated by petitioner Luz Taganas. However, in Civil Case No. 6754, the subject matter was the collision between the Shell tanker truck insured by private respondent insurance company and the Isuzu Elf van of the Juntos which was rear-ended by the Petron tanker truck of petitioner.

Finally, the Rules of Court defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.⁹ Records reveal that Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was filed by the Juntos against petitioners for the damage caused by petitioners’ Petron tanker truck to the Juntos’ Isuzu Elf van. On the other hand, Civil Case No. 6754 was filed by private respondent insurance company against both petitioners and the Juntos arising from the damage suffered by the Shell tanker truck insured by it.

The Court therefore finds no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was conclusive only as between the petitioners and the Juntos, and not as to private respondent. Consequently, the principle of res judicata did not apply.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C-A G.R. SP No. 55500 is AFFIRMED.

LUZ E. TAGANAS and VALENTIN G. TABBAL, petitioners, vs.HON. MELITON G. EMUSLAN AND STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., respondents.THIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 146980             September 2, 2003

Sex denotes biological characteristics and exists along a spectrum from male to female. Gender, on the other hand, denotes social and cultural characteristics that are assigned to different sexes. Sex and gender are not always synchronous, meaning they do not always line up in an easy-to-categorize way.

"Sex" refers to physiological differences found among male, female, and various intersex bodies. Sex includes both primary sex characteristics (those related to the reproductive system) and secondary sex characteristics (those that are not directly related to the reproductive system, such as breasts and facial hair). In humans, the biological sex of a child is determined at birth based on several factors, including chromosomes, gonads, hormones, internal reproductive anatomy, and genitalia. Biological sex has traditionally been conceptualized as a binary in Western medicine, typically divided into male and female. However, anywhere from 1.0 to 1.7% of children are born intersex, having a variation in sex characteristics (including chromosomes, gonads, or genitals) that do not allow them to be distinctly identified as male or female. Due to the existence of multiple forms of intersex conditions (which are more prevalent than researchers once thought), many view sex as existing along a spectrum, rather than simply two mutually exclusive categories.

A person's sex, as determined by his or her biology, does not always correspond with their gender; therefore, the terms "sex" and "gender" are not interchangeable. "Gender" is a term that refers to social or cultural distinctions associated with being male, female, or intersex. Typically, babies born with male sex characteristics (sex) are assigned as boys (gender); babies born with female sex characteristics (sex) are assigned as girls (gender). Because our society operates in a binary system when it comes to gender (in other words, seeing gender as only having two options), many children who are born intersex are forcibly assigned as either a boy or a girl and even surgically "corrected" to fit a particular gender. Scholars generally regard gender as a social construct—meaning that it does not exist naturally, but is instead a concept that is created by cultural and societal norms.

Gender identity is a person's sense of self as a member of a particular gender. Individuals who identify with a role that corresponds to the sex assigned to them at birth (for example, they were born with male sex characteristics, were assigned as a boy, and identify today as a boy or man) are cisgender. Those who identify with a role that is different from their biological sex (for example, they were born with male sex characteristics, were assigned as a boy, but identify today as a girl, woman, or some other gender altogether) are often referred to as transgender. The term "transgender" encompasses a wide range of possible identities, including agender, genderfluid, genderqueer, two-spirit (for many indigenous people), androgynous, and many others.

Cultural Variations of Gender

Since the term "sex" refers to biological or physical distinctions, characteristics of sex will not vary significantly between different human societies. For example, persons of the female sex, in general, regardless of culture, will eventually menstruate and develop breasts that can lactate. Characteristics of gender, on the other hand, may vary greatly between different societies. For example, in American culture, it is considered feminine (or a trait of the female gender) to wear a dress or skirt. However, in many Middle Eastern, Asian, and African cultures, dresses or skirts (often referred to as sarongs, robes, or gowns) can be considered masculine. Similarly, the kilt worn by a Scottish male does not make him appear feminine in his culture.

Sexuality

"Human sexuality" refers to people's sexual interest in and attraction to others, as well as their capacity to have erotic experiences and responses. People's sexual orientation is their emotional and sexual attraction to particular sexes or genders, which often shapes their sexuality. Sexuality may be experienced and expressed in a variety of ways, including thoughts, fantasies, desires, beliefs, attitudes, values, behaviors, practices, roles, and relationships. These may manifest themselves in biological, physical, emotional, social, or spiritual aspects. The biological and physical aspects of sexuality largely concern the human reproductive functions, including the human sexual-response cycle and the basic biological drive that exists in all species. Emotional aspects of sexuality include bonds between individuals that are expressed through profound feelings or physical manifestations of love, trust, and care. Social aspects deal with the effects of human society on one's sexuality, while spirituality concerns an individual's spiritual connection with others through sexuality. Sexuality also impacts and is impacted by cultural, political, legal, philosophical, moral, ethical, and religious aspects of life.

The Standard Model of the Terms

The terms "sex" and "gender" have not always been differentiated in the English language, and it was not until the 1950s that they formally began to be distinguished. In an effort to clarify usage of the terms "sex" and "gender," U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in a 1994 briefing, "The word 'gender' has acquired the new and useful connotation of cultural or attitudinal characteristics (as opposed to physical characteristics) distinctive to the sexes. That is to say, gender is to sex as feminine is to female and masculine is to male" (J.E.B. v. Alabama, 144 S. Ct. 1436 [1994]).

The standard model of the difference between sex and gender says that one's sex is biologically determined (meaning that when a child is born, doctors classify the child as a particular sex depending on anatomy), while one's gender is socially or culturally determined (meaning that the way in which that child is raised, socialized, and taught determines whether they take on masculine or feminine traits). The standard model has been criticized for saying that humans are sexually dimorphic: this means each and every human being is either male or female, thus leaving out those who are born intersex. The standard model explains that gender is categorized into two separate, opposing sides, being either masculine or feminine, again completely excluding those who are intersex, transgender, androgynous, and so on. Modern scholars such as Anne Fausto-Sterling and Bonnie Spanier criticize the standard binaries of sex and gender, arguing that sex and gender are both fluid concepts that exist along a spectrum, rather than as binaries.

Source: Boundless. “Defining Sex, Gender, and Sexuality.” Boundless Psychology. Boundless, 15 Aug. 2016. Retrieved 19 Nov. 2016 from https://www.boundless.com/psychology/textbooks/boundless-psychology-textbook/gender-and-sexuality-15/introduction-to-gender-and-sexuality-75/defining-sex-gender-and-sexuality-294-12829/

commissioner's fee

Finally, on the issue on commissioners’ fees. We held in Lee v. Land Bank of the Philippines⁴⁷ that while the provisions of the Rules of Court apply to SAC proceedings, it is clear that, unlike in expropriation proceedings under the Rules of Court, the appointment of a commissioner or commissioners is discretionary on the part of the court or upon the instance of one of the parties. Section 58 of R.A. No. 6657 provides:

SEC. 58. Appointment of Commissioners. — The Special Agrarian Courts, upon their own initiative or at the instance of any of the parties, may appoint one or more commissioners to examine, investigate and ascertain facts relevant to the dispute, including the valuation of properties, and to file a written report thereof with the court.

Here, both parties did not object to the appointment of commissioners. Our ruling in Apo Fruits⁴⁸ is instructive:

The relevant law is found in Rule 67, Section 12 of the Rules of Court:

"SEC. 12. Costs, by whom paid. — The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner."

Rule 141, Section 16 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

"SEC. 16. Fees of commissioners in eminent domain proceedings. — The commissioners appointed to appraise land sought to be condemned for public uses in accordance with these rules shall each receive a compensation to be fixed by the court of NOT LESS THAN THREE HUNDRED (P300.00) PESOS per day for the time actually and necessarily employed in the performance of their duties and in making their report to the court, which fees shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings."

From the afore-quoted provision, the award made by the RTC is way beyond that allowed under Rule 141, Section 16; thus, the award is excessive and without justification. Records show that the commissioners were constituted on 26 May 2000 and they submitted their appraisal report on 21 May 2001, when the old schedule of legal fees was in effect. The amendment in Rule 141 introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which took effect on 16 August 2004, increased the commissioner’s fees from P100.00 to P300.00 per day. Assuming they devoted all the 360 days from the time they were constituted until the time they submitted the appraisal report in the performance of their duties, and applying the old rate for commissioner’s fees, they would only receive P38,000.00. Moreover, even if the new rate is applied, each commissioner would receive only P108,000.00. The rule above-quoted is very clear on the amount of commissioner’s fees. The award made by the RTC in the amount of 2½% of the total amount of just compensation, i.e., 2 1/2% of P1,383,179,000.00, which translates to P34,579,475.00, is certainly unjustified and excessive. x x x⁴⁹

Accordingly, remand of the case for the determination of the proper amount of commissioners’ fees is in order, pursuant to the aforecited provision of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. The SAC shall particularly determine the number of days which the Board actually devoted to the performance of its duties. Since the Board in this case was constituted on March 3, 2000, and it rendered its Report on July 28, 2000, or prior to the increase in the rate of commissioner's fees, the old rate of P100.00 per day shall be applied.

x x x x

In sum, we find LBP’s valuation sufficiently substantiated and in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998.⁴²

We also cannot subscribe to respondent’s postulation that interest should be imposed in this case.

It is established that in expropriation cases, interest is due the landowner if there was delay in payment. The imposition of interest is in the nature of damages for the delay in payment, which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance. It follows that the interest in the form of damages cannot be applied where there was prompt and valid payment of just compensation.⁴³ Records show that LBP fully paid respondent in the amount of P150,795.51 with dispatch, and he himself acknowledged the receipt thereof. Moreover, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation Company, Incorporated,⁴⁴ we held that the mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the SAC and the CA does not mean that LBP deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to the landowner. Having only exercised its right to appeal, LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for interest.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.ATTY. RICARDO D. GONZALEZ, Respondent.FIRST DIVISION(G.R. No. 185821 , June 13, 2013)

grant of interest in expropriation cases

The Court has allowed the grant of interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment of just compensation.⁵⁵ In fact, the interest imposed in case of delay in payments in agrarian cases is 12% per annum and not 6%⁵⁶ as "the imposition x x x is in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one of forbearance."⁵⁷

Quoting Republic v. Court of Appeals⁵⁸ this Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera,⁵⁹ held :

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case , the final compensation must include interest on its jus t value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine , between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time. ⁶⁰ (Citation omitted, emphasis in the original.)

x x x x

The Court, in Republic, recognized that "the just compensation due to the landowners for their expropriated property amounted to an effective forbearance on the part of the State."⁶¹ In fixing the interest rate at 12%, it followed the guidelines on the award of interest that we enumerated in Eastern Shipping Lines, In c. v. Court of Appeals,⁶² to wit:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" o f the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Fur t her more, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at t he discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. N o interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extra judicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the d ate the judgment o f the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages ma y be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.⁶³ (Citations omitted.)

This Court therefore deems it proper to impose a 12% legal interest per annum, computed from the date of the "taking" of the subject property on the just compensation to be determined by the SAC, due to respondent, less whatever he and his co-owners had already received. 

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.EMILIANO R. SANTIAGO, JR., Respondent.G.R. No. 182209    (FIRST DIVISION   October 3, 2012)