Problem No. 1.Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were the children's parents. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner's clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.[4]The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty[5] given under Republic Act No. 8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.[7] Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.[8] Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
Given the above facts, as judge will you grant the adoption? Explain.
ANSWER: The adoption shall not be granted. Under the law, adoption should be made JOINTLY by the husband and wife. IN this case, the husband only executed the affidavit of consent, which is not the JOINT ADOPTION contemplated by law.
2.What are the legal effects of adoption with respect to (a) parental authority (b) legitimacy (c) successional rights
ANSWER:Article V. Effects of Adoption
Sec. 16. Parental Authority. — Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
Sec. 17. Legitimacy. — The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support in keeping with the means of the family.
Sec. 18. Succession. — In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
3. Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the ground that the latter has abandoned them?
ANSWER: The general rule is that consent of the natural parent must be obtained. However, when the abandonment is clearly proved during the hearing, the consent need not be obtained.
4. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition[2] to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private respondents’ residence.
If you were the judge hearing this case, will you grant the change of first name and the surname of the adopted?
ANSWER: The use of the of the adoptive parents is a matter of legal right. But to change the cannot be done without using the proper procedure outlined in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court (Change of Name).Hence, if i were the judge, i will grant the change of surname, but not the first name, unless the procedure under Rule 103 is followed.
5. Can the adopter rescind the adoption of the adopted? How about the adopted can it file an action to have his adoption rescinded? ON what grounds?
ANSWER: There is no more provision of law which allows the rescission of adoption by the. However the adopted may file a petition to rescind the adoption on grounds of
1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having undergone counseling;
2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3) sexual assault or violence; or
4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
6. Boyet and Baby, both Filipino citizens, met in California, U.S.A. where they were working. They fell in love with each other and got married. What law shall govern their property relationship?
ANSWER: Philippine law shall govern their property relationship.
7. May mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity? Explain.
ANSWER: Yes. In view of the clear provision of the law on the matter.
8. Leouel Santos, Jr. was born of the spouses Leouel Santos, Sr., and Julia Bedia-Santos. From the time of his birth, he has under the care of his maternal grandparents. His mother left for the USA to work as a nurse, and his father alleged in a Petition for the Care, Custody and Control of the Minor that he was not aware of her whereabouts. The RTC awarded the custody of the child to his maternal grandparents. The CA affirmed it. The maternal grandparents contended that they are in a better position to take care of the child for they have amply demonstrated their love and affection for the boy since his infancy; hence, they are in the best position to promote the child’s welfare. Who should be awarded the custody of the child? Why?
ANSWER: It is the father who must have custody of the child in the absence of the mother.
9. A parcel of land was acquired by Miguel and Erlinda who got married while Miguel’s marriage with Carlina was still subsisting. The question was what law governs the acquisition of such property. Can Erlinda be considered a co-owner since there is no showing of her contribution to the acquisition of the same considering that was only 20 years old then? Why?
ANSWER: For the reason that Erlinda's marriage to Miguel is bigamous, the property bought by Miguel shall be considered as the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel. ON the given facts, Erlinda cannot be considered as a co-owner.
10. Petitioner, a Filipino, was a common-law spouse of a Chinese named Go Eng, with whom she had seven children, two of whom were erroneously registered as legitimate and Chinese citizens in their birth certificates. All the other five children had birth records correctly reflecting the fact that their parents were both single; that they were illegitimate; and that they were Filipino citizens. The Petition was published in a news paper of general circulation as required by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Notice thereof was duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar, and Go Eng. The order setting the case for hearing also directed the civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest to file their opposition and cross-examined the petitioner during the trial.
This petition sought to correct the civil status and citizenship of petitioner as appearing in her children’s birth certificates, as well as the civil status of said children. If your were the judge, how would you decide? Explain.
2
Problem No. 11. Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
x x x x
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE--The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee's legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
x x x x
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
x x x x
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE--The Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
x x x x
4.3 DEPENDENTS--Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
QUESTION: Is Continental Steel correct in denying the claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits?
ANSWER: Continental is wrong. The fetus can be considered as a dependent, hence shall entitle the death benefits due to the Hortillano's.
Problem No.12. “On October 7, 1993, the petitioners herein filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City alleging, inter alia, the following:
‘-- On May 2, 1967, during his lifetime. Louis P. Dawson offered to buy on installment from the SISKA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, per contract to sell, a parcel of land in Quezon City, consisting of 638 square meters for P27,632.00, now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-58706 (248057);
-- On June 3, 1971, Louis P. Dawson died intestate;
-- Upon his death, the petitioners assumed the rights and obligations of deceased Louis P. Dawson in the aforementioned contract to sell, paying in full the selling price of the lot from their own funds, which payment was completed in 1978;
-- With said full payment, vendor SISKA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION executed on March 16, 1978 a deed of absolute sale in favor of deceased Louis P. Dawson who had died seven (7) years earlier, instead of in favor of the petitioners who assumed and to whom [were] transferred the rights and obligations of deceased Louis P. Dawson upon the latter’s death;
-- Because of the obvious error, Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-58706 (248057) was issued in the name of deceased Louis P. Dawson instead of those of petitioners -- hence, the petition for the cancellation and correction of TCT No. RT - 58706 (248057) in the name of Louis P. Dawson and the issuance of a new title in the names of herein petitioners, to wit: Dr. Ernesto C. Dawson (1/5), Louis P. Dawson, Jr. (1/5), Benjamin C. Dawson (1/5), Josephine Dawson Soliven (1/5), Ralph D. Cudilla (1/15), Eliza C. Isip (1/15) and Larry D. Cudilla (1/15).
Question: If you were the judge would you grant the petition for the cancellation and correction of the TCT?
ANSWER: Yes, the death of Louis Dawson caused the loss of his juridical capacity. The heirs naturally are entitled to become the registered owners of the land in question.
Problem No. 13. Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children and finally, he had three illegitimate children.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The law of Texas did not provide for legitimes for illegitimate children.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Question: What law is applicable on the matter? Will you grant the shares for the illegitimate children?
ANSWER: It is basic that successional rights, amount of succession and intrinsic validity of the will shall be governed by the national law of the decedent, hence Texas law shall govern. There being no legitimes under Texas law, then the shares of the illegitimate children cannot be granted.
Problem No. 14. Is a provision in a foreigner’s wills to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law valid?
ANSWER: NOT VALID. That will be contrary to our law on the matter.
Problem No. 15. On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
Question: What is a prejudicial question? What are its elements? Is there an existence of a prejudicial question in the above-stated problem? Explain.
ANSWER: A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
There is no prejudicial question in the above-stated problem. The elements of parricide are not similar to declaration of nullity.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to pay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorney’s fees and costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995, reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
Question: Is the appellate court correct? Explain.
ANSWER: The ruling of the Court of Appeals is correct. This is the new ruling of the SC emphasizing the need to uphold the rules of procedure as a matter of practicability, efficiency and expediency.In short, there is a need to reserve an independent civil action. If not reserved, the same is considered waived.
Problem No. 17. (Ugalde v. Ysasi, GR No. 130623, Feb. 29, 20080 ) On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married before Municipal Judge Remigio Peña of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. On 1 March 1951, Rev. Msgr. Flaviano Arriola solemnized their church wedding at the San Sebastian Cathedral in Bacolod City. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They had a son named Jon de Ysasi III.
Petitioner and respondent separated sometime in April 1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before Judge Lucio M. Tanco of Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties.
On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 48 (trial court). The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3330. In particular, petitioner asked for her conjugal share in respondent’s inheritance as per the settlement of the estate of respondent’s parents, Juan Ysasi and Maria Aldecoa de Ysasi, who died on 17 November 1975 and 25 February 1979, respectively. Petitioner also prayed for a monthly support of P5,000 to be deducted from her share in the conjugal partnership; the appointment of a receiver during the pendency of the litigation; the annulment of all contracts, agreements, and documents signed and ratified by respondent with third persons without her consent; and payment of appearance and attorney’s fees.
Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, among others, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 then pending before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI). The Amicable Settlement stipulates:
2. That the petitioner shall pay the respondent the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in full satisfaction of and/or consideration for and to cover any and all money and/or property claims she has or may have against the petitioner in the future, including but not limited to pensions, allowances, alimony, support, share in the conjugal property (if any), inheritance, etc.;
3. That for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the payment of THIRTY THOUSAND pesos (P30,000.00), the receipt of which sum is hereby acknowledged and confessed by and to the entire satisfaction of the respondent, she hereby completely and absolutely transfer, convey, assign, set over, waive, remise, release and forever quitclaim, unto petitioner, his successors and administrators, any and all rights, claims and interests which the respondent has or may hereafter have against the petitioner arising, directly or indirectly, from the fact that the petitioner and respondent were married on March 1, 1951, including but not limited to any and all money and/or property claims mentioned in the paragraph immediately preceding;
4. That, except with reference to the custody of the boy, the parties herein hereby waive any and all rights to question the validity and effectivity of the provisions of this amicable settlement, as well as the right to raise these matters on appeal[.]
In its Order dated 6 June 1961, the CFI approved the Amicable Settlement.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner already obtained a divorce from him before the Supreme Court of Mexico. Petitioner then contracted a second marriage with Richard Galoway (Galoway). After Galoway’s death, petitioner contracted a third marriage with Frank Scholey. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains on the grounds of estoppel, laches, and res judicata.
In his Supplemental Affirmative Defense, respondent alleged that the marriage between him and petitioner was void because it was executed without the benefit of a marriage license.
On 22 November 1991, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, after collating the evidence, the evidence for the respondent is preponderant to prove his affirmative and special defenses that the petition does not state a sufficient cause of action. On these bases and under the doctrine of res judicata, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Without pronouncements as to costs and attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court ruled that the existence of a conjugal partnership of gains is predicated on a valid marriage. Considering that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license, the marriage was null and void, and no community of property was formed between them. The trial court further ruled that assuming that the marriage was valid, the action was barred by res judicata. The trial court noted that petitioner and respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The amicable settlement was approved by the CFI and petitioner may no longer repudiate it. Finally, the trial court ruled that there was no proof to show that during their union, petitioner and respondent acquired properties.
Question: Is the decision of the trial court correct?
Answer: The trial court is correct.
The marriage between petitioner and respondent was already judicially annulled as of 20 November 1995. The trial court had no jurisdiction to annul again in Special Proceedings No. 3330 the marriage of petitioner and respondent.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and respondent's conjugal partnership of gains.
Petitioner and respondent were married on 15 February 1951. The applicable law at the time of their marriage was Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code) which took effect on 30 August 1950.16 Pursuant to Article 119 of the Civil Code, the property regime of petitioner and respondent was conjugal partnership of gains, thus:
Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Code defines conjugal partnership of gains, as follows:
Art. 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
Under Article 175 of the Civil Code, the judicial separation of property results in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains:
Art. 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties' separation of property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. Hence, when the trial court decided Special Proceedings No. 3330, the conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved.
Petitioner alleges that the CFI had no authority to approve the Compromise Agreement because the case was for custody, and the creditors were not given notice by the parties, as also required under Article 191 of the Civil Code. Petitioner cannot repudiate the Compromise Agreement on this ground. A judgment upon a compromise agreement has all the force and effect of any other judgment, and conclusive only upon parties thereto and their privies, and not binding on third persons who are not parties to it
The Amicable Settlement had become final as between petitioner and respondent when it was approved by the CFI on 6 June 1961. The CFI's approval of the Compromise Agreement on 6 June 1961 resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between petitioner and respondent on even date.
PROBLEM NO. 18. Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by a judge at Lapu-Lapu City. The two lived together continuously and without interruption until the later part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on Nov. 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to the petitioner. Villareyes confirmed in handwritten letter that indeed Tenebro was her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. During trial, Tenebro admitted having married to Villareyes and produced two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took place. He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a seaman. The trial court found him guilty of bigamy.
Questions: (1) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
(2) What is the effect of declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity?
ANSWER: Yes, Tenebro is guilty of bigamy, it being that all elements of the offense are present. The declaration of nullity of the second marriage has no effect at all.
PROBLEM NO. 19. Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel[4] at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding[5] at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.[6] Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.
QUESTIONS: (a) Define psychological incapacity as contemplated in Art. 36
(b) What are the so called “Molina guidelines”?
(c) given the above premises, will you declare the marriage as null and void? Explain.
Psychological incapacity, which a ground for annulment of marriage (which is different from divorce), contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
Among the grounds for annulment of marriage, psychological incapacity is the more (if not the most) commonly used. It is also one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code (Article 36). The guidelines (shortened here) in the interpretation and application of Article 36 were handed down by the Supreme Court in Molina:
1. The plaintiff (the spouse who filed the petition in court) has burden of showing the nullity of the marriage. Our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family, so any doubt is resolved in favor of the existence/continuation of the marriage.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
In Antonio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006), the Supreme Court sustained the nullity of the marriage based on the psychological incapacity of the wife (respondent). As concluded by the psychiatrist, the wife’s repeated lying is abnormal and pathological, and amounts to psychological incapacity
Problem No. 20. (PERLA G. PATRICIO, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELINO G. DARIO III AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND DIVISION, RESPONDENTS. FIRST DIVISION[ G.R. NO. 170829, November 20, 2006 ])On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755) square meters, more or less.[2]
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent and Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,[3] the trial court ordered the partition of the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6; Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner.[4]
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003,[5] hence he appealed before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19, 2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home.[6]
Questions: (1) What is a family home?
(2) Who are its beneficiaries?
(3) In the given case, is the ruling of the court of appeals correct?
(4) Will you consider Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code Explain.
ANSWER:
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during one’s lifetime. It is the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family. The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by the owner thereof or by “any of its beneficiaries” must be actual. That which is “actual” is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the “beneficiaries” enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code.
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of a family home:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home; and
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term “descendants” contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent’s minor son, who is also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV’s parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.[16] Legal support has the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in amount.
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson’s legal support. On the contrary, herein petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
