Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the “intrinsic worth and dignity” of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.

It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor.[18]

What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?

Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period.

x x x x

The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of imprisonment.  In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year,  the petitioner shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.”

FIRST DIVISION, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013, GEORGE BONGALON, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.



The express irrevocability of the same (“hindi na mababawi”) is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donationinter vivos.

Significant to the resolution of this issue is the irrevocable character of the donation in the case at bar. In Cuevas v. Cuevas,^[12] we ruled that when the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives. It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor continues to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is alive. In the Bonsato case, we held that:

(W)hat is most significant [in determining the type of donation] is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be “irrevocable”, a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art.737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).^[13]

Construing together the provisions  of the deed of donation, we find and so hold that in the case at bar the donation is inter vivos. The express irrevocability of the same (“hindi na mababawi”) is the distinctive standard that identifies that document as a donationinter vivos. 

 

 

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 106755, February 01, 2002 ]

APOLINARIA AUSTRIA-MAGAT, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENTINO LUMUBOS, DOMINGO COMIA, TEODORA CARAMPOT, ERNESTO APOLO, SEGUNDA SUMPELO, MAMERTO SUMPELO AND RICARDO SUMPELO, RESPONDENTS.

A VALID DONATION ONCE ACCEPTED BECOMES IRREVOCABLE

A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude.<sup>[19]

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Art. 765 The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases: (1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority. (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority; (3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.

^[22] Article 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 111904, October 05, 2000 ]

SPS. AGRIPINO GESTOPA AND ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND MERCEDES DANLAG Y PILAPIL, RESPONDENTS.

gauge to determine whether donation is mortis causa or inter vivos

It has been held that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.^[10] In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals,^[11] this Court enumerated the characteristics of a donation mortis causa, to wit:

(1)	It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2)	That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed;
(3)	That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

onerous donation:the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.

From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3) onerous. A simple donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A remuneratory donation is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated (Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 11 ed., vol. 11, p. 726).
It is the finding of the trial court, which is not disputed by the parties, that the donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five years from execution of the deed of donation.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts, as held in the cases of Carlos v. Ramil, L-6736, September 5, 1911, 20 Phil. 183, Manalo vs. de Mesa, L-9449, February 12, 1915, 29 Phil. 495. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription applies. (Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra.). The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides: 

"Article 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed."

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our opinion that said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Under Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, the parties to a contract have the right "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." Paragraph 11 of the "Revival of Donation Intervivos, has provided that "violation of any of the conditions (herein) shall cause the automatic reversion of the donated area to the donor, his heirs, x x x, without the need of executing any other document for that purpose and without obligation on the part of the DONOR". Said stipulation not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding upon the foundation who voluntarily consented thereto.
The validity of the stipulation in the contract providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to the donor upon non-compliance cannot be doubted. It is in the nature of an agreement granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in case of breach, without need of going to court. Upon the happening of the resolutory condition of non-compliance with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect. In the case of University of the Philippines v. de los Angeles, L-28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102-107, it was held: 

"x x x There is nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into agreement that violation of the terms of the contract would cause cancellation thereof, even without court intervention. In other words, it is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for rescission of the contract. (Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., L-11897, 31 October 1964, 12 SCRA 276)."

This was reiterated in the case of Angeles v. Calasanz, L-42283, March 18, 1985: 

"Well settled is, however, the rule that a judicial action for the rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions (Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 37 SCRA 327, 334, and cases cited therein). 
"Resort to judicial action for rescission is obviously not contemplated.... The validity of the stipulation can not be seriously disputed. It is in the nature of a facultative resolutory condition which in many cases has been upheld, by this court. (Ponce Enrile v. Court of Appeals, 29 SCRA 504)"

However, in the University of the Philippines v. Angeles case,  (supra), it was held that in cases where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, "only the final award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the resolution is proper or not". It was held, thus: 

"x x x since in every case, where the extrajudicial resolution is contested, only the final award of the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper or not. It is in this sense that judicial action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become barred by acquiescence, estoppel or prescription."

It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was proper.
The case of Parks v. Province of Tarlac, supra, relied upon by the trial court, is not applicable in the case at bar. While the donation involved therein was also onerous, there was no agreement in the donation providing for automatic rescission, thus, the need for a judicial declaration revoking said donation.
The trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint in the case at bar is barred by prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations.
As provided in the donation executed on April 9, 1971, compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract (Article 1144(1), New Civil Code), counted from April 9, 1976.

[ G.R. No. 57455, January 18, 1990 ]

EVELYN DE LUNA, ROSALINA DE LUNA, PRUDENCIO DE LUNA, JR., WILLARD DE LUNA, ANTONIO DE LUNA AND JOSELITO DE LUNA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SOFRONIO F. ABRIGO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON, BRANCH IX, AND LUZONIAN UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION, INC., RESPONDENTS.

jurisdiction of family courts (r.a. 8369)

Section 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred.

The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code";

b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter;

c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof;

d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains;

e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment;

f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines";

g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;

h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;

i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;

j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and

k) Cases of domestic violence against:

1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and

2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.

If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.

Section 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the use of ten per cent (10%) of their income derived from filing and other court fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court for research and other operating expenses including capital outlay: Provided, That this benefit shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice.

The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to effectively implement the provisions of this Sec.

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Section 17.  x x x Transitory Provisions.  In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Sec. 5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.