Table of
Contents
CASE DIGESTS
TORTS AND
DAMAGES
Outline by Atty. Nicanor B. Jimeno & Atty.
Linda Jimeno
st
Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176) Barredo vs. Garcia and
Elcano vs. Hill 9 Cinco vs. Canonoy 10
Baksh vs. Court of Appeals 10
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals 11
Damage, Damages,
Injury 12
(As of 1
8
semester SY 2010-2011)
People vs. Ballesteros 12
Custodio vs.
Court of Appeals 12
Board of
Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw 13
Custodio vs.
Court of Appeals 13
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code 14
Garcia vs. Florido 14
Andamo vs. Court of Appeals 15
Taylor vs. Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Co. 15
Tayag vs. Alcantara 16
Quasi Delict vs. Delict 17
Barredo vs.
Garcia- Art. 2177 Discussion 17
People vs. Ligon 17
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals 18
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals 18
Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. vs. People 19
Quasi-delict vs.
Breach of Contract 20
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad
Co. 20
Fores vs. Miranda 21
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals 22
Air France vs. Carrascoso 22
PSBA vs. Court of Appeals 24
Syquia vs. Court of Appeals and Manila
Memorial Park and Cemetery, Inc. 24
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals 25
N egligence
P icart vs. Smith
26
26
U S
v. Pineda BPI v. CA 31
30
Intoxication 34
U S vs. Baggay 3 5
D egrees of Negligence 3 5
Marinduque vs.Workmen’s Compensation 35
Res Ipsa Loquitur 36
R amos vs. CA 3 7
Batiquin
vs. CA 39
D.M. Consunji vs. CA 40
Defenses
(Plaintiff’s negligence) 41
M anila
Electric Co. vs Remonquillo Bernardo vs. Legaspi 41
Bernal vs. House 42
41
D efenses
(Contributory Negligence) Genobiagon vs. Court
of Appeals 43
Rakes vs. Atlantic 43
43
A SSUMPTION OF RISK
Afialda
vs. Hisole 51
51
K ramer vs. Court of Appeals
54
A NURAN
vs. BUÑO CANLAS vs. CA 74
74
Consolidated Bank vs. Court Of Appeals 75
E NGADA vs. CA 7 6
I nterference
of Contractual Relations Gilchrist vs. Cuddy,
et al. 79
So Ping Bun vs. CA 80
G uilatco vs. City of Dagupan 8 1
L iability of Governmental Units 8 1
Worcester vs. Ocampo 81
79
J. H. Chapman vs. James M. Underwood 82
C aedo vs. Yu Khe Thai 8 3
Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC 84
R odriguez-Luna v IAC
C uadra vs. Monfort 8 6
Libi v. IAC 86
214 SCRA
16 (1990) 86
86
A madora
vs. CA Pasco vs. CFI 90
89
YLarde
vs. Aquino 90
S t.
Francis High School vs. CA PSBA vs. CA 93
Soliman
vs. Tuason 93
92
S t. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos 9 4
Vicarious liability of owners and
managers of establishments 95
Philippine Rabbit vs. Philippine American 95
Vicarious Liability of employers 96
Castilex
vs. Vasquez 96
Filamer
vs. IAC 97
N PC vs. CA 9 8
L ight
Rail Transit vs. Navidad Mckee vs. IAC 99
Valenzuela vs. CA 100
99
V icarious
liability of the State 1 01
E. Merritt vs Government Of The Philippine
Islands 101
Inocencio Rosete vs.The Auditor General 101
Mendoza vs. De Leon, et al. 102
F ontanilla vs. Maliaman
102
M adeja v. Caro 1 08
A rafiles v. Phil. Journalists 1 09
Defamation 110
MVRS vs. Islamic 110
Salta v. De Veyra 110
Physical Injuries 111
Capuno v. Pepsi Cola 111
Dulay v. CA 112
Intentional Tort
(Abuse of Right) 113
V elayo v. Shell 1 13
S audi Arabia v. CA 1 14
Globe Mackay v. CA 115
Albenson v. CA 116
A monoy v. Gutierrez
UE v. Jader 118
117
Garciano v. CA, et al. 119
Barons vs. CA 120
B PI vs. CA 1 21
Acts Contra Bonus Mora 122
Ruiz v. Secretary
of National Defense 122
Breach of promise
to marry, seduction and sexual assault 123
TANJANCO vs. SANTOS 124
Bunag vs. CA 124
C onstantino vs. Mendez 1 25
Quimiguing vs. Icao 126
Pe vs. Pe 126
Malicious Prosecution 127
Lao vs.
Associated Anglo American Tobacco 127
Que vs. IAC 128
Drilon vs CA 129
P ublic Humiliation 1 30
P atricio vs. Leviste
130
Grand Union
Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino 131
Unjust Dismissal 132
M edina vs. Castro-Bartolome 1 33
Derelection of duty 134
Amaro vs. Sumanguit 134
Violation of
human dignity and Privacy 134
C oncepcion v. CA 1 35
Concept of Damages 136
Heirs of Borlado
vs. Vda. De Bulan 136
L azatin vs. Twano 1 36
A ctual or Compensatory Damages Algarra vs. Sandejas 137
Kinds of Actual Damages 137
137
I ntegrated
Packaging Corp. vs. CA 1 37
Attorney’s fees 138
Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate
Court 138
I nterest 1 39
Crismina Garments, Inc. vs. CA 139
Mitigation of Liability 139
Cerrano vs. Tan Chuco 139
M oral Damages 1 40
Kierulf vs. CA 140
Proof and Proximate
Cause 141
M iranda-Ribaya vs. Carbonell 1 41
D el Rosario vs. CA Raagas vs. Traya 144
143
Enervida vs. Dela Torre 145
P eople vs. Bugayong 1 46
Francisco vs. GSIS 146
Expertravel &
Tours, Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals 147
Unfounded suits 148
Editha and
Glicerio Mijares vs. CA and Metro Drug, Inc. 148
J Marketing vs. Sia 150
Cometa vs. Court of Appeals 151
Triple Eight
Integrated Services, Inc vs. NLRC 152
P eople of the
Philippines vs. Pirame 1 54
Arcona vs. Court of Appeals 155
Factors in determining amount 156
Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals 156
Gregorio Fule vs.
Court of Appeals 156
Philippine
Airlines vs. Court of Appeals 158
Valenzuela vs. CA 158
Aurelio Sumaplong
vs. Court of Appeals 160
Lopez vs.
Pan-American World Airways 160
Producers Bank of
the Philippines vs. CA and Spouses Chua 162
W ho may recover? S trebel vs Figueras
163
163
ABS-CBN vs. Court of Appeals 164
National Power v. Philipp Brothers 165
N ominal Damages 1 66
Ventanilla vs. Gregorio
Centeno 166
Robes-Francisco
Realty and Development Corp. vs.CFI 166
People vs Gopio 167
Dr. Armovit, et
al. vs. CA and Northwest Airlines,
Inc. 168
Temperate Damages 169
People vs. Singh 169
People of the
Philippines vs. Edison Plazo 169
P NB vs. CA 1 70
Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176)
Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario
73
Phil. 607 (July 8, 1942)
Facts: A taxicab
figured in a head-on collision with a carretela. The carretela
overturned, causing death
to one of its passengers, a 16-year old boy. A criminal case was instituted by the parents of the
deceased against Fontanilla, the driver of the taxicab, wherein the former
reserved the right to institute a separate civil action for damages. The driver
of the taxicab was convicted. Subsequently, the parents instituted the present civil action for damages against
Barredo, the employer
of the taxicab driver. Barredo
contends that his liability rests only on the
provision of the penal code and hence,
since no civil action has been filed against Fontanilla, he too cannot
be held civilly responsible.
Issue: Can plaintiffs bring a separate civil action
against the employer of the taxicab driver making him primarily and directly
responsible under Art. 1903 of the Civil Code?
Held: YES. A Quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability. Under Article 1903 of the Civil Code, an employer
is primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
There
are two remedies available for the parents to choose:
. The first is under Article 100 of the
Penal Code wherein the employer is only subsidiarily liable for damages arising
from the crime committed by his employees. If the parents choose
this remedy, the complainant must first exhaust
the properties of the employee, before the employer’s properties could be made answerable.
. The other action is under Article 1903
of the Civil code (quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana) wherein the negligent
employer is held primarily liable, subject to the defense that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and engagement of his employees.
In
this case, the parents chose the second type of action since it is more
practical to file for damages against the employer, who is more solvent than
his employee.
NOTE: The Barredo case was decided by the Supreme Court
prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. The principle enunciated in
said case (that responsibility for fault or negligence under a quasi-delict is separate and distinct
from the negligence penalized under the Revised Penal Code) is now specifically
embodied in Art. 2177 of the New Civil Code.
Elcano vs. Hill
77
SCRA 98 (May 26, 1977)
Facts:
Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally for killing Agapito Elcano. At the time of the occurrence, Reginald
Hill is still a minor and, under laws effective at the time, also legally
married. Reginald is still living and receives subsistence from his father,
Marvin Hill. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his acts were not
criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.”
Issues: (1) Does the prior acquittal of Reginald bar the
present civil action for damages? (2) Is Atty. Marvin Hill vicariously liable?
Held:
1. No. The acquittal of Reginald
Hill in the criminal case does not extinguish his liability arising from
quasi-delict. For one, the quantum of proof required in the criminal case
differs from that required in a civil suit. To find the accused guilty in a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient.
The concept of
culpa acquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation
of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Art 2177 of the New Civil
Code provides that “Responsibility for fault or negligence is separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
However, plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.”
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is also
criminally charged, to recover damages
on both scores.
And assuming awards
made in the two cases vary, he would be entitled only to the bigger award of the two.
In other words, the
extinction of civil liability refers exclusively to the civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil liability arising from quasi- delict is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the accused is acquitted.
2. While it is true that parental
authority is terminated upon emancipation by marriage of the minor, such
emancipation is not absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living
with his father and still dependent from the latter.
ART 2180 applies
to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. The minor may be emancipated, but that does not mean that he is no longer under the
responsibility of his parents.
In
the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was
living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question.
Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a
situation which is not unusual.
However, inasmuch
as Reginald is now of age (at the time the case reached the Supreme Court), it
is a matter of equity that the liability of Atty. Hill should be declared
merely subsidiary to that of his son.
Note: In this case, there is no doubt that Reginald
killed Elcano. His acquittal is based on “lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake” and not on the non-commission of the acts alleged.
Cinco vs. Canonoy
90
SCRA 369 (May 31, 1979)
Facts: On Feb 25, 1970, Cinco filed
a complaint for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver Romeo Hilot arising
from the same accident.
At the pre-trial in the civil
case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend
the civil action
pending the final
determination of the criminal suit invoking Rule 111, Section 3(b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
“(b) After a criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, unitl final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered.”
The City Court of Mandaue ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil
action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
Held: Yes, the civil suit for damages brought by the
petitioner is based on quasi-delict predicated on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code. Thus, the civil case may proceed as a
s eparate and independent
civil action:
“Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.”
The separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict is also
clearly recognized in sec 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
Sec 2. Independent civil action. – In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action
entirely separate and d istinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding
section. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The civil
action referred to in Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising from the criminal offense
not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
Baksh vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No. 97336 (February 19, 1993)
Facts:
Private Respondent Marilou
Gonzales filed an action for damages against Gashem Baksh for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. Gonzales is 22 years old, single,
Filipina, a pretty lass of good moral character and has a reputation duly respected
in her community; Baksh, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen and is an
exchange student taking a medical course in Dagupan City.
Gonzales alleges
that before 20 August 1987, Baksh courted and proposed to marry her. She
accepted his love on the condition that they would get married after the end of
the school semester. In fact, Baksh visited Gonzalez’ parents in Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage. In August 1987, Baksh forced her to live
with him in an apartment. According to Gonzales, she was a virgin before she
began living with him. A week before the filing of the complaint, Baksh’s
attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill
her. During a confrontation in the barangay, Baksh repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore, saying further that he is
already married to someone else.
Issue: Whether or not a breach of promise to marry is an
actionable wrong, thus making Baksh liable for damages.
Held:
The existing rule is that a breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se . This notwithstanding, Article 21 of the Civil Code has
expanded the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is
limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness
or intent. In the Philippine legal system, as envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts,
with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly
broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple
and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
Where a man's
promise to marry is the proximate cause for the woman to give herself unto him
in sexual congress, and there is proof that he had, in reality, no intention of
marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme
or deceptive device
to obtain her consent to the sexual act, the award of damages pursuant
to Article 21 is
in order. The court took notice that Gonzales’ is an innocent barrio lass and
a typical Filipina, who under our customs would not have gave in to sexual
congress with Baksh much more lived-in with him, were it not for his promise to marry.
Dulay vs. Court of Appeals
243
SCRA 220 (1995) [see infra]
Facts: An altercation between Benigno Torzuela
and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang sa Alabang,” Alabang
Village, Muntinlupa, in which Torzuela,
a security guard in
the said carnival shot and killed Atty. Dulay with a .38 caliber revolver
belonging to Torzuela’s security agency. Petitioner Maria Benita Dulay, widow of the deceased
Atty. Dulay filed an action for damages against
Torzuela and SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD security agency, which were impleaded
as alternative defendants being the employer/s of Torzuela. Petitioner Dulay
alleged in her complaint that “the
incident resulting in the death of Atty. Dulay was due to the concurring
negligence of the defendants, Torzuela’s wanton and reckless discharge of the
firearm issued to him by defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD”
SUPERGUARD filed a
motion to dismiss claiming that Torzuela’s act of shooting was beyond the scope
of his duties and that the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), and therefore, the
civil liability is governed by the Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. - Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
SUPERGUARD alleged that the complaint for damages based on
negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, could not lie, since the civil
liability under Art. 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Art. 365 of the
RPC. The RTC upheld the arguments of SAFEGUARD. Thus in their appeal, the
Dulays allege that: “without stating the
facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law…x x x…Respondent
judge also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes
punishable under Art.100 &103, RPC as
distinguished
from those arising from quasi-delict.” The CA affirmed the decision of
the lower court, hence, the appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON, Article 2176 covers only acts of negligence
HELD: No. Contrary to the theory of SAFEGUARD, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched
is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also those which are voluntary and intentional. ‘fault or negligence’, under the article
covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent”.
Damage, Damages, Injury
People vs. Ballesteros
285
SCRA 438 (January 29, 1998)
Facts:
Carmelo Agliam, his half-brother
Eduardo and Ronnel Tolentino along with Vidal Agliam, his brother Jerry Agliam,
Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial Barid went to the barangay
hall to attend a dance.
The group did not stay long because
they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his companions who were giving them dagger
looks. The group had
barely left when,
within fifty meters
from the dance hall, their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. The precipitate attack upon the jeep left two people
dead (Eduardo and Jerry)
and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo
and Vidal Agliam, warrants for the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were
issued for the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder. The
trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
qualified by treachery awarding the heirs of Eduardo and Jerry:
1.
Compensatory damages in the amount of PhP50,000.00
2.
Moral damages in the amount of PhP20,0000
3.
Actual damages in the amount of 61,785.00 (Jerry)
& P35,755.00 (Eduardo)
Issue: Whether or not the trial court is correct in the
award of damages?
Held:
As to moral and to actual damages,
yes. As to compensatory damages, no. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences, which the law imposes for the breach of
some duty or the violation of some right.
Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense
for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked when the
complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical
suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were
the proximate result of the offender's wrongful act or omission.
Before
actual or compensatory damages could be granted, the party making
a claim for such must present the best evidence
available, viz.,
receipts, vouchers, and the like, as corroborated by his testimony. Here, the
claim for actual damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the
same having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and
presented to the court. Therefore, the award of actual damages is proper.
However, the
order granting compensatory damages to the heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo
Tolentino Sr. must be amended. Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of f ifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is
given to the heirs of the victims by way of indemnity,
and not as compensatory damages. As regards moral damages, the trial court
in its discretion may determine the amount of psychological pain,
damage and injury
caused to the heirs of the victims,
although inestimable. Hence,
we see no reason to disturb its findings as to this matter.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
253 SCRA 483 (February
9, 1996)
Facts: Mabasa bought a parcel of land with an apartment
in Interior P. Burgos St., Taguig, Metro Manila. There were tenants
occupying the apartment
at the time of purchase.
Taking P. Burgos St. as the
point of reference, on the left side going to Mabasa’s apartment, the row of
houses are as follows: That of Custodio, then of Santos, then that of Mabasa.
On the right side is that of Morato and a septic tank. The first passageway
from the apartment to P. Burgos St. is through these houses. The second
passageway goes through the septic tank, with a width of less than 1 meter.
Sometime later, one
of the apartment’s tenants vacated it. Mabasa checked the premises and saw that
the Santoses built an adobe fence, making the first passageway narrower. Morato
also built an adobe fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. Then the remaining tenants vacated the area. Santos claimed that she
built the fence because of an incident involving
her daughter and a passing
bicycle. She also mentioned that some drunk tenants would bang their doors and windows. The RTC granted
a right of way and damages
in
favor of Custodio and the Santoses. The CA modified it, ordering an award of
damages to Mabasa. Custodio questioned the right of way and award of damages in
the SC.
Issue: Whether or Not the award of damages is proper.
Held: Firstly,
the Custodios are barred from questioning the grant of the right of way,
because they failed to appeal the decision. The decision has become final. As
to the award of damages, the CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private
respondents Mabasa. The mere fact that Mabasa suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there
must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by Custodio, and
damage resulting to Mabasa. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong does
not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy
allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong. In the case at bar, there were no p revious easements existing in favor of
Mabasa. The construction of the adobe fence is a natural use and enjoyment
of one’s property in a general and ordinary manner. Nobody can complain of being injured
here, because the inconvenience arising
from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life.
Board of Liquidators vs. Heirs of Kalaw
20
SCRA 987 (1967)
Facts:
Maximo Kalaw was a general manager
and chairman of the board of NACOCO (National Coconut Corp.) Defendant Juan
Bocar and Garcia were members of Board. After the passage of a law that
empowers NACOCO to buy, sell, barter, export their products, NACOCO embarked on
Copra trading Activities. Kalaw executed contracts. However, due to the
typhoons, the copra industry was affected, resulting to impending financial
losses on the contracts executed by Kalaw. A meeting was held with the board of
directors and the disclosure of the impending loss was communicated to the
members but no action was taken thereafter.
Some of the buyer
like Louis Dreyful and Co. filed a suit against the Corporation for damages due
to undelivered copra. Settlement was made with the buyer. NACOCO on the other
hand seeks recovery from Kalaw and the other directors charging them with
negligence under Art 2176 with bad faith or breach of trust for having approved
the contracts.
Issue: Whether or not Kalaw is liable for damages.
Held: Kalaw had authority
to execute the contracts without
need of prior approval due to the nature of his position
as general manager.
Also, doubts were only thrown when the contracts
turned out to be unprofitable for NACOCO.
Rightfully had it
been said that bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong; it means breach of a known duty thru some motive
or interest or ill will; it partakes
of the nature of fraud. Applying this precept to the given facts herein,
we find that there was no
"dishonest purpose," or "some moral obliquity," or "conscious doing of wrong," or "breach of a known duty," or "Some motive
or interest or ill will" that "partakes of the nature
of fraud."
Nor was it even intimated
that the NACOCO
directors acted for personal reasons,
or to serve their own private interests, or to pocket
money at the expense of the corporation. As the trial court correctly observed, this is a case of damnum absque injuria. Conjunction of damage and wrong is absent.
There cannot be an actionable wrong if either one or the other is wanting.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals
253
SCRA 483 (February 9, 1996)
Held: The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered
losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages.
To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages
are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a
plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the
defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award
of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach
of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded;
it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability
merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents
occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage
or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor.
In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person
alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in
order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must
be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person
sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property,
without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law
does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
In the case at bar, although
there was damage,
there was no legal injury.
Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle
of abuse of right. In order that the principle
of abuse of right provided
in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential
that the following
requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There
was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
Garcia vs. Florido
G.R.No.
L-35095 (August 31,1973)
Facts: Petitioners German C. Garcia, his wife, Luminosa
L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, boarded a public utility car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by
respondent, Ricardo Vayson,
for a round-trip from Oroquieta
City to Zamboanga City. While the car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway,
it collided with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated
by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a
result of the collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated medical treatment and hospitalization.
Petitioners filed
for damages against the private respondents, owners and drivers, respectively,
of the public utility car and the passenger bus.Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo
Vayson filed their answer admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners
but alleged, by way of defense, that the accident was due to the negligence and
reckless imprudence of the bus driver.
Respondents, Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion
to dismiss arguing
that the petitioners had no cause of action
for on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action
for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in a criminal case already for
"double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence," by the Chief of
Police. Hence, with the filing of the criminal case, no civil action could
be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally
adjudicated. Therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature,
because the liability of the employer is merely subsidiary and does not arise
until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro Tumala,
guilty of negligence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may recover damages
under a separate and independent action while a criminal case is pending.
Held:
Yes. Petitioners may recover
damages for liability arising from quasi-delict. Under Sec. 2 in relation to
Sec. I of Rule III of the Revised Rules of Court, in the cases provided for by
Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has
reserved his right to institute it separately. But it should be noted, however,
that neither Sec. 1 nor Sec. 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such
reservation shall be made.
In the case at bar,
there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action
instituted by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less
has the said criminal action been terminated either by conviction or acquittal
of the accused. Petitioners have two options from where they could recover
damages from—that arising out of the criminal act, and that under quasi-delict.
Petitioners opted to recover damages under quasi-delict, which in effect
operated as their abandonment of their claim to damages under the pending
criminal case. Therefore, petitioners may still recover damages from their
civil action against the defendants.
Andamo vs. Court of Appeals
191 SCRA 195 (November
6, 1990)
Facts:
Petitioner-spouses Emmanuel and
Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso)
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of
Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of
respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances (including an artificial
lake) were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land;
caused a young man to drown; damaged petitioners' crops and plants; washed away
costly fences; endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during
rainy and stormy seasons; and exposed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
Issue:
Whether or not a corporation,
which has built waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances within its land,
thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts.
Held: A careful examination of the complaint
shows that the action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements
of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by
the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person
for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
Clearly, the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have
inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal
connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action, if proven, constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the
recovery of damages.
It must be stressed
that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in
such a manner as to injure the rights of a third
person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties
which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person,
the latter can claim indemnification for the injury
or damage suffered.
Taylor
vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
16 Phil 8 (March 22, 1910)
Facts:
Defendant Manila Electric left
some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite
scattered in the premises behind its power plant. Fifteen year old David Taylor
is a son of a mechanical engineer. Two years before the incident David spent
four months at sea, as a cabin boy on an interisland transports. Later he took
up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical
engineering. It appears that he was a boy of more than average intelligence,
taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys his age.
David, along with
Manuel, a 12 year old, entered the premises of the defendant without
permission. While playing, the boys saw the fulminating caps, picked some
pieces and brought them home. In the presence of Jessie, a 9 year old girl ,
The two boys made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends
of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. Next, they
tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of the
caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance
they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a
lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the
boys and to Jesse. This action was brought by the plaintiff, through his
father, to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered.
Issue: Whether or not the company was liable for the
injury sustained by plaintiff.
Held: The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the negligence of the defendant of leaving the caps exposed
on its premises was not the proximate
cause of the injury. When the
immediate cause of an accident
resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own acts, he cannot recover
damages for the injury.
The immediate
cause of the explosion, which resulted in plaintiff’s injury,
was his own act in putting a match to the contents
of the cap. True, David Taylor may not have known
and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not
anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred, but he well knew that a
more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion
We are satisfied
that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be
sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the
contents of the cap; that his age and his experience qualified
him to understand the necessity
for the exercise
of that degree of caution
which would have avoided the injury which resulted
from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result
of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that
these injuries would
not have been incurred but for the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed
on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
NOTE for undergraduates: Read the analysis of US turn-table case in the
original.
Tayag vs. Alcantara
98
SCRA 723 (July 23, 1980)
Facts:
The Heirs of Tayag filed a
complaint for damages against Phil Rabbit Bus lines alleging among others that
Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along McArthur highway on his way home.
He was hit by the bus driven by Villa which caused his death.
Philippine Rabbit
filed motion to suspend trial on the ground that criminal case against Villa
was still pending. When Villa was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt,
Philippine Rabbit filed a motion to dismiss the civil case. The heirs opposed
alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict.
The Judge indeed dismissed the case, hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of Villa in the
criminal case will result to the dismissal of the civil case based on quasi-delict.
Held: No. The acquittal of the driver of the crime
charged is not a bar to the prosecution for damages based on quasi-delict.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides:
When the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted
provision refers to a civil action based,
not on the act or omission charged
as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an
obligation arising from other sources,
like quasi delict. In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action
was based upon a quasi-delict, to wit:
That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater
speed than what was reasonable and proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and
imprudent manner, without due regards to injuries to persons and damage to
properties and in violation of traffic rules and regulation.
That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly defendant Romeo
Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the death
of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred.
The essential
averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or
omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation
between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties.\
Quasi Delict vs. Delict
Barredo vs. Garcia- Art. 2177 Discussion
73 Phil 607 (July 8,
1942)
Facts:(Supra)
Issue: Whether
or not plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil
Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.
Held: Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or
"culpa aquiliana " is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle
and on the wording and spirit article
1903 of the Civil Code,
the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
safely anchored.
Some of the differences between
crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under
the Civil Code are:
1. That
crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos
are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because
the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt.
People vs. Ligon
152
SCRA 39 (July 29, 1987)
Facts: Accused Fernando Gabat
was riding a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father
and driven by the other
accused, Rogelio Ligon.
While waiting for the traffic
light to change, Fernando called a cigarette
vendor, Jose Rosales to buy some cigarettes. While the transaction was
occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the car suddenly moved
forward. While the car was moving,
Rosales was clinging
to the window but lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. The bystanders rushed
Rosales to PGH where he was treated
for multiple physical injuries
until his death.
Since Ligon
did not stop the car, Castillo, a taxi-driver chased
him and sought
the assistance of two police
officers in an owner-type jeepney.
At an intersection, Castillo was able
to overtake the car and blocked it, while the jeep pulled up right behind. The police officers
drew their guns and told them to alight from the car. They were brought to the police station.
Ligon was then
charged with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. A charge of robbery with
homicide was likewise charged to Ligon and Gabat, since there was an allegation
that Gabat forcibly took the cigarette box of the victim. Ligon however was
never apprehended after the police released him, so only Gabat was convicted by
the RTC. An appeal was then brought to the SC, which ruled that the guilt of
the accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: Whether or not accused may be held civilly liable
despite the finding of the Court of Appeals that his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes. When a person was acquitted of a crime, it
does not follow that he is free from civil liability, since only preponderance
of evidence is required in a civil action for damages.
The judgment of acquittal can extinguish the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not e xist.
In the instant case, a preponderance of evidence
exists sufficient to establish the facts from which the civil liability of
Gabat arises. Gabat, by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused
damage to Rosales
and should answer
civilly for the damage done.
Gabat’s willful act of calling
the victim to the middle
of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes
set the chain of events
which led to the death of the victim. Through
fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent
the driver from moving forward
while the purchase
was completed;
(2) failed to help the victim
while the latter
clung precariously to the moving
vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver
to stop. Finally,
Gabat acquiesced in the driver’s
act of speeding away, instead
of stopping and picking up the injured victim.
Padilla vs. Court of Appeals
129 SCRA 558
Facts:
Petitioner Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdones, Pepito Bedena, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanaoc, Roberto
Rosales, Villania, Garrido, Ortega jr., Celestino, “Kamlon” and 14 Ricardo Does
was charged of Grave Coercion. On Feb 1964 around 9 am at Camarines Norte, The
petitioners willfully and feloniously prevented Antonio Vergara and his family
from closing their stall at the Public Market. Petitioners forcibly opened the
door of the stall and brutally demolished the stall using axes then carrying
away the goods and merchandise. Such acts of the petitioners where said to be
pursuant to an ordinance. The damage amounted to 30K for actual damages and 20K
for exemplary damages. Roy Padilla and company also took advantage of their public
position, being the Mayor of the said municipality and the others
being policemen. The CFI finds them guilty.
The CA acquitted the accused
but ordered them to
pay jointly and severally 9,600 as actual damages.
Issue: WON the order of payment for damages is valid
notwithstanding the acquittal of the accused.
Held:
Yes it is valid. Civil liability
is not extinguished where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt that the
accused is guilty of the crime charged. No separate civil action is necessary
considering that the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceeding. To require a separate civil action
would only clod the court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation. A
separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals
282
SCRA 188 (1997)
Facts:
Petitioner Dr. Cruz is a surgeon
at Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital. She examined Lydia and found the
latter to have 'myoma' in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hsyterectomy
operation. On the day of the operation, Lydia's daughter noticed how untidy the
hospital was. She asked that the operation be postponed but Lydia said that Dr.
Cruz told her she must be operated as scheduled.
During the
operation, Lydia's family was asked to buy tagamet ampules. Later they were
asked to buy blood for Lydia at a blood bank. They were again asked to buy
blood but the blood bank already ran out of type A. They also saw Lydia gasping
for breath as the oxygen supply had ran out so they had to go and buy oxygen
for Lydia again. Later that night, Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure
dropped to 60/50. Lydia was brought to the San Pablo Hospital however the
doctors were not able to save her. She was announced dead at 3:00 AM the
following day. Petitioner and her anaesthesiologist were charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. The MTC, RTC, and the CA all found petitioner
guilty (anaethesiologist was acquitted) on the ground that the clinic was untidy and they lack the needed facilities like blood and oxygen which are essential
for the continuity of the operations
they undertake.
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide as a consequence of medical malpractice is
supported by the evidence on record.
Held:
No. The elements of reckless
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the
doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without
malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5)
that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
The 4th element is lacking in the case at bar.
The material damage
was not proved to be the result of the reckless imprudence. In litigations
involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there
must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death
of his patient. As shown by the experts presented by both parties, the
death of Lydia may have been caused by DIC (clotting defect). Therefore, the
cause of death cannot be attributed to petitioner's fault or negligence.
Furthermore,
whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of
precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according
to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In
the case at bar, no physician was asked to testify to show the standard care
that needed to be observed given the present circumstances. Therefore, the
conviction is not supported by the evidence.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. vs. People
GR
No. 147703 (2004)
Facts:
On July 27, 1994, accused Napoleon
Roman y Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage
to property and was sentenced to imprisonment.
The court
further ruled that in the event of insolvency of accused, Philippine Rabbit, as its employer, shall be liable
for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgment against the accused had become
final and executory. Admittedly, accused jumped bail and remained at-large. It
is worth mentioning that Section 8, rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes
the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps
bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully
participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
HELD:
No. The accused cannot be accorded
the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against
them. While at large, they cannot seek relief from the court,
as they are deemed to have waived
the appeal. In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed
to have abandoned
his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against
him has become
final and executory.
Petitioner admits helping the accused employee, hence, it participated in
the proceedings before the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process.
It might have lost its right to appeal, but it was
not denied its day in court.
Under Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. To
allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would
enable them to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.
By the same token, to allow them to appeal
the final criminal
conviction of their
employees without the latter’s consent
would also result
in improperly amending,
nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision
convicting an employee
in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer
not only with respect to the former’s
civil liability, but also with as to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.
Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
38
Phil 768 (October 14, 1918)
Facts:
Jose Cangco, was in the employment
of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk. He lived in the pueblo of
San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company. Everyday, he comes by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he works and he uses a pass, supplied
by the company, which entitles
him to ride the trains free
of charge.
One day, Jose
Cangco stepped off the train, but one or both of his feet came in contact with
a sack of watermelons causing his feet to slip making him fell violently on the
platform. His body rolled from the platform
and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted
from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
he had received were very serious. He was brought at once
to hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was
amputated.
He instituted this
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to recover
damages from the defendant company. His action is founded upon the negligence
of the servants and employees of the defendant
in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform
and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security
of passenger alighting
from the trains. The trial judge concluded that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant
by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed
to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded
from recovering. Judgment
was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Manila
Railroad can excuse
its liability upon the ground
that the breach
was due to the negligence of their servant.
2. Whether
Cango is negligent when he alight from the moving train.
Held: (1)
No. Failure to perform a contract
cannot be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of
a servant of the obligor, and that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.
It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad
company were guilty
of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform
in the manner above stated; that their presence
caused the plaintiff
to fall as he alighted
from the train;
and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It
necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant
company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to
note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract
of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff
has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of
the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to
say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants,
imposed by article
1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted
by proof of the exercise of
due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to
extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that
article relates only to culpa aquiliana
and not to culpa contractual.
(2) No.
it is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving
train. As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted:
The company's platform
was constructed upon a level
higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance
from the steps of the car to
the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was
thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature
of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured
to the passenger a stable
and even surface
on which to alight.
Furthermore, the
plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was
by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person.
In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether
the passenger acted prudently
or recklessly the age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety
of the passenger, and should be considered.
Again, it may be noted that the place
was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on
and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in
his mind with regard either to the length of the step, which he was required to
take, or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion
is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train
was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Fores vs. Miranda
105 Phil 266 (March 4,
1959)
Facts:
Miranda was riding a jeepney
driven by Luga. While the vehicle was descending Sta. Mesa bridge at high
speed, the driver lost control. It swerved and hit the bridge wall, resulting
to injuries to the passengers and Miranda. Miranda broke some bones in his right
arm. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced accordingly. Fores, owner of the
jeepney, claimed that one day before the accident, she sold the vehicle to a
certain Sackerman. In the meantime, Miranda prays for moral damages.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not approval of the
Public Service Commission is necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle
even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the same.
2.
Whether or not an award for damages is proper.
Held: While the sale, without the required approval, is
still valid and binding between the parties, approval of the Public Service
Commission is necessary for such sale, as provided for by Sec. 20 of the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act 146).
As to the second issue, the award of moral damages
is not proper. It has been held that moral damages are not recoverable in
damage actions predicated on a breach of contract of transportation, in view of
Art. 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following analogous
cases:
1.
a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
2. quasi delicts causing physical injuries
ART. 2220. Willfull injury to
property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should
find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.
The exceptional rule in Article
1764 provides that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages
are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. T he mere carelessness of the carrier’s driver does not per se constitute or justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier,
as in the case at bar.
In the absence of statutory provision, it is presumed
that the lawmakers intended in article
2220 to limit recovery of moral damages
to breaches of contract in bad faith.
The fact that negligence may
be so gross as to amount to malice, must be shown in evidence, and a carrier’s
bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract
was breached though negligence of the carrier’s employees. The award for moral damages is eliminated.
Far East Bank and Trust Company
vs. Court of Appeals
241
SCRA 671 (February 23, 1995)
Facts:
Private respondent Luis Luna
applied for and was accorded a Fareastcard issued by petitioner FEBTC. Upon his
request, a supplemental card was issued to Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her card and FEBTC was forthwith
informed. Due to bank policy,
petitioner recorded the lost card, along with the principal
card as a “hot card” or a “cancelled
card”. In October, Luis used his card to pay for lunch at the Hotel Intercontinental Manila. However, after verifying with the bank, the card was not honored and Luis had to pay cash. He was
embarrassed by this incident. Luis, through counsel,
wrote to petitioner and asked for the payment
of damages. The VP of the bank wrote a letter to Luis and expressed his apologies
in their failure to inform the latter
of the bank's security policy.
Also, the VP sent a letter to the hotel to assure the latter
that the private
respondents were very valued clients.
Still feeling aggrieved,
private respondent filed a complaint for damages in the RTC. The RTC ruled in
their favor and ordered FEBTC to pay moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed
the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
Held:
NO. In culpa contractual, moral
damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of contract. (Art. 2220 NCC) While it is true that the bank was remiss in neglecting to personally inform
Luis of his own card's
cancellation, there is no finding
that there was deliberate intent
on the part of FEBTC
to cause harm to Luis. Neither
could FEBTC's negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith.
Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design
to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose
or moral obliquity; it is different
from the negative
idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Thus, the award
of moral damages is inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
Exemplary or corrective damages
are awarded, in the case of quasi-delicts, if the defendant is shown to have been so guilty of gross negligence as to approximate malice. And in case of contracts and quasi-contracts,
it is awarded when the defendant is found to have acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. Thus, the award of
exemplary damages is improper.
NEVERTHELESS,
the bank's failure to honor its credit card issued to Luis should entitle him
to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2221. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and
not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
Air France vs. Carrascoso
G.R.
No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts: Plaintiff Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member
of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims
that left Manila
for Lourdes. Air France, through
its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a ‘first
class’ round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok,
plaintiff travelled in ‘first class’, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate
the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto
G. Cuento, there was a ‘white man’ who, the Manager
alleged had a better right to the seat. When asked to vacate his ‘first class’
seat, the plaintiff refused, and told defendant’s Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body. A commotion ensued, and, according to said
Ernnesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist
class; when they found out that Mr. Casrrascoso was having a hot discussion
with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the ‘white man’ and plaintiff
reluctantly gave his ‘first class’ seat in the
plane.
Carrascoso filed a
case for damages. The CFI of Manila sentenced Air France to pay rCarrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000 as exemplary damages; P393.20
representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for
the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome. The CA slightly reduced the amount of
refund on Carrascos’s plane ticket.
Issue: WON Carrascoso’s action is planted upon breach of
contract, with the existence of bad faith, entitling him to the award of
damages.
Held: There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg. The said
contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok.
The evidence shows
that defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad
faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant’s Manager in Bangkok
went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence
of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane
to give the ‘first class’ seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, a ‘white man’ whom he (defendant’s manager) wished to accommodate, and
the defendant has not proved that this ‘white man’ had any ‘better right’ to occupy the ‘first class’
seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first class ticket was issued.
The responsibility of an employer
for the act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner’s manager,
petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
“ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the
damage.”
In
parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal percept; and, held upon
the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated
by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect,
courtesy and due consideration. They are
entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rude or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives
the latter an action for damages against
the carrier.
Thus, “Where
a steamship company
had accepted a passenger’s check, it was a breach of contract
and tort, giving
a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons
to falsely notify her, that the check was worthless and demand payment
under threat of ejection; though the language used was not insulting and she
was not ejected. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual
both in origin and nature” the act that breaks the contract may also be a
tort”. And in another case, “Where a passenger on a rail-road train, when the
conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where
the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train
reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination,
there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor
in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic, and the Supreme
Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable
for the mental suffering of said passenger.
Petitioner’s
contract with Carrascoso, is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carasscoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.
This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of
quasi-delict.
Damages are proper.
Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample to
power to grant exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition
is that defendant
should have “acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner”. The manner
of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this is in addition to moral damages.
PSBA vs. Court of Appeals
205
SCRA 729 (February 4, 1992)
Facts:
Carlito Bautista, a student of
PSBA, was stabbed while on the second floor of Philippine School of Business
Administration (PSBA) by some elements from outside the school. Carlito died.
His parents, filed an action for damages against PSBA and the school authorities
(President, Vice-President, Treasurer/Cashier,Chief of Security and Vice Chief
of Security). Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of parents.
Issue: Whether or not PSBA and the school authorities can
be held liable under 2176 and 2180 for quasi-delict.
Held: No. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that
pupils or students of the educational institution should have caused the
damage.
Article 2180,
in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in
loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the cases of Exconde,
Mendoza, Palisoc, and more recently, in Amadora vs. CA. In all such cases, it
had been stressed that Article 2180 plainly provides that it is the students
who must have caused the damage before the educational institution can be held
liable for quasi-delict. I n
the case at bar, the assailants were not students or pupils of PSBA but were
elements from outside the school. Hence, PSBA and its school authorities cannot
be held liable under Article 2180.
The circumstances
of the present case evince a contractual relation between PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista since they entered into a contract the moment Bautista enrolled in the
school. There being a contract, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
However, should the act which breaches the contract be done in bad faith and be
violative of Article 21 as ruled in the Air France case, then there is a cause
to view the act as constituting quasi-delict.
In the case at bar
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and
Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there
be, a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of
contractual obligation only. In other words, a contractual relation is a
condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school
cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under
the circumstances set out in Article 21.
Therefore, PSBA and its school authorities cannot be held liable for
quasi-delict under Art. 2180.
Syquia vs. Court of Appeals and
Manila Memorial Park and Cemetery, Inc.
217
SCRA 624 (January 27, 1993)
Facts: Juan Syquia, father of deceased
and the private respondent executed
a Deed of Sale of a memorial
lot and an Interment Order, where the private respondent was authorized to bury
the remains of the deceased in accordance with its procedures.
Preparatory
to transferring the remains to the newly-purchased lot also in Manila Memorial
Park, the concrete vault encasing the coffin of the deceased was removed from
its niche underground. It was then discovered that said vault has a hole and
after one hour or less water drained out of the hole.
Pursuant to the authority granted by the MTC the concrete vault
was opened and it was discovered that the interior
walls of the concrete vault
showed evidence of total flooding and the coffin as well as the
clothing and exposed parts of the deceased’s remains were entirely damaged.
A complaint
was filed by petitioners (parents
and siblings of deceased) for quasi-delict, alleging
that there was breach of respondent’s contractual obligation to provide
a sealed vault. RTC dismissed the complaint since there was no guarantee
in the contract that the vault shall be waterproof and since there was a pre-existing contractual relation defendant cannot be guilty of quasi-delict. The RTC
also sustained the explanation given by the private respondent, that the hole
had to be bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault
will float and the grave would be filled with water. CA affirmed RTC’s decision
hence the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of
quasi-delict.
Held: No. Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does
not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, SC find no reason to disregard
the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence. Article 2176
provides that Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
. The agreement between the parties governed their relations and defined
their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there been actual
negligence on the part of the private respondent it would be held liable not
for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code,
to wit: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the
tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Petitioners claim that the vault provided
by private respondent was not sealed,
that is, not waterproof. In this regard
SC held that there was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and
in the Rules and Regulations of the private
respondent that the vault would be waterproof. “Seal" is defined
as any of various closures
or fastenings that cannot be opened without
rupture and that serve as a check against
tampering or unauthorized opening." It is therefore clear that "sealed" cannot be equated
with "waterproof".
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence
which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place." In the absence of stipulation or
legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the
performance of the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed
act boring of the hole negate the allegation of negligence.
Vicente Calalas
vs. Court of Appeals
332
SCRA 356 (2000)
Facts:
Eliza G. Sunga, a college freshman
at Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Vicente
Calalas. She was given by the conductor an extension seat at the backdoor
of the jeepney at the rear end. On their
way, the jeepney
stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passengers, just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio
Verena which is owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney,
which injured Sunga.
Sunga then filed action
for damages against
Calalas for violation of contract of carriage, in failing to exercise the diligence required
by him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva.
Issue: Whether or not Calalas can blame Francisco Silva as
the proximate cause of the loss.
Held: No. There was a contract of carriage between the
parties, which was violated, hence, proximate cause is immaterial.
The Supreme Court
found Calalas guilty of violating the contract of carriage as a driver failed
to transport Sunga safely to her destination, being negligent in (1) not
properly parking the jeepney;
(2) taking more passengers, than the allowed
capacity; and (3) the fact that Sunga was seated in an extension seat placed in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed.
The determination of the proximate cause
of the damage incurred, whether it was the collision between the jeepney and
the truck or the negligence of the driver is immaterial. T he doctrine
of proximate cause
is applicable only in actions
of quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between
parties it is the parties
themselves that create
the obligation and the law will merely
regulate the relation
created. (Since there
was a contract of carriage
here in the case at bar).
Negligence
Picart vs. Smith
37
Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)
Facts:
Plaintiff, Picart was riding a
pony on Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando. He pulled his pony over the bridge’s
railing on the right instead of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly
approaching. His pony was unfortunately frightened when the automobile passed
so close to them. The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died.
Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days. Picart seeks to render the sum of Php31,000
as damages. CFI- La Union absolved Smith.
Issue: Whether
or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last clear chance is
attributable to him?
Held: The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under
the doctrine of last clear chance even though the plaintiff was on the wrong
side of the bridge. Defendant has had the opportunity to avoid the accident after realizing that the negligence by the plaintiff
could not have placed him in a position of better safety.
The last clear
chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was his duty to
bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the
bridge to take the other
side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of doing
this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost
upon the horse.
When Smith exposed
the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the
law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear
chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the lower court, and rendered judgment that Picart
recover of Smith the sum of P200, with costs of both instances. The court held
that the sum awarded was estimated to include the value of the horse,
medical expenses of Picart, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel,
and lawful interest
on the whole to the date of this recovery.
Negligence in special cases
(Children)
JARCO Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Aguilar
GR
No. 129792 (December 21, 1999)
Facts: Petitioner Jarco is the owner of Syvel's Department
Store in Makati City. Respondent spouses are the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar.
nd
On May 9,
1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2 floor of Syvel's. As Criselda was
signing her credit card slip, she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud
thud. She
looked
behind her and saw her 6 yr. old daughter Zhieneth pinned down on the floor by
the store's giftwrapping counter/structure. Zhieneth was crying and screaming
for help. She was rushed to the Makati Medical Center and was operated on. The
next day, she lost her speech and fourteen days after, she died. The cause of
her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.
Spouses Aguilar
demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical
bills, wake and funeral expenses but petitioners refused to pay. Spouses filed
a complaint for damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint and ruled that
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of
clinging to it. The court also held that Criselda's negligence in allowing her
daughter to freely roam around the store contributed to the accident. In
absolving petitioners from liability, the court reasoned that the counter
nd
was situated at the end corner of
the 2 floor as a precautionary measure, hencce, it could not be considered as
an attractive nuisance.
On appeal,
CA reversed the judgment and found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter
was shaped like an inverted
'L' and it was top heavy and
the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by
its narrow base. It was also established that 2 employees already requested the
management to nail the counter
because it was shaky but the latter did not take any action. The management insists
that it has been there for 15 years and it has been stable.
The Court of Appeals also declared that Zhieneth was absolutely incapable of negligence or tort. It also absolved
Criselda of any negligence, finding
nothing wrong in momentarily allowing
Zhieneth to walk while she signed
the document. Moreover, the allegation that Zhieneth clung to the counter which caused the same to fall on her was denied by Gonzales in his testimony. He said that when the
doctor asked Zhieneth what she did, the child answered 'nothing, i did not come
near the counter, the counter just fell on me'. The CA awarded actual and
compensatory damages. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the
court denied the same. Hence, this appeal.
Issues:
1. Whether
the death of Zhieneth was accidental or attributable to negligence.
2.
In case of a finding of
negligence, whether the same was attributable to the store management for
maintaining a defective counter or to Criselda and Zhieneth for failing to
exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
Held: An accident pertains
to a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly
through human agency,
an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person
to whom it happens. On the other hand, negligence is the failure
to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Accident and negligence are
intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark
case of PICART V. SMITH,
thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The
court held that Zhieneth's tragedy
and death can only be attributed to negligence.
The
testimony of Gonzales
pertaining to Zhieneth's statement formed part of the res gestae
under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under
the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think
and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court.
it is unthinkable for a child of tender age and in extreme pain to have lied to a doctor
whom she trusted
with her life.
Zhieneth
performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. However, petitioners did,
through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's
base.
Anent the negligence imputed
to Zhieneth, the court applied
the rule that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. And even if contributory negligence can be attributed to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed
over the counter,
no injury should
have occurred if the counter
was stable and sturdy.
Criselda too, should be absolved from contributory negligence. Zhieneth held on
to her mother's hand, Criselda momentarily released the child's hand when she
signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment,
it was reasonable for Criselda
to let go of her child. When the counter
fell on her child, Criselda
was just one foot away.
Del Rosario vs.
Manila Electric Company
57
Phil 478 (November 5, 1932)
Facts: At 2PM in the afternoon, trouble developed in a wire used and operated by Manila Electric
Company for the purpose of conducting electricity and lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. Noguera noticed that the
wire was burning and the connections smoking. He then told Soco to telephone
the Malabon station of defendant. Soco transmitted the message at
2.25 p.m. and received answer from the station to
the effect that they would send an inspector.
At 4 p. m. the neighborhood school
was dismissed and the children
went home. Among these was Alberto Del Rosario with two of his friends.
When they came upon the place where the
wire was down, Alberto's friend tried to touch it but was stopped by his other
friend, Jose. Alberto, saying he has the habit of touching wires, touched the
wire despit Jose's warning, got electrocuted, and was pronounced dead when
brought to the hospital.
The parents of Alberto filed for
damages against the company. The engineer of the company says that it was
customary for the company to make a special inspection of these wires at least
once in six months, and that all of the company's inspectors were required in
their daily rounds to keep a lookout for trouble of this kind. There is nothing
in the record indicating any particular cause for the parting of the wire.
Issue: Whether or not negligence can be imputed to the
defendant company, making it liable for damages.
Held:
Yes. The Court is of the opinion
that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the breakage
of this wire has not been overcome, and the defendant is responsible for the
accident. Furthermore, when notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25
p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at
once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger;
but more than an hour and a half passed
before anyone representing the company appeared
on the scene, and in the meantime
this child had been claimed as
a victim.
It is doubtful whether contributory
negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years
and the natural curiosity as a 9-year-old boy. The fact that he ignored the
warnings of his friend does not alter the case.
The
Court therefore awards P1000 as general damages for loss of service and P250
for expenses incurred for the death and burial of the boy.
Ylarde vs. Aquino
163
SCRA 697 (July 29, 1988)
Facts:
Private respondent Soriano was the
principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public school in Tayug, Pangasinan,
while Private respondent Aquino was a teacher therein. During the happening of the events
which led to the filing
of the case, there were several concrete
blocks in the school which
were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge
stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, Sergio Banez, also a teacher
therein, started burying them. Aquino, in order to help, gathered eighteen of
his male pupils after class and ordered them to dig an excavation pit wherein
the stone can be buried. It was continued the following day by four of the
original eighteen pupils. Among them is the son of the petitioners, Novelito. When the depth was right enough
to accommodate the concrete block,
Aquino and his pupils got out of the hole. Aquino left to
borrow a key to the workroom from Banez to get a rope, he instructed the pupils not to touch the stone.
Three of the four kids, including Novelito,
playfully jumped into the pit. The other kid, without any warning jumped on
top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening.
Except
for Novelito, the other kids were able to go out of the pit. The concrete
block pinned Novelito
to the wall in a standing position. As a result
thereof, he sustained
injuries. Novelito died 3 days after. Petitioner-parents filed a suit for damages
against both private
respondents. Petitioners base their action against Aquino
on Article 2176 NCC for his alleged
negligence that caused their son's death while the complaint against
Soriano as the head of school is founded on Article 2180 NCC. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by
the pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise
of Novelito was due to his own reckless imprudence. This was affirmed
by CA on appeal. Hence the present
petition.
Issues: (1)Whether or not Soriano is liable for damages
under Art. 2180. (2) Whether or not Aquino is liable for damages under Art.
2176.
Held:
1. No. The Court based their
ruling on the doctrine enunciated in the case of Amadora vs. CA, Article 2180
applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. It provides further
that teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except
where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof
who shall be answerable. Thus, Soriano, as principal, cannot
be held liable
for the reason
that the school
he heads is an academic
school and not a school
of arts and trades. Besides,
as clearly admitted
by private respondent Aquino,
private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
2. Yes. It is very
clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when
he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and
instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the
one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required
the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging,
knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or
kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around
the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place
where he would
not be able to check
on the children's safety;
and (5) left the children
close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. These negligent
acts have a direct causal connection to the death of Novelito.
A reasonably
prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation
site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an
accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume
that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger
that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the
children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils would
have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.
The defense that
the digging done by the pupils was part of their Work Education was not
sustained, since the nature of the activity reveals a dangerous one and
requires the attendance of adult laborers and not ten-year old grade-four
pupils. In fact, there was no showing that it was included in the lesson plan
for their Work Education. Further it is admitted that Aquino decided all by
himself to help his colleague.
The finding of the
lower court that the injuries were caused by Novelito’s own reckless imprudence
was not sustained. The Court ruled that deceased was only 10 years old as such
his actuations were natural to a boy his age. The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with one’s capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience
under the same or similar circumstances.
Negligence
(Experts/Professionals)
Cullion Ice, Fish and Electric Company vs. Philippine Motors Corporation
GR
No. 32611 (November 3, 1930)
Facts:
Culion Ice, Fish & Electric
Co. Inc. owned a motor schooner named Gwendoline.
H.D. Cranston, the representative of Cuilion in Manila, decided to have the
engine on the Gwendoline converted from gasoline consumer
to a crude oil burner.
He had a conference with C.E. Quest,
the manager of Phil. Motors,
who agreed to do the job, with the understanding that payment shall be made
upon completion of the work.
The work began and conducted under the supervision of Mr. Quest,
and chiefly by a mechanic
whom Quest took with him to the boat. Cranston
also directed the members of the
crew of the Gwendoline to assist in
the work, placing them under the command of
Quest.
Upon inspection of the engine,
Quest concluded that a new carburetor was needed, hence one was installed. The next problem
was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel. A temporary tank to contain the
mixture was placed on deck above and at a short distance from the compartment
covering the engine. This tank was connected with the carburetor by a piece of
tubing, which was apparently not well fitted at the point where it was
connected with the tank. The fuel mixture leaked from the tank and dripped down
into the engine compartment. To paraphrase, a device was made where the engine
can be converted from gasoline
to crude oil, switching back and forth.
Later, it was observed
that the carburetor was flooding, and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was
dripping freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. This fact
was called to Quest's attention, but he said that, when the engine had gotten
to running well, the flooding would stop
The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The engine stopped a few times during the first run, owing to the use of an improper mixture of fuel. As the boat was coming in from this run, the engine
stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a
new start. After this had been done, the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the
tube connecting with the new mixture. A moment later a back fire occurred
in the cylinder chamber. This caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered
with a mass of flames,
which the members
of the crew were unable
to subdue. A case for damages was filed.
Issue: Whether or not the loss of the boat is chargeable
to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest.
Held:
YES. When a person holds himself
out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be
held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
The temporary tank
in which the mixture was prepared was apparently at too great an elevation from
the carburetor, so that when the fuel line was opened, the hydrostatic pressure
in the carburetor was greater than the delicate parts of the carburetor could
sustain. This was the cause of the flooding of the carburetor; and the result
was that; when the back fire occurred, the external parts of the carburetor,
already saturated with gasoline, burst into flames, whence the fire was quickly
communicated to the highly inflammable material near- by. The leak along the
pipe line and the flooding of the carburetor had created a dangerous situation,
which a prudent mechanic, versed in repairs of this nature, would have taken
precautions to avoid.
Proof shows that Quest had had ample experience in fixing the engines of
automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the
doing of s imilar work on boats. Possibly the dripping
of the mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding
of the carburetor did not convey to his mind an adequate
impression of the danger of fire. Quest did not use the skill that
would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline
engines on boats. There was here, on the
part of Quest, a blameworthy a ntecedent
inadvertence to possible harm, and this constitutes negligence. The burning
of the Gwendoline may be said to have
resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable
accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill.
US v. Pineda
37
Phil 456 (January 22, 1918)
Facts:
Santiago Pineda is a registered
pharmacist and the owner of a drug store. Feliciano Santos, having some sick
horses, presented a copy of a prescription to Pineda. On other occasions,
Santos had given the medicine prescribed to his horses with good results. Under
the supervision of Pineda, the drugs were prepared and given Santos.
Santos, under
the belief that he had purchased potassium chlorate, placed two of the packages in water and gave the doses to two of his sick horses. Another
package was mixed with water for another horse, but
was not used. The two horses, who took the drugs, died afterwards. Santos took
the drug packages to the Bureau of Science for examination. It was found that the packages
contained not potassium
chlorate but barium chlorate (a poison). When sued Pineda
alleges that he did not intentionally sold the poison and that what the law (to which he is indicted) forbids is the
sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name”.
ISSUES: Whether or not Pineda can be held liable for the
death of the horses, assuming he did not deliberately sold poison.
HELD: Yes. In view of the tremendous and imminent danger to the public from the careless
sale of poison and medicine,
we do not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one
drug for another whether it be through negligence or mistake. The care required
must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must
correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
As a
pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poison he
sells. If were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to convict
any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist
made a material representation; that it was false; that when he made it
he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its
truth and as a positive assertion; that he made it with the intention that it
should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance
upon it, and that the purchaser suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known p rinciples on the subject of fraud
would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the
innocent purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and
vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any unscrupulous vendor.
We should not, therefore, without good
reason so devitalize the law. The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the
purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee in this case do not stand
at arm’s length as in ordinary transactions. It would be idle mockery for the
customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing.
Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the
drug called for.
BPI v. CA
216
SCRA 51 (November 26, 1992)
Facts:
A person purporting to be Eligia
G. Fernando, who had a money market placement evidenced by a promissory note
with a maturity date of November 11, 1981 and a maturity value of
P2,462,243.19, called BPI's Money Market Department. The caller wanted to
pre-terminate the placement. However, Reginaldo Eustaquio, Dealer Trainee in
BPI's Money Market Department, told her that "trading time" was over for the day (Friday). He suggested that she call again the following week.
The promissory note the caller
wanted to preterminate was a roll-over of an
earlier 50-day money market placement that had matured on September 24, 1981.
Later that
afternoon, Eustaquio conveyed the request for pretermination to the officer who
before had handled Fernando's account, Penelope Bulan, but Eustaquio was left
to attend to the pretermination process.
The caller
presenting herself as Ms. Fernando
phoned again and made a follow-up with Eustaquio the pretermination of the placement. Although Eustaquio was not familiar
with the voice of the real Eligia G. Fernando, Eustaquio "made
certain" that the caller was the real Eligia G. Fernando by
"verifying" the details the caller gave with the details in "the
ledger/folder" of the account. But neither Eustaquio
nor Bulan who originally handled
Fernando's account, nor anybody else at BPI, bothered to call up Fernando at her Philamlife office to verify the request for pretermination.
Informed that the placement would yield less than the maturity value,
the caller insisted
on the pretermination just the same and asked that two checks
be issued for the proceeds,
one for P1,800,000.00 and the second
for the balance,
and that the checks be delivered to her office
at Philamlife. Eustaquio, thus, proceeded to prepare the "purchase order
slip" for the requested
pretermination as required by office procedure. From his desk, the papers,
following the processing route, passed through the position analyst, securities
clerk, verifier clerk and documentation clerk, before
the two cashier's
checks were prepared.
The two cashier's checks, together
with the papers
consisting of the money market
placement was to be preterminated and the promissory note to
be preterminated, were sent to Gerlanda E. de Castro and Celestino Sampiton,
Jr., Manager and Administrative Assistant, respectively, in BPI's Treasury
Operations Department, both authorized signatories for BPI, who signed the two checks
that very morning.
Thereafter, the checks
went to the dispatcher for delivery.
In the same morning
when the checks were to be delivered, the caller changed the delivery
instructions; instead that the checks were to be delivered to her office at
Philamlife, she would pick the checks
up herself or send her niece, Rosemarie
Fernando, to pick them up. Eustaquio then told the caller that if her niece was going to get the checks, her niece would have to being a written
authorization from her. It was agreed that Rosemarie would pick the checks up
from the bank. Thus, Eustaquio hurriedly went to the dispatcher to inform him
of the new delivery instructions for the checks; in fact, he changed the
delivery instruction on the purchase order slip, writing thereon
"Rosemarie Fernando release only with authority to pick up.”
It
was, in fact Rosemarie who got the two checks from the dispatcher, as shown by
the delivery receipt. As it turned out, the same person impersonated both
Eligia G. Fernando and Rosemarie Fernando. Although the checks represented the
termination proceeds of Fernando's placement, not just a roll-over of the
placement, the dispatcher failed to require the surrender of the promissory
note evidencing the placement. There is also no showing that Fernando's
purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the latter
authorizing Rosemarie to pick up the two checks was compared or verified with
Fernando's signature in BPI's file. Such purported signature has been
established to be forged although there 0was a "close similarity" to
the real signature of Eligia G. Fernando.
On a different day, a woman
who represented herself
to be Eligia G. Fernando
applied at China Banking Corporation's Head Office for the opening
of a current account. She was
accompanied and introduced to Emily Sylianco
Cuaso, Cash Supervisor, by Antonio Concepcion whom Cuaso knew to have opened, earlier
that year, an account. What Cuaso indicated in the application form,
however, was that Fernando was introduced by Valentin Co, and with her initials
on the form signifying her approval, she referred the application to the New
Accounts Section for processing. The application form shows the signature of
"Eligia G. Fernando", "her" date of birth, sex, civil
status, nationality, occupation ("business woman"), tax account number, and initial
deposit of P10,000.00. This final approval
of the new current account
is indicated on the application form by the initials of the cashier,
who did not interview
the new client but affixed her initials on the application form after reviewing it.
The woman holding
herself out as Eligia G. Fernando deposited the two checks in controversy. Her
endorsement on the two checks was found to conform with the depositor's
specimen signature. CBC's guaranty of prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement was then stamped
on the two checks, which CBC forthwith
sent to clearing and which BPI cleared on the same day. Two days after,
withdrawals began.
The maturity
date of Eligia G. Fernado's money market placement
with BPI came and the real Eligia
G. Fernando went to BPI for the roll-over of her placement. She disclaimed having preterminated her placement. She then executed
an affidavit stating
that while she was the payee of the two checks in controversy, she never received
nor endorsed them and that her purported signature on the back
of the checks was not hers but forged. With her surrender of the original of
the promissory note evidencing the placement which matured that day, BPI issued
her a new promissory note to evidence a roll-over of the placement.
BPI returned the two checks in
controversy to CBC as supported by Eligia G. Fernando's affidavit, for the
reason "Payee's endorsement forged". CBC, in turn, returned the
checks for reason "Beyond Clearing Time". These incidents led to the
filing of this case with the Arbitration Committee.
The Arbitration Committee ruled in favor of BPI and ordered CBC to pay the former
with interest. - However, upon CBC’s motion for reconsideration, the Board of Directors of the PCHC reversed the Arbitration
Committee's decision and dismissed the complaint of BPI while ordering it to
pay CBC.
BPI then filed a
petition for review with the Regional Trial Court which dismissed said petition
but modified the award by including a provision for attorney’s fees in favor of
CBC, among others. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUES: Who between BPI and CBC should be held liable?
Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the payment of the forged checks made
by the impostor?
HELD:
In the present petition,
Fernando’s name in the checks were forged. The checks are "wholly
inoperative" and of no effect. However, the underlying circumstances of
the case show that the general rule on forgery is not applicable. The issue as
to who between the parties should bear the loss in the payment of the forged
checks necessities the determination of the rights and liabilities of the
parties involved in the controversy in relation to the forged checks.
The
records show that petitioner BPI, as drawee bank and CBC as representing or
collecting bank were both negligent resulting in the encashment of the forged
checks.
The Arbitration
Committee in its’ decision, analyzed the negligence of the employees of BPI
involved who are involved in the processing of the pre-termination of
Fernando's money market placement and in the issuance and delivery of the
subject checks. A) The impostor could have been readily unmasked by a mere
telephone call, which nobody in BPI bothered to make to Fernando; b) The
officer who used to handle Fernando's account did not do anything about the
account's pre-termination; c) Again no verification appears to have been made on Fernando's purported signature on the letter requesting the pretermination and the letter authorizing her niece to pick-up the checks, yet, her signature
was in BPI's file; and
d) the surrender of the promissory note
evidencing the money market placement that was supposedly pre-terminated. The
Arbitration Committee, however, belittled BPI's negligence compared to that of
CBC which it declared as graver and the proximate cause of the loss of the
subject checks to the impostor.
Banks handle daily
transactions involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the
degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees
and officials is far greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. For
obvious reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of
diligence in the selection and
supervision
of their employees.
In the present
case, there is no question that the banks were negligent in the selection and
supervision of their employees. The Arbitration Committee, the PCHC Board of
Directors and the lower court, however disagree in the evaluation of the degree
of negligence of the banks. While the Arbitration Committee declared the
negligence of respondent CBC graver, the PCHC Board of Directors and the lower
courts declared that BPI's negligence was graver. To the extent that the degree
of negligence is equated to the proximate cause of the loss, we rule that the
issue as to whose negligence is graver is relevant. No matter how many
justifications both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase
the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising extraordinary diligence
in the selection and supervision of their employees.
The next issue hinges
on whose negligence was the proximate
cause of the payment of the forged
checks by an impostor. BPI insists that the doctrine
of last clear chance should have been applied considering the circumstances of this case. Under this doctrine, where
both parties were negligent and such negligence were not contemporaneous, the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
Applying these principles, BPI's reliance on the doctrine
of last clear chance to clear it from liability
is not well-taken. CBC had no prior notice
of the fraud perpetrated by BPI's
employees on the pretermination of Eligia G. Fernando's money market placement.
Moreover, Fernando is not a depositor of CBC. Hence, a comparison of the
signature of Eligia G. Fernando with that of the impostor Eligia
G. Fernando, which CBC did, could not have resulted
in the discovery of the fraud. Hence,
respondent CBC had no way to discover
the fraud at all.
In fact, the records fail to show that respondent CBC had knowledge, actual or implied,
of the fraud perpetrated by the impostor
and the employees
of BPI.
BPI further
argues that the acts and omissions of are the cause "that set into motion
the actual and continuous sequence of events that
produced the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." BPI anchors its argument on its
stance that there was "a gap, a hiatus, an interval between the issuance
and delivery of said checks by BPI to the impostor and their actual
payment of CBC to the impostor. BPI points out that the gap of one (1) day that elapsed from its issuance
and delivery of the checks
to the impostor is material on the issue of proximate cause. At this stage, according
to BPI, there was yet no loss and the impostor could have decided
to desist from completing the same plan and could have held to
the checks without negotiating them.
BPI's contention that CBC alone should bear the loss must fail. The gap of one (1) day between the issuance and delivery of the checks
bearing the impostor's name as payee and
the impostor's negotiating the said forged checks by opening an account and
depositing the same with respondent CBC is not controlling. It is not unnatural or unexpected that after taking the risk of impersonating Eligia G.
Fernando with the connivance of BPI's employees, the impostor would complete
her deception by encashing the forged checks. There is therefore, greater
reason to rule that the proximate cause of the payment of the forged
checks by an impostor was due to the negligence of BPI. This finding, notwithstanding, we are not inclined to rule that BPI must solely bear the loss. Due care on the part of CBC could have prevented any loss.
The Court cannot
ignore the fact that the CBC employees closed their eyes to the suspicious
circumstances of huge over-the-counter withdrawals made immediately after the
account was opened. The opening of the account itself was accompanied by
inexplicable acts clearly showing negligence. And while we do not apply the
last clear chance doctrine as controlling in this case, still the CBC employees
had ample opportunity to avoid the harm which befell both CBC and BPI. They let
the opportunity slip by when the ordinary prudence expected of bank employees
would have sufficed to seize it.
Both banks were
negligent in the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the
encashment of the forged checks by an impostor. Both banks were not able to
overcome the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees. It was the gross negligence of the employees of both banks
which resulted in the fraud and the subsequent loss. While it is true that
BPI's negligence may have been the proximate cause of the loss, CBC's
negligence contributed equally to the
success of the impostor in encashing the proceeds of the forged checks. Under
these circumstances, we apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the effect that
while CBC may recover its losses, such losses are subject to mitigation by the
courts.
Intoxication
E.M. Wright V Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co.
28
Phil 122 (October 1, 1914)
FACTS: Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street
railway. Wright’s residence
in Caloocan fronts
on the street along which defendant’s tracks
run. To enter his premises from the street, Wright
must cross defendant’s tracks.
One night,
Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing
the tracks to enter the premises of his home, the horse stumbled, leaped
forward, and fell, throwing the Wright from the
vehicle, causing injuries. On the location where Wright crossed the tracks, the
rails were above-ground, and the ties upon which the rails rested projected
from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, making
the tops of the rails
some 5 or 6 inches
or more above
the level of the street.
Manila Electric
admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but it also claimed that Wright was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the
accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that
plaintiff’s negligence was not as great as defendant’s. It awarded Wright
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Wright contributed
to the “principal occurrence” or “only to his own injury.”
HELD: NO. I ntoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending
to prove negligence. No facts, other
than the fact that Wright was intoxicated, are stated
which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff
was negligent. The conclusion that if he had been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the facts as found. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle
under the conditions described.
A horse crossing
the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties
themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling,
the vehicle crashing against the rails with such force as to break a wheel,
might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his
condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would
not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters
the realm of speculation and guesswork. Wright was not negligent. No facts to
merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff
US vs. Baggay
20
PHIL 142 (September 1, 1911)
Facts:
Several persons were assembled in
Baggay's house to hold a song service called "buni." The
Non-Christian Baggay without provocation, suddenly attacked a woman named Bil-
liingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she died immediately. With the same bolo, he likewise inflicted
various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and
on his own mother, Dioalan.
For this reason,
the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in court charging Baggay with murder.
After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration,
the judge exempted Baggay from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify
the heirs of the murdered woman. The Baggay's counsel and his heirs appealed to
this court.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not an insane person, exempt from
criminal liability can still be civilly liable. (2) Can the heirs of Baggay be
held civilly liable?
HELD:
(1) YES. Civil liability
accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a
crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for
indemnification of the harm done.
Civil liability
may arise from acts ordinarily punishable under the penal law, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal
liability. Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite
of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged
mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the
consequences of his acts, even though they be performed
unwittingly. His fellows
ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts inspite of his unfortunate condition.
Law
and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when
he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and
indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent
maintenance, but this protection does not exclude
liability for damage
caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts.
(2) Yes. The persons who are civilly liable for
acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile are those who have them under their
authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no
blame or negligence on their part.
Should there be no
person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such
person be insolvent, the lunatic shall answer with his own property, excepting
that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.
Degrees of Negligence
Marinduque vs.Workmen’s Compensation
99
PHIL 48 (June 30, 1956)
FACTS:
A truck driven by Procopio
Macunat, belonging to Marinduque Iron Mines, turned over and hit a coconut tree
resulting in the death of Pedro Mamador and injury to the other laborers. Macunat
was prosecuted, convicted and was sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
He paid nothing,
however, to the latter. Madador’s
wife now seeks compensation
by Marinduque Iron Mines as the employer.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Mamador
has a right to be compensated by Marinduque Iron Mines. (2) Whether or not there was notorious
negligence by Mamador
for having violated
the employer’s prohibition on riding haulage trucks.
HELD: YES. Marinduque Iron Mines alleged
that the criminal
case sentencing Macunat
to indemnify the heirs of Mamador was a suit for damages
against a third person, thereby
having the effect of releasing the employer from liability. The criminal
case, however, was not a suit for damages against third persons because the
heirs did not intervene therein and they have not received the indemnity
ordered by the court. At any rate, even if the case was against a third person,
the court already decided in Nava vs.
Inchausti that criminal prosecution of the "other person" does
not affect the liability of the employer.
Marunduque also contended that the amicable
settlement entered into by Mamador's widow and Macunat
barred the widow's
claim against the employer because
she has already elected one of the remedies. This contention cannot
be sustained because
what the widow waived was the offender's criminal prosecution and not all civil action
for damages.
2. NO. Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a
ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. It couldn't be, because
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. Although the employer
prohibited its employees to ride the haulage trucks, its violation does not
constitute negligence per se, but it may be an evidence of negligence.
Under
the circumstance, however,
it cannot be declared negligence because the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal
safety of the riders. Notorious
negligence means the same
as gross negligence which implies
"conscious indifference to consequences,” or "pursuing a course of conduct which
would naturally and probably result
in injury."
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Layugan vs. IAC
167
SCRA 363 November 14, 1968
FACTS: Pedro Layugan testified that while he and his
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck that was parked along
the right side of the National Highway, Godofredo Isidro’s truck, recklessly
driven by Daniel Serrano bumped Layugan. As a result, Layugan had his left leg
amputated.
Defendant Isidro
admitted his ownership of the vehicle
involved in the accident. Isidro
said that Layugan
was merely a bystander, not a truck
helper being a brother-in-law of the
driver of said truck; that the truck allegedly, while
being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane right after the curve; that the proximate
cause of the incident was the
failure of the driver of the parked truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano,
defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver;
that before leaving,
he checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the truck being repaired by Layugan, while the same was at a stop. Serrano also testified that, “When I was a few meters
away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped
on my foot brakes but it did not function
with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear right was cut that's
why the breaks did not function.” Layugan, on the other hand, claims
that a warning device consisting of the lighted
kerosene lamp was placed 3-4 Meters from the back of the truck.
Isidro points to the driver of parked
truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it would, under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there exists a presumption of negligence on
the part of the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper.
ISSUES
1.
Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent.
2.
Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this
case.
HELD:
1. NO. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that
reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Applying the definition
and the test, it is clear that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano
has been
established by clear and convincing
evidence. Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half of the
shoulder of the road is immaterial taking into account the warning device
consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the back of the truck.
But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still bumped the
rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident,
Layugan sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
2. NO. In our jurisdiction, Res ipsa loquitur as
a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely
a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof
and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care.
The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents
evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury,
or where there’s direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and
all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And
once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no
presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability
can reasonably be made, whatever
the source of the evidence.
In this case, it is
inapplicable because it was established by clear and convincing evidence the
negligence of the defendant driver.
(Note:
The discussion in this case of res ipsa loquitur is merely stated in the obiter
dictum.)
Ramos vs. CA
321
SCRA 584 (December 29, 1999)
Facts: Erlinda Ramos was a robust
woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains
caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder.
She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of the stone in her gall bladder.
She underwent a series of examinations which included blood
and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery.
She and her
husband, Rogelio, met Dr. Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, for the
first time. They agreed on the date of the operation and the doctor decided
that she undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation. Erlinda was admitted in the
hospital and was accompanied by her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz. At the
operating room, Cruz saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez, the other
defendant, who was to administer the anesthesia. Although
not a member of the hospital staff,
Herminda Cruz introduced herself as the Dean of the College of Nursing at the
Capitol Medical Center and was allowed to stay inside the operating room.
Hours later, Cruz, who was inside the
operating room with the patient, heard somebody say “Dr. Hosaka is already
here.” As she held the hand of Erlinda, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating
the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, “ang hirap
maintubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan”. Due to the
remarks of Dr. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on what Dr. Gutierrez was
doing. She noticed a bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of
Erlinda. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr.
Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived in the operating
room, Cruz saw him trying to intubate Erlinda. Erlinda’s nailbed became bluish
and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position. Immediately,
thereafter, Cruz went out of the operating room, and told Erlinda’s husband
(her brother) “that something wrong was happening”. Cruz immediately rushed
back, and saw Erlinda was still in trendelenburg position. On that fateful day,
she saw Erlinda taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Erlinda stayed for
about four months in the hospital and has been in a comatose condition.
When asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient,
Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka explained that the patient
had bronchospasm. After being discharged from the hospital,
she has been staying in their residence, still needing constant medical
attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring monthly expenses. She was
diagnosed to be suffering from “diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage.”
The
Ramoses filed a civil case for damages against the private respondents alleging
negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
is applicable. (2) Whether or not private
respondents were negligent in the care of
Erlinda during the anesthesia phase
of the operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged
negligence was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s
comatose condition. (3) Is the hospital liable?
Held:
YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in the
case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda
in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for
the application of the doctrine.
In holding
that res ipsa loquitur
is available to the present
case we are not saying that the
doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Res ipsa loquitur
is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
The phrase “res ipsa loquitur”
is a maxim for the rule that the
fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit
an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie
case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation.
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or
separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. Mere invocation and application of the doctrine
does not dispense
with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply
a step in the process of such proof.
Still, before resort
to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1.The accident
is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants;
and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element
is the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the
defendant.
But
it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden
of proof to the defendant
to show that he is not guilty
of the ascribed negligence.
The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation
any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance
occurred. If there were such extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
may be utilized
and the defendant is called
upon to explain
the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
(2) YES. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part. Their negligence was the proximate cause of her
condition. Dr. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient. She admitted
that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation. And no
prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. She was unaware
of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. This is an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility.
Private respondents
repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlinda’s
coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to a drug
introduced into her system. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
Respondent Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the “captain” of the operative team) in not determining, if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols. No evidence on record exists to show that Dr. Hosaka
verified if respondent Dr. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient.
Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled
another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda’s cholecystectomy, and was in fact over
three hours late for the latter’s operation. Because
of this, he had little
or no time to confer
with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
(3) We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital. The unique practice
(among private hospitals) of filling up specialist staff with attending and
visiting “consultants,” who are allegedly not hospital employees, presents
problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice
cases. The truth is, Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control
over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff. While “consultants” are
not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in
denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill
the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception
of the payment of wages.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not
only
for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s
responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned
prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to
prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on
the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the instant case,
respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over
respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the
latter. Upon these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are
solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Batiquin vs. CA
258
SCRA 334 (July 5, 1996)
Facts:
Mrs. Villegas consulted Dr.
Batiquin for prenatal care. Dr. Batiquin, along with other physicians and
nurses, performed a caesarian operation on Mrs. Villegas and successfully
delivered the latter’s baby. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to
suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish. She also gradually
lost appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter's polyclinic who
prescribed certain medicines for her. However, the pains still kept recurring.
She then consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho. After examining her, Dr. Kho suggested
that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery.
When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs.
Villegas she found whitish-yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of
the left and right ovaries which gave out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus,
and a p iece of rubber which appeared to be a
part of a rubber glove. This was the cause of the infection of the ovaries
the discomfort suffered by Mrs. Villegas.
The piece of rubber
allegedly found was not presented in court. There were also doubts as to the
whereabouts of the piece of rubber, as 2 versions arose from Dr. Kho’s
testimony: 1) that he sent it to a Pathologist in Cebu and (2) he threw it
away. But aside from Dr. Kho's testimony, the Medical Certificate, the Progress
Record, the Anesthesia Record, the Nurse's Record, an the Physician's Discharge
Summary mentioned the piece of rubber. The trial court, however, regarded these
documentary evidence as mere hearsay, since those who prepared them did not
testify in court.
The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.
The CA reversed the decision.
Issues: Whether or not Dr. Batiquin could be held liable
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Held:
While Dr. Batiquin claims that
contradictions and falsities punctured Dr. Kho's testimony, a reading of said
testimony reveals no such infirmity and establishes Dr. Kho as a credible
witness. Dr. Batiquin failed to impute any motive for Dr. Kho to state any
untruth, leaving her trustworthiness unimpaired.
Considering that we have assessed Dr. Kho
to be a credible witness, the rule of res
ipsa loquitur comes to fore. In the instant case, all the requisites for
recourse to the doctrine are present. First, the entire proceedings of the
cesarean section were under the exclusive
control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the Dr. Batiquin were bereft of
direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign
object finding its way into private respondent Villegas' body, which, needless
to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence. Second,
since aside from the cesarean
section, V illegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber
to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason
that such could
only have been a byproduct of the cesarean
section performed by Dr. Batiquin. Dr. Batiquin
failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is
therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private
respondent Villegas' abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
D.M. Consunji vs. CA
357 SCRA 249 (April 20, 2001)
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker
of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City
to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together
with Jessie Jaluag
and Delso Destajo
were performing their work on board a steel platform
with plywood flooring
and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked
at the 5 ton chain
block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect
the chain block with the platform came loose causing
the whole platform
assembly and the victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator
core of the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
Jose Juego’s
widow, Maria, filed
with the RTC a complaint
for damages against
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other
defenses, the widow’s
prior availment of the
benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove D.M. Consunji’s
negligence.
Held:
YES. As a rule of evidence, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based
in part upon the theory
that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either
knows the cause of the accident
or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where
evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites
are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of
the person injured.
No worker is going
to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work
in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite
is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused
the injury is under the exclusive control
and management of appellant;
thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was
attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband; thus, the last requisite is also
present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any evidence
to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising
from the application of res ipsa
loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Defenses (Plaintiff’s
negligence)
Manila Electric Co. vs Remonquillo
99
PHIL 117 (May 18, 1956)
Facts:
Efren Magno went to the house of
Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, to repair a leaking “media agua.” The “media
agua” was just below the window of the third floor of his stepbrother’s house.
Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru the window a
galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. The lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of Manila Electric Company
parallel to the media agua, causing his death by electrocution.
Magno’s
widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. Trial court
rendered judgment in their favor. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
The electric
wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched
between poles on the street
and carrying a charge of 3600 volts.
It was installed there some two
years ago before Peñaloza’s house
was constructed. During
the construction of said house a similar
incident took place,
with less tragic
consequences. The owner of the house complained to the defendant about the
danger which the wire presented, and defendant moved one end of the wire
farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other end where it
was. Regulations of the City required that “all wires be kept three feet from
the building.”There was no insulation that could have rendered it safe, because
there is no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire
(according to appellant, and this was not refuted).
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is guilty of
negligence.
HELD: NO. It was the victim who was guilty of negligence. The liability of electric companies
for damages or personal injury is governed
by the rules of negligence. Nevertheless such
companies are not insurers of the safety of the public.
The death of Magno
was primarily caused by his own negligence, and in some measure by the too
close proximity of the “media agua” to the electric wire of the company by
reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the
subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the “media agua.”
The company cannot
be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which
reduces the distance between its wires and said construction, and to change the
installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance.
The
violation of the permit for the construction was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. The real cause of the accident or death was the reckless
or negligent act of Magno himself.
It is to be presumed
that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. He had training and experience for the job. He could
not have been entirely a stranger
to electric wires and the danger lurking in them.
Bernardo vs. Legaspi
29
Phil 12 (December 23, 1914)
Facts:
Due to a collision between the
respective automobiles of Bernardo and Legaspi, the former filed an action to
recover damages for injuries sustained by his car. Legaspi, on the other hand,
filed a cross-complaint alleging it was Bernardo's fault. He also asks for
damages. The lower court found upon that both the plaintiff and the defendant
were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of
such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from
recovering.
ISSUE Whether or not the parties may recover damages
HELD:
NO. Where two automobiles, going
in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from
the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were
equally negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as
determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the other for damages
suffered.
Bernal vs. House
54
PHIL 327 (January 30, 1930)
Facts:
Fortunata Enverso with her
daughter, Purificacion Bernal went to Tacloban, Leyte to attend the procession
on Holy Friday. After the procession, accompanied by two other persons, they
passed along a public street. Purificacion was allowed to get a short distance
in advance of her mother and her friends.
While in front of
the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile
appeared which frightened the child. She turned to run, but fell into the
street gutter. At that time there was hot water running in the gutter coming
from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions
reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. The girl was
taken to the provincial hospital. Despite his efforts, the child died that same
night. It was certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree,
whole Body", and that the contributory causes were "Congestion of the
Brain and visceras of the chest & abdomen.”
The defense
was that the hot water
was permitted to flow down the side of the street with the knowledge and consent of the authorities and that the cause of death was other than the hot water; and that in the death
the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and negligence. The trial judge
dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the action should be dismissed due
to the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs
Held: NO. The death of the child was the result of fault
and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, endangering
the lives of passers-by who were unfortunately
enough to fall into it. The mother
and her child had a perfect right to be on the street on the evening
when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal
in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance
of the mother. No one could foresee
the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water.
. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does result not operate as a bar to recovery,
but in its strictest sense could only in reduction of the damages.
PLDT vs.
CA
G.R.
No. 57079 (September 29, 1989)
FACTS: The jeep of Spouses Esteban
ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The Spouses Esteban’s complaint alleged that
Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered
because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. Gloria Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries
on her arms, legs and face, leaving
a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. The windshield of the jeep was also shattered.
PLDT, in its answer,
denies liability on the contention that the injuries
sustained by Spouses
Esteban were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R.
Barte and Company, an independent contractor which undertook the said
construction work. The trial court ruled in favor of Esteban spouses whereas
the CA reversed the ruling.
Issue: Whether or not the Estebans can claim damages from
PLDT.
Held:
NO. A person claiming damages for
the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault
or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence.
The accident was
due to the lack of diligence of Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to the
negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. The jeep was running along
the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it
would not have hit the accident mound. That plaintiffs’ jeep was on the inside
lane before it swerved to hit the accident mound could have been corroborated by a picture
showing Lacson Street
to the south of the accident mound.
Plaintiffs’ jeep was not running
at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff husband claimed. At that speed,
he could have stepped on the brakes the moment it struck the accident mound.
The above findings
clearly show that the negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only contributory
to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the
occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby
precludes their right to recover damages.
Defenses (Contributory Negligence)
Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 422
(September 22, 1957)
Facts:
Genobiagon was driving a rig along
T. Padilla St. in Cebu City. The petitioner's vehicle was going so fast not
only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was
trying to overtake the rig ahead of him.
As an old woman was
crossing the street, Genobiagon’s rig bumped her and caused her to fall in the
middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao saw the incident and shouted at Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genobiagon reasoned out that he did not bump the old woman and that it was the old woman who bumped
him. The old woman was brought to the
hospital but she died 3 days after.
Petitioner was charged
and convicted with the crime
of homicide thru reckless imprudence. CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability from 6,000 to 12,000. Hence,
this petition.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the court erred in the
affirmation of conviction (2) Whether
or not the court unjustly increased the civil liability
Held:
(1) No. The alleged contributory
negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. The defense
of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade
the effects of his own negligence.
(2) No. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for
death in homicide or murder is 30,000 (at present 50,000, this case was decided
in 1989).
Rakes vs. Atlantic
G.R.
No. 1719 (1907)
Facts: The plaintiff Rakes,
one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon
in Manila. Plaintiff
claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant
Atlantic, has proved
that there were two immediately following one another,
upon which were piled
lengthwise seven rails,
each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails
lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured
to the cars, but without
side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of
the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front,
hauling by a rope. At a certain
spot at or near the water's edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset,
the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking
his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
In order to charge
the defendant with negligence, it was necessary to show a breach of duty on its part in failing
either to properly
secure the load on iron to vehicles
transporting it, or to skillfully build the tramway or to maintain it in
proper condition, or to vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as
the depression in it became visible. It is upon the failure of the defendant
to repair the weakened track,
after notice of its condition, that the judge below based his judgment.
In respect of the
second charge of negligence against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence does not justify the
finding that the car was pulled by means of a rope attached
to the front end or to the rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in evidence make it clear that the persons necessary
to operate the car could not walk upon the plank
between the rails
and that, therefore, it was necessary for the employees moving it to get hold upon it as best they could,
there is no specific finding upon the instruction given by the
defendant to its employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon the necessity
of the plaintiff putting himself upon the ties at the side in order to get hold
upon the car.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on
the part of Rakes.
Held:
While the plaintiff and his
witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way,
but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition
frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car,
and the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of
this particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the
preponderance is in favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general
order being made known to the workmen.
If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself
in danger contributed in some degree
to the injury as a proximate,
although not as its primary cause.
Difficulty
seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction
must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the
event giving occasion for damages — that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding
of the iron rails. To this event,
the act of the plaintiff
in walking by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element
of the damage which came to himself.
Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act
of omission of duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of
the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury,
he may recover the amount
that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA
(Lipana)
269
SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997)
Facts:
Rommel's Marketing Corporation
(RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBCom
in connection with its business of selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMC’s GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totaling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose
of depositing said funds to RMC’s account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not credited
to RMC's account
but were instead
deposited to the PBCom account
of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas.
Irene Yabut would
accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account
number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but
the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad,
would validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit
slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the
duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record
purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the
space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written
thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made her company believe that the amounts she deposited were being
credited to its account when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account
of her husband.
During the entire
period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with monthly statements showing
its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was never the practice of Romeo
Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence
to PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC
demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money.
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on
the part of RMC.
Held:
In the case at bench, there is no
dispute as to the damage suffered by the private respondent (plaintiff in the
trial court) RMC in the amount of P304,979.74. It is in ascribing fault or
negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the
culprit.
Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.
Picart v. Smith, provides the test by
which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Applying the above
test, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in
validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and
presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was
not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank
with respect to the proper validation of deposit
slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.
Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad
but also on the part of the bank itself
in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad.
This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo
Bonifacio, then Manager
of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered
the investigation of the incident,
he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated
in total disregard
of the bank's validation procedures.
It was this
negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner
bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the
proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the
latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the
petitioners
Defenses (Fortuitous Event)
Juntilla vs. Fontanar
136
SCRA 624 (May 31, 1985)
Facts: Juntilla was a passenger of a public utility jeepney,
being driven by Defendant Berfol Camoro, enroute
from Danao to Cebu City. The jeepney
had fourteen (14) passengers in the
back and three (3) at the front, one of whom was Juntilla. Upon reaching
Mandaue City, the right rear tire of the jeepney exploded causing the vehicle
to fall into a ditch and turn turtle. As consequence, Juntilla
was thrown out of the jeepney and sustained lacerations to his right
palm and suffered
other injuries. Juntilla, still shocked, went back to Danao City for medical help but on his way discovered
that his watch is missing.
Juntilla then filed
a case for breach of contract of carriage with damages before the City Court of
Cebu, which found the respondents (the driver, the franchise operator and
owner) liable for the accident ordering the latter to pay damages, including
the value of watch lost by petitioner during the incident. Upon appeal, the
CFI, relying on a case decided by the Court of Appeals (Rodriguez case),
exonerated respondents on grounds that the blowing of tire is a fortuitous
event, and therefore beyond the control of the latter.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the blowing of the tire a
fortuitous event (2) Whether or not the respondents should be held liable for
breach of contract of carriage.
Held: No. A fortuitous event has the following essential
characteristics:
(a) The cause of the unforeseen or unexpected occurrence, or the failure
of the obligor to comply with his obligation must be independent of human will.
(b) The event
must be impossible to foresee or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible
to avoid.
(c) The occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the obligor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner.
(d) The
obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation if the injury
resulting to the oblige
The
Supreme Court held that the cause of the incident was NOT independent from
human will. The accident was caused EITHER by the negligence of the driver or because of the
mechanical
defects in the tire.
Common carriers
should teach their drivers not to overload
their vehicles, not to exceed
the speed limits
and to know the correct
measures to take when a tire blows up, thus ensuring
the safety of the passengers at all times. In the instant case, the Supreme
Court found that the jeep was overloaded with passengers (17, excluding
the driver), and was speeding. The Court made the observation that a jeepney
at a regular and safe speed would not have jump into a ditch when the right rear tire blows up.
Neither can the driver and operator point liability to the manufacturer
of the tire. The Supreme Court, citing Necesito et. al. vs. Paras, held that:
xxx [A] passenger
is entitled to recover damages
from a carrier for an injury resulting
from a defect in appliance (tire) purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears
that the defect would have been discovered by the
carrier if it had exercised
the degree of care…with regard to the inspection and application of the
necessary tests…[T]he manufacturer
is considered… the agent or servant of the carrier as regards the work of the
appliance (tire) xxx
Such
rationale is based on the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor
control over the carrier’s selection of the tire. Having no privity with the
manufacturer or vendor of the tire, the passenger has no remedy against the
former, on the other hand, the carrier has. T he sudden blowing up of the tire may
have been caused by too much air pressure. The Source of the common carrier’s
legal liability is the contract of carriage. The carrier binds itself to carry
the passengers safely as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all circumstances.
Hernandez vs. Commission on Audit
179 SCRA 39 (November
6, 1989)
Facts:
At the time of the incident in
question, Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge and special disbursing
officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. As such, he went to the main office of the Authority in Manila on July 1, 1983 to encash two checks covering
the wages of the employees and the operating expenses of the Project. He estimated that the money would be
available by 10:00AM and that he would be back in Ternate by about 2:00PM. For
some reason, the processing of the checks was delayed and was completed only at
3:00PM. Despite realizing that he would not reach ternate in time to distribute
the salary of the workers, Hernandez nevertheless decided to encash them. He thought he had to do this for the benefit of the laborers,
otherwise they would have to wait until the following
Tuesday, when the main office
would reopen. And so, on the same afternoon he collected the cash value
of the checks and left the main office a substantial amount of money.
Hernandez realized
that had two choices, to (1) return
to Ternate, Cavite,
the same afternoon and arrive there in the early evening;
or (2) take the money to his house in Marilao,
Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following morning. He
opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. And so, he took a passenger
jeep bound for his house in Bulacan.
While the vehicle
was along EDSA, two persons boarded with knives in hand. One pointed his weapon
at the Hernandez’ side while the other slit his pocket and forcibly took the
money he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez, after
the initial shock, immediately followed in desperate pursuit. He caught up with
Virgilio Alvarez and overcame
him after a scuffle. Hernandez sustained injuries in the lip arms and knees. Alvarez
was subsequently charged
with robbery and pleaded guilty,
but the robber
who had the money escaped.
On
July 5, 1983, Hernandez filed a request for relief from money accountability
under Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code. Deespite favorable
endorsement by
Philippine Tourism Authority and the
NCR Regional Director of the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Audit,
through then Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the Hernandez’ request.
According to Tantuico, the loss of the P10,175.00 under the accountability of
Mr. Hernandez can be attributed to his negligence because had he brought the
cash proceeds of the checks (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate,
Cavite, immediately after encashment for safekeeping in his office, which is
the normal procedure in the handling of public funds.
Issue: Whether or not the COA acted with grave abuse of
discretion in holding Hernandez negligent.
Held: Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code
reads as follows:
Section
638. Credit for loss occurring in transit
or due to casualty. Notice to Auditor. When a loss of government funds or
property occurs while the same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or
other casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having custody thereof
shall immediately notify the Auditor General, or the provincial auditor,
according as a matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or the
other, and within thirty days or such longer period as the Auditor, or
provincial auditor, may in the particular case allow, shall present his
application for relief, with the available evidence in support thereof. An
officer who fails to comply with this requirement shall not be relieved of
liability or allowed credit for any such loss in the settlement of his
accounts.
Applying the letter and spirit of the
above-mentioned laws, and after considering the established facts in the light
of the arguments of the parties, this Court inclines in favor of the
petitioner.
It is pointless to argue that Hernandez
should have encashed the vouchers earlier because they were dated anyway on
June 29, 1983. He was not obliged to encash the checks earlier and then again
there might have been any number of reasons why he did so only on July 1, 1983.
The point is that he did encash the checks on that date and took the money to
Marilao and not Ternate in view of the lateness
of the hour. The question
before us is whether these acts are so tainted
with negligence or recklessness as to justify
the denial of the petitioner's request for relief from accountability for the stolen money.
It seems to us that the petitioner was
moved only by the best of motives when he encashed the checks on July 1, 1983,
so his co-employees in Ternate could collect their salaries and wages the
following day. Significantly, although this was a non-working day, he was
intending to make the trip to his office the following day for the unselfish
purpose of accommodating his fellow workers. The other alternative was to
encash the check is on July 5, 1983, the next working day after July 1, 1983,
which would have meant a 5-day wait for the
payment of the said salaries
and wages. Being
a modest employee
himself, Hernandoz must have realized
the great discomfort it would cause the laborer
who were dependent
on their wages for their sustenance and were anxious
to collect their pay as soon as possible. F or such an attitude,
Hernandez should be commended rather
than faulted.
As for Hernandez's choice between
Marilao, Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily agree that the former
was the safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips
to the two places. It is true that the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court
feels he should
not be blamed for that.
The decision he made seemed
logical at that time and was
one that could
be expected of a reasonable and prudent person.
And if, as it happened, the two robbers
attacked him in broad daylight
in the jeep while it was on a busy highway, and in
the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the result of his imprudence and negligence. This was undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said provisions,
something that could not have been reasonably foreseen although it could have
happened, and did.
We find, in sum, that under the circumstances as above narrated,
the petitioner is entitled to be relieved
from accountability for the money
forcibly taken from him in the afternoon of July 1, 1983. To impose
such liability upon him would be to read the law too sternly when it should
be softened by the proven
facts.
Gotesco vs. Chatto and Lina
Delza Chatto
210
SCRA 18 (June 16, 1992)
Facts:
Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year
old daughter, Lina, went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at Superama I
theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony
tickets but even then were unable to find seats. Hardly ten (10) minutes after
entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. The theater was
plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked and hurt, the mother and
daughter managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able
to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were
confined and treated for one (1) day.
Chatto filed a complaint for damages
against Gotesco. Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that the
collapse of the ceiling of its theater was due to force majeure. The trial court ordered Gotesco to pay the
plaintiffs moral damages, actual damages, attorney's fees, plus the cost of the
suit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due
to an act of God or Force Majeure?
Held: No. The collapse of the ceiling was not due to Force Majeur. Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted
that "he could not give any reason
why the ceiling
collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the burden to prove
that the collapse was indeed caused by force
majeure. It could not have collapsed without a cause. The fact that Mr. Ong
could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse
if indeed it were due to force majeure.
To Our mind,
the real reason
why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not
actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court
impliedly held, incompetent. He is not an engineer, but an architect who had
not even passed the government's examination. Verily, post-incident investigation
cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is
significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court
that the collapse was due to construction defects. There was no evidence
offered to overturn this finding. The building was constructed barely four (4)
years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the
causes denominates as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. S uch
defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due
diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by
the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was no adequate inspection of the premises
before the date of the accident. The fact that structural designs and plans of
the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and that building permits
and certificate of occupancy were issued, do not at all prove that there were
no defects in the construction, especially as regards the ceiling, considering
that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever inspected at all.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument
that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse
was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence,
which the trial court denominated as gross.
As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from
any liability because of it, he must have exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
Servando vs. Philippine Steam Navigation Co
117
SCRA 832
Facts: Clara Uy Bico and Amparo
Servando loaded on board a vessel owned by Philippine Steam Navigation cargoes
consisting of 1,528 cavans of rice and 44 cartons
of colored paper for
carriage from Manila
to Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental. Bills of lading were issued by Philippine Navigation. The cargoes were discharged in Negros Occidental Bureau of Customs Warehouse as complete and in good order.
At about 2:00 PM of
the same day, the Customs warehouse was razed by a fire of unknown origin,
destroying the cargoes. The claims for the value of said goods were rejected by Philippine Steam, herein respondent. Lower Court ordered
Philippine Steam to pay Servando
damages, including legal
interest from filing
of the case. They also awarded
damages to Uy Bico the sum for the portion
of the cargo which was not recovered
by her. The legal basis of the lower court for its decision if Article 1736:
Common
carriers have the duty to observe extraordinary diligence from the moment the
goods are unconditionally placed in their possession until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee or to
the person who has a right to receive them, without prejudice to the provisions
of Article 1738
It held that the delivery to the Bureau of Customs is not the
constructive delivery as contemplated in Article 1736, thus the common carrier
continues to be responsible.
Issue: Whether or not FIRE is a fortuitous event,
absolving Respondents of any liability?
Held: Yes. The burning
of the warehouse was an extraordinary event
independent of the will of the respondents. The following characteristics of caso fortuito
are present. 1. the
cause of the unforeseen event must be independent of the human will; 2. it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the 'caso fortuito', or if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; 3. the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner.4. the obligor
must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
When the proximate
cause of loss is a fortuitous event or force majeure, the obligor is exempt from liability. This is provided
for by Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by
the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of
the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.
It
should also be pointed out that in the Bill of Lading (BOL) existing on the
cargoes, the responsibility of the carrier has been limited as provided by
Clause 14.:
Not unless the loss or damage is caused by the
negligence of the carrier, the common carrier shall not be liable for such
caused by force majeures, accidents of sea, war and public enemies.
This is a mere reiteration of Article 1174.
Furthermore, the storage of the goods in the Customs warehouse
while waiting withdrawal by the
petitioners was made with their knowledge and consent.
Since the warehouse belonged t o and maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute negligence to Philippine Steam, having no control over the same. There is also no proof or showing that the fire can be imputable to the negligence of its
employees. Judgment appealed is set aside.
NAPOCOR vs. CA
GR
Nos. 1 03442-45 (1993)
Facts: The controversy stemmed
from separate complaints filed by several
residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan against petitioner, National Power Corp. The residents
seek to recover actual and
other damages for the loss of lives due to the inundation of their town. The
flooding was allegedly caused by NAPOCOR’s acts of negligently releasing water
in the spillways of Angat Dam (hydroelectric plant). NAPOCOR, in its defense,
maintains that (1) they exercised due care and diligence in maintaining the
power plant; (2) petitioners duly notified the residents about the impending
release of water with the onset of typhoon kading and advised
them to take necessary precautions; and (3) that the damages
incurred by private
respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure.
The lower court
dismissed the complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. The CA reversed the
decision and awarded actual and moral damages (plus litigation expenses) to the
residents. The judgment was based on a patent gross and evident lack of
foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat
Dam. The unholiness of the hour, the extent
of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but
products of NAPOCOR’s headlessness, slovenliness,
and carelessness. The resulting flash flood and inundation
of even areas (sic) one (1) kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have
been avoided had NAPOCOR prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining a water
elevation, which would allow room for the expected torrential rains.
The
CA also rejected the NAPOCOR’s plea that the incident was caused by a
fortuitous event.
Issue: Whether or not the incident was caused by a
fortuitous event.
Held:
The SC rendered its decision based
on the same errors in G.R. No. 96410, entitled National Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al,
according to the Court, the proximate cause of the damage incurred by private
respondents was due to negligence of the NAPOCOR. The early warning notice was
insufficient. The SC cannot rule otherwise because its decision is now binding.
To exempt the
obligor from liability under Article 1174 (Acts of God) of the Civil Code, the
following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor;
(b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation
in a
moral manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury
to the creditor
Thus,
if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any
manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the
Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape
liability
The principle
embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one
occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to
be excluded from creating
or entering into the cause
of the mischief. Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person
concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person
is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage
was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of
God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that
loss or damage may have been occasioned.
Southeastern College Inc. v CA
GR
No. 126389 (July 10, 1998)
Facts:
Private Respondents Dimaano are
owners of a house in College Road, Pasay City while petitioner Corporation,
South Eastern College, owns a four-storey school building along the same road. In October 1989, a powerful
typhoon called “Saling”
hit the Metro.
Buffeted by very strong winds,
the roof of petitioner’s building
was partly ripped
off and blown away,
landing and destroying portions of the roofing of Dimaano’s house. An ocular
inspection was conducted by a team of engineers. They found that one factor and
perhaps, the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofings
structural trusses is the improper
anchorage of the trusses to the roof beams, thus recommending the building to be declared
a structural hazard.
Respondents filed a
complaint based on culpa aquiliana, alleging that the damage to their house
rendered the same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in other
houses. The Dimaanos sought to recover actual, moral and exemplary damages,
including attorney’s fees and costs from petitioners. In their answer,
Southeastern averred that the building withstood several devastating typhoons
and other calamities in the past without its roofing giving way, and that
typhoon Saling was an act of God.
In giving credence
to the ocular inspection, the Trial court ruled in favor of the Dimaanos and
ordered the Southeastern to pay the decreed damages sought. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the award of moral damages.
Issues: Whether or not the Southeastern College is liable
for the damage.
Held:
No. The antecedent of fortuitous
event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as an event
which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. In order that a
fortuitous even may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be
free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason which the loss may
have been occasioned
There
is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous even, a natural
occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of
foresight, diligence or care. From these premises, we proceed to determine
whether Southeastern was negligent, such that if it were not the damage caused
to private respondents’ house could have been avoided? At the outset it bears
emphasizing that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence. The facts c onstitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by presumption or
conclusions without basis of fact. The Dimaanos merely relied on the ocular
inspection, however by this basis, the relationship of cause and effect has NOT
been clearly shown.
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from private respondent’s city
building official, Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of
petitioner’s school building were
approved
including the certificate of occupancy. Having obtained both, these are, at the
least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a subject
school building.
As to the damages,
it is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually
proved with reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that
afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK
Afialda vs. Hisole
85
Phil 67 (November 29, 1949)
Facts:
Loreto Afialda was employed by
Hisole spouses as caretaker of their carabaos. While tending to the animals, he
was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence. His sister then filed a complaint against
the spouses Hisole.
The spouses filed a motion
to dismiss, which the court granted. Plaintiff now seeks to hold defendants liable under art. 1905 of the
Civil Code which states that “The possessor
of an animal or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages
it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away.
This liability shall cease only in case the damage
should arise from force majeure
or from the fault of the person
who may have suffered it.”
Issue: Whether or not the owner of the animal is liable
when the damage is caused to its caretaker.
Held:
No. The owner of an animal is
answerable only for damages caused to a stranger, and that damage caused to the
caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he had been negligent
or at fault under art. 1902 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, the
animal was in the custody of the caretaker. It was the caretaker’s business to
try to prevent the animal f rom causing
injury or damage
to anyone, including himself. Being injured
by the animal was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed
and for which he must take
the consequences. There was no allegation of negligence on the part of the Hisole spouses.
Thus, they are not liable.
Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INEL Co.)vs. Court
of Appeals
179
SCRA 5 (November 6, 1989)
Facts:
In the evening of June 28 until
the early morning of June 29, 1967, typhoon 'Gening' buffeted the province of
Ilocos Norte and brought heavy rains and flooding. Between 5:30- 6:00AM, Isabel
Lao Juan (Nana Belen) along with Aida Bulong and Linda Estavillo ventured out
of her house and traversed waist-deep flood to proceed to a store, which she
owns to check if her merchandise have been damaged.
Suddenly, Nana Belen screaamed 'ay!' and quickly
sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help but fear dissuaded
them because on the spot where
the deceased sank,
they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving
in snake-like fashion
in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to Nana Belen but he turned back because the water was
grounded. Ernesto informed Antonio Yabes that his mother in law had been
electrocuted and together they went to the City Hall of Laoag to request the
police to ask INELCO to cut off the current.
Subsequently, the search for the body began and such was found two meters
from an electric post.
In another
place at about
4:00 A.M., Engineer
Antonio Juan of the NAPOCOR
noticed certain fluctuations in their electric
meter which indicated
such abnormalities as grounded
or short-circuited lines.
He then went out for inspection and saw grounded
and disconnected lines which were hanging from posts to the ground.
Since there were no INELCO
linemen in sight, he decided to go to the INELCO
office but it was closed.
On the way to INELCO,
he passed by Guerrero St. and saw and electric
wire about 30 meters long and the other end of the wire was seeming to play with the
current of the water. At about 8:00 A.M., he went out for inspection again and
learned about the death of Nana Belen. He tried to help revive the deceased but
his efforts proved futile. He also noticed a hollow wound on the left palm of
the victim. In the afternoon, he went on an inspection trip again and the wire
that he saw on Guerrero St. earlier was no longer there.
Dr. Castro
examined the body of the deceased at around 8:00 A.M. and noted that the skin was grayish
or cyanotic which indicated death by electrocution. The wound on the left palm
was an electrically charged wound
or a first degree burn. The certificate of death prepared
by Dr. Castro stated the cause of death as 'circulatory shock
electrocution'.
An action for
damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased. INELCO, through its
officers and employees who testified, claims that on and even before June 29,
their electric system did not suffer from any defect that might constitute
hazard to life and property. Moreover, it was alleged that the lines and
devices were newly installed and they had installed safety devices to prevent
injuries to persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities.
INELCO also alleged that they had 12 linesmen charged with the duty of checking
the areas assigned to them. Fabico Abijero even testified that in the early
morning of June 29, he passed by the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal streets
and did not see any broken wires. He said that what he saw were many people
fishing out the body of the deceased. INELCO also presented Dr. Briones who
said that without an autopsy, no doctor or medico-legal can speculate the cause of death. Moreover,
he said that cyanosis (lack of oxygen
circulating in the blood) appears
only in a live person.
INELCO also said that the deceased
was negligent because she installed a burglar deterrent
by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate, thus charging the latter with electric current
whenever the switch
is on. INELCO then conjectures that the switch
must have been left on, causing the deceased electrocution when she tried to open her gate.
The CFI ruled in favor of INELCO. CA reversed.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the deceased died of
electrocution. (2) Whether or not petitioner INELCO may be held liable for the
death of Isabel Lao Juan. (3) Whether or not the maxim
volenti
non fit injuria can be applied in the case at bar.
Held:
(1) YES. The nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who saw them
can lead to no other conclusion than that they were burns and there was nothing
else in the street where the victim was wading thru which could
cause a burn except the dangling live wire of petitioner company.
In the issue of the burglar deterrent, the suggestion of petitioner that the switch was left on is mere speculation,
not backed up with evidence.
(2) YES. While it is true that typhoons
and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person
may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused
the victim's death. It was
through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. As
stated by Engr. Juan in his testimony, he saw no INELCO lineman and that the
office of INELCO was closed.
The SC held that in times of calamities, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigil
to prevent or avoid any probable incident
that might imperil life or limb. The petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public.
Furthermore, the court held that when an act of God combines
or concurs with the negligence
of the defendant (in this case the petitioner) to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own
negligent conduct or omission.
(3) NO. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding
typhoon. She went to her grocery store to see to it that the goods were
not flooded. It has been held that a person is excused from the force of the
rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the
consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, she was at a place where she had a right to be without
regard to petitioner's consent as she was on
her way to protect her merchandise.
DUE DILIGENCE
Ramos, et al vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
P.I., et al
19
SCRA 289 (1967)
Facts: The car owned by Placido
Ramos, while being
driven by his son Augusto,
collided with a truck-tractor and trailer of Pepsi Cola, driven by i Andres Bonifacio. Ramos
filed a case at the CFI of Manila against Pepsi. CFI found Bonifacio
negligent and declared that Pepsi Cola failed to exercise the due diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Pepsi and Bonifacio are held solidarily liable to pay P2,638.50 actual damages, P2,000
moral damages, P2000 exemplary damages
and P1,000 Atty. fees.
CA affirmed the
decision of CFI regarding Bonifacio but absolved Pepsi Cola from liability
stating that Pepsi has sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of
its employees.
Issue: Whether or not Pepsi Cola exercised due diligence
in the selection of its driver.
Held:
Yes. When it was proven that the
employer had carefully examined the erring driver as to his qualifications,
experience and record of service, such evidence is sufficient to show that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection of the driver and rebuts the juris tantum presumption that the employer
was negligent. Juan Anasco,
personnel manager of Pepsi stated
that before Bonifacio
was hired, his background, experience, physical capacity was checked. Also, he was asked to submit clearance
and also asked to
take theoretical and practical driving examination. Pepsi was also a member of
the Safety Council.
Petitioner can no
longer assail the credibility of Anasco. Findings of CA are binding on SC. A
motion for reconsideration was made stating that respondents violated the Motor
vehicle law. It was said that the truck was overweight and running beyond
the speed limit and that it was not equipped
with a rear vision mirror
and with a helper. Such allegations failed to show their basis. Patrolman
Pahate did not affirm such allegations. Also, a special permit may be granted
for overweight trucks and the absence of such permit was not proven. In Quasi
delicts, the motor vehicle owner is not an absolute owner against all damages
caused by its driver. The owner’s responsibility ceases once it proves that it
has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damages.
Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) vs. CA
223
SCRA 521 June 21, 1993
Facts:
Appellant Nenita Custodio boarded
a jeepney driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned by his co-defendant
Victorino Lamayo. The jeepney collided with an MMTC bus at the intersection of
DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road. MMTC bus was driven by defendant Godofredo
Leonardo. Both drivers failed to slow down or blow their horns. As a result of
said incident, Custodio was thrown out through the windshield and sustained
serious physical injuries. She was sent to the hospital and regained
consciousness only after a week.
Appellant, assisted
by her parents, filed a complaint for damages. Defendants denied the material
allegations. MMTC for its part presented Milagros Garbo, its training officer,
and Christian Bautista, its transport supervisor, as two of its witnesses.
Garbo testified that the company's bus drivers undergo a series of training
programs, examinations, clearances, interviews and seminars for their
selection. Bautista on the other hand, testified that he ensured the drivers
were in proper uniform, briefed in traffic rules and regulations and fit to
drive before the start of duty.
The trial court
found both drivers negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules
and regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching
an intersection. It however,
absolved MMTC, stating
that it was careful and diligent in selecting its employees and strict and diligent in supervising them as shown by the evidence. The CA
modified the said ruling, holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other
defendants. According to the CA, MMTC failed to substantiate its allegations
that it exercised the diligence of the good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees. It pointed out the fact that Garbo and
Bautista failed to present documentary evidence to support their claims, such
as the clearances and test results of Leonardo or the written guidelines. As
such, the testimonies fall short of the required evidentiary quantum.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence of MMTC is sufficient
to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
Held: No. The SC agrees with the ruling of the CA.
In civil cases, the
degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible
than that of the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming
a right to prove his case. Corollary, defendant must likewise
prove its own allegation to buttress its claim that
it is not liable. In fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who
asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial
such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. In the
case at bar, petitioner's attempt to prove it diligentissimi patris familias in
the selection and supervision of employees must fail as it was unable
to buttress the same with any other
evidence, object or documentary, which
might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. MMTC only gave oral
testimonies as its evidence, no documentary proof was submitted upon request to
further bolster its defense. The mere formulation of various company policies
on saftey without showing that they were being complied
with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising
from negligence of its employees.
The SC does not
find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the
diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, applying Art. 2180 in relation
to Art. 2176, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the other defendants.
PRESCRIPTION
Kramer vs. Court of Appeals
178
SCRA 518 (October 13, 1989)
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, F/B Marjolea, a
fishing boat owned by the petitioners was navigating its way from Marinduque to
Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat collided
with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines, owned by the private
respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.
F/B Marjolea sank,
taking with it its fish catch. The captains of both vessels filed their
respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine
Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose
of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who
were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. The findings made
by the Board served as the basis of a subsequent Decision of the Commandant of
the Philippine Coast Guard dated April 29, 1982 wherein the second mate of the
M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a marine officer.
On May 30, 1985,
the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private
respondent in the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the
dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of prescription. He argued that under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a
Complaint for damages arising from a quasi- delict like a maritime collision is
four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their
Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued,
i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime
collision took place, and that accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year
prescriptive period. Petitioners contended that maritime
collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with
special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine
Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the
running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine
protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date
of the decision of the board become final.
RTC ruled in favor
of petitioners holding that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime
collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to
such collision, and that the Board was constituted precisely to answer the
need. CA reversed the decision, holding that it is clear that the cause of
action of the petitioners accrued from the occurrence of the mishap because
that is the precise time when damages were inflicted upon and sustained by the
aggrieved party. It said that if the tolling of the prescriptive period would
hinge upon the discretion of a government agency, said alternative could entail
hazards. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the action for quasi-delict is
barred by prescription.
Held: Yes. Under Article
1146 of the Civil Code, an action
based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. The right of action accrues when there exists a
cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs
or takes place
that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen.
Allied Banking Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals
178
SCRA 526 (October 13, 1989)
Facts:
In 1977, Joselito Yujuico obtained
a loan from GEN BANK in the amount of PhP500,000 and as evidence, it issued a
promissory note payable GEN BANK. At the time private respondent incurred
the obligation, he was a ranking officer
of GENBANK and a member
of the family which owns the controlling interest in the bank. In 1980, the Central Bank issued
a resolution forbidding GENBANK from doing further
business. Four days after, another
resolution was issued
ordering the liquidation of GENBANK. Later,
ALLIED Bank acquired
all the assets and assumed all the liabilities of GENBANK, including the
receivable due from private Yujuico.
Upon Yujuico’s failure to pay, ALLIED Bank filed a complaint against
private respondent for the collection of a sum of money.
The CA affirmed the RTC decision in a special proceeding finding that the
liquidation of GENBANK was made in bad faith. This decision declared the
liquidation of GENBANK null and void. It was then that Yujuico filed the third
party complaint for damages alleging
that by reason
of the tortious interference by the Central
Bank with the affairs of GENBANK, he was prevented from paying his loan.
Issue: Assuming that the Central Bank is guilty of
tortious interference, has the claim of Yujuico under the third party complaint
prescribed?
Held: YES. An action for damages
arising from quasi-delict or alleged tortious
interference should be filed within
four (4) years
from the day the cause of action
accrued. Since the cause
of action accrued on 25 March 1980 (the time when Central Bank issued a cease
and desist order against GENBANK) and the third party complaint was filed only
on June 17 1987, the action has prescribed.
It is from the date the act or omission violative
of the right of a party that the cause of action arises and it is from this date that the prescriptive period must be reckoned. (Español vs. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans)The third party complaint should not be admitted.
Causation
(Proximate Cause)
Bataclan vs. Medina
G.R.
No. L-10126 (1957)
Facts:
Bus no. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, operated by its owner, Mariano Medina, left the town of Amadeo,
Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by Conrado Saylon. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan.
While the bus was running
within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,
one of the front tires burst causing
the vehicle to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch
on the right side of the road and turned
turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, namely Bataclan, Lara and the
Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia Villanueva, could not get out
of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them
carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end. These men
presumably approached the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fire
started, consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside. It
would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from
the gasoline tank on the side of the chassis,
spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and
the ground under
and around it, and that the
lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call
for help set it
on fire.
The
heirs of the deceased brought an action to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the proximate cause
of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the
fire that burned the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were
unable to leave it.
Held: The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more
natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to
extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the
coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of
the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call
for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its
conductor.
According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position
in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the
fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch
too near the bus.
Fernando vs. Court of Appeals and the City of Davao
G.R.
No. 92087 (May 8, 1992)
Facts: Morta, market master of Agdao Public Market
requested with the City Treasurer Office the emptying of a Septic tank in
Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Bertulano, Catarsa, Bascon, Bolo and
Suner. Bascon won the bid and signed the purchase order. Prior to the signing
of purchase order, Bertulano with four other companions- Liagoso, Fernando and
Fajardo Jr. was found dead inside the septic
tank.
While, Garcia died in the Regional
Hospital after being rescued by a fireman. Autopsy revealed diminution of
oxygen and intake of sulfide gas as cause of death. Investigation by the City
Engineer Office learned that the 5 victims entered and re-emptied the tank
without clearance and consent. The heirs of the deceased filed a case for
damages contending that it was the gross negligence of the City of Davao for
failing to clean the septic tank for 10 years which resulted in the
accumulation of hydrogen sulfide gas, and was therefore the proximate cause of
the death of the laborers. They further contend that the market master failed
to supervise the area where the tank was located as a further reflection of the
public respondent’s negligence. Petitioner’s also insisted on the application
of Article 24 of the New Civil code. Art.
24. In all c ontractual,
property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender
age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Issue: WON proximate cause of death is the own negligence
of the plaintiffs?
Held:
Yes. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous
sequence unbroken by and efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and
without which the result would not have occurred.
While it may be
true that the public respondent had been negligent in the re emptying of the
septic tank annually since 1956, the negligence is not a continuing one. The
public respondents have immediately responded to such issue upon invitation to bid on the service
of emptying the tank. Public
Respondents have also shown
in court that people in the market have been using the toilet for
their necessities and remained uninjured.
As proven by Respondents, the septic tank was air-tight
as provided for by regulations. The accident of toxic gas leakage from the tank is unlikely
to happen unless
one removes
its covers. The accident occurred
because the victims
have ontheir own and without
authority opened the tank. Bertulano who has offered
his services to clean the septic tank is
presumed to know the hazards of his
job. His and his men’s failure to take precautionary measures for their
safety is the proximate case of the accident. The Court also cited Culion vs. Phil Motors Corp. “When a person
holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill,
he will be held liable
for negligence if he fails to exhibit
the skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the particular work he attempts to do.” Furthermore, the
surreptitious way the victims did the job without clearance from the market
master and or the security jobs g oes
against their good faith.
Moreover, Article 24 of the NCC is
inapplicable as there is total absence of contractual relations between the
victims and City of Davao that will give rise to contractual obligations as the
victims did not win the bidding. It was not to Bertulano, but to Bascon, that
the contract to clean the septic tank was awarded.
Urbano
vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-72964) (1988)
Facts:
Petitioner, Filomeno Urbano
quarreled with Marcelino Javier because the latter opened the irrigation canal
which caused the flooding of the place where Urbano's palay was stored. Urbano
hacked the right palm of Javier with a bolo and caused
an incised wound that was later treated.
Urbano and Javier
agreed on an amicable settlement and petitioner paid for
the hospital bills.
22 days later,
Javier was rushed to the hospital, he had a locked jaw and was having
convulsions, caused by tetanus toxin. The doctor noticed that the wound was
infected. The next day, Javier
died. Petitioner was charged with homicide and was later found guilty
by the trial court. The IAC affirmed
the conviction. Petitioner filed a motion
for new trial based on the
affidavit of the barangay captain
that Javier was found catching
fish on the irrigation canal,
10 days prior to his death.
Issue: Whether or not the inflicting of the wound by
petitioner was only a remote, and not a proximate, cause.
Held:
The inflicting of the wound is
only a remote cause and petitioner cannot be held liable therefor. A prior and
remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition
or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
The incubation period of tetanus,
ranges from 2 to 56 days. However,
over 80 percent
of patients become
symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur
within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent.
(NOTICE that it took Javier 22 days, from the time of the hacking, before he
had symptoms of Tetanus)
In the case at bar,
the evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano
was infected with tetanus at the time of the hacking. The evidence merely
confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered
the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus. However,
as to when the wound was infected is not clear. There is a likelihood that the
wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection (failure to take
the necessary precautions against tetanus) may have been the proximate cause of
Javier's death.
Phoenix
Construction vs. IAC
148 SCA 353 (L-652095) (1987)
Facts: In the early morning of 15 November
1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was driving his way home from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting
with his boss. During the
cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of
liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not
far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car
headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
some 2-1/2 meters
away from his car.
The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of General
Lacuna Street facing
the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew in such a manner
as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of incoming traffic.
There were neither lights nor any so- called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando Carbonel,
its regular driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of
work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed
that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result
of the collision, Dionisio suffered
some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous
breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio commenced
an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast
at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that
it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck
driver.
Issue: Whether or not the proximate cause of the accident
is the negligence of the driver or the negligence of Dionisio.
Held: It was the negligence of the truck driver. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck
was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. , the
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The truck driver's
negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather
an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and
the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred
had the dump truck not been parked
askew without any warning lights
or reflector devices.
The improper parking
of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and
for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In
our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer
to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.
respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though
such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
TRIVIA: Did the headlights of Dionisio really
turned off unexpectedly, as he claims? Remember, this happened during Martial
law years when curfews were in effect. It was 1:30 AM and Dinisio was drunk. Excellent!
Pilipinas Bank v. CA
G.R.
No. 105410 (1994)
Facts:
As payments for the purchased shoe
materials and rubber shoes, Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner
Industrial Corporation and Vicente Tui with due dates on October 10 and 12,
1979, respectively.
To cover the face
value of the checks, plaintiff, on October 10, 1979, requested PCIB Money
Shop's manager Mike Potenciano to effect the withdrawal of P32,000.00 from his
savings account therein and have it deposited with his current account with
Pilipinas Bank (then Filman Bank), Biñan Branch. Roberto Santos was requested
to make the deposit. In
depositing
in the name of FLORENCIO REYES, he inquired from the teller the current account
number of Florencio Reyes to complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing.
He was informed
that it was "815" and so this was the same current account number he
placed on the deposit slip below the depositor's name FLORENCIO REYES. Nothing
that the account number coincided with the name Florencio, Efren Alagasi, then
Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, thought it was for Florencio
Amador who owned the listed account number. He, thus, posted the deposit in the
latter's account not noticing that the depositor's surname in the deposit slip
was REYES. On October 11, 1979, the October 10, check in favor of Winner
Industrial Corporation was presented for payment. Since the ledger of Florencio
Reyes indicated that his account had only a balance of P4,078.43, it was
dishonored and the payee was advised to try it for next clearing. On October
15, 1979, the October 10, 1979 check was redeposited but was again dishonored.
Likewise, the October 12, 1979 check in favor of Vicente Tui when presented for
payment on that same date met the same fate but was advised to try the next clearing.
Two days after the October 10 check was again
dishonored, the payee returned the same to Florencio Reyes and demanded
a cash payment of its face value which he did if only to save his name. The October 12, 1979 check was
redeposited on October 18, 1979, but again dishonored for the reason that the check was drawn against
insufficient fund. Furious
over the incident,
he immediately proceeded
to the bank and urged an immediate verification of his account. Upon
verification, the bank noticed the error. The P32,000.00 deposit posted in the
account of Florencio Amador was immediately transferred to the account
of Reyes upon being cleared
by Florencio Amador
that he did not effect
a deposit in the amount
of P32,000.00. The transfer having
been effected, the bank then honored the October 12, 1979, check.
Issue: WON the proximate cause of the mis-posting of
deposit was due to the error of the representative of Reyes
Held: No. For Article 2179 of the Civil Code to apply, it must be established that private respondent's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury. The concept of proximate cause is well defined
in our corpus of jurisprudence as "any cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
result complained of and without
which would not have occurred
and from which it ought to have been forseen
or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary
case that the injury
4
complained of or some similar injury,
would result therefrom
as a natural and probable
consequence." In the case at bench, the proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
petitioner's
employee in erroneously posting the cash deposit of private respondent in the
name of another depositor who had a similar first name. As held by the trial
court:
Applying the test, the bank employee
is, on that basis, deemed to have failed to exercise the degree of care
required in the performance of his duties. As earlier stated, the bank employee
posted the cash deposit in the account of Florencio Amador from his assumption
that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger without, however, going through
the full name, is the same Florencio stated
in the deposit slip. He should have continuously gone beyond mere
assumption, which was proven to be erroneous, and proceeded with clear
certainty, considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would
create on the totality of the person notable of which is the credit standing of
the person involved should a mistake happen. The checks issued by the plaintiff
in the course of his business were
dishonored by the bank because the ledger of Florencio Reyes indicated a
balance insufficient to cover the face value of checks.
Quezon City Government vs.
Fulgencio Dacara
G.R.
NO. 150304 (June 15, 2005)
Facts: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., son of herein respondent was driving the Toyota Corolla
of his father along Matahimik St. in Quezon
City. While driving,
the vehicle rammed
into a pile of earth (street
diggings) as the street was being repaired by the Quezon City government. As
result, Dacara allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered
extensive damages when it turned turtled as it hit the pile of earth.
Indemnification was
sought from the City Government but it yielded negative results. Dacara Sr. on
behalf of his minor son filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioner
(QCG). In its answer, QCG alleged that the diggings were provided with a mound
of soil and barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed
before or after it which was visible during the incident. QCG claimed that they
exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures
to avoid accident. Such claim was disproved by the investigation report
which stated that the deep excavation was without any warning device.
The RTC, on the basis of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, rendered
judgment in favor of Fulgencio Dacara
and ordered QCG to pay the former
actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and costs of suit. CA affirmed. Hence,
this petition.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not negligence of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr.
was the proximate cause of the accident.
2.
Whether or not award for moral damages is proper.
3.
Whether or not award for exemplary damages is proper.
HELD:
(1) NO. Art. 2189 NCC capsulizes
the responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of roads
and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over the same.
Failure of the petitioner to comply with the statutory provision found in the
subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable. Petitioner pointed out that Fulgencio was driving at the
speed of 60kph which was above the maximum limit of 30kph when he met the
accident, so he can be presumed negligent based on Art. 2185. Such a matter was not raised at any time during the trial and was
only raised for the first
time in their Motion
for Reconsideration. The SC held it was too late
to raise such issue .
(2) NO. Art. 2219(2) NCC specifically allows moral damages to be recovered
for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries.
There can be no recovery or moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in
physical injury. In the case at bar, Fulgencio testified that he suffered a
deep cut on his left arm. However, no other evidence such as a medical certificate, was presented to prove such bare assertion of physical injury.
Thus, there was no credible
proof that would
justify an award of moral
damages. Moral damages
are not punitive in nature,
but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury inflicted
on a person. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of proof that the
person experienced emotional and mental suffering. Mere allegations do not
suffice, clear and convincing proof is necessary.
(3) YES. Exemplary damages
cannot be recovered
as a matter of right,
it is subject to the discretion of the courts
but cannot be awarded unless
claimants show their entitlement to moral,
temperate or actual damages. In the case at bar, petitioner's negligence was the proximate
cause of the incident, thereby
establishing his right to actual damages. Art. 2231 NCC mandates
that in cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the
defendant acted with gross negligence. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant
case. The City Government failed to show the modicum
of responsibility, much less, care expected from them by the constituents of the city. It is even more deplorable that it was a case of a street-digging in a side street which caused the accident in
the so-called 'premier city'.
Remote cause, distinguished from Proximate case
Gabeto vs. Araneta
G.R.
No. 15674 (1921)
Facts:
On Aug. 4, 1918, Basilio Ilano and
Proceso Gayetano rode a carromata (horse driven carriage) to go to a cockpit on
Calle Ledesma in the city of Iloilo. Agaton Araneta stepped out into the street
and stopped the horse. Araneta protested to the driver that he was the first
one who called for the carromata. The driver Julio Pagnaya pulled on the reins
(one which control the horse) of the bridle to free the horse from the control
of Araneta. Due to the rottenness of the reins, the bit (placed on the horse’s
mouth for control) came out of the horse’s mouth. Pagnaya got off the carromata
and pulled over the same near the curb and fixed the bit. While doing so, the horse moved forward
and pulled one wheel of the carromata uo on the sidewalk and pushed Pagnaya.
The carromata struck
a police telephone box and due to the crashing sound,
the horse got frightened and set out at full speed up the street.
Basilio Ilano was able to get off the carromata but Proceso Gayetano
retained his seat and when he jumped from the rig, he sustained injuries which
caused his death.
Issue: Whether or not the act of Araneta is the proximate
cause of the death of Gayetano.
Held:
No. The mere act of Araneta of
stopping the horse will not make him liable. Evidence shows that when Pagnaya
got out of the carromata to go the horse’s head and fix the bit, an appreciable
interval of time elapsed. The act of Araneta is too remote from the accident to
be considered as the proximate cause.
By getting off and taking his post at
the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the
control of the animal. Also, evidence shows that the bridle was old and the leather
is weak and easily broken.
Urbano vs. IAC
G.R.
No. L-72964 (1988)
Facts: Supra
Held:
There is a likelihood that
the wound was
but the remote cause
and its subsequent
infection, for failure
to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus
may have been the proximate
cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled in Manila Electric
Co. v. Remoquillo, et al.
(99 Phil. 118).
"A prior and
remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible,
if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the instances which result in injury because
of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition
is the proximate cause."
(45 C.J. pp. 931-932). (at p. 125)
Concurrent
Cause, distinguished from Proximate
Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.
130068 (1998)
Facts: Supra
Held: It may be said, as a general
rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
more efficient causes other than piaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the
injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person
is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them,
it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an
efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent,
and that such cause is not attributable to the person
injured. It is no defense
to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the
negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent rortfeasor. Where several
causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes
and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons
although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of
them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person
was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely
because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is
responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the
sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since
both of them are liable
for the total damage. Where
the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omissions of two or more persons,
although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury
to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury
and either of them is responsible for the whole
injury. Where their
concurring negligence resulted
in injury or damage to a third
party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article
2194 of the Civil Code.
Subido vs. Custodio
L-21512 (Aug 31, 1966)
Facts: Agapito Custodio was a passenger
of an LTB Bus. He was hanging
on the left side of the bus because it was full of passengers. A truck owned by Subido which was coming from the
opposite direction sideswiped the LTB bus and injured
Custodio who died as a result thereof.
Both drivers were found negligent- the LTB bus driver for having allowed
a passenger to ride
on the running board of the bus and the driver of the truck
for running at a considerable speed while negotiating a sharp curb and running
on the middle instead of on the right side of
the road. The owner and the driver
of the truck contended that the proximate cause of the death of Custodio was the negligence of the driver
of the LTB bus who allowed Custodio
to ride on the running board
of the LTB bus.
Issue: Is there concurrent liability here in this case at
bar? How does the negligence of both parties affect the liability of both?
Held:
Although the negligence of the
carrier (LTB bus) and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the
negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the
proximate cause of death of Agapito Custodio. In fact the negligence of the
first two(2) would not have produced this result without the negligence of
petitioners herein (the owner and driver of the truck). What is more,
petitioner’s negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the
running board of the carrier’s bus sometime before petitioner’s truck came from
the opposite direction, so that, in this sense petitioner’s truck had the last
clear chance.” The owner and the driver of the truck were held jointly and
severally liable, together with the LTB bus and its driver, to the heirs of
Custodio.
TESTS
of proximate cause- the “BUT FOR” test
Bataclan vs. Medina
102 Phil 181 Facts: supra
Held: There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier
is liable. The only question
is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion
that the proximate cause of the death of
Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned
the bus, including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered
physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages were
awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by him. We
disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38,
pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in
their brief. It is as follows:
.
. . 'that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom.
It may be that
ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and
extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some
highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is
burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle.
But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining
in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle
turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the
coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry
a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were
not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue
requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to
be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through is driver
and its conductor.
According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth.
They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position
in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the
gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the
fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier
come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles
1733, 1759 and 1763.
Substantial
Factor Test
Philippine Rabbit vs. IAC and Casiano Pascua et al.
G.R.
No. 6 6102-04 (August 30, 1990)
Facts: On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers
boarded a jeepney bound for Pangasinan via Dau. Manalo drove the jeep owned by
Magune and Carreon. Reaching Tarlac, the right
wheel of the jeep was detached resulting to its 180 degree turn invading the other lane with the jeep’s front
facing south. The bus driven
by Del Rosario collided with the
jeepney resulting in the death of three passengers and physical injuries to
some. Manalo was convicted of Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries.
Manalo did not appeal. Three Civil Cases fro Damages docketed 1136; 39-40 was
filed anchored on the contractual liability of the jeepney owner and Philippine
Rabbit’s liability based on quasidelict. Trial court decided against the jeepney operator
as well as the joint liability of his Insurance Agency for Actual and Moral Damages. The Trial Court based its decisions on the following:
(1) Testimony of passenger Pascua alleging that the driver
was running really
fast. (2) Unrebutted testimony of Police Inspector on the sharp angle track marks of the jeep; the observation of the skid marks.
(3) Manalo’s Conviction on the Criminal
Compalint (4)Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor, attesting
to the collision happening on the right
of way of the bus.
CA reversed decision. It ordered
Plaintiff bus operator and driver to pay jointly and severally the damages
awarded. It based its decisions primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear
chance. 2.) presumption of the responsibility of the vehicle on the rear end to
avoid collision with the vehicle in front. 3.) the substantial test concluding
Bus driver negligent by not making an effort to avoid accident and being the
physical force causing the injury and death of passengers.
Issue: Who has liability over the injuries and death of
victims?
Held: The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of the jeepney operator for failure to exercise precautions needed.
The carrier is presumed to have been at fault unless it is caso fortuito or
that he has observed extra-ordinary diligence as provided in Articles
1733,55-56. Negligence was proven based on the testimony-evidences adduced by
the trial court.
Last clear chance
cannot be applied. It does not aride where a passenger demands responsibility
under culpa contractual. A negligent driver and its owner cannot be exempted on
the ground that the other party was likewise guilty of negligence. The
substantial factor test is testing whether the actor’s conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another. THE FACT THAT THE ACTOR NEITHER
FORESAW NOR SHOULD HAVE FORESEEN THE EXTENT OF HARM OR MANNER IN WHICH THE
EVENT
OCCURRED DOES NOT PREVENT HIS
LIABILITY. However, this test does not apply. The court does not fault Reyes
for not having avoided such sicne no other options are available to him. The other lane even though empty was narrow and covered with tall grass. The wheels of the bus were also clear of the roadwasy except the outher
left that hit the jeep. This clearly shows the attempt to
hit the jeep. Inability to avoid the jeep must have been due to the limitations
of options.
IAC decision is set
aside. The Trial Court decision is Reinstated with Modification that only the
Operator and the Insurance Company is liable for the victims and heirs. The
driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the carrier in Breach
of Contract as provided in Article 2180 and to make driver jointly and
severally liable is to make the carrier’s liability a personal one and not
explicit.
Cause
v. Condition
Phoenix
Construction vs. IAC
148 SCRA 353 (Mar 10, 1987)
Facts: Supra
Held:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the
active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions"
upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a passive
static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to
be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the
result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive
situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have gone before.
The defendant who spills gasoline
about the premises
creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because
of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites
the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the
fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has
created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable
time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily
affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity
at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new
force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between
"cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature
of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
Manila Electric Co. vs.
Remoquillo
G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)
Facts:
Efren Magno went to the 3-story
house of his stepbrother to repair a "media agua" said to be in a
leaking condition. The "media agua" was just below the window of the
third story. Magno received
from his son thru that window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion,
turned around and in doing so, the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact
with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company. He died by electrocution.
His
widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the electric company.
Issue: Were the acts of Magno the proximate or the remote
cause of the incident.
Held:
Magno’s acts were the proximate
cause. It is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution
was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless
and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution. Magno was expected, as a person who is deemed
a professional in his line of work, to have looked back toward the street and at the wire to avoid contacting with the iron sheet, the same being length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to
injuries, the following citation is helpful:
"A prior and remote cause
cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more
than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive,
unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not
have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C. J. pp.
931-332.).
Furthermore, the owner of the house
disregarded a city ordinance, declaring illegal the length of less than 3 feet
distance between a building and the electric pole. And added to this violation,
was its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. The
electric company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal
construction which reduces the distance between its wires and said
construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced,
to change the stringing or installation of its wires so as to
preserve said distance. It would be
much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the alert and
to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to
condemn or disapprove all illegal constructions.
Of course, in the
present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the
"media agua" was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely
contributed to it. And contrary to the case of Astudillo vs. Manila electric,
in the case at bar, the construction cannot be said to be a public place as it
is a private construction. The deceased person was also a person of age who is
expected to be more careful and knowledgeable as to what he is doing.
Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad
Co.
G.R. No.15688 (November 19, 1921)
Facts:
Manila Railroad Co. operates a
line through the district of Daraga. As one of its trains passed over the line,
sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was
communicated to four houses nearby, and they were entirely consumed. All of
these houses were of light construction except that of Rodrigueza’s, which was
of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. The fire
occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was
blowing it. It doesn’t appear whose house caught fire first, though Manila
railroad claimed that it was first communicated to Rodrigueza’s house and
spread to the others. The plaintiffs claim that Manila Railroad was negligent
in the following manners: a. in failing to exercise proper supervision over the
employees in charge of the locomotive; b. in allowing the locomotive which
emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack protected
by some device for arresting
sparks; c. in using in its locomotive Bataan fuel, a fuel of known inferior
quality which upon combustion, produces sparks in great quanity. Manila
Railroad, on the other hand, argued that Rodrigueza’s house stood partly within
the limits of the land owned by it, thogh exactly how far away from the
company’s track does not appear.
It also claimed of notifying Rodrigueza to get his house off the land of the company,
and that Rodrigueza did not comply.
Issue: Who should be liable?
Held: Manila Railroad should
be liable. Whether
or not the fire may have been communicated through
Rodrigueza’s house, or directly from the locomotive is immaterial. With regards to the position of Rodrigueza’s house,
there is no proof that Rodrigueza unlawfully intruded upon the railroad’s property
in the act of building
his house. Rodrigueza may have assumed
the risk of loss that might have resulted
from fires occasioned by the defendant’s locomotives if operated
and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed
the risk of any damage that might result from the
unlawful negligent acts of Manila Railroad. Nobody is bound to anticipate and
defend himselfagainst the possible negligence of another. The circumstances
cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of
action because, a) that condition was not created by himself, b) his house
remained on the ground by toleration and therefore with the consent of the
Railroad co., and c) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact
would not justify the defendant company in negligently destroying it.
Efficient
Intervening Cause
McKee vs. IAC
211
SCRA 517 (68102) (1992)
Facts: A cargo truck driven by Ruben Galang
and owned by private respondents Tayag and Manalo
was travelling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando, Pampanga, bound for Manila. On
the other hand, a Ford Escort car driven by Jose Koh, was on its way to Angeles
City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about 10 meters away from
the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted from the
right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving back
and forth, unsure of whether to cross all t
he way to the other side or turn back.
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered
the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before
he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in the
lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge. The said
collision resulted to the death of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee, and Loida Bondoc,
and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee, and Araceli
Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
In the statement of Ruben Galang to the investigating police officers immediately after the accident,
he admitted that he was travelling at 30 miles per hour (48
kph).
Two civil cases for damages were filed before the CFI of Pampanga.
The first civil case was for damages
for the death of Jose Koh. The second civil case, on the other hand, was for
the damages for the death of one and a half year old Kim Koh McKee and the physical injuries
sustained by George and Araceli.
About a month later, a charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide,
physical injuries and damage to property was filed against Ruben Galang and was
raffled in the same court where the second civil case was assigned. In their
Answer with Counterclaim for the first civil case, private respondents asserted
that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and bumped the lane of the
truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as counterclaim, prayed for the award of attorney's fees, actual and liquidated damages,
moral damages and business losses.
In the second civil
case, private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
pendency of another action and failure to implead an indispensable party, Ruben
Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion to consolidate the case with
the first civil case pending before Branch III of the same court, which was
opposed by the plaintiffs. Both motions were denied
by Judge Capulong. In the criminal
case, a judgment
of conviction was rendered against
Ruben Galang. Subsequently, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two
(2)
civil cases and awarded the
private respondents moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Ruben
Galang appealed the judgment of conviction but it was affirmed. Plaintiffs
(McKee) on the other hand, appealed the dismissal of the civil cases to the
appellate court.
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's
inattentiveness or reckless
imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the
law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), as
employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it was
further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in selecting and supervising the said employee. Private respondents filed
a motion for reconsideration alleging
improper appreciation of facts and on the basis of which,
respondent court affirmed
the trial court's
decision in dismissing the civil cases.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Koh's negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident.
Held:
NO. The respondent Court held that
the fact that the car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the
collision occurred in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the appellate court immediately concluded
that it was Jose Koh's negligence that was the immediate
and proximate cause of the collision.
This is an
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly shows
that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached the
southern end of the bridge, two boys darted across the road from the right
sidewalk into the lane of the car. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck
was necessary in order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater
peril-death or injury
to the two boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. No negligence could be imputed
to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent
man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car
away from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course
to take particularly where the vehicle in the opposite
lane would be several meters
away and could
very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Moreover, under what is
known as the e mergency rule, "one who suddenly
finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to
consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself
is brought about by his own negligence." Although it may be said that the
act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of
events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths
because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening cause, the negligent
act of the truck driver,
which was t he actual cause of the tragedy.
The entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the
collision had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to
slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving
to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the
truck driver continued at full speed towards the car.
Moreover, the truck
driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck
was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed
negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence
in failing to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid
the collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident.
E ven if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine
of last clear chance finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in
the law of torts which states that the contributory negligence of the party
injured will not defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the person
who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in law solely
responsible for the
consequences
thereof
Manila Electric vs. Remonquillo
G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)
Facts: Supra
Held:
A prior and remote cause cannot be
made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish
the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation
the circumstances which result in injury because
of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J.
p. 931.)
Teague vs. Fernandez
51
SCRA 181 (L-29745) (1973)
NOTE: To easily remember, call this the “Maghulos dili” ka case.
nd
Facts: Realistic
Institute is a vocational school for hair and beauty culture owned and operated
by defendant. It is located at the 2 floor of Gil-Armi Building. A fire broke
out 10 meters
away from the building. The students upon
seeing the fire panicked. The six instructresses tried to calm them down. Mrs. Prieto, one of the instructresses even
slapped three students to q uiet them down. The panic could
not be subdued, thereby causing a stampede. No part of the building was burned.
But after the panic was over, four students including Lourdes Fernandez, sister
of plaintiffs were found dead.
Deceased’s five
brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Teague, as owner and
operator of Realistic Institute. CFI dismissed the case. CA reversed, and
awarded damages of P11,000.
CA held that defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of Hernandez’ death. The negligence was primarily predicated on the violation of the city ordinance of Manila, which consisted in the fact that the second storey
of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although
at the time of the fire the owner
of the building had a second stairway
under construction. Hence a petition
for review was filed in SC.
Issue: Are there independent causes/efficient intervening
causes?
Held: None. The panic
and stampede cannot
be considered efficient intervening causes. It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance was ahead and prior to the other events in point of time, in the
sense that it was contemporaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the
violation was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety
designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the occupants
of the building. That situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become
necessary to evacuate the building,
which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency
conditions if there was only one stairway
available.
The violation of a
statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner
in which it happened was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended
to prevent.
Urbano vs. IAC
G.R.
No. L-72964 (1988)
Issue: Whether or not there was an efficient intervening
cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate
Urbano from any liability for Javier's death.
Held: Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease. In the case at bar, Javier suffered
a 2-inch incised
wound on his right palm when
he parried the bolo which Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place
on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November 14, 1980, he suffered the
symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November
15, 1980, he died.
If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted
by the appellant was already
infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable
that Javier should
have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared
on the 22nd day after the
hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have
been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion
is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe
form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's
wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.
The rule is that the
death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are dealing with a
criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond
reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an e fficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of
his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.
(People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).
Last Clear Chance
Picart vs. Smith
37
Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)
Facts: Supra. Note: This is
the first time the doctrine of last clear chance was introduced in Philippine
Jurisprudence.
Held:
The last clear chance was passed
unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was his duty to bring the car to
an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the bridge to take
the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of
doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When
Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of
the law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last
clear chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
The existence of negligence in a given
case is not determined by reference to
the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.
Bustamante vs. Court Of Appeals
193
SCRA 603 (February 6, 1991)
Facts: A bus was traversing an inclined road. The bus
driver saw, from 30 meters away, a sand and gravel truck fast approaching with
its front wheels wiggling. The bus driver also
th rd
observed
that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance and
believing that truck driver was merely joking, the bus driver shifted from 4 to
3 gear to gain
more power and speed in order to
overtake a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder of
the highway. All of this happened while the truck was descending and the bus was ascending
the inclined part of the road. The two vehicles
sideswiped each other at each other's left side ripping
off the said wall of the bus from the driver's seat to the last rear seat.
Due to the impact,
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the
injuries they sustained. The heirs sued the respective owners and drivers of
both the bus company and the truck.
The trial concluded
that the negligent
acts of both drivers contributed to or combined
with each other in directly
causing the accident, thus the liability
of the two drivers for their
negligence is solidary.
The driver and
owner of the truck appealed, the Court of Appeals, in resolving the motion for
reconsideration, absolved the owner and driver of the truck based on the
doctrine of last clear chance, saying that the bus driver had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident and that it is his negligence which was the
proximate cause of mishap.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is correctly applied.
Held: NO. The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applicable in this case.
The doctrine
of last clear chance, stated
broadly, is that—the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears
that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence,
might have avoided
injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine
of last clear chance means
that even though
a person's own acts may have placed
him in a position of peril, and an injury
results, the injured
person is entitled
to recovery.
The practical
import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
negligent plaintiff, if he (the defendant) were aware of the plaintiff’s peril,
or should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in
fact an opportunity to avoid the accident. And this is true even if the
plaintiff is grossly negligent.
The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners
and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility f rom the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would
be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
and its owners
on the ground that the other driver
was likewise guilty of negligence.
The Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear
chance as between
the defendants, since
the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers
of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased
passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding v ehicles. Therefore, the
respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck
from liability.
Phoenix Construction Inc. vs.
IAC
148
SCRA 353 (March 10, 1987)
NOTE: Emphasis
is made on the obiter dictum.
FACTS: On November 15, 1975 (During
the period of Martial Law) at approximately 1:30 AM, Leonardo
Dionisio, driving his Volkswagen car, was on his way home to Makati from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss where had taken "a shot or
two" of liquor.
Dionisio alleged
that while he was crossing the intersection of General Lacuna
and General Santos
Streets in Bangkal,
Makati, not far from his home, when his car’s
headlights suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on
"bright" and thereupon saw a Ford dump truck looming some two and a
half meters away. The Ford dump truck, owned and operated by Phoenix Construction Inc. was p arked askew partly blocking and facing the way of incoming traffic.
There were neither
lights nor any so-called "early warning" devices or reflectors set anywhere near the dump truck. The dump truck had, earlier
that evening, been driven home by Carbonel, its regular driver.
Dionisio claimed
that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries
including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
Dionisio
commenced an action for damages claiming that the legal and proximate cause of
his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck.
Phoenix and
Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a
curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due
care in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
ISSUE: Whether or not the last clear chance doctrine
should be applied, therefore exculpating Phoenix from paying damages.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that
private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory,"
that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the
truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently Dionisio may
recover damages though are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179,
Civil Code of the Philippines).
Obiter Dictum by Justice Feliciano:
Phoenix and
Carbonel also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear
chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the
petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio had
the "last clear chance" of
avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed
to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common
law was imported
into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith but it is a matter
for debate whether,
or to what extent, it has found
its way into the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The historical function
of that doctrine
of last clear
chance was to mitigate
the harshness of
another common law doctrine— that of contributory negligence. The common law rule
of contributory negligence prevented any recovery
at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor
as compared with the
wrongful act or omission
of the defendant.
The common
law notion of last clear
chance permitted courts
to grant recovery
to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided
that the defendant
had the last clear chance
to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult
to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play
in a jurisdiction where the common law concept
of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in article 2179 of the civil code.
Is there perhaps a
general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its
common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil
law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe
so. Under Article
2179, the task of a court, in technical terms,
is to determine whose negligence-the plaintiff's or the defendant's-was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That
task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as
the petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or
"intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.
Of more fundamental importance is the nature
of the negligent act or omission of each party, and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission
for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck
driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for
his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with
that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril
precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept
this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle
of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own
negligent act or omission (NOTE: P arking
the truck askew facing incoming traffic). Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to
reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among
the members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to
weaken the very bonds of Society.
NOTE:
The point in assigning this case
is for students to realize that the common law concepts of “last clear chance”
and “contributory negligence” are counter-intuitive. Interestingly,
contributory negligence in our jurisdiction does not mean that the plaintiff can no longer
recover, but while he may recover, the liability of person ultimately responsible is mitigated. This is clearly visible from our treatment of contributory
negligence in Art. 2179, which states:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be
a warded. (n)
Philippine Bank Of Commerce vs. CA (Lipana)
269
SCRA 695 (March 14, 1997)
Facts:
Rommel's Marketing Corporation
(RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with the Pasig Branch of PBCom
in connection with its business of selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMC’s GM, claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totaling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose
of depositing said funds to RMC’s account with PBCom. It turned out, that these deposits were not credited
to RMC's account
but were instead
deposited to the PBCom account
of Yabut's husband,
Bienvenido Cotas.
Irene Yabut would
accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The
original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number.
On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the
name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would
validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips
retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the
duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record
purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the
space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written
thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made her company believe that the amounts she deposited were being
credited to its account when, in fact, they were being deposited in the account
of her husband.
During the entire
period, PBCom had been regularly furnishing RMC with monthly statements showing
its current account balances. Unfortunately, it was never the practice of Romeo
Lipana to check these monthly statements reposing complete trust and confidence
to PBCom and to his secretary. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC
demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money.
Issue: Whether the proximate cause of the loss is the
bank's negligence or that of RMC’s.
Held: It was the negligence of PBCom’s teller,
Ms. Azucena Mabayad,
coupled by the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate
cause of the loss. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
The bank's teller,
Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and
signing all the deposit slips presented by Ms. Yabut, notwithstanding that the
duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to PBCom’s SOP. In this
case, were it not for the act of Ms. Mabayad, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have
had the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme.
Lastly, under the
doctrine of "last clear
chance" where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one
is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible
to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and
failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
In this case, assuming that private
respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing
the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, t he bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to
avert the injury by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
Considering,
however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year
covering various deposits, it cannot be denied that RMC was likewise negligent
in not checking its monthly
statements of account.
Had it done so, the company would have been alerted of the series
of frauds being committed by its secretary. Such omission by RMC is to be considered contributory negligence on its part, which shall
mitigate the damages
that may be awarded. AWARD: Of
actual damages, RMC shall shoulder
40% of the loss, while PBCom
shall pay 60% of the loss.
Glan People’s Lumber And Hardware vs. IAC
G.R.
No. 70493 (May 18, 1989)
FACTS: Engineer Orlando T. Calibo was driving a Davao
city-bound jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. Also aboard
the jeep were Agripino Roranes, and Maximo Patos.
A cargo truck driven by Paul Zacarias
and loaded with cement bags, GI sheets and plywood was coming from the opposite
direction and bound for South Cotabato. Just after the truck went across a
bridge, it collided with the jeep and as a consequence, Engineer Calibo died
while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
As a result of the impact, the left
side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of the jeep,
including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged. After the impact, the
jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to
the rear of the truck, while the
truck was stopped on its wheels on the road.
A civil suit was filed by the wife of
Calibo against Zacarias and the owner of the truck. The lower court dismissed
the case, and accepted the argument that even if there was negligence on the
part of Zacarias who intruded about 25 centimeters to the lane of Calibo, the
latter had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
The
Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that Zacarias saw the jeep
already at about 150 meters and Zacarias did not have a driver’s license at the
time of the
incident.
ISSUE: To whose negligence is the accident imputable?
HELD:. The evidence
indicates that it was Engineer
Calibo’s negligence that was the proximate cause of the accident. Assuming
there was antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias,
Calibo had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident.
Both drivers had a full view of each
other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were
travelling at a speed of approximately thirty kilometers per hour. T he survivors of the jeep admitted
that the truck was already at a full stop when they collided with it. The
logical conclusion is that the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while at that distance of thirty meters
away from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving
his jeep away from the truck, either
of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a
speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In
those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity to avoid the
mishap, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect the truck to swerve and
leave him a clear path.
The
doctrine of the last clear chance provides as a valid and complete defense to
accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of
Picart vs Smith.
Pantranco vs. Baesa
179
SCRA 384 (November 1989)
FACTS: On June 12, 1981, at approximately 7:00 o'clock in the morning,
spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their three children, along with spouses
David Ico and Fe Ico, their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons,
were onboard a passenger jeepney on their way to Malalam River, Isabela, to
have a picnic in celebration of spouses Baesa’s fifth wedding anniversary.
David Ico was driving.
Upon reaching the
highway, the jeepney turned right at a speed of about 20 KPH. A speeding
PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on-route to Manila, encroached on the jeepney's lane while
negotiating a curve,
and collided with it. David Ico, spouses
Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children, died while the rest of the passengers sustained injuries.
The jeepney is extensively damaged. The driver of the bus went into hiding, and
has never been seen since.
Maricar Baesa
through her guardian and Fe O. Ico filed separate actions for damages arising
from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO. The other victims settled with Bus
Company.
PANTRANCO, aside
from pointing to the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the proximate cause
of the accident, invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its driver, Ambrosio Ramirez.
ISSUE: Can PANTRANCO invoke the defense of Last Clear
Chance?
HELD: No. Petitioner claims the driver of the jeepney had
the last clear chance to avoid the collision and hence, was negligent in
failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence the opportunity to avoid
the harm.
The doctrine of the
last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not
preclude recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the
latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. The doctrine
of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary
to show that the person who had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due
care, have been aware of it
In this case, there
is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending
danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on
his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to its own
lane upon seeing the jeepney approach from the opposite direction.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding
towards Manila. At the time David Ico must have realized that the
bus was not returning to its own lane, it was already
too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to prevent
an accident.
The Court held that the last clear chance doctrine
"can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if
the injury cannot be avoided
by the a pplication of all means at hand after
the peril is or should have been discovered"
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water
District
G.R.
No. L-7644 (August 29, 1958)
Facts: Metropolitan Water District owns and operates three
swimming pools in Balara, Quezon City. It allows the public to use the pools
for a fee.
Dominador Ong, a 14-year
old boy, went to the pool with his two brothers. At about 4:35 p.m., Dominador
told his brothers
that he was going to the locker
room in an adjoining
building to drink a bottle
of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio Ong went to the bigger
pool leaving Dominador in the small pool. Later
that day, a bather reported
that a person was underwater for too long.
Upon hearing this,
the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ong’s
lifeless body. Applying
first aid, the lifeguard tried
to revive the boy.
Soon after, nurse
Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector
Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of
the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a
medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After
the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the
University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual
respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator
until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted.
The investigation
revealed that the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in water. The
parents of Ong brought this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging
negligence on the selection and supervision of its employees and if not
negligent, they had the last clear chance to revive Ong.
Issue: Whether
or not Metropolitan is negligent in operating the pool.
Held: NO, Metropolitan is not negligent. Metropolitan has taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. The swimming pools are provided
with a ring buoy, toy roof,
towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottoms of
the pools are painted black so as to insure clear visibility. On display in a
conspicuous place are rules and regulations governing the use of the pools Metropolitan also employs six trained lifeguards, all of whom were issued certificates of proficiency.
These lifeguards
work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have
two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is
a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of
emergency.
The record also
shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the
pool, the employees of Metropolitan did everything possible to revive him. When
they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately
injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration
proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were
exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr.
Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however arrived late. All of
the foregoing shows that Metropolitan has done all that is humanly possible
under the circumstances to restore minor Ong’s life. For that reason it is
unfair to hold it liable for his death
T HE LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE IS INAPPLICABLE TO
THIS CASE. The record does not
show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The doctrine of last clear
chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a
recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that
he went there without any companion in violation of pool regulations and it
appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his
attention was called and immediately exhausted all efforts
to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine.
ANURAN
vs. BUÑO
17
SCRA 224 (May 20, 1966)
FACTS: On January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney,
driven by Buño,
was on the road to Taal, Batangas. It stopped to allow one of his passengers to alight. But the jeepney
was parked in such a way that ½ of its width was on
the asphalted pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of
the said road. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind,
which such violence
that three of its passengers died, while two other passengers suffered injuries that required confinement in the Provincial Hospital.
The heirs of the dead and injured passengers filed a case against the respective drivers
and owners of the truck and of the jeepney
to recover damages.
The Court of First Instance absolved the driver of the
jeepney and its owners, but it ordered the truck driver and the owners to pay
damages. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the driver
and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the driver and owners of the jeepney
should also be made liable.
HELD:
YES. It must be remembered that
the degree of diligence required of a carrier in transporting its passengers is
“utmost diligence” (Art. 1755) and consequently, they are “presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have
observed extraordinary diligence” (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption
of negligence is confirmed by the appellate court’s finding that the jeepney
driver parked the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver – and the
owners – of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
Obiter dictum on Application of Principle of Last
Clear Chance: The principle of
“last clear chance” applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its obligations under a contract of carriage. For
it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
This principle does not apply in this case.
CANLAS
vs. CA
G.R.
No. 112160 (February 28 2000)
Facts:
In August 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas,
and Vicente Mañosca, decided to venture in business and to raise the capital
needed therefor. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Mañosca to mortgage two parcels of land situated in BF Homes, Paranaque. Each
lot has a semi-concrete residential house in the name of the Canlas and his
wife. Spouses Canlas agreed to sell the two lots to Mañosca, for and in consideration of PhP 850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which
payable within one week, and the balance
of PhP 350,000.00 shall serve
as serve as Canlas’ investment in the business. Canlas delivered to Mañosca the
transfer certificates of title of the two lots sold. Mañosca, on his part, issued two postdated checks in
favorof Osmundo Canlas
in the amounts of P40,000.00 and P460,000.00, respectively, but it turned
out that the check covering
the bigger amount
was not sufficiently funded. In sum, the
spouses Canlas received only PhP40,000.00, despite delivering the TCTs to the
supposed vendee.
On September 1982,
Mañosca, with the use of the SPA previously issued by Canlas, was able to
secure a P100,000.00 loan from a certain Atty. Manuel Magno by mortgaging the same parcels of land, with the help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Canlas. On September
29, 1982, Vicente
Mañoscam, using the same parcels
of land as security and through the involvement
of the same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses,
applied and was approved of another loan by Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the
amount of P500,000.00. When the loan was not paid, the bank, extra-judicially
foreclosed the mortgage.
On January 1983, the
spouses Canlas wrote a letter informing the bank that the execution of subject
mortgage over the two parcels of land was without their authority. They
requested that steps be taken to annul the questioned mortgage.
Issues: Is the mortgage with the bank valid? And if the
answer is in the negative, should the bank bear the loss?
A contract of mortgage
must be constituted only by the absolute
owner on the property mortgaged; a mortgage, constituted by an impostor
is void. Considering that it was established that the
contract of mortgage
was entered into and signed
by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Canlas, the subject
contract of mortgage
is a complete nullity.
As to who shall bear the loss, T he doctrine
of last clear chance is applicable, the respondent bank must suffer the resulting
loss. In essence,
the doctrine of last clear chance is to
the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence
of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. The respondent bank did not observe the required diligence
in verifying the real identity
of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo
Canlas and Angelina Canlas.
Not a single identification card was presented by the impostor-loan applicants
to show their true identity. And yet the bank approved the loan on sheer
finding that the signatures affixed on a deed of mortgage
previously executed in favor of a certain
Atty. Magno matched
the signatures in the residence certificates presented by the impostors. In fact the deed
of mortgage referred
to did not bear the tax identification number of the spouses, as well as the Community
Tax Certificate of Angelina Canlas.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required
of banks is more than that of a good father of a family
in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the n ecessary care and prudence in dealing
even on a registered or titled property. Under
such principle, the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land
registration law, accorded to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good
faith. Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss.
Consolidated Bank vs. Court Of
Appeals
G.R.
No. 138569 (Sept. 11, 2003)
FACTS: LC Diaz and Co. (Diaz)
is an accounting firm. Diaz has a savings account
with Consolidated Bank (the predecessor of Solidbank). In 1991, Diaz, through its cashier, Macaraya, filled up a savings (cash)
deposit slip for PhP900.00 and check deposit slip for PhP50.00. Macaraya
instructed the firm’s messenger, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with
Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to
Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook.
Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for
L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre
returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed
him that “somebody
got the passbook.” Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported
the incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya, together
with Calapre, went to Solidbank. When Macaraya asked
for the passbook,
Teller No. 6 told her that someone
got the passbook
but she could
not remember to whom she gave it to. Failing to g
retrieve the passbook, Macaraya returned to LC Diaz and reported the matter.
The next day, L.C. Diaz’ CEO, Luis Diaz, called up the bank to stop any
transaction involving the stolen passbook. Diaz learned that an unauthorized
withdrawal of 300,000 was made on same day the passbook was stolen. The
withdrawal slip bore the signatures of authorized signatories, who denied
signing the same. A certain Noel
Tamayo received the PhP300,000.
In 1992, Diaz
demanded from Solidbank the return of his money. The trial court ruled in favor
of the bank, saying that possession of the passbook raises the presumption of
ownership and payments made upon production of the passbook
shall have the same effect
as if made to the depositor. Noel Tamayo, at the time of the withdrawal, had possession of the
passbook and the withdrawal slip which bore signatures matching the specimen
signatures in the bank. The trial court, using the rules on contractual
obligations, said that the bank acted with care and observed the rules on
savings account when it allowed the withdrawal , concluding that Diaz’s
negligence was the proximate cause of the loss. The Court of Appeals reversed,
saying that the teller of the bank should have been more careful in allowing the
withdrawal. It said that although L.C. Diaz was negligent in allowing a
messenger to make its deposits and said messenger left the passbook,
by applying the last clear chance doctrine, the proximate cause of the loss is attributable to the bank.
Issue: Is the
last clear chance doctrine applicable in this case? Who is the proximate cause
of the loss?
Held: The rules on simple loan or mutuum apply
in this case, hence, the
bank was liable
for breach of contract and not by virtue of a quasi-delict. Accordingly, the negligence of the bank is
classified as Culpa contractual AND NOT Culpa Aquilana, and therefore, the
Last clear chance
doctrine is inapplicable. Because of a bank’s nature
of business, a fiduciary relationship is deemed written into every
deposit agreement. This imposes a higher degree of diligence than “a good
father of a family”. While this does not convert the contract into a trust
agreement, the law requires of banks a higher standard
of integrity and performance in complying with its obligations under the contract.
While the passbook is in the bank’s hands,
the law imposes
a high degree of diligence
in safeguarding the passbook. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves breach on the
part of the defendant, there is the presumption that the latter was negligent
or at fault. The burden shifts to the defendant to prove that he was not
negligent. But in culpa aquiliana, the
p laintiff has the burden of proving the defendant’s negligence.
Tellers must return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized
representative. Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the
principle of respondeat superior. And the defense of exercising the diligence
in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete d efense in culpa contractual unlike in
culpa aquiliana. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor,
the loss would not have occurred. Hence, the proximate cause of the loss the bank’s negligence in not returning
the passbook to Calapre. But L.C. Diaz was guilty
of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the
liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
ENGADA vs. CA
G.R.
No. 140698 (June 20, 2003)
FACTS: On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota
Tamaraw jeepney bound
for Iloilo City.
On board was Sheila Seyan,
the registered owner of the
Tamaraw. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a
speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by Rogelio Engada. When it was just a few meters
away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-up’s right signal light flashed, at the
same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and
headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved
to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the
Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its
right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the
Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and
landed on a ricefield. Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses.
ISSUES
1.
Whether or not the Last Clear Chance doctrine is applicable in favor of Engada.
HELD:
No. It is a settled rule that a
driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle
in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and
he should not proceed if he cannot do so in safety. For failing to observe the
duty of diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles abandoning their
lane, petitioner must be held
liable. Edwin Iran could not be faulted when, in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he swerved to his left.
E ngada’s acts placed Iran in an emergency situation
which forced him to act quickly. An individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
The doctrine of last
clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity
to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is
considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
However, the doctrine
cannot be interposed in cases where the emergency
rule applies. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid Engada’s
pickup, which was already on a head-on
path towards Iran’s Tamaraw jeepney.
No convincing proof was adduced
by Engada that Iran could have avoided
a head- on collision.
Strict liability
Vestil vs. IAC
G.R.
No. 74431 (November 6, 1989)
Facts: On July 29, 1975, Theness
Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing
with a child of Purita and Agustin
Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda,
the father of
Purita. Thenese was rushed to the Hospital, where she was treated for "multipte lacerated
wounds on the forehead" and administered an anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine
days but was readmitted
a week later due to "vomiting of saliva." On August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified
as broncho-pneumonia.Theness developed
hydrophobia, a symptom of
rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, a
complication of rabies, which
ultimately caused her death.
The Uys sued for damages,
alleging that the Vestils were liable as the possessors of the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Uys claim that the Vestils are liable
for the death
of Theness, since they own the dog that bit her. While
the Vestils contend
that the dog belonged to the deceased
Vicente Miranda, and that it was a tame animal,
and that in
any case no one had witnessed it
bite Theness.
Issue: Whether or not the Vestils are liable for the
damage caused by the dog.
Held:
ART.
2183 states “The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be
lost. This
responsibility shall cease only
in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the
person who has suffered damage.”
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance
of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of
social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente
Miranda's estate, t here is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at
the time of the incident
in question. The Vestils’ contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote
control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code
holds the possessor
liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control.
And it does not matter either that the dog was tame and was merely provoked
by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but
covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the belated
allegations that Theness provoked the dog, the Vestils forget that the deceased
was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted
for whatever she might have done to the animal.
There is evidence
showing that Theness and her family regularly went to the house of the Vestils
once or twice a week. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and
the certified cause of death has been satisfactorily established. The
obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the
negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the
animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses
animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.
Things thrown from a
building
Dingcong
vs. Kanaan
G.R. No. L-47033 (April 25, 1941)
Facts: The Dingcong brothers leased the upper floor of house owned by Emilia Saenz, where they established and managed the Central Hotel. A guest by the name of Francisco
Echivarria occupied
Room No. 10 of the hotel for P30. Kanaan, on the other hand, occupies the ground floor the house of Saenz and where they established a store named
"American
Bazaar" dedicated to the
buy and sell of articles and merchandise.
Echivarria, before going to bed, let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs. A bucket was placed
underneath the leaking
faucet to catch the dripping
water, but still the bucket overflowed. Water seeped through the floor and the merchandise in the bazaar below got wet and caused damages worth around P1,000.00 (considerable
amount in 1941). The Kanaans brought an action for damages
against the managers, the brothers Dingcong, and Echivarria. During trial one of the Dingcong brothers died,
but suit continued against the surviving Dingcong.
Issue: Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco
Echevarria are liable for damages.
Held:
Francisco
Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who, by his negligence
in leaving the faucet open, caused the water to spill on the ground and wet the
articles and
merchandise of the Kanaans.
Jose Dingcong, the surviving
co-renter and manager of the hotel, had complete possession of the house, and
consequently must also be responsible for the damages caused. As a
co-lessee and manager of the hotel, the
Dingcongs have to answer for the damage caused by things that thrown or falling
from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil).
The Dingcongs likewise failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent the damages. They knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, as
managers, they should have
presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a
bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks.
Death/Injuries
in the course of employment
Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine
Company
58
PHIL 14 (March 6, 1933)
Facts:
Leopoldo Madlangbayan was a
collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in the district of San
Francisco del Monte, outside of the limits of the City of Manila. He was
supposedly residing in his district according to the records of the company.
His compensation was on a commission basis of eight percent on all collections
made by him.
One Sunday, Leopoldo, while riding a bicycle,
was ran over and killed in the City of Manila by a truck driven by Vitaliano Sumoay. It appears that Leopoldo
had moved to
Teodora Alonso St. in Manila without notifying
the company and that at the time of his death he was returning
home after making some collections in San Francisco
del Monte.
According to the practice of the company,
if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required
to deliver the amount collected
to the company the next morning. The widow and
children of Leopoldo brought an
action to recover from Singer under Act No. 3428 (Workmen’s Compensation Act)
Issue: May the heirs of
Leopoldo recover from the corporation considering the nature of his employment
and the manner of the injury?
Held: No. The accident
which caused the death of the employee was not due to and in pursuance of his
employment. At the time that he was run over by the truck, Leopoldo was not in
pursuance of his employment, but
was on his way home after he had finished his work for the day and left the
territory where he was authorized to make collections for the defendant.
The employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries
which might happen
to an employee while in the course
of the employment", and as a general
rule an employee is
not entitled to recover from personal
injuries resulting from an accident
that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident
DOES
NOT arise out of and in the course of his employment.
"The words 'arising out of' refer
to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character,
while the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental
injuries
which might happen to an employee
while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries
arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar
to the NATURE of the work in the
scope of the workman's employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible
to trace the injury to some risk or hazard
to which the employee is exposed in
a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly
situated are equally exposed and not traceable
in some special degree to the particular
employment are excluded.
Furthermore, it appears that the deceased
had never notified
the defendant corporation of his change
of residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila, and that the company
did not know that he was living
in Manila on the day of the accident. Neither does the company
did not require its employees
to work on Sunday, or furnish or require its agents to u se
bicycles. These are additional reasons
for holding that the accident
was not due to and in pursuance
of the employment of the deceased. If the deceased
saw fit to change his residence
from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use of a bicycle in going
back and forth, he did so at his own
risk, as the company did not furnish him a bicycle or require him to use one;
and if he made collections on Sunday, he did not do so in pursuance
of his employment, and his employer is not liable
for any injury sustained by him.
Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Ca
G.R.No. 110295
(October 18, 1993)
Facts:
Lydia
Geronimo is the proprietress of a school canteen. On August 12, 1989, a group of parents complained before Geronimo that they found fibrous
material in the bottles of Coke
and Sprite that their children bought from her store. Geronimo
examined her stock and found that there were indeed fibrous materials
in the unopened soda bottles.
She brought the
bottles to the Department of
Health Regional Office and was informed that the soda samples she sent were
adulterated.
Because of this,
the canteen had to close
down due to the big drop in its sales
of soft drinks. On Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against
Coca cola. Coca-Cola moved to
dismiss the complaint
on the grounds of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. According to Coca-Cola, under the law on sales on breach of warranty,
more
particularly Article 1561 , the
action should have been brought within six months from the delivery of the
goods.
Coca cola moved to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust all administrative remedies
and prescription. It contends that the existence
of a contractual relation between the
parties (arising from the contract
of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since Geronimo’s cause of action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the
complaint should have been filed within six months from
delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code. Geronimo claims that the cause of action is based
on injury to her right and can be brought within four years pursuant to Article
1146 of the civil code.
Issue: Has the action prescribed? Can
Geronimo’s action based on quasi-delict exist despite the pre-existing contract
of sale?
Held: While it
may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a
general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the
liability may itself be deemed to
a rise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act
which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
In Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine
Islands," this Court stated: "We
have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in
a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France
vs. Carrascosa, involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket,
had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat
in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the
air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the
relation between the passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and
nature x x x the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.'''
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still
exist despite the presence of contractual relations. Therefore, Geronimo has four years to file the case, reckoned
from the time
the cause of action accrued.
Interference
of Contractual Relations
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, et al.
29 Phil 542
(February 18, 1915)
Facts:
Cuddy
was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in
Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist a movie
entitled
“Zigomar” for exhibition in his
theatre for a week for PhP125.
Days
before the delivering the film, Cuddy returned
the money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to cinema
owners Espejo and Zaldarriaga, who offered to pay a
higher price for lease of the
film.
Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance with
prayer for damages against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga.
Issue: Whether such acts of Espejo and Zaldariaga were actionable
and if so under what legal principle.
Can Espejo and Zaldariaga their lack of evil motive use as defense by alleging
that their intention was purely for business?
Held: The
only motive for the interference with the Gilchrist - Cuddy contract on the part of the appellants was a desire to make a
profit by exhibiting the film in their theater.There was
no malice beyond this desire; but this fact does not relieve them of the legal liability for
interfering with that contract and causing its breach. Hence, they are liable to Gilchrist
for the damages caused by their acts.
The liability of the Espejo and Zaldriagga arises from
unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations, as they were under no such
obligation to induce Cuddy to violate his
contract with Gilchrist. So that if the action of Gilchrist had been one for
damages, it would be governed by chapter 2, title 16, book 4 of the Civil Code.
Article
1902 of that code provides that a person who, by act or omission, causes
damages to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage so
done.
There is nothing in this article which
requires as a condition precedent to the liability of a tort-feasor that he must
know the identity of a person to whom he causes damages. In fact, the chapter
wherein this article is found clearly shows that no such knowledge is required
in order that the injured party may recover for the damage suffered.
So Ping Bun vs. CA
GR
No. 120554 (September 21, 1999)
FACTS:
In 1963,
Tek hua Trading, through its Managing Director So Pek Giok, entered into a
lease agreement with Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI ) covering four stalls
in Binondo.
The terms of the contract were
initially for one year but after its expiry, they continued on a month to month
basis.
In 1976,
Tek Hua Trading was dissolved with the original members forming a new
corporation named Tek Hua Enterprises, with Manuel Tiong as one of the
incorporators. So
Ping Bun, on the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok (Managing director
of defunct Tek Hua Trading),
occupied the same stalls for his own textile business
under the name,
Trendsetter Marketing.
In 1989, the lessor, DCCSI sent letters to Tek Hua Enterprises advising that it will be increasing rent. Enclosed in both letters were new lease contracts
for signing. While the
letters contained a statement that the leases
will be terminated if the contracts were not signed,
the same were not rescinded. In 1991, Manuel Tiong (incorporator of Tek Hua Enterrises)
wrote a letter to So Ping Bun
asking him to vacate the four stalls:
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my
closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late
grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you
temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. for several
years to generate your personal business.
Since I
decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my
stocks. Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua
Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are
hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that
you have the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure to
protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential
attention to avoid inconvenience on your part.
But instead of vacating the stalls, So
Ping Bun was able to secure lease agreements in favor Trendsetter Marketing
from D.C. Chuan. Tek Hua Enterprises filed a suit for injunction and
pressed for the nullification of
the
lease contracts between DCCSI
and So Ping Bun and as well prayed for damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not So Ping Bun was guilty of tortuous
interference of contract.
HELD: Yes. The elements of tort interference are (a) existence of
a valid contract (b) knowledge on the part of the third party of its existence
(c) interference of the third party is
w ithout legal justification or
excuse. Since there were existing lease contracts between
DCCI and Tek Hua Enterprises, the latter had property rights over the leased
stalls. The action of Trendsetter in asking DCCSI to execute the contracts in
their favor was unlawful interference.
As to the question of whether the interference may be justified, the Supreme Court stated that it is sufficient that So Ping Bun’s conduct lies in a proper business
interest
r ather than in wrongful
motives to conclude.
Nothing on the record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on the part of So Ping Bun. Hence, while there is tortuous
Issue: Whether or
not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages?
Ruling: Yes. The
City of Dagupan is liable for damages.
The liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered
by pedestrians by reason of the defective
condition of roads is expressed in the Art. 2189 of Civil
Code, which states:
Provinces,
cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings,
and other
public works under their control or supervision.
For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong
to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either
control or supervision is
exercised over the defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this
control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan City and is
exercised through the City Engineer. This function of supervision over
streets, public buildings, and other public works is coursed
through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer.
Although these last two officials
are employees of the National
Government, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan
and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
The express provision in the charter
holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by persons or
property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of
the charter, cannot be used to exempt the city from liability. The charter only
lays down general rules regulating
the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising
from "defective streets, public buildings and other public works.
Liability
of Governmental Units
Worcester vs. Ocampo
22
PHIL 42 (Feb. 27, 1912)
Facts:
Plaintiff,
a former member of the Civil Commission and Secretary of the Interior of the
Insular Government, commenced an action against the writers, owners, directors, editors
and administrators of the newspaper "El
Renacimiento” (Muling Pagsilang) for recovery of damages resulting
from an alleged libelous editorial. Worcester alleged that the article
attacked his integrity and reputation while he was in office.
The editorial "BIRDS OF PREY” was in the form of a blind-item which though not directly pointing
to the plaintiff was
alleged to charge the latter with malfeasance in office and criminal acts; with the prostitution of his office for personal
ends; with wasting public funds for the purpose of promoting his
personal welfare; with the violation of the laws of the Philippine
Islands and the ordinances of the city of Manila; with taking part in illegal
combinations for the purpose of robbing the people; with the object
of gain for himself and for others;
and lastly with being "a
bird of prey”, which, for Worcester, alluded
to him as an eagle
that surprises and devours, a vulture that gorges himself on dead and rotten
meat, an owl that affects
a petulant omniscience, and a vampire
that sucks the blood of the victim
until he leaves it bloodless.
After trial, the judge of the CFI rendered judgment in
favor of Worcester, holding all the defendants (except for Reyes, Aguilar and
Liquete who were found to be in
asubordinate position and found
to have merely acted under the direction of their superiors) liable jointly and
severally for moral and punitive damages
Defendants contend
that the editorial "Birds of Prey" does not refer to a determinate
person; and that, conceding that it does refer to the plaintiff, none of the
defendants, except
Teodoro M. Kalaw, chief editor
or director is responsible for the writing, printing, or publication of the
alleged libelous article of the damages to the plaintiff resulting therefrom.
Issue:
Whether
or not the defendants are jointly and severally liable.]
Held:Yes. Joint tortfeasors are all the persons whocommand, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort,
or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
J oint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the
tort which they commit. They are each liable as
principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had
performed the wrongful act
themselves. The defendants may have
been sued separately for the commission of the tort or as it were here, might
be sued jointly and severally. It is not necessary that the cooperation should
be a direct, corporeal act. The person injured may sue all of them, or any
number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and altogether jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others
who participated in the wrongful
act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his
participation in the tort was insignificant as compared with that of the
others. Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist
paying an aliquot
part. They are jointly and severally liable
for the full amount.
J. H. Chapman vs. James M. Underwood
27
Phil 374 (March 28, 1914)
Facts: J.H. Chapman visited a man by the name of Creveling, in
front of whose house the accident occurred. Chapman wanted to board a certain "San Marcelino"
single-track street-car coming from Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he hurriedly, passed from the gate of Creveling’s home into the street for the
purpose of signaling and boarding the car. The car was a closed
one, the entrance
being from the front or the rear platform. Chapman
attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that
he could not reach it without
extra exertion, stopped
beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come within reach for him to board. While in this position, he was
struck from behind and run over
by Underwood’s automobile.
Immediately prior to
the incident, Underwood’s automobile, which was being driven by his chauffeur,
followed behind a street car from Manila bound to Santa Ana (Opposite direction of the “San Marcelino” street-car that Chapman wanted
to board). Just before reaching
the scene of the accident,
the street car being followed
by Underwood took the switched off the main line to the left. Thereupon, Underwood’s automobile no longer followed
that street-car nor went to the left, but either
kept straight ahead on the main street-car track or a bit
decision in favor of the defendant.
Held: A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the Underwood’s driver was guilty of negligence in running upon and over
the plaintiff. He was passing an
incoming car upon the wrong side. The plaintiff, out to board the car, was not
obliged to observe whether a car was coming upon him from his left hand. He had
only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that, according to
the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should
pass upon his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his
right, as they were the only ones under the law permitted to pass upon that
side of the street car.
Underwood, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver,
under the facts and circumstances of this case. As stated
in the case of Johnson vs. David
(5 Phil. Rep.,
663),
the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the
Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. The owner of an automobile who permits his
chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour,
without any effort to stop him, although he has had a reasonable opportunity to
do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally
and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity
to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a person or violates the
criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at
the time the act was committed, is not responsible, either
civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence
of the owner for such a length
a time
that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
In this case, it DOES NOT appear that, from the time the automobile took the wrong
side of the road to the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to
give the defendant an opportunity to correct the act of his driver. Instead, it
appears that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the street
car and the happening of the accident was
so
small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant with the negligence of the
driver.
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai
G.R.
No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
Facts: On March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue)
in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village,
Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car. With them in the car were
Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming from the opposite direction
was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Parañaque
home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate
speeds, their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance.
Ahead of the
Cadillac, going in the same direction,
was a caretella owned by Pedro Bautista.
The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical
post on
the right side and held at the
other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Bernardo tried to overtake the
carretela, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until the
lane was clear. Its rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and
wrenched it loose, and the car
skidded to the other lane. Caedo tried to avoid the collision at the last
moment by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful.
Caedo and his family members
were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages from the defendants.
The CFI Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants, Yu Khe
Thai and Rafael Bernardo.
ISSUE: Is Yu Khe Thai, as
owner of the Cadillac, solidarily liable with the driver?
HELD: No. The
applicable law is Article 2184 of the
Civil Code:
ART. 2184. In motor
vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former,
who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that
a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the
causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was
present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap
by the exercise of due
diligence.
The basis of the
master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the
relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the
negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely
correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in
order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in
the same capacity
for over ten years. During
that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed
him at all may be imputed to his
master.
The time element was such that
there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly.
The law does not require that a person must possess
a certain measure
of skill or proficiency either
in the mechanics of driving
or in the observance of traffic rules before he may
own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of
Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses
tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent
a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught
with danger to one passenger
may appear to be
entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform
standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners
who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be
effectively proscribed.
Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs. IAC
G.R.
No. L-62988 (February 28, 1985)
Facts:
Roberto
R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place on
January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila. Those
involved were the go-kart driven
by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela
Rosa, a minor of 13 years who had no driver's license.
Luna's heirs brought
a suit for damages against
Luis and his father, Jose dela Rosa at the CFI Manila.
The dela Rosas were sentenced to pay, jointly
and severally, to the heirs the
sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages,
and P50,000.00 for the loss of his companionship, with legal interest
from the
date of this decision; plus
attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00, and the costs of suit.
On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto
the decision of the trial court. However, upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by the dela Rosa, the CA reduced the unearned
net earnings to P450,000.00.
ISSUES:
(1) Did
the court err in reducing the amount of unearned income? (2) Should the award
for attorney's fees have legal interest?
HELD: (1)The award of P1,650,000.00
was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could
have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income
was P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00
annual personal expenses.
The CA sustained the trial court's conclusion with respect to Luna’s life
expectancy of 30 years and his
annual income and expense.
In reducing Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 years, the CA said that his habit and manner of life should be taken into account, i.e. that he had been engaged in car racing as a
sport both here and abroad
- a dangerous and risky activity tending
to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna had engaged
in car racing is not based on any evidence
on record. That Luna
was engaged in go-kart racing
is the correct statement but then go-kart
racing cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts
are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances. It was error
on the part of the Court of Appeals to have disturbed
the determination of the trial
court which it had previously
affirmed.
Similarly, it was
error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual income of the deceased
by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at the same time
increasing his annual gross income. It stands to reason that if his annual
personal expenses should increase because of the "escalating price of gas
which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's social standing" [a
statement which lacks complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to suppose
that his income would also increase considering the manifold sources thereof.
(2) Yes. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a
quasi-delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court. (See Art. 2211, Civil Code.) As
with the other damages awarded, the interest should accrue only from the date
of the trial court's decision.
Vicarious
liability of Parents
Exconde vs .Capuno
G.R.
No. L-10134 (June 29, 1957)
Facts:
Dante
Capuno, the 15 year old minor son of Delfin Capuno and Boy Scout Organization
member, attended a parade upon the instruction of the City school’s supervisor.
Dante,
with other students, boarded a
jeep and drove the same when it ran with the driver in his left. Shortly after,
Dante sent the jeep tumbling, killing two of its passengers.
Issue:
Whether
or not the father is liable for the acts of his son in a parade?
Held: Yes. The civil liability
imposed upon the father and mother for any damages
that may be caused by the minor children is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority
they
exercise over them, which imposes upon parents the “duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means,”
while,
on the other hand,
gives them the “right to correct and punish them in moderation.” The only way to relieve
them is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family. This defendant failed to
do.
Salen vs Balce
G.R.No.
L-14414 (April 27 1960)
Facts: Gumersindo
Balce, 14 years old, was convicted of homicide and was sentenced to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased the amount of P2,000. The amount was not realized by
the
heirs after execution because
Gumersido had no property in his name so they demanded the father of the minor
to indemnify them.
Issue:
Whether
or not the father is liable for obligations arising from criminal acts?
Held: Yes. While the
court agrees with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from
a crime shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, it
disagrees with
the contention that the subsidiary liability
of persons for acts of those who are under their custody should likewise
be governed by the same Code even in the absence of any provision
governing the case, for that would leave the transgression of certain right without any punishment or sanction in the law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of
appellee as sustained by the
trial court.
A minor over 15 who
acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason
the Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he
stand convicted. In that case, resort
should be had to the general law which is our Civil Code. The particular law that governs this case is
Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides:
"The father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the
minor children who lived in their company."
To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for
the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent.
FUELLAS v CADANO
G.R.
No. 14409 (October 31, 1961)
Facts: Rico Fuellas took the pencil of one of his classmates. Pepito returned the pencil which angered Rico who then held Pepito’s
neck and pushed him on the floor. Their teacher
separated them and ordered
them to go home. Rico met Pepito outside and repeated what he did earlier which broke Pepito’s
right arm. Rico was later convicted for intentional felony
with discernment,and his father
held subsidiarily liable for damages.
Issue:
Whether
or not the father is liable should his minor child act with discernment in a
criminal offense?
Held: Yes. Since Article
101 of the Revised Penal Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability in case
a minor child acts with discernment and become criminally liable so the resort
should
be referring to the general law
which is the Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this case is
Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case
because it only covers obligations which arise from
quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez
G.R.
No. 34840 (September 23, 1931)
Facts:
Bonifacio
Gutierrez, the 18 y/o son of Manuel Gutierrez, was driving the family car with
other family members overly speeding while approaching a bridge which caused an
accident with a passenger bus
injuring Narcisso Gutierrez (not related to Bonifacio and Manuel). It was later
held that Bonifacio is incompetent to drive.
Issue: Is the father
liable for the act of his son?
Held: Yes. The
theory of the law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other
members of the family is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he
is liable for the
negligence of
the child because of the relationship of master
and servant.
Rodriguez-Luna v IAC
135
SCRA 241 (1985)
Facts: Luis dela Rosa, 13 years of age and without
a driver’s license,
at that time while driving
a Toyota car negligently killed Roberto Luna who was driving a Go-Kart in a practice
run. Later, Luis already
became of age, married, with two children,
and living in Madrid says that he has no properties so a writ of execution cannot be enforced
against him.
Issue: May the father still be held liable despite the
attainment of majority by his son at the time the decision was promulgated?
Held: Yes. Notwithstanding emancipation, he is still
liable but as a matter of equity, the liability shall become merely subsidiary.
Cuadra vs. Monfort
35
SCRA 160 (1970)
Facts:Maria Teresa Cuadra
and Maria Teresa
Monfort, 13 years old, together
with three other
classmates were assigned
to weed the grass in the school
premises. Monfort pulled
a prank to scare Cuadra by throwing a plastic headband
at her face and making
it appear that it was an earthworm. Unfortunately, the headband
hit Cuadra’s right eye, blinding
the same.
Issue: Is the father liable for his daughter’s acts?
Held: No. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his
parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it.
On the contrary, his
child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he
had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the
teacher. And as far as the act which caused
the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however
careful, would have any
special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any
mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which
would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be
attributed to her parents.
Libi v. IAC
214 SCRA 16 (1990)
Facts:
Wendell
Libi, minor, was dumped by his sweetheart Julie Anne after the latter found him
to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands
for
reconciliation but the Julie
refused, prompting him to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him,
Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso.
Later, Wendell took the key of
deposit box, opened it and, and took the gun stored inside. The gun belongs to
his father, an agent of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU).
Wendell went to his
ex-sweetheart, killed her and then committed suicide using the same gun. The
parents of Julie Anne sued the parents of Wendell for damages.
The Libis contend
that an unknown
third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer
of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused
Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any witness and thereby avoid identification.
Issue:
Is the
father liable for Wendell’s acts?
Held:
Yes. The
father of Wendell did not exercise due diligence when he did not prevent the
kid from having access to the key which opens his safety deposit box. The court
did not give
credence to the story of the
Libis.
Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he
kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the
Wendell’s parents holds a key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's
key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They have never seen their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted,
however, that on that fateful
night the gun was no longer in the safety
deposit box. In view of these circumstances, it can be deduced that the spouses
Libi have not exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family by safely
locking the fatal
gun away. Wendell could not have gotten
hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit
box was negligently left lying around or he had free access
to the bag of his mother where
the other key was.
Tamargo vs CA
G.R.
No. 85044, June 3, 1992.
Facts:
A case
based on quasi-delict was filed against the natural parents of Adelberto
Bundoc, a minor, who shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which caused her
death. Prior to the
incident, Adelberto has been the subject of adoption
proceedings filed by Rapisura spouses and after the incident,
the same was granted. In the Bundocs’
answer, they said that the
Rapisuras are the ones who
should be liable since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment a successful petition was filed.
Issue:
Who
should be liable for the minor’s acts?
Held: Parental authority is not retroactively transferred
to the adopting
custody pending the adoption proceedings are still the
natural parents over the child, they should be
the ones liable for any damage
caused.
Vicarious
liability of teachers and heads of institutions
Mercado vs. CA
G.R.
No. L-14342, May 30, 1960
Facts:
Manuel Quisimbing, Jr., son of private respondents Ana and Manuel,
Sr., was the classmate of Augusto Mercado
in the Lourdes School of Kanlaon, Q.C. A melee ensued between the two on account of the
latter’s (Augusto Mercado) “pitogo”, an empty nutshell used by children as a
coin bank. The said coin bank was lent several times. As Mercado attempted to
obtain the same, Manuel Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at
putting the chain into the holes of the "pitogo". The fight started
thereafter. Augusto gave successive blows to Manuel,
Jr., and as he clutched
his stomach, which bore the brunt of Augusto's anger,
Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a razor. Private
respondents went to court asking for moral damages on account of a)
the wound inflicted by Augusto Mercado (2,000) , and b) moral damages due to
the mental anguish of seeing their son wounded (3,000). Although originally dismissed by the CFI of Manila,
on appeal, judgment
was rendered in favor of respondents, ordering
petitioner to pay P2,000 as moral damages
and P50 as medical expenses.
Petitioner argues that since the infliction of the wound occurred in a Catholic
School (during recess
time), through no fault of the father,
petitioner herein, the teacher or head of the
school should be held responsible instead of the latter. Further,
they claim that the award of moral damages was excessive.
Issue: To whom does responsibility over the child’s
actions pass to, the teacher or the parent? Was the award of moral damages
excessive?
Held: As to the first issue,
the Supreme Court held in Exconde vs. Capuno
and Capuno that responsibility over the child’s
actions must pass to the teacher. However,
this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades not to an academic educational institution. Further, upon reading the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it would be seem that the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody," contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that control, direction and influence on the pupil
supersedes those of the parents. Such a situation does not appear in the case
at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to
their homes with their parents after school is over. Similarly, paragraph 2 of said article,
which makes father
or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their
minor children, cannot
apply. The claim
of petitioner that
responsibility should pass to the school must, therefore, be held to be without merit.
As to the amount of
moral damages, the Court held that while moral damages included physical
suffering, the decision of the court below does not declare that any of the
cases specified in Article
2219 of the Civil Code in which moral damages
may be recovered, has attended
or occasioned the physical injury.
The only possible
circumstance in the case at bar in which moral damages are recoverable
would be if a criminal offense or a quasi-delict has been committed. It does
not appear that a criminal action for physical injuries was ever presented. Further,
the offender was nine years old and did not appear to have acted
with discernment when he inflicted the physical injuries
on Manuel Quisumbing, Jr.
Further, even if we
assume that the CA considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it imposed
moral damages, the facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel,
Jr. had tried to intervene
in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is, therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another boy.
Palisoc vs. CA
G.R.
No. L-29025 (October 4, 1971)
Facts:
Dominador
Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates and, together with
another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room located on the ground
floor. At that time the classes
were in recess, Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador
Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting
like a foreman. Because of this remark
Palisoc slapped slightly
Daffon on the face. Daffon,
in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, followed by
other fist blows to the stomach. Palisoc retreated, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged
blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block causing him to fall face downward.
Palisoc became pale and fainted.
First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately
taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness.
Trial ensued, with the trial court giving credence
to Cruz’s version of the incident. The trial court found defendant Daffon
liable for the quasi delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It held that "(T)he act of Daffon in
giving the deceased strong fist blows in the stomach which ruptured his
internal organs and caused his death falls within the purview of this article
of the Code."
Issue: Did the trial court err in absolving the defendants-school
officials instead of holding them jointly and severally liable with defendant
Daffon, for the damages awarded them as a
result of their son's death?
Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the lower court’s
decision to absolve was based on Mercado
v. CA, which was based in turn on another dictum in the earlier case of Exconde vs.
Capuno, The dictum in such earlier case that "It is
true that under the law above-quoted, teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody, but this … applies to an institution of arts and trades
and not to any academic educational institution." The case at hand was
instituted directly against the school officials and squarely raises the issue
of liability of teachers and heads of schools under Article 2180, Civil Code,
for damages caused by their pupils and students against fellow students on the
school premises.
There is no question, either, that the school involved
is a non-academic school, the Manila Technical Institute being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school.
With this in mind, the Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher
of the Manila Technical Institute
( Valenton and Quibulue, respectively) are liable jointly
and severally for damages
to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant
Daffon at the school's laboratory room.
In the law of torts, the governing
principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers
is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents.
It becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself
to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole
time that they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time,
as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect
the students in their custody
from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including
injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students.
There is nothing in the law that
requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits
the tortious act must live and board in
the school, as erroneously held
by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must
now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
Amadora
vs. CA
G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Facts: Alfredo Amadora went to the San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. Daffon was convicted
of
homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, a civil
action for damages
was filed against
the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys,
and
the physics teacher, together
with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents.
The Court of Appeals,
in reversing the CFI’s decision,
found that Article
2180 was not applicable as the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It
also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time
of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in preventing the injury.
The petitioners
contend that their son was in the school to show his physics experiment as a
prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the custody of the
private respondents.
Earlier, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated
from Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without
making a report to the principal or taking
any further action.
As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed Alfredo,
petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been
confiscated from Gumban and that
their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso.
Issues:
Does
Article 2180 apply only to cases of tort which occur in schools of arts and
trades? When is a student said to be in the “custody” of the school?
Held: The Court
held that Article 2180 should apply to
all schools regardless of its academic or non-academic status, since there is
no substantial difference between the two insofar as
supervision, advice and insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned.
This is in line with the dissenting
opinion penned by Justice JBL Reyes in Exconde v. Capuno.
The
Court cannot see why different degrees
of vigilance should
be exercised by the school
authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. No plausible reason exists for
relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for increasing
such vigilance where the school is non-academic. The teacher certainly
should not be able to
excuse himself by simply showing
that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head
would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
Further, following reddendo singgula singulis, in reading
the provision, “teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and
students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to
the word "apprentices." The latter can be traced from history, back
when schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who
personally and directly
instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft.
The head of the school of arts and trades
was such, a master, and was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even
boarded with him and came under his constant control, supervision and influence.
As regards the
second issue, the Court held that while the custody requirement does not mean
that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify
that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. The student is
deemed to be in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester
has not yet begun or has already
ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the
school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise
of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues.
Pasco vs. CFI
G.R. No. L-54357 (April 25, 1988)
Facts:
On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner Pasco, together with two companions, while
walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after
attending classes in said university, was accosted and mauled by a group of
Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng." Said Muslim
group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently
stabbed by Abdul and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central
University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent surgery to save his life.
Petitioner, assisted by his father
Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul Karim Madidis and
herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta University which was docketed as
Civil Case No. SM-1027. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Subsequently, a motion to dismiss was filed by
respondent school.
Respondent court granted the motion to dismiss, and likewise denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Is the provision in the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code equally applicable to academic institutions?
Held: The court rules in the negative,
for surely the provision concerned speaks only of "teachers or heads."
Further, the court finds no necessity of discussing the applicability of the
Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades)
for the issue in this petition.
NOTE: Compare this with the immediately preceding case.
YLarde vs. Aquino
G.R.
No. L-33722 (July 29, 1988)
Facts: Supra
Issue: Whether or not under Art. 2176 and 2180, both the
teacher and the principal can be held liable for damages
Held: As to the principal, he cannot be
made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an
academic school and not a school of arts and trades. In line with the ruling in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals,
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should
be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court
went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the
school who can be held liable. Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for
the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino,
private respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily
seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in
his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to
prevent any injury on their persons. However, petitioners base the alleged
liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176. Were there acts and
omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or
negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde?
The Court answered in the affirmative. He is liable for damages.
Clearly, private respondent Aquino
acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of
services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to eleven
to make an excavation near the one-ton
concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous task; (2) required
the children to remain inside
the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge
block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around
the excavation when it was so apparent
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place
where he would not be able to check on the children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the
excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The contention that private respondent
Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly
without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that
bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by
themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would
not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is
sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block
adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher
who stands in loco parentis to his
pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in
his company
Salvosa vs. IAC
G.R. No. 70458
October 5, 1988
Facts: Within the premises
of Baguio Colleges
Foundation (BFC), an academic institution, is an ROTC Unit, the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC)
Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Jimmy B. Abon is its duly appointed
armorer, who received
his appointment from the AFP, and is not an
employee of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon
Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed
firearm
which the former
took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. Napoleon Castro
died and Jimmy
B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime
of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP.
defendants. The trial court
rendered decision sentencing Abon, Salvosa and BCF jointly and severally liable
to the heirs of Castro.
ISSUE:
Can
Salvosa and the BCF be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy
B. Abon?
HELD: No. Under the penultimate paragraph of
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are hable for "damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody." The rationale of such liability
is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter "stands, to a
certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called
upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase
used in [Art. 2180 — 'so
long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time."
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student
not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
A "recess," as the concept
is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the
school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student
still remains within
call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises,
or the area within which the school activity is conducted.
Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being
in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated
in the law.
Jimmy B. Abon cannot be
considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners
cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held
solidarily liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
St.
Francis High School vs. CA
G.R. No. 82465 (February 25, 1991)
Facts:
Ferdinand Castillo, a freshman
student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join a school
picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon.
Ferdinand's parents, spouses
Dr. Romulo Castillo
and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because
of short notice,
did not allow their son to join but merely allowed him to bring food
to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should
go back home after doing
so. Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic,
one of the female teachers
was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came
to her rescue, but in the process, Ferdinand
drowned.
The spouses
Castillo filed a complaint against
St. Francis High School, represented by the spouses
Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers: Tirso de Chaves,
Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for
Damages. The trial court decided against teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas,
Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz, for failing to exercise the diligence required of
them by law under the circumstances to guard against the harm they had
foreseen. It dismissed the case against the St. Francis High School, Benjamin
Illumin and Aurora Cadorna for failing to show that they were responsible for Castillo's death.
On appeal, the CA
ruled that St. Francis HS and Illumin were liable under Art 2176 taken together
with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Yoly
Jaro and Nida Aragones, who had satisfactorily explained why they were late in
going to the picnic site were absolved of liability.
ISSUES:
(1) Were the school and their
teachers negligent? (2)Is Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code is applicable? (3) Is the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper?
HELD: The school and the principle are neither guilty of
their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under them. They
cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.
Under
Article 2180, par. 4, before an employer
may be held liable for the negligence of his employee,
the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred
while an employee was in the performance of his assigned
tasks. Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning
of the picnic by the students and their teachers
does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent
to the holding of the same. The application therefore
of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence.
No negligence could be attributable to
the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the
respondents-spouses. Arquio, class adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages
to all the students who joined the picnic.
With these facts in mind, no moral nor
exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of respondents-spouses. The case at
bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.
Moreover, as already pointed out
hereinabove, petitioners are not guilty of any fault or negligence, hence, no
moral damages can be assessed against them. While it is true that
respondents-spouses did give their consent to their son to join the picnic, this
does not mean that the petitioners were already relieved of their duty to
observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in ensuring the
safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to prove
that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral or
exemplary damages becomes baseless.
PSBA vs.
CA
G.R. No. 84698 (February 4, 1992)
Facts: A stabbing incident
on 30 August 1985 caused
the death of Carlitos Bautista
while on the second-floor premises
of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA). His
parents filed a suit in the RTC of Manila (Branch
47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals
justice) Regina Ordoñez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its
corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was
enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was
established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
PSBA sought to have the suit
dismissed, alleging that since they are being sued under Art 2180 of the Civil,
the complaint lacks a cause of action because they, as an academic
institution, were beyond the ambit of the rule . The
courts denied the motion.
ISSUE: Is the PSBA liable
under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Article
2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule
of in loco parentis. Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should have
been caused
or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist
in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students
of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. However,
it does not necessarily follow
that
PSBA is exculpated from
liability.
When an academic
institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound
to comply with. The school undertakes to provide the student with an education
that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary
tools and skills to pursue higher education
or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Because the circumstances of the
present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual
obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract,
whether express or implied.
However, this impression has not prevented the Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains
a contract. Jurisprudence indicates that should the act which breaches
a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, there is no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence
in
providing proper security
measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence,
the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
Using the test of Cangco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant
absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of
the contractual relation between
PSBA and Bautista.
In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the negligence
occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
As the proceedings have yet to commence, only the
trial court can make a determination of material facts.
Soliman
vs. Tuason
G.R. No. 66207 (May 18, 1992)
Facts:
On 13 August 1982, Soliman, Jr., a
regular student of Republic Central Colleges (RCC), was in its campus ground
and premises taking his morning classes. Jimmy B. Solomon, who was on said date
and hour in the premises of said school performing his duties and obligations
as a duly appointed security guard under the employment, supervision and
control of
R.L. SECURITY AGENCY, INC., headed by Mr. Benjamin
Serrano, shot Soliman on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver, a deadly
weapon, which ordinarily such wound sustained would have caused plaintiff's
death were it not for the timely medical assistance given to him.
Soliman filed a
civil complaint for damages against private Republic Central Colleges, the R.L.
Security Agency Inc. and Jimmy B. Solomon, a security guard. RCC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that there was no cause of action
against it, and that it is free from liability
because RCC was not the employer of the security
guard charged, Jimmy
Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon.
They also argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply,
since said paragraph holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and
trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of
the school. The court granted the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Is RCC liable for damages?
Held:
Yes, but RCC is not liable under
Article 2180 par. 5 of the Civil Code. RCC was not the employer of Jimmy
Solomon. The employer of Jimmy Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while
the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security Agency Inc. It is
settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns
the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such
guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the
security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or
customers of such agency.
Likewise, RCC is not liable under
Article 2180 par 7. since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a
pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he being in fact an employee
of the R.L. Security Agency Inc.,
However, it does not follow that RCC
could not be held liable upon any other basis in law. In PSBA, the Court held
that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been
injured by one who was an outsider or by one over whom the school did not
exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the
Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a
school which accepts students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students
who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in obligations for
both parties.
As PSBA states,
acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent
trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should
not have granted the motion
to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice, allowed
petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or
ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
St.
Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
G.R.
No. 143363 (February 6, 2002)
Facts:
From 13 to 20 February 1995, St.
Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school
year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of
schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos was
part of the campaigning group. Sherwin, along with other high school students
rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel
II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. The jeep turned turtle.
Sherwin died.
Spouses William
Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his
parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City. The RTC rendered judgment holding St. Mary's Academy liable for damages,
and the Daniels' subsidiarily liable. James Daniel II and Villanueva were
absolved of liability.
ISSUE: Is St. Mary's Academy liable for damages?
Held:
No. Under Article 218 of the
Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school,
its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside
the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority
and responsibility applies
to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school
premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article
219 of the Family Code,
if the person under custody
is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable
for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or
omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this
case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim.
“The
proximate cause of an injury
is that cause,
which, in natural
and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”
Considering it was
the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by Villanueva which caused the accident, an event over
which St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of
the accident, the school may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
Consequently, the school cannot be liable for moral
damages. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of
the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. In this case, the proximate
cause of the accident was not attributable to petitioner.
Incidentally, there
was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused
the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.”
Vicarious
liability of owners and managers of establishments
Philippine Rabbit vs. Philippine
American
G.R.
No. L-25142 (March 25, 1975)
Facts: In the complaint for damages filed by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on
November 24, 1962, Pineda
drove recklessly a freight truck,
owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national
highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus
driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged
and could not be used for
seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting
to P8,665.51. Balingit
was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
The case was dismissed
based on the ground that Balingit as the manager of Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., which together with Fernando Pineda and Balingit, was sued for
damages in an action based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, is not the manager of an establishment
contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Do the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise" (dueños o directores
de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil
Code, formerly article 1903 of the old Code, embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from
which the damage arose?
Held: No. Those terms do
not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context
of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the
Spanish version) is
used in the sense of
"employer".
Hence,
under the allegations of the complaint, no
tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of
Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection
with the vehicular accident
already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or
dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
The bus company and its driver,
in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual
issue which was not alleged
in their complaint. They argue that Phil- American
Forwarders, Inc. is merely a
business conduit of Balingit. That argument implies that the veil of corporate
fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. and Balingit
and his wife should be treated
as one and the same civil personality. This issue was not raised
in the lower court. The legal issue,
which Philippine Rabbit
and Pangalangan can ventilate in this appeal, is one which was raised in the lower court and which is within the issues framed
by the parties (Sec. 18, Rule 46, Rules of Court).
Vicarious Liability of employers
Philtranco vs. CA
G.R.
No. 120553 (June 17, 1997)
Facts: The heirs of Ramon A. Acuesta instituted n action against Philtranco. They alleged that on March 24, 1990, about 6:00 o'clock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was riding in his
easy rider bicycle along the
Gomez Street of Calbayog City. Philtranco Bus No. 4025 with plate No. EVA-725
driven by defendant Rogasiones Manilhig y Dolira, was being pushed by
some persons to start its
engine. The engine started and continued running. It bumped Acuesta and ran
over him.
Philtranco, on the other hand, alleged that Manilhig, warmed up the engine of the bus and made a few rounds within the city proper of Calbayog. While the bus was cruising
along Gomez Street, the victim, who was biking towards the same direction as the bus, suddenly overtook
two tricycles and swerved left to the center of the road. The swerving
was
abrupt and so sudden that even as Manilhig applied
the brakes and blew the bus horn, the victim was bumped from behind
and run over by the bus. The trial court rendered judgment
holding Philtranco and Manilhig jointly
and severally liable. The CA affirmed
the trial court’s
decision.
Issues:
(1) Is
Article 2194, instead of Article 2180 of the Civil Code applicable, in other
words, were Philtranco and Manilhig solidarily liable? (2) Is the award of
damages proper?
Held:
Yes. The
case is action for damages based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code against petitioner Manilhig and his employer, petitioner
Philtranco,
respectively.
Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
primary, direct, and joint and
several or solidary with the drive. Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or
more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Since the employer's liability is
primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is
satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed
the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict.
Art. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused
by his dependents or employees
may recover from the latter
what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
The award of "P200,000.00 as death
indemnity" not as compensation for loss of earning capacity. There is no
evidence on the victim's earning capacity and life expectancy. Only indemnity
for death under Article 2206 is due, which is fixed at P50,000.
Castilex vs. Vasquez
G.R. No. 132266 (December 21, 1999)
going around the Osmeña rotunda
he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his
route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. The pick-up collided with the
motorcycle. Abad brought Vasquez
to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital, where
Vasquez subsequently died.
An action for damages was
instituted. The trial court ruled in
favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and held Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation
jointly and solidarily liable
for damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court
holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only
vicarious and not solidary"
with the former.
Issue:
May the
employer be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle?
Held: Castilex contends that the par. 5 of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in
business or industry. Since it is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore
not covered by said provision. Instead, par. 4 should apply. This is not
accurate.
This court has
applied par. 5 to cases where the employer was engaged in a business or
industry such as truck operators and banks. The Court of Appeals cannot,
therefore, be faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code to this case.
Under par. 5 of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business
or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned
tasks. But it is necessary
to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
that the employee
was acting within the
scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer
may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence
in the selection and
supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a
Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence.
As to whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned
task is a question of fact,
which the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
The mere fact that ABAD was
using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself
sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of
said vehicle unless it appears
that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment.
In the case at bar,
it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office,
which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's
Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away
from petitioner's place of business. It was when ABAD was leaving the
restaurant that the incident in question occurred.
ABAD
was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in
line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident.
Since there is lack
of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to
him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus,
justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability
for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.
Filamer vs. IAC
G.R.
No. 75112 (August 17, 1992)
Facts: The private
respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision
rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990, which ruled that Filamer is not
liable for the injuries
caused by Funtecha
on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly
and primarily answerable, and that
Funtecha was merely a working scholar
who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the
petitioner.
Funtecha was a working student,
being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in
relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the
school premises for only two (2)
hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student
driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed,
to take over the vehicle
while the latter
was on his way home one late afternoon.
Allan Masa turned
over the vehicle
to Funtecha only after driving
down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing
that the road was clear.
A fast moving truck with glaring
lights nearly hit them so that
they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. The Pinoy jeep hit
Potenciano Kapunan.
Issue: Is Filamer, Funtecha’s employer, liable?
Held: Yes. In learning
how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction
of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely
was not having a joy ride. Funtecha
was not driving for the
purpose of his enjoyment
or for a "frolic of his own"
but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended
by the petitioner school. Therefore,
the Court is constrained to
conclude that the act of
Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of
his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by
arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his
janitorial duties. The clause
"within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising
the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an
employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of
the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense,
was promulgated only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. It is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor.
The reliance on
said rule is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an
employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the
Civil Code. There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an
extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence
of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
(him)."
Funtecha is an employee
of petitioner Filamer. The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant
or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised
the required diligence
of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha
and Allan.
FIlamer thus has an
obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. The liability of the employer is, under Article
2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against
the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.
NPC vs. CA
G.R.
No. 119121 (August 14, 1998)
Facts: On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four (4) dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left Marawi city bound for Iligan city. Unfortunately, enroute to its
destination, one of the trucks
with plate no RFT-9-6-673 driven by a certain Gavino Ilumba figured in a
head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of
three (3) persons riding in the
Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages against NPC and PHESCO before the then CFI of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City. The trial court rendered a decision
absolving NPC of any liability
and holding PHESCO,
Inc. and Gavino Ilumba jointly
and severally liable.
On Appeal, the CA reversed
the trial court’s
decision and held that as Phesco is
a “labor only” contractor, of Napocor the statute itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer
(Napocor) and the employee (driver
Ilumba) of the labor only
contractor (Phesco). NPC is
therefore liable and not Phesco.
Issue:
As
between NPC and PHESCO, who is the employer of Ilumba, driver of the dumptruck
which figured in the accident and which should, therefore, would be liable for
damages to
the victims?
Held:
Under the Memorandum, NPC had
mandate to approve the "critical path network and rate of expenditure to
be undertaken by PHESCO. Likewise, the manning schedule and pay scale of the
workers hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation by NPC. Then too, it
cannot be ignored that if PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease, again
NPC's concurrence is needed. Another consideration is that even in the
procurement of tools and equipment that will be used by PHESCO, NPC's favorable
recommendation is still necessary before these tools and equipment can be purchased. Notably, it is NPC that will provide
the money or funding that will be used by PHESCO to undertake the project. Furthermore, it must be
emphasized that the project being undertaken by PHESCO, i.e., construction of
power energy facilities, is related to NPC's principal business of power
generation. In sum, NPC's control over PHESCO in matters
concerning the performance of the latter's
work is evident. It is enough that NPC has the right to wield such power to be considered as the employer.
Under this factual
milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in "labor-only"
contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as such, it is considered merely an agent of the
latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship between
the principal employer and the employees of the "labor-only"
contractor is created. Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to
the employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees had
been directly employed by the principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a
"labor- only" contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including
the driver of the ill-fated truck, should be considered as employees of NPC.
After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters
into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of a
specified work or for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility over the
employees of the latter.
It is apparent that
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code, as NPC argues, that will
determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an
injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the "labor
only" contractor. With respect to the liability of NPC as the direct
employer, Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Employers
shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
In this regard, NPC's liability is
direct, primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of course, NPC, if the
judgment for damages is satisfied by it, shall have recourse against PHESCO and
the driver who committed the negligence which gave rise to the action.
Light Rail Transit vs. Navidad
G.R.
No. 145804 (February 6, 2003)
Facts: On 14 October
1993, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on
the platform near the LRT tracks,
Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued
that led to a fist fight.
No evidence, however,
was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between
the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks.
At the exact moment that Navidad
fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in.
Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
Nicanor’s widow filed a complaint for damages against
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. The trial court rendered decision
holding Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally
liable. On appeal,
the CA exonerated Prudent from any liability
and, instead,
held the LRTA and Roman jointly
and severally liable.
Issue: (1) Is LRTA liable? (2)Is Roman
an employee of LRTA and also liable?
Held:
(1)Yes.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of
its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of
exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety
of passengers.
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract
of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises
from the breach
of that contract by reason
of its failure to exercise
the
high diligence required
of the common carrier. In the discharge
of its commitment to ensure
the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees
or avail itself
of the
services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is
not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Prudent’s
liability, If any, could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176
and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission
causes the injury,
one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may
arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.
Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no
contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
However, the Court
is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is
nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason
that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x
x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification
in our own review of the records of the case.
(2) No. There being no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself
is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from
liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie
between the LRT and Navidad is
not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can
be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
Mckee vs. IAC
211
SCRA 517 (1992)
Facts: Supra
Issues: (1) Did Galang’s negligence cause the collision?
(2) Were Tayag and Manalo liable for damages?
Held:
Yes. The lower court held that
Jose Koh was negligent for improperly invading the lane of the truck. This is
unwarranted because it is manifest that no negligence can be imputed to Koh. In
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813)
the Court held that:
The test by
which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use
that (reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation?) If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
It is manifest
that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent
man would have tried to avoid running
over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they were even if this
would mean entering the opposite lane.
The truck driver's
negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his truck was
running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the maximum
speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under Article
2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. The truck
driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the testimony of
Araceli Koh McKee which was duly corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio
Tanhueco, an impartial eyewitness to the mishap.
Clearly, therefore,
it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing to take the proper
measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was the
proximate cause of the resulting accident.
(2) Yes. It was the truck driver's
negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collision which was,
in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of the truck driver,
the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are
negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption, however,
is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible defense
is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage.
Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R.
No. 115024 (1996)
Facts:
The petitioner, Ma. Lourdes
Valenzuela, was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon,
heading towards the direction of Manila. Suddenly, she noticed something wrong
with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to
verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been
told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she
cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk.
She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools
to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987
Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for
moral damages in the amount of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 and other medical and related expenses amounting to a total of
P180,000.00, including loss of expected earnings.
After trial,
the lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant
Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. The trial court likewise
held Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li's employer,
jointly and severally
liable for damages
pursuant to Article
2180.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not, the petitioner
is guilty of contributory negligence? (2) Whether or not, respondent’s
employer, Alexander Commercial Inc, is liable for the acts of its employee?
RULING:
(1) The SC ruled that the
Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. Valenzuela did exercise
the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard
was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions.
(2) Likewise, the
SC ruled that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the
master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of his employees.
It is up to this point, however,
that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias
standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, hence, the court
is of the opinion that Li's employer,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly
and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.
Vicarious
liability of the State
E.
Merritt vs Government Of The Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March
21, 1916
Facts:
E.
Merritt was riding on a motorcycle travelling at ten to twelve miles per hour
when he collided with the General Hospital ambulance which turned suddenly and unexpectedly
before reaching the center
of the street and without
sounding its whistle
or horn in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act. The plaintiff suffered from fractures
to the skull, material injury
to
the grey matter and brain and a broken right leg as a result of the collision. He was mentally
and physically impaired
such that he lost his efficiency in constructing wooden buildings,
which was his occupation.
Act No. 2457 was enacted
specifically to authorize E.Merritt to bring suit against the Government “in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages,
if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt
is entitled on account of said collision.” The court found the chauffeur of the ambulance solely negligent and
awarded plaintiff a total P14,741.
Issue: Whether the Government is
legally liable for the damages resulting from the collision committed by the
agent or employee of the Government
RULING: The SC increased
the total damages awarded to plaintiff to P18,075 since he was incapacitated
for a period of six months and not only for the time he remained confined in
the
hospital.
The general
rule is that the Government cannot be sued by an individual without
its consent. In accordance with Act No.2457,
the plaintiff was authorized to bring action against
the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision and to determine
the amount of the damages,
if any. However, Act No. 2457 does not operate
to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously
recognized. According to the Civil Code Article 1903 (now Art 2180):
“The state is
liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to
do the act performed, in
which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.”
The responsibility of the state is
limited to cases wherein it acts through
a special agent; a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed
order or commission, foreign to the exercise
of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. This does not apply
to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent
in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations.
Therefore, the State is only liable
for the acts of its agents, officers
and employees when they act as special
agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903 (now Article
2180); and that the chauffeur of the ambulance
of the General Hospital was not such an agent
for which the State is made liable.
Inocencio
Rosete vs.The Auditor General
G.R. No. L-1120 (August 31, 1948)
Facts:
Inocencio Rosete and others filed
a claim against the Government for damages caused to buildings belonging to the
claimants, which were destroyed by fire from the contiguous warehouse of the
Emergency Control Administration, ECA, an office or agency of the Government.
The fire was initiated by the reckless ignition of a cigarette-lighter by a
certain Jose Frayno y Panlilio near a five-gallon drum where gasoline was
drained and stored in contrary to the provisions of Ordinances of the City of
Manila.
The Insular Auditor denied or dismissed the claim
of Rosete and others in the amount of P35,376.
Issue: Whether the government is liable for the damages
sustained by the claimant under article 1903 of the Civil Code (now Article
2180)
Ruling: The pertinent provision reads as follows:
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceding
article is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions but also for
those persons for whom another is responsible.
The state is liable in the scene when
it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been
caused by the official to whom it properly pertained to do the act performed,
in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The court citing
Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands held that the state is not liable for damages suffered
by private individuals by government employees
in the discharge of their
responsibilities unless such act was committed by a special agent, “duly
empowered by a definite order or
commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which
gives rise to the claim.” Since the officers of the ECA did not act as
special agents and there is no negligence imputable to a special agent, the
government is not liable for the damages resulting from the negligence
complained of.
Act No. 327,
authorizing the filing of claims against the Government with the Insular
Auditor, does not make any and all claims against the Government allowable or
the Government responsible for such claims.
Mendoza
vs. De Leon, et al.
G.R. No. L-9596 February
11, 1916
Facts:
Marcos Mendoza was the highest
bidder for the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege in the municipality of
Villasis, Pangasinan, and was duly awarded the privilege under the provisions
of Act No. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. After a little more than a year,
the municipal council of Villasis, Pangasinan, through a resolution, awarded
the franchise for the same ferry to another person, forcibly ejecting Mendoza
therefrom. The council claimed that the ferry Mendoza was operating was not the
one leased to him.
Mendoza instituted an action for damages against
the individual members of the Municipal Council.
Issue: Whether the individual members of the Municipal
Council are liable to Mendoza for forcibly ejecting him from the leased ferry
Ruling: A municipality has a two-fold
character of powers,
namely governmental and proprietary. With respect to liability, numerous
cases elucidate that the municipality is liable for the
acts of its officers and agents in the exercise
of proprietary or corporate powers,
but it is not liable for the acts of its officers
or agents in the performance of its governmental functions.
Officers or agents of the Government
charged with the performance of governmental duties are not liable for the
consequences of their official acts, unless they have acted willfully and
maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury.
In so far as its governmental functions
are concerned, a municipality is also not liable, unless expressly made so by
statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perform their duties honestly
and in good faith.
But a municipality is not exempt from
liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or
business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to
be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to
third persons on contract or in tort is concerned.
Mendoza had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry;
and there is no evidence
that there was justifiable reason
for his eviction.
The contention that Mendoza was operating a ferry
that was not leased to him is untenable since it was the vice-president himself who personally placed him in possession thereof,
a fact know to the council members.
It cannot be said that the councilors
acted honestly for the interests of the municipality. Therefore, they are
jointly and severally liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from
the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question.
Fontanilla
vs. Maliaman
G.R. No. L-55963 December 1, 1989
FACTS:
Francisco Fontanilla, son of the
spouses Jose and Virginia Fontanilla, died as a result of an accident when a
pickup owned and operated by the National Irrigation Administration, a government agency,
driven by Hugo Garcia (a regular employee
of said agency)
bumped the bicycle
he was riding. The deceased
was thrown 50 meters from the point of
impact, while his companion, who survived the incident, was thrown a bit further
away. Nevertheless, the NIA employees
did not stop to assist
the victims and instead sped away.
The trial court directed respondent National
Irrigation Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses
to petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not the award of moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a complaint for
damages based on quasi-delict against the NIA
Ruling: The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:
1.
Its public or governmental aspects where it is
liable for the tortious acts of special agents
only.
2.
Its private or business aspects where it becomes
liable as an ordinary employer.
The National
Irrigation Administration is a government corporation and exercises proprietary
functions, by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. As a corporate body
performing non-governmental functions, it is liable as an ordinary employer for
the acts of its employees. As such, the NIA becomes answerable for damages
caused by its employees upon the existence of negligence of supervision on its
part.
At the time the
accident took place, the employees and the driver did not assist the victims
and instead sped off even though there were dent marks indicating they were
aware they hit something or someone. The strength of the impact also indicated
that they were driving at a high speed at the time the collision occurred.
There was evident negligence on the part of NIA
when its supervisor within the group allowed the driver to travel at a high
speed.
Considering the
foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses
the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for
hospitalization and burial expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as
moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the
total award.
City of Manila vs. Teotico
G.R.
No. L-23052 (January 29, 1968)
Facts: Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted manhole when he attempted to board a jeepney at a "loading and unloading" zone. As a result of the fall, Teotico’s
eyeglasses broke and its shards
pierced his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Aside from the lacerated wound
in his left upper eyelid, he also suffered from several contusions to his body
and an allergic eruption caused
by anti-tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. His medical
expenses amounted to P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence,
Teotico filed a complaint for damages against
the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer,
city treasurer and chief
of police. The City of Manila and its officers
contended that every time a report that a cover of a manhole is missing, the Office of the City Engineer immediately had it replaced
and that
they were attentive thereto.
The trial court rendered a decision in favour of
the City of Manila but the Court of Appeals sentenced the City of Manila to pay
damages amounting to P6,750.00.
Issue: Whether the City of Manila is liable for payment of
damages to Teotico
Held: Between RA 409, the Charter of Manila, exempting
the City from liability, and the Civil Code, the Civil Code applies because its
subject-matter is more particular. RA 409 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof. On the other hand,
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Provinces,
cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control
or supervision.
Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
thereon.
Even assuming that the incident took
place in a national highway, it is not necessary for liability to attach that
the defective roads or streets belongs to
the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
Article 2189 requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road.
Republic Act No. 917 provides that the
construction, maintenance and
improvement of national, provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the
Highway District Engineers and Highway City
Engineers.
Liability
of employees
Araneta vs. De Joya
G.R.
No. L-25172 (May 24, 1974)
Facts: Antonio de Joya was the general manager of the Ace Advertising. He proposed that an employee,
Ricardo Taylor, be sent to the United States to take up special studies
in
television. Although the board of directors failed to act on the proposal, Taylor was still sent to the US, with the assurance that Taylor’s expenses
would be defrayed by parties
other
Taylor received his salaries
while abroad through
checks and vouchers
signed by Luis Araneta (vice-president), Vicente Araneta (company
treasurer) or de Joya. The total costs
of Taylor’s travel and study
expenses was P 5,043.20.
Ace Advertising filed a
complaint with the court for the recovery of the total amount disbursed to
Taylor since the travel and expenses were made without its knowledge,
authority or ratification. A third-party
complaint was filed by de Joya against Vicente Araneta, Luis Araneta and
Taylor.
Both
Aranetas disowned any personal liability, claiming that they signed the checks
covering part of the travel expenses and payroll in good faith since they were
approved by de
Joya.
The trial court ruled that de
Joya was liable for the amount disbursed by the company but dismissed the third
party complaint, while the Court of Appeals held that according to
the facts of the case, the two
Aranetas were also privy to the unauthorized disbursement of the corporate
moneys jointly with the appellant.
Issue:
Whether
Luis Araneta is solidarily liable with de Joya and Vicente Araneta for payment
of the erroneously disbursed funds.
Ruling: Luis Araneta is guilty of a quasi-delict. His allegations of good faith were not substantiated and established. In fact, as vice-president of the company,
Luis Araneta remained
passive concerning the unauthorized disbursement of corporate
funds and approved
three of the payroll checks for Taylor’s
salary. Luis Araneta
evidently neglected to perform his duties
as an officer of the firm.
Applying Article 2194 of the New
Civil Code, it is proper that the other joint tortfeasors be made solidarily
liable and shoulder their proportional responsibility.
Engineers/Architect-
Nature of liability
Lanuzo vs. Sy Bon Ping
G.R.
No. L-53064 September 25, 1980
Facts: Salvador Mendoza, driver of Sy Bon Ping, recklessly
and negligently rammed the residential house and store or Felix Lanuzo. The
total damage to his property was P13,000 and he was deprived of his monthly
income from the store of P300.
In a complaint for damages instituted
by Lanuzo independently from the criminal action, the trial court ruled that Sy
Bon Ping and Mendoza were jointly and severally liable to pay Lanuzo P
13,000.00 as damages and P 300.00, representing Lanuzo’s monthly income, until
the entire P 13,000.00 has been paid in full.
Issue: Whether Sy Bon Ping, as employer, and Mendoza, as
employee are solidarily liable for payment of damages to Lanuzo
Held: Plaintiff predicated his claim for damages on
quasi-delict, which may proceed independently and regardless of the result of
the criminal case. Salvador Mendoza is evidently primarily liable for his
reckless driving resulting to the damage caused to Lanuzo under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code
Sy
Bon Ping, as employer, is also primary and direct under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Sy Bon Ping failed to disprove the
legal presumption of his negligence in the selection and supervision of this
employee (Article 2180) and is primary and solidarily liable with Mendoza.
Nevertheless, Sy Bon Ping may demand reimbursement from Mendoza for whatever
amount he will have to pay the offended party to satisfy the claim for damages.
Malipol vs. Tan
G.R.
No. L-27730 January 21, 1974
Facts:
Pantaleon
Malijan was walking with his companion Leonardo Amante when he was hit by a
gasoline tanker, got thrown to the ground and was ran over by the tanker’s
right wheel
that got detached. Although he
was brought to the hospital, Malijan died that night from "possible
traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker at that time was driven by Ernesto Labsan and was used and owned by Lily Lim Tan for her gasoline business.
The mother and minor siblings
of Malijan
filed a complaint
for damages against Tan and Labsan.
The trial court ruled that Labsan was primarily liable to pay the damages,
and in case he would not be able to do so, Tan would be
subsidiarily liable.
Issue:
Whether
the trial court erred in ruling Labsan as primarily liable for damages, and Tan
as subsidiarily liable.
Held: The court ruled that the trial court correctly
denied the motion to set aside order of default and for new trial; however, the
trial court erred in holding Tan subsidiarily liable.
The action was based on
quasi-delict and not to demand civil liability arising from a crime, since the
complaint makes no mention of a crime. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the liability of the
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages caused by
their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary.
Therefore, the employer, Lily Lim Tan,
must be held primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages
awarded in the decision of the lower court, without prejudice to the right to
demand reimbursement from damages from Ernesto Labsan for whatever she would
have to pay the relatives of the deceased.
Viluan vs. CA
G.R.
Nos. L-21477-81 (April 29, 1966)
Facts:
The bus
owned by Francisca Viluan, and driven by Hermenigildo Aquino raced with the
overtaking bus driven by Gregorio Hufana and owned by Patricio Hufana. Aquino
lost
control of the bus, hitting a
post and crashing into a tree, after which it burst into flames wherein seven
persons were killed and thirteen others were injured.
In the complaint for breach of
contract of carriage and damages filed by the heirs of those who perished in
the incident and Carolina Sabado, an injured passenger, Vilaun and
Aquino filed third party
complaints against Gregorio Hufana and his employer, Patricio Hufana,
contending that the incident was their fault.
The lower court found that the
accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the two buses
and held both the two drivers and their employers jointly and
severally liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the two buses but held that only Vilaun is liable because Aquino, as driver, cannot be made
jointly and severally
liable in a contract of carriage. It ruled that the Hufana’s
cannot be made liable since the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints in the main action so as to assert a
claim against them.
Issue:
Whether
Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should be made equally liable although they were
third-party defendants and not principal defendants
Held:
The fact
that the respondents were not sued as principal defendants but were brought
into the cases as third party defendants should not preclude a finding of their
liability.
Section 5 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, precluding
a judgment in favor of a plaintiff and against a third party defendant where
the plaintiff has not amended his complaint to assert a claim against a third
party defendant, applies only to cases where the third party defendant is
brought in on an allegation of liability to the defendants. It does not apply where a third-
party defendant is impleaded on
the ground of direct liability to the plaintiffs, in which case no amendment of
the plaintiffs complaint is necessary.
In this case the third-party complaints
filed by Viluan and Aquino charged Gregorio and Patrcio Hufana with direct
liability to the plaintiffs. Amendment of the complaint is not necessary and is
merely a matter of form since the liability of the Hufana’s as third-party
defendant was already asserted in the third-party complaint.
Regardless whether the injury is
quasi-delict or breach of contract of carriage, in case of injury to a
passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding
and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the
two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Torts
with Independent Civil Actions (Violation of Civil and Political rights)
Lim vs. Ponce De Leon
G.R. No. L-22554 August 29, 1975
Jikil Taha sold a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL" to
Alberto Timbangcaya but a year later Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the
Office of the Provincial
|
|
Facts:
Fiscal that Taha forcibly took
the motor launch.
Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon in his capacity as Acting
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed an information for Robbery with Force and
Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil
Taha and instructed Orlando Maddela, Detachment Commander
of Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch,
which was already sold to Delfin Lim. Fiscal de Leon
informed Maddela that the
subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from
taking custody of the same.
Lim filed a complaint
for damages against
Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. Lim contended
that there was a violation
of his constitutional rights when the motor launch was seized without
a
search warrant. As defense, de
Leon and Maddela contended that the motor launch was the corpus
delicti in an
ongoing investigation and
filed a counterclaim
for malicious and
groundless filing of the
complaint by Lim and Taha.
The trial court upheld the validity of the seizure of
the motor launch and ordered Taha and Lim to pay for damages.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights
of Jakil Taha and Delfin
Lim was violated,
and if so, whether they are entitled
to damages
Held: The taking of the
motor launch was ruled to be in violation of the constitutional right of the
parties against unreasonable searches and seizure as provided in the Bill of
Rights since
it was effected without a search
warrant, the authority of which lies with a magistrate or judge and not a
fiscal.
With respect to damages, Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha were entitled
to damages under Article 32 and 2219 of the New Civil Code for the violation
of their constitutional right.
Good faith is not a defense against
liability under Article
32 of the NCC. To be liable it is enough that there was a violation
of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not
required that the act was
attended with bad faith or malice.
Therefore, Fiscal de Leon was liable to
pay damages to Delfin Lim for violating his constitutional right; but Orlando
Maddela cannot be held accountable because he acted upon the order of his
superior officer believing that there was a legal basis and authority to
impound the launch.
Aberca
vs. Ver
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
Facts:
The intelligence units of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM), were
ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against
known communist-terrorist (CT). The plaintiffs complained that in the execution
of such order, the TFM raided several places using “defectively issued judicial
warrants” and arrested the plaintiffs without warrant, confiscated personal
property, interrogated plaintiffs without council and employed threats,
tortures and other forms of violence.
The plaintiffs
filed an action for damages, which was dismissed by the trial court on the
grounds that (1) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended, (2)
the defendants were performing their official duties and (3)the complaint
states no cause of action.
Issue:
Whether the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights
and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, and if so, who should be made
liable
Held:
The contention that respondents
are covered by state immunity for acts done in the performance of their
official duties was not accepted by the court because plaintiffs may have been
ordered to conduct pre-emptive strikes against the communist terrorists but
this did not amount to “a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by
any constitutional restraint”. In carrying out their task and mission,
constitutional and legal safeguards should still have been observed by
respondents.
The plaintiff’s cause of action were not barred by
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was
explicitly recognized in PD No. 1755:
However, when the action (for injury to
the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any
act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers
or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or
trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.
Even if the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus suspended petitioners' right of action for damages
for illegal arrest and detention, it did not extend to suspend their right to
demand damages for injuries suffered through the confiscation of their private
belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and
their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and
against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.
As to who should be
made liable for damages, the doctrine of respondent
superior is applicable to the case. Article 32 speaks of “an officer or
employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the
violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another”. Thus, the
person directly causing damage and the person indirectly responsible has also
to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Article 32
of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.
MHP Garments
vs. CA
G.R.
No. 86720 September 2, 1994
Facts:
MHP Garments, Inc. had the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms,
supplies, badges, and insignias. When MHP Garments received information that
Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman, and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy
Scouts items and paraphernalia without any authority, Larry de Guzman, an
employee of MHP Garments, together with members of the police constabulary,
went to the stores of Cruz, Lugatiman, and Gonzales at the Marikina Public
Market and seized these items. The seizure caused a commotion to the
embarrassment of Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales.
MHP Garments
instituted a criminal complaint for unfair competition against the vendors. The
Provincial fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized
items. Cruz, Lugatiman and Gonzales instituteed an action for sums of money and
damages against MHP Garments and de Guzman. MHP Garments contend that they
should not be made liable for damages since they did not commit the act of
seizure.
Issue: Whether MHP Garments and de Guzman should be held
liable for the seizure of the goods in question although it was the Police
constabulary who effected the seizure
Held: The seizure was conducted without
a warrant in evident violation
of the constitutional right of the vendors.
The facts of the case did not justify the warrantless search
and seizure of the vendors’ goods.
There was sufficient time for de Guzman in behalf of MHP Garments
to secure a warrant from the time of receipt
of the information and the raid of the stores.
Although the
Philippine Constabulary conducted the raid, their omission as party to the
complaint does not exculpate MHP Garments and de Guzman from liability. The
company was indirectly involved in transgressing the rights of Cuz, Lugatiman
and Gonzales.
It was MHP Garments
who instigated the raid and the raid was conducted with the active
participation of their employee, Larry de Guzman, who apparently assented to
the conduct of the raid and is as liable to the same extent as the officers
themselves. The corporation is also liable to the same extent as the officers
when it received the goods for safekeeping and refused to surrender them for
quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Independent
Civil Action (Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries)
Marcia et al. vs.CA
G.R.
No. L-34529 January 27, 1983
Facts: A passenger bus operated by private respondent
Victory Liner, Inc.,driven by its employee, Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep
driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical
injuries to Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap.
An information for homicide and serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against the driver while
an action for damages was filed by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, and the heirs
of Clemente Marcia against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje.
The trial court initially convicted
Paje of the offense charged, but on appeal, Paje was acquitted after it was
found that he was not speeding and was diligent, but the collision,
nevertheless, took place and was a fortuitous event. It further ruled that
criminal negligence was wanting and that Paje was not even guilty of civil
negligence.
The court dismissed the civil case
against Paje and Victory Liner ruling that they could not be held civilly
liable after it had ruled in the criminal action that negligence was wanting
and that the collision was a case of pure accident.
Issue: Whether the acquittal in the criminal case would
result in the dismissal in the civil case
Held: The judgment of acquittal included
a declaration that the fact from which civil liability
may arise did not exist.
In acquitting Paje, the court ruled that the event was an accident and that Paje was without fault, and it
is only proper that the civil case be dismissed.
Furthermore, the
charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for
reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide and physical
injuries. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of
the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, which provides:
ART. 33. In
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Therefore,
it was only proper that the court dismiss the civil case against Paje and
Victory Liner since Paje was acquitted of the fact from which the civil case
arose.
Madeja v. Caro
211
Phil 469 (December 21, 1983)
Facts:
Dra. Eva Japzon is accused of
homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madejo after an
appendectomy. The widow of Madejo filed a criminal complaint and reserved her right to claim for a separate
action for damages.
The judge dismissed the civil case because of Rule 111 3(a) but the petitioner appealed to the SC by using Rule 111 Section 2 ROC in relation to Article 33
of the NCC, which states:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In
cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
The Court found the case impressed with merit.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the civil case can carry on
independently of the criminal case. (2) Whether or not physical injuries of
Article 33 encompass other bodily injury in its definition
Held:
(1)Yes. Rule 111 Section 2 creates
an exception to the rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical
injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the
criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured
party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation.
(2) Yes. The Code Commission discussed
that the term "physical injuries" is used in a generic
sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries
defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes
not only physical injuries by consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide
but also any other bodily injury including battery based on the American
Law.
Arafiles v. Phil. Journalists
GR
No 135306 (2003)
Facts: In 1987, Emelita Despuig, working as a grant-in-aid
scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker at a government office
in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency director, last March
15, but afraid to lose her job – and of being harmed – she chose to keep her
ordeal to herself.
On the second
night, she was almost raped again by the same man, Catalino Arafiles. However,
the bellboy and the security guard noticed something suspicious as Emelita was fighting back while they were
checking in the Flamingo Hotel, thus the bellboy followed them to their room.
Arafiles rushed to leave as soon as he paid money to the bellboy and the
security guard not to report the same.
Emelita reported
the same information to the police
and she was interviewed by Romy Morales,
a journalist of People’s Journal
Tonight. During the following day, the news was
part of the headlines in the said newspaper. After a year of publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages arising
from the said publication against
the journalist and its employer.
Arafiles alleged
that on account of the “grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting
in the news item” prepared by respondent Morales, edited by respondent Buan,
Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal, Jr. as president of
Philippine Journalists, Inc., and published by respondent Philippine
Journalists, Inc., aspersions were cast on his character; his reputation as a
director of the NIAS at the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and
Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured; he became the object
of public contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and
serial rapist; and the news item deferred his promotion to the position of Deputy
Administrator of PAGASA. The RTC of Quezon City ruled in favor of Arafiles
granting him awards for damages. 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.)
P50,000.00, as exemplary damages; 3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages; 4.)
P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and 5.) Costs of suit. .
CA reversed RTC’s decision. MR from CA made by Arafiles was denied. Hence
they elevated it to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the publication of the news item was
not attended with malice, hence, must free respondents of liability for
damages.
Held: Yes. There was no malice in the article. Art. 33.
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 33 contemplates a civil action
for the recovery
of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal
aspect of the case. A civil action
for libel under this article
shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by
preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the
institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing
the criminal offense
charged and the civil liability
arising therefrom
In actions for
damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain
libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be
construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain,
or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the
context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit and
motive of the publication taken in its entirety.
Arafiles brands the
news item as a “malicious sensationalization” of a patently embellished and
salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted rape
incidents. For, so petitioner argues, the police blotter which was the sole
basis for the news item plainly shows that there was only one count of abduction
and rape reported by Emelita.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may
have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. In determining the manner in which
a given event should be presented as a news item and the importance to be
attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.
Defamation
MVRS vs. Islamic
GR
135306 (January 28, 2003)
Facts:
Bulgar, a local tabloid, published an article in 1992 about the Muslim’s
practical customs stating:
ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga
baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay.
Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam
sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila
itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang
pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’."
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines filed a
complaint alleging the libelous statement as insulting and damaging because
words alluding to pig as the God of Muslims were with intent to hurt the
feelings, cast insult, and disparage the Muslims and Islam.
MVRS
contended however, that they did not mention respondents as the object of the
article, thus not entitled to damages.
In
defense, the article was only an expression of their belief or opinion.
The
RTC dismissed their case because there was no cause of action. The plaintiffs
were not specifically identified for defmation.
In
1998, the CA reversed the decision.
Hence,
this review.
Issue: Whether or not the Islamic Council was entitled to
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s feed, and costs of suit
Held:
No. Words that are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se. Mere words of abuse
whether written or spoken do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. There is NO
identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the article. Muslims do not
have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
Requisites
to recovery are the following:
1.
Published a statement
2.
That was defamatory
3.
Of and concerning the plaintiff
To
maintain an action, the plaintiff must be the person with reference to whom the
statement was made as this is vital for a group or class to prove they have
been defamed.
Fraud
Salta v. De Veyra
202
Phil 527 (September 30, 1982)
Facts: Amayra Salta was employed as branch manager
of the Philippine National Bank (PNB). As such, his duty was to grant
loans or to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the the amount of the loan applied for.
PNB filed
two civil complaints against Salta charging
him of indiscriminately granting certain
loans in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud,
and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the
loans. The two civil cases were assigned to two different salas of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. At the same time, the bank caused to be filed, a
criminal case, based on the same acts.
Petitioner was acquitted in the criminal
case on the ground that the elements
of the crime charged were not proven.
Based on his acquittal petitioner filed a Motion
to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases. The two
presiding judges in the separate civil cases took diametrically opposing views.
One judge denied his motion and the other granted it. Hence, these petitions by
the Philippine National Bank in one case and by Salta in the other.
Issue: Whether or not the motion to dismiss the civil
cases should be affirmed or denied.
Held:
The motion to dismiss should be
denied and the other order granting such should be reversed. The filing in this
case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted
under the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
The criminal
case is for the prosecution of an offense
the main element
of which is fraud. . Based on the same acts for which the criminal action
was filed, the civil actions
very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the
cause of action averred in the complaints. The following allegation in the
complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud:
"That there was fraud committed by the defendant
in granting the aforesaid loans
which rendered him liable for his acts,
which fraud is positively and
easily identifiable in the manner and scheme
aforementioned."
The civil actions can be maintained regardless of
the outcome of the criminal action.
Physical
Injuries
Capuno v. Pepsi Cola
G.R.
No. L-19331 (1965)
Facts: The case arose from a vehicular collision which
occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola
delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The
collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras.
Elordi was charged
with triple homicide through reckless imprudence; the information was
subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three
victims. While the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan
spouse and their heirs filed a civil case. Included in the complaint was a
claim for indemnity in the sum of P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the
heirs of Capuno under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
On June 11, 1958
the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a "Compromise and
Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up its claims for
damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno
"under the Workmen's Compensation Act." The Court approved
the compromise and accordingly
dismissed the case on the following June 17.
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment
was rendered only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi
was acquitted of the charges
against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein
appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action which, upon appellees' motion,
was dismissed by the Court a quo in its order of February
29, 1960, from which order the present
appeal has been taken.
Issue: Whether or not the action had already prescribed.
Held:
Yes. The action has prescribed.
The civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately
upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno, on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have been stayed by the filing
of the criminal action for homicide through
reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after
the lapse of more than five years.
In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia,
et al., G.R. No. L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, SC held that an action
based on a quasi-delict is governed
by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the prescriptive
period of four years shall begin to run, that is, "from the day (the
action) may be brought," which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
The foregoing
considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing
of the criminal action against
Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived
the civil action
nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not then necessary; without
having made it they could
file
— as in fact they did — a separate
civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case and consequently, as
held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the
institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict."
Corpus v. Paje
G.R.
No. L-26737 (1969)
Facts: On December 23, 1956, a passenger bus of the
Victory Liner Transportation Co., Inc., driven by Felardo Paje, collided within
the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia,
resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons.
An information for
homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was
filed against Felardo Paje. In 1962, the heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved
their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Paje was
convicted and pending appeal, the heirs of the Clemente Marcia filed a separate
civil action for damages based on the criminal act and praying that Victory
Liner pay jointly and severally the damages claimed by the heirs. Paje was
acquitted by the CA. During the pre-trial of the civil case, the Court
dismissed the same because the cause of action being a quasi-delict has
prescribed.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the case is proper
by reason of prescription
Held: Yes. The trial court’s finding
was correct that the cause of action
has prescribed in 1962. An action upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years (Article
1146, Civil Code). The four-year prescriptive period began to run from the day the quasi-delict was committed, or from December
23, 1956, and the running
of the period was not interrupted by the
institution of the criminal action for reckless imprudence. Six years have
already lapsed.
Dulay v. CA
GR
No 108017 (1995)
Facts: On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang sa
Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno
Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
The widow of Atty.
Dulay filed an action for damages against the employer and the security guard
and prayed to be awarded actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. She alleges that the Secuity agency has concurrent negligence as
Torzuela, their employee:
“ Defendant TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless
discharge of the firearm issued
to him by defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD was the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury, while the negligence
of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision and
control of its employee to avoid the injury.”
SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the complaint does not state a valid cause of action.
SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties,
and that since the alleged
act of shooting was committed
with deliberate intent
(dolo), the civil
liability therefore is governed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states:
"ARTICLE
100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."
1.
However, petitioner contends
further that Article 2180 of the Civil Code shall govern and that it is
independent from the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.
2.
That the act of Torzuela is actionable under
Article 33 of the New Civil Code:
"ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence."
Issue: Whether or not the civil action is founded on
quasi-delict and should the employer be held jointly liable for damages.
Whether or not physical injuries include consummated homicide for Article 33 to
apply in the case
Held: Yes to both issues. The SC ruled in favor of the
petitioner. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies
only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant
to the ruling in Marcia
v. CA. However, the term " physical injuries" in Article
33 has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Co. of the Philippines). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide
Intentional
Tort (Abuse of Right)
Velayo v. Shell
100
Phil 186 (July 30, 1957)
Facts: Commercial Air Lines,
Inc., referred to as CALI, is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws, and previously engaged in air transportation
business. The Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., is a corporation organized
under the laws of England
and duly licensed
to do business in the Philippines.
CALI’s
operations needed fuel,
thus it had a number
of persons extending credit to said corporation. However,
on August 1948,
CALI had financial difficulties and had to call on an informal meeting of creditors because
they were in the state of insolvency.
Soon
thereafter, the big creditors present
in the meeting discussed preferences of credit. The creditors present
agreed to the formation of a working
committee to continue
to order of payment and to supervise the preservation of the properties of the corporation while they attempted to come to an understanding as a fair distribution of assets among
them.
The
committee consists of Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Agcaoili, and Atty. Sycip.
Creditors agreed not to file a suit. However, on the day of the meeting of the working
committee, they received a
letter from Shell regarding its transfer of credit of CALI to the Shell Oil
based in the US.
The
American corporation, Shell, then sued CALI for the amount of the credit thus
assigned. A writ of attachment was issued against a C-54 PLANE in Ontario
International Airport.
And
on January 5,1949, a judgment by default had been issued by the American court
against CALI. The stockholders of CALI were unaware of this.
On December 17, 1948, Velayo
filed for a writ of injunction to stop the foreign court from prosecuting the claim, and in the alternative, he prayed for damages in double the amount
of the plane which was attached. The plaintiff having failed to restrain the
progress of the attachment suit in the US by denial of the application of the
writ of injunction and the consequences on execution
of the C-54 plane in the state of California, USA, he confines
his action to the recovery
of damages against
the defendant.
The
complaint was dismissed, hence this petition.
Issues: Whether or not Shell acted in bad faith and betrayed the trust and confidence of the creditors
of CALI. Whether
or not by reason of betrayal of trust, Shell should be liable for damages.
Held: Yes. Chapter 2 of the preliminary title of the
Civil Code on Human relations provides:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
It is evident that
Shell, upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that will
all probability, it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the
preferred claims of other creditors, entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory
tenets.
The telegraphic transfer made without
knowledge and at the back of other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and surprise move that enabled
Shell to collect
almost all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the
Supreme Court cannot countenance such attitude at all,and much less from a
foreign corporation to thedetriment of Philippine Government and local
business.
Shell’s transfer of
credit would have been justified only if Fitzgerald had declined to take part
in the working committee and frankly and honestly informed the other creditors
present that he had no authority to bind his principal and that the latter was to be left free to collect
its credit from CALI by whatever means
his principal deemed
wise and were available
to it. But then, such information would have dissolved all attempts to come to an amicable
conciliation and would
have precipitated the filing of CALI’s voluntary insolvency proceedings
and nullified the intended transfer of Shell’s credit to American Shell.
It may be said that
article 19 only contains a mere declaration of principles and while such
statement is essentially correct, yet We find that such declaration is
implemented by Article 21 and the sequence of the same chapter, which prescribe
the following:
Article 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Saudi Arabia v. CA
297
SCRA 469 (October 8, 1998)
Facts:
Private respondent Milagros Morada
was a flight attendant of Petitioner Company. During a stop-over in Jakarta,
she went to a disco with 2 of her fellow crew members Thamer and Allah (both
surnamed Al-Gazzawi) and had breakfast in their hotel room. While there, Allah
left and Thamer attempted to rape her.
She was saved by
hotel security personnel who heard her cries for help. She later filed a case
against them. The two were arrested and detained by Jakarta police. When Morada
returned to Jeddah (the base of operations of petitioner), she was asked to go
to Jakarta to arrange for the release of the two men. She proceeded to Jakarta
but she refused to cooperate. She was eventually allowed to return
to Jeddah but barred from Jakarta flights.
The Indonesian authorities eventually deported the 2 men, through the intercession of the Saudi
govt., after 2 weeks of
detention. They were put back in service while respondent Morada was
transferred to Manila.
Two years later,
she was asked by her superiors to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of
Saudi Air, in Jeddah. When they met, he brought her to the police station where
her passport was taken and she was questioned about the Jakarta incident.
Miniewy merely stood as the police put pressure on her to drop the case against
the two men. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport
and allowed her to catch a later flight out of Jeddah.
A year and a half later,
she was again asked to go to Jeddah to see Miniewy. When she did, a certain
Khalid of Saudia brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign
a d ocument written in Arabic.
She was told that it was necessary
to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it
turned out, she signed a document to appear before the court a week later.
When the date of appearance came, she complied
but only after being assured
by Saudia’s Manila
manager that the investigation was a routine
and posed no danger to her.
She was brought before the court and was interrogated by a Saudi judge and let go, however, just as she was about to board a plane home, she was told that she had been forbidden to take flight. She was later told to
remain in Jeddah and her passport was again
confiscated.
A few days later,
she was again brought before the same court where the S audi judge,
to her astonishment and shock, sentenced her to 5 months imprisonment
and 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah for what happened
in Jakarta. The court found her guilty
of adultery; going to a disco, dancing
and listening to music in violation of Islamic laws; and socializing
with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
F acing conviction, she sought help from her employer, petitioner Saudi Arabian Air but she was denied assistance of any kind.
She asked the Phil. Embassy
to help her. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince
of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by
Saudi Arabian Air without being informed of the cause.
She then filed a
complaint for damages against Saudi Arabian Air and Mr. Al-Balawi, its country
manager. Saudi Arabian Air filed a motion to dismiss raising the issues of lack
of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
Issues: Whether or not Morada had a cause of action (2)
Which law should govern, Phil. Law or Saudi Law?
Held: YES, she has a cause of action.
She aptly predicated her cause of action on Art.19 and Art.21 of the CC. As held in PNB v CA, “the aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of
torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no.
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide
in the statutes.”
Although Art.19 merely declares a principle of law,
Art.21 gives flesh to its provisions.
She was the one made to face trial for
very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and
tradition. Saudi Arabian Air may have acted beyond its duties as employer in
turning her over to Jeddah officials. Its purported act contributed to or even
proximately caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private
respondent, Morada. Saudi Air allegedly facilitated the arrest,
detention and prosecution of Morada under the guise
of petitioner’s authority
as employer, taking
advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As purportedly found
by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of Morada was
wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person
and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable
as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for the wrongs
done, once duly proven.
2. Philippine Law should be applied.
Choice of law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact,
such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Considering that
the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting
factor” or “point of contact” could be the place or places where the tortious
conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a
conflicts case, the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of
the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
The SC held what is important
here is the place where the over-all
harm or the totality of the alleged
injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights o f complainant, had lodged according to the private
respondent. All told, it is not without
basis to identify
the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
The SC finds it
necessary to apply the “State of the most significant relationship” rule, which
should be appropriate to apply given the factual context of the case. In
applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue:
(A) the place
where the injury occurred;
(B) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(C) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business
of the parties, and;
(D) the place
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
There is basis for the claim that the
over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. Private respondent is a
resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged in international air carriage business here. Thus, the
“relationship” between the parties was centered here.
Globe
Mackay v. CA
176 SCRA 778 (August 25, 1989)
Facts:
Restituto M. Tobias, the private
respondent, was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos.
According to Tobias it was him who actually
discovered the anomalies and reported them on November
10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then
the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
However, his
superiors twisted the facts and alleged that it was Tobias who was their number
one suspect. This led to the different investigations including a lie detector
test to make Tobias admit something he did not do. He was later on dismissed by
Globe Mackay. Unemployed, Tobias tried applying for a new job in RETELCO.
However, the
petitioner, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Tobias
filed a civil case. The RTC awarded damages and the Court of Appeals affirmed
said judgment.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages
to private respondent.
Held:
Yes. An employer who harbors
suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in
taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing
the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth
would also be expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment
accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
Petitioners contend
that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their
right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private
respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Several other tortious acts were
committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from
work. The damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other
quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners such as the filing of six
criminal complaints which amount to malicious prosecution.
Albenson v. CA
G.R.
No. 88694 (January 11, 1993)
Facts: Albenson Enterprises delivered to Guaranteed
Industries mild steel plates and as payment, it was paid with a check amounting
to P2,575 drawn against the account of E.L Woodworks.
The check was
dishonored, Albenson, traced the origin of the check. The result from the SEC
shows that the president of Guaranteed Industries and the owner of E.L
Woodworks were one and the same with the name of Eugenio S. Baltao. Albenson
made extrajudicial demand but Eugenio Baltao denied that he issued a check,
urging the petitioner to file a complaint through Fiscal Sumaway for violation
of BP 22.
Fiscal Sumaway
claimed that he had given Eugenio S. Baltao opportunity to submit controverting
evidence, but the latter failed to do so and therefore, was deemed to have
waived his right.
Respondent Baltao,
claiming ignorance of the complaint against him, immediately filed with the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal a motion for reinvestigation, alleging that it was
not true that he had been given an opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation conducted by Fiscal Sumaway, and that he never had any dealings
with Albenson.
The complaint of Albenson was dismissed and Baltao’s complaint was given
merit and the RTC ruled in favor of him.
Issue: Whether or not Eugene Baltao is entitled to such
damages for abuse of rights and malicious prosecution.
Held: No, the SC found no cogent reason to award such
damages in favor of Eugene Baltao.
Article 19, known to
contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights:
that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized
or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible "
What prompted
petitioners to file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of P2,575.00 due on
a bounced check which they honestly believed was issued to them by private
respondent.
It appears however,
that there was a mistake in identity as there were three (3) men having the
name Eugenio Baltao that were all doing business in the building where E.L
Woodworks was situated. It was most probably the son, Eugene Baltao III who
issued the check to Albenson, which Mr. Eugene Baltao never during the
investigation.
The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution. An award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the action was filed in good faith.
If damage results
from a person's exercising his legal rights,
it is damnum absque
injuria.
Nor is he entitled
to compensatory damages because he did not present proof of the cost of the
medical treatment which he claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous
breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business
caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual damages, the
court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount.
Without the actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes
erroneous.
There is no evidence
of the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or
oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong
Electrical Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).The award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of exemplary
damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil
Code; Agustin vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, there was
no malicious prosecution against private respondent, attorney's fees cannot be
awarded him on that ground.
Amonoy v. Gutierrez
351
SCRA 731 (2001)
Facts: The house of spouses Gutierrez was situated
in a lot foreclosed and bought by Sergio Amonoy. In April and May 1986, an
Order of Demolition of the house was issued by the trial court but was enjoined
by a temporary restraining order (TRO) granted to respondents on June 2, 1986.
In 1988, the TRO
was made permanent by the Court, but the house of respondents had already been
destroyed. The Court of Appeals held petitioner liable to respondents for
P250,000.00 for actual damages thereof.
Hence, the appeal to the SC
where petitioner asserted the principle of damnum
absque injuria.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
deciding that the Amonoy was liable to the respondents for damages
Held: Yes. Amonoy invokes the principle of damnun absque
injuria, the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a
person's rights is a loss without injury for which the law gives no remedy. In
other words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury
and cannot be held liable for damages.
The SC finds damnum
absque injuria not applicable to this case. Amonoy did not heed to the TRO
issued by the Court. He was already in bad faith when he continued the
demolition despite the issuance of a TRO. The demolition of respondents' house by petitioner, despite his receipt
of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise
of such right.
Amonoy’s liability is premised on the
obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of
one's act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or
not punishable by law.
UE v.
Jader
G.R. No. 132344 (2000)
Facts: Romeo Jader, a law student
enrolled in the University of the East, failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an incomplete grade in the 1st semester of his last year
(1987-1988). After completing his 2nd semester, Jader filed an application for
the removal of the incomplete grade given him by Professor Carlos Ortega. This was approved by Dean Celedonio
Tiongson after paying the required
fee. He took the examination, and on May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega submitted
his grade, a five (5).
Deliberations were
held, with Jader’s name appearing in the tentative list of candidates for
graduation, but annotated with his deficiencies. Invitations were also made,
with Jader’s name appearing as one of the candidates, albeit annotated as to
the tentative nature of the list. Jader attended the said graduation ceremony,
vested with all the rites symbolic of his graduation from law school. Believing
he had successfully graduated, he took a leave of absence without pay to
prepare for the bar examination. Upon his enrollment in the pre-bar review of
the Far Eastern University, however, Jader learned of his deficiency, dropped
out of the same and ultimately did not take the bar examination.
Jader sued UE for
damages for suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights arising from the latter’s
negligence. Awards of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit were also prayed for.
UE denied
liability, arguing that it never led Jader
to believe that he completed
the requirements for a Law degree when his name was included
in the tentative list of graduating
students. Trial ensued,
with the lower court ruling
in favor of Jader, ordering
UE to pay 35,470 with legal rate of interest, and 5,000 for attorney’s fees and cost of suit. This was modified
by the CA to the effect of requiring UE to pay Jader an additional 50,000 for
moral damages.
Issue:
Is UE liable to Romeo Jader,
despite the former’s allegation that the proximate and immediate cause of the
alleged damages incurred arose out of his own negligence in not verifying the
result of his removal exam?
Held:
UE is still liable to respondent
Jader. In a contract of education, since the contracting parties are the school
and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the formers agents,
although nothing prevents either professors or students from sharing with each
other such information. It is the contractual obligation of the school to
timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements
for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those
who will graduate.
In belatedly informing Jader, UE cannot be said to have acted
in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved
party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another,
even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together
with the absence
of all information or belief
of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
The school exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to the
submission of reports involving the students standing, with “exclusive control”
meaning that no other person or entity had any control over the instrumentality
which caused the damage or injury.
Being a university
engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its
students, specifically the principle of good dealings in Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, the former provision intended to expand the concept of torts by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs,
impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
UE failed
to act seasonably and cannot
feign ignorance that Jader will not prepare
himself for the bar exams,
since that is precisely the immediate concern
after graduation of an
LL.B. graduate. Liability
arose from its failure to promptly inform
him of the exam results
and in misleading the latter
into believing that he had satisfied all course requirements.
While UE was guilty
of negligence and liable to Jader for actual damages, he should not have been
awarded moral damages. At the very least, it behooved on Jader to verify
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible
for the bar examinations. As a senior law student,
he should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs were in order. The Court fails to see how he could have suffered untold
embarrassment in attending
the graduation rites,
enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the
bar exams. If Jader was indeed humiliated, he brought this upon himself by not
verifying all the requirements including his school records, before preparing
himself for the bar examination.
Facts: Esteria Garciano was hired to teach during the 1981-82
school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes.
Before the school year ended, she applied
for
an indefinite LOA because her daughter was taking her to Austria,
her daughter’s place of employment. The application was recommended for approval by the school
principal, Emerito
O. Labajo, and approved by the
President of the school's Board of Directors. On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo
addressed a letter to the Garciano, stating that by way of the decision of
school founder, Fr. Joseph Wiertz,
the president of the PTA and the school faculty,
they have decided
to terminate her services due to: a) absence of a written
contract of employment due to Garciano’s refusal
to sign one, and b) the difficulty of getting a substitute for her on a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without
a written contract.
Upon Garciano’s arrival from
Austria, and after several inquiries about the matter, the Board of Directors
without the consent of the school founder signed a letter, reinstating Garciano
to her former position, with a statement declaring the previous communication
received had been declared null and void for not bearing the sanction or
authority of the Board. Subsequently, the president, vice president, secretary,
and three members of the Board of Directors resigned from their positions
"for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's
deliberations for the reinstatement of Garciano.
A complaint
for damages was filed in the RTC-Cebu
against Fr. Wiertz,
Emerito Labajo, and some members
of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal
dismissal. After trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Garciano, ordering
Wiertz and Co. to pay 200,000 as moral damages, 50,000 exemplary damages,
32,400 as lost earnings for 9 years and 10,000 as litigation and attorney’s
fees. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the ruling of the lower court,
dismissing the complaint and absolving Wiertz and Co. Following the denial of
their motion for reconsideration, Garciano seeks redress in the High Court.
Issues: Did the CA err in absolving Wiertz and Co. from
liability by faulting Esteria Garciano for her failure to report back to work?
Should they be held liable for damages?
Held:
The High Court ruled in the
negative. It held that the board of directors of the Immaculate Concepcion
Institute, which possesses the authority to hire and fire teachers and other
employees of the school, did not dismiss the Garciano, but merely directed her
to report for work. While the Wiertz and Co. sent her a letter of termination
through her husband, as discovered by the CA, Wiertz and Co. were aware of
their lack of authority to do so. The letter of termination they sent to
Garciano through her husband had no legal effect, and did not prevent her from
reporting for work. There was no reason why she could not continue with her
teaching in the school.
No evidence had
been presented to show that defendants-appellants prevented her from reporting
for work. An acidic reaction made by Wiertz and Co. can be seen as nothing more
than a reaction to what they perceived as an affront to their collective prestige.
It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff-appellee voluntarily desisted from
her teaching job in the school and has no right to recover
damages from defendants-appellants. They actually did nothing to physically prevent
her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's
Board of Directors
With regard to
damages, liability under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code arises only
from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals,
good customs or public policy.
Given that
Garciano's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice, whatever loss she
may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was self-inflicted. Volenti non fit injuria. With respect to Garciano's claim for moral damages, since the right to recover
them under Article
21 is based on equity,
he who comes to court to demand
equity must come with
clean hands. In this case, Garciano is not without
fault. Her indefinite leave of absence,
followed by her failure to report in time for the opening
of classes, as well as her refusal
to sign a written contract of employment and her ignorance of the
Board’s order to return to work are reflections of her fault.
Barons vs. CA
G.R.
No. 126486 (1998)
Facts: Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. (PDPI), appointed Barons
Marketing, Corporation (BMC) as one of its dealers of electrical wires and
cables. The latter was given 60 days credit for its purchases of plaintiff's
electrical products, to be reckoned from the date of delivery by Phelps Dodge
of its products.
For the period
covering December 1986 to August 17, 1987, BMC purchased, on credit, from PDPI
various electrical wires and cables in the total amount of P4,102,438.30, which
were subsequently sold to MERALCO. Sales invoices issued by PDPI to BMC
stipulate a 12% interest on the amount due for attorney’s fees and collection.
On September 7, 1987, defendant paid plaintiff the amount of P300,000.00 out of
its total purchases, leaving an unpaid account on the aforesaid deliveries of
P3,802,478.20. Demand for payment was
made several times by PDPI, which was
responded to by BMC with a request that it be able to pay its obligation in
monthly installments of 500,000 at 1% interest per annum. The offer was
rejected by PDPI, who reiterated its demand for full payment.
A complaint was
filed by PDPI before the Pasig RTC against BMC for the recovery of the unpaid
balance for made deliveries worth 3,108,000, as well as interest, exemplary
damages of at least 100,000,
the cost of the suit,
as well as attorney’s fees at the rate of 25% of the amount
demanded. In response, BMC, although admitting that the said purchases were theirs, disputed the amount
claimed by PDPI, asserting that the acts were perpetrated to induce humiliation and in abuse of PDPI’s rights.
After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of PDPI, ordering BMC to pay for the unpaid
balance of their purchases at 12% interest per annum, attorney’s fees at 25% of
the preceding obligation, exemplary damages worth 10,000 and the cost of the
suit.
On appeal, the judgment was modified to adopt the
original amount of unpaid deliveries (3,802,478.20) at 12% per annum and 5% of
the said obligation as attorney’s fees.
Issue/s: Is PDPI guilty of abuse of right? If not, can PDPI
recover interest and attorney’s fees?
Held:
The Court held that BMC’s theory
that PDPI abused its rights by rejecting the former’s offer of settlement,
subsequently followed by the filing of the present complaint was untenable. To
invoke Article 19 of the Civil Code, the defendant must act with bad faith or
intent to prejudice the plaintiff. Quoting Tolentino, abuse of right exists “when it is exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another.“
Given this premise, the Courts held
that PDPI’s act of rejecting BMC’s offer to settle was not made to prejudice or
injure BMC. It is also a fundamental rule that good faith is
presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging
the same. BMC, in this case, has failed to prove the bad faith
of PDPI. On the contrary, the Court finds
the reasons of PDPI to be legitimate. As pointed out, the corporation had its own "cash position
to protect in order for it to pay its own obligations."
With this in mind, BMC’s prayer for moral and exemplary damages must also
be rejected, in lieu of Article 2219 (10).
As to the second
issue, the Court ruled that the stipulation provided constitutes a penal
clause, and thus, BMC is required to pay interest, attorney’s fees and
collection fees. However, given the power of the courts to reduce the penalty
whenever it is found to be iniquitous or unconscionable, the Court believes
that 10% of the principal amount is adequate to cover both attorney’s and
collection fees.
BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 120639 (1998)
Facts:
Ricardo Marasigan, a lawyer by profession, was a complimentary member of the
BPI Express Card Corporation (BECC) from February 1988 to February 1989. Said
corporation issued him Credit Card No. 1 00-012-5534 with a
credit limit of P3,000.00. Said membership to BECC was renewed until February
1990 at an increased credit limit of P5,000.00. The contention arose when
Marasigan failed to timely pay his account for October 1989 amounting to
P8,987.84. Through Marasigan’s secretary, BECC informed him that they are
demanding immediate payment
of his balance, the deposit
of a P15,000.00 to cover his future bills, and threatened to suspend his credit card. A postdated
check was issued by Marasigan from the Far East Bank and
Trust, Co. and was received by BECC’s co-employees on November 23, 1989. The
same was forwarded to the collection department a week later. 5 days after
receipt, BECC served Marasigan a letter informing him of the temporary
suspension of his credit card privileges and the inclusion of his account
number in their Caution List. He was also told to refrain from further use of
his credit card to avoid any inconvenience/embarrassment and that his
membership will be permanently cancelled unless he settles his outstanding
account with the defendant within 5 days from receipt of the letter. Marasigan,
however, did not receive the letter before December 8, 1989, the day wherein he
entertained several guests at Café Adriatico. Upon presentment of his credit
card to foot the bill of P735.32, said card was dishonored. One of his guests,
Mary Ellen Ringler, paid the bill by using her own credit card.
Correspondence was sent out by Marasigan, seeking that he be sent the exact bill due him as of December
15, 1989, to withhold the deposit of his postdated check, and return
the same due to his instruction to stop payment. No reply was given by
BECC, prompting Marasigan to send another letter reminding the BECC that he had
long cancelled whatever arrangement he entered
into with the Corporation and requested for his correct
billing, less improper
charges and penalties, and for an explanation within 5 days from receipt
thereof why his card was dishonored on December 8, 1989 despite
assurance by defendant's personnel-in-charge, otherwise court action shall be filed to hold defendant responsible for the humiliation and embarrassment suffered by
him. In turn, final demand was sent to Marasigan dated March 21, 1990 requiring
him to pay in full his overdue account, including stipulated fees and charges,
within 5 days from receipt thereof or face court action, as well as replace the
postdated check with cash within the same period or face criminal suit for
violation of the B.P. 22. Marasigan, in turn, demanded BECC’s compliance with
his earlier request, or face court action.
A complaint for
damages against BECC was filed before the Makati RTC. After trial, the lower
court ruled in favor of Marasigan, finding BECC had abused its right in
contravention of Article
19 of the Civil Code. It ordered
BECC to pay a) 100,000
as moral damages,
b) 50,000 as exemplary damages
and c) 20,000 as attorney’s fees. On the other hand, the lower court ordered Marasigan to
pay for his outstanding obligation worth 14,439.41.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed but modified, ordering BECC to pay
a) 50,000 as moral damages, b) 25,000 as exemplary damages and c) 10,000 as
attorney’s fees.
Issue: In canceling Marasigan’s credit card, did BECC
abuse his right under the terms and conditions of their contract?
Held:
BECC did not abuse its right. To
find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19 the following elements
must be present: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
The Court went on to distinguish
damage, damages and injury, the latter being an illegal invasion of a legal
right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury, while
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
In order to maintain
an action for the injury,
one must establish
that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which a defendant
owed to a plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility
by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first
be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded;
and the breach
of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.
Acts
Contra Bonus Mora
Ruiz v.
Secretary of National Defense
G.R. No. L-15526 (1963)
Facts:
Allied Technologists, Inc. (ATI)
and the Republic of the Philippines entered into a contract for the
construction of the Veterans Memorial Hospital in September 11, 1950. Ruiz and Herrera
were stockholders of ATI. The construction of the said hospital was halted in 1955, followed
by the filing of 2 civil cases in succession by Ruiz and Herrera against
ATI, the Secretary of National Defense,
Col. Nicolas Jimenez,
the head of the Engineering Group of the DND and Pablo Panlilio, as Auditor of the DND.
The first case (CC No. 23778) was
dismissed by the CFI on October 12, 1954 as affirmed by the high Court on July
7, 1955. Civil Case No. 26601 was also dismissed on September 13, 1955. On
appeal, the high Court reversed the order of dismissal, under the impression
that the real controversy was confined merely between Panlilio, Ruiz and
Herrera over the 15% of the contract price, which was retained by the DND,
which was originally made to answer for any claim or lien that might arise, in
the course of the construction. Civil Case No. 26601 was remanded to its court
of origin for further proceedings.
Panlilio and ATI filed
their amended answers, stating that the amount retained by the DND was already
paid to ATI, as sought for by the Ruiz and Herrera in their complaint. In view
of this development, the trial court invited the parties to a conference, in
which the Ruiz and Herrera indicated their conformity, to the dismissal of the
complaint with respect to the retention of the 15% of the contract price; but
insisted upon the hearing of the second question, which sought the declaration
and recognition of Ruiz and Herrera, as two of the three architects of the
hospital. The trial court dismissed the complaint, for being moot and academic.
Issue: Did the lower court err in ordering the dismissal
of the case?
Held: The trial court made no error. Ruiz and Herrera
contend that the only ground
relied upon by the trial
court to dismiss
the case without
trial is the allegation that the
amount retained by the DND had already
been paid, yet except for this bare allegation, no evidence was adduced to prove the truth of the same. Even assuming,
for the sake of argument,
that the same is
true, nevertheless the first part of the first cause of action still remains,
for which they had insisted
upon a hearing to establish
their right to be recognized as two of the three architects of the hospital; that because the
pleadings do not show any ground which might legally justify the action taken
by the lower court, the latter should not have ordered the dismissal of the
entire case but should have ordered only the striking
out of the moot portion
of appellants' first cause of action, based upon Article
21 of the Civil Code.
This
cannot be given merit. As found by the trial
court, Ruiz and Herrera’s first cause of action is composed of: a) judicial
declaration or recognition that Ruiz and Herrera, together
with Panlilio, were the architects of the Veterans
Hospital; and b) injunction restraining government officials paying
Panlilio the sum retained, as per stipulation contained in the contract.
By discarding the Secretary and other
officials of the DND, as defendants, Ruiz and Herrera could not expect the
trial court to order them to recognize and declare them co-architects in the
construction of the hospital. And, as the amount retained by the Department on
the contract price, which retention was authorized by the contract, was, as
sought by the appellants, already paid to the ATI, there is nothing more for
the trial court to decide, even without first ruling on the special defenses of
Panlilio and ATI.
Ruiz
and Herrera’s reliance
on Article 21 of the Civil Code is unfounded. They contend that the word "injury" in the said article, refers
not only to any indeterminate right or property, but also to honor or credit.
However, although this article envisions a situation where a person
has a legal right which is violated
by another in a manner
contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy, it presupposes loss or
injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of said
violation. The pleadings do not show that damages were ever asked in connection
with this case, predicated upon the said article. Under the facts and
circumstances in this case, one cannot plausibly sustain the contention that
the failure or refusal to extend the recognition was an act contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
Breach
of promise to marry, seduction and sexual assault
Wassmer
vs. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 (1964)
Facts: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz
P. Wassmer, following
their mutual promise
of love, decided
to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left Wassmer with a note stating
that the wedding
must be postponed, as Velez’s
mother opposes it. He also asked Wassmer
not to fuss. The following day, however, Velez sent Wassmer another telegram, stating that nothing has changed, and he shall return very soon. Velez was never seen by Wassmer nor heard from again after that.
Wassmer filed a
suit for damages against Velez. Velez filed no answer and was declared in
default. Judgment was rendered in favor of Wassmer, ordering Velez to pay
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. Velez filed a petition
for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration. Plaintiff moved to strike it out, but the Court
ordered the parties
to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement.
Following a series
of failed attempts to amicably settle the matter, the court issued an order
denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Hence, Velez’s appeal to the high
Court. In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is
that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action
for breach of promise to marry. As stated in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, “…a mere breach of a promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong.”
Issue: Should the lower court’s decision be set aside,
removing Wassmer’s right to claim damages?
Held: The lower court’s
decision must be affirmed, as what was done by the high Court in this case. The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not
limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals
that Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract marriage, set a
wedding day for September 4, 1954, Printed and distributed wedding invitations
to relatives, friends and acquaintances, purchased dresses and other apparel
for the important occasion and the like. And then, with but two days before the
wedding, Velez simply left.
Surely this is not
a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably
and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Velez also contends
that the moral damages awarded were excessive, and should be totally
eliminated. This argument, however is devoid of merit. Under the above-narrated
circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner." The high Court's opinion, however, is that
considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
TANJANCO vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-18630 (1966)
Facts:
Apolonio Tanjanco courted Araceli
Santos, the former expressing and professing his undying love and affection for
her who also, in due time reciprocated the tender feelings. In consideration of Tanjanco’s promise
to marry Santos,
she consented to Tanjanco’s pleas
for carnal knowledge, as a result
of which Santos
conceived a child.
To avoid embarrassment and social humiliation due to her pregnancy, Santos resigned
from her job in IBM, Philippines as a secretary, thereby unable to support
herself and her baby. Tanjanco, on the other hand, refused to marry Santos, as
well as recognize their unborn child, prompting her to file suit to compel
Tanjanco to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, to give her support of
not less than P430.00 a month, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages
and P10,000.00 attorney's fees. Tanjanco, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss.
The lower court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On appeal, the
CA held that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of a child as
yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a
cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code. It set
aside the lower court’s decision and directed the same to proceed with the
case. This prompted Tanjanco to appeal to the high Court.
Issue: Is Tanjanco correct in pleading that actions for
breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction?
Held: The Court ruled in the affirmative. The Appellate court erred by relying upon a memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original
draft of the Civil Code, which provided this
example:
"A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or cannot be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there
is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action
for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action
for damages. But under the proposed article (now Article 21), she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
Indeed, the CA overlooked the fact that the memorandum referred to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced,
which connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded.
Given the
circumstances of this case, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, Santos, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual
relations with Tanjanco with repeated
acts of intercourse. Such conduct
is incompatible with the idea of seduction. There is voluntariness and mutual passion
in this case, for had the she been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively
because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the Tanjanco, she would
not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without
exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
Hence, we
conclude that no case
is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing
the complaint.
The dismissal,
however, must be understood to be without prejudice to whatever actions may
correspond to the child of Tanjanco. On that point, this Court makes no
pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
Bunag vs. CA
G.R. No. 101749 (1992)
Facts: Conrado Bunag, Jr. and Zenaida
Cirilo, after reaching
a hotel/motel and having sexual
intercourse, went to Pamplona in Las Piñas,
where they lived together as husband and wife
for 21 days, even filing an application for a marriage
license in Cavite.
Bunag, Jr., however,
withdrew the application on October 1, 1973.
Cirilo’s version
of the case recites that she and Bunag were lovers. She also states
was brought to the hotel/motel against her will where Bunag succeeded in raping her, and that thereafter, she was allowed to go
home only after they were married. They then went to Bunag’s grandmother’s
house in Las Piñas where they lived as husband and wife, but on September 29, 1973, Bunag left and never returned,
bringing Cirilo humiliation and shame because
of Bunag’s deception. This was corroborated by Cirilo’s uncle,
Vivencio, who added that Bunag’s father, Bunag, Sr.
wanted to settle things and have the couple wed.
Bunag, Jr., on the
other hand, insists that he did not rape Cirilo. In fact, he and Cirilo had
plans to elope and get married. However, due to bitter disagreements over money
and threats to his person, Bunag, Jr. broke off the engagement.
A complaint for
damages was filed by Cirilo for Bunag, Jr.’s broken promise of marriage. In
finding that Bunag, Jr. had forcibly abducted and raped Cirilo, the trial court
ruled for Cirilo ordering Bunag, Jr. to pay P80,000.00 as moral damages,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and
P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Conrado
Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all liability. On appeal, the CA ruled to
affirm the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: Is Bunag, Jr. correct in asserting that since the
action involved breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding
damages?
Held: The high Court
held that while it is true that in this jurisdiction, the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing
in the civil law, apart
from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
The award of moral
damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code,
in relation to Article
2219 (10), any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted
to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of
moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury,
and is intended to vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to specifically provide
for in the statutes.
Under the prevailing circumstances, the acts of Bunag, Jr. in forcibly
abducting Cirilo and having carnal
knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order
to escape criminal liability, only to renege on such promise after cohabiting
with her for twenty-one days, constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Further,
the dismissal of the criminal
case against Bunag,
Jr. for rape did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
Constantino
vs. Mendez
G.R. No. 57227 (1992)
Facts: Amelita Constantino worked
as a waitress at Tony’s
Restaurant in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
It was here where she met Ivan Mendez. Following
their first meeting,
Mendez invited her to
dinner at the Hotel Enrico.
While dining, Mendez
professed his love for Constantino. Constantino asked to be brought
home, to which
Mendez agreed, on the pretext
of getting something in return. Promising to marry her, Mendez succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with Constantino, then after confessing that he was a married
man. This continued
on to the months of September and November. Constantino
eventually got pregnant, and asked for help from Mendez to support the child,
but this plea fell on deaf ears. Constantino was forced to leave her work as a
waitress, as a result. This prompted Constantino to file for acknowledgment,
support and the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages. In response,
Mendez denied having sexual relations with Constantino and prayed for the
dismissal of the case. He further prayed for the payment of exemplary damages
and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the filing of the
malicious complaint.
The lower court
ruled in favor of Constantino, ordering Mendez to pay P8,000.00 by way of
actual and moral damages; and P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees, as
well as the costs of the suit. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration,
with the trial court finding merit in Constantino’s motion, amending its
decision by ordering Mendez to pay for actual and moral damages, hospital
expenses of P200.00, permanent monthly support of P300.00, P5,000.00 as
attorney’s fees, and to recognize Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son
of Ivan Mendez. On appeal, the CA dismissed the amended decision.
Issue: Is Amelita Constantino entitled to damages in this
case?
Held:
The high Court ruled in the
negative. Amelita's claim for damages, which is based on Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code, sits on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity. The high Court,
however, agrees with the Court
of Appeals that mere sexual
intercourse is not by itself
a basis for recovery of damages. Damages could only be awarded if sexual
intercourse was not a product of voluntariness and mutual desire.
At the time Amelita
met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, she was already
28 years old and admitted
that she was attracted to Ivan. Her attraction is the reason
why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or deceived because of a
promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with Ivan
when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August,
1974, that he was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of
September, October and November, 1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged promise
of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself
to Ivan.
Quimiguing
vs. Icao
G.R. No. 26795 (1970)
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her
parents, sued Felix Icao. The parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had
close and confidential relations. Icao, although married, succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with Quimiguing several times by force and intimidation, and
without her consent. As a result, she became pregnant, despite efforts and
drugs supplied by Icao, forcing her had to stop studying. Hence, she now claims
support at P120.00 per month, damages and attorney's fees. Icao, on the other
hand, moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not
allege that the child had been born. After hearing arguments, the trial judge
sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Quimiguing moved
to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth
to a baby girl; but the court,
sustaining Icao's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the
original complaint averred no cause of action. Hence the appeal directly to
this Court.
Issue: Was the trial court correct in sustaining Icao’s
motion?
Held:
The high Court ruled in the
negative. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as
explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code. Therefore, an unborn child
has a right to receive support from its progenitors, even if the said child is
only "en ventre de sa mere."
Further, for a
married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in
the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the
rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage
caused, as mandated by Article 21 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article
2219 (3,10).
Hence, Quimiguing herself had a cause of action for damages under the
terms of her complaint, and the dismissal of the same constitutes an error on
the part of the lower court.
Pe vs. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396 (1962)
Facts:
The case originates from the
parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe, who had gone missing on April
14, 1957 and at that time, was a single, 24 year old woman. Sometime in 1952,
Alfonso frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each
other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in
Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. Eventually, Lolita’s
parents found out and forbade Alfonso from going to their house and from
further seeing Lolita.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers
and sisters at their residence
at 54-B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita
disappeared from said house.
After she left, her brothers and sisters checked her things and found that
Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece
of paper inside Lolita's aparador. The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police
authorities and the NBI but up to the present
there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
This prompted
the filing of the current
action with the CFI-Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages
in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Defendant, after denying some
allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged
therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
The lower court, finding
that Alfonso had carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe, being a married man himself, declared
that Alfonso cannot
be held liable for moral damages, it appearing that Lolita’s relatives failed to prove
that Alfonso deliberately and in bad faith tried
to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered
a decision dismissing the complaint
Issue:
May the parents and siblings of
Lolita Pe recover damages based on the fact that defendant, being a married
man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing them injury in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy?
Held:
The present action is based on
Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Conversely, the trial court considered the
complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to prove that Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection.
The high Court refused to align itself
to this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's
affection cannot lead, to any other conclusion than that it was he who seduced
the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him, as shown by the
fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his
visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a
collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs
not only in Gasan but also in Boac.
Indeed, no other
conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that Alfonso, through a
clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the
extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the
new Civil Code.
Malicious Prosecution
Lao vs. Associated Anglo American Tobacco
G.R. No. 47013 (2000)
Facts: The Associated Anglo-American Tobacco Corporation
(AATC) entered into a "Contract of Sales Agent" with Andres Lao.
Under the contract, Lao agreed to sell cigarettes manufactured and shipped by the AATC to his business address
in Tacloban City.
Lao would in turn remit the sales
proceeds to AATC. For his services, Lao would receive
commission depending on the kind of cigarettes sold,
fixed monthly salary,
and operational allowance. As a guarantee to Lao's compliance with his contractual obligations, his brother
Jose and his
1
father Tomas executed a deed of
mortgage in favor of AATC in the amount of P200,000.00.
Lao regularly
remitted the proceeds
of his sales to AATC, generating, in the process,
a great deal of business.
However, in February
1968 and until about seven (7) months
later, Lao failed to accomplish his monthly sales
report. He was reminded of his enormous
accounts and the difficulty of obtaining a tally thereon
despite Lao's avowal
of regular remittances of his collections. Sometime
later, Esteban Co, the vice-president and general manager
of AATC, summoned
Lao to Pasay City for an accounting where it was established that Lao's liability amounted to P525,053.47. And so, Lao and his brother Lao Y Ka, enlisted the services of the Sycip Gorres and Velayo Accounting Firm (SGV) to check and reconcile the accounts.
Subsequently, AATC
discovered that Lao was engaging in the construction business so much so that
it suspected that Lao was diverting the proceeds of his sales to finance his
business. In the demand letter
of April 15, 1979,counsel for AATC sought payment of the obligations of Lao, warning
him of the intention of AATC to foreclose the mortgage. Attached to said letter was a statement of account indicating that Lao's total obligations duly supported by receipts amounted
to P248,990.82.
Ngo Kheng was sent by AATC to supervise the sales operations of Lao in Samar and Leyte. It was discovered that, contrary to Lao's allegation that he still had huge collectibles
from his customers, nothing was due to AATC from Lao's clients. From then on,
Lao no longer received shipments from AATC which transferred its vehicles to
another compound controlled by Ngo Kheng. Shipments of cigarettes and the corresponding invoices were also placed in the name of Ngo Kheng.
On May 21, 1970, Andres, Jose and Tomas Lao brought
a complaint for accounting and damages with writ of preliminary injunction against AATC before
the then CFI of Leyte in Tacloban City. The lower court
ordered AATC to undergo a court-supervised accounting and to pay Lao: a)
P180,000 representing actual loss of earnings, b) moral damages in the amount of P130,000.00, c) exemplary damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, d) attorney's fees in the amount of P40,000.00, e) the compensation of the commissioners pro-rata and f) the
cost of the suit. Upon conclusion of the accounting, the lower court revised
its ruling, declaring Andres Lao's accountability to AATC in the amount of
P167,745.20 and ordering him to pay same to AATC. On appeal, AATC was ordered
by the CA to pay plaintiffs P150,000.00 actual damages for loss of earnings,
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 for exemplary damages. The
supplemental decision issued by the lower court, further, was reversed and set aside.
During the pendency of civil case,
Esteban Co, as vice-president of AATC filed a criminal case for estafa against
Lao. Without awaiting the determination of the criminal case, Lao lodged a
complaint for malicious prosecution. The court ruled in favor of Lao declaring
that the estafa case was filed without probable cause and with malice and
ordered AATC and Esteban Co to jointly and severally pay Lao: a) P30,000 as actual damages,
b) P150,000.00 as moral damages,
c)P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages and, d) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and
costs.
Issue: Is AATC liable for malicious prosecution?
Held: No. A reading of the complaint reveals
that the complaint
for malicious prosecution was founded on the filing
of estafa against
Lao. As such, it was prematurely filed and it failed
to allege a cause of action.
The Court ruled
that the complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution and/or on
Articles 20 and 21 should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action. The
Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the decision of the trial court. It should be stressed, however,
that the dismissal
of subject complaint should not be taken as an adjudication on the merits,
the same being merely grounded on the failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action.
Malicious
prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by one against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been
instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of
such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.
Que vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-66865 (1989)
Facts:
The origin of this dispute goes
back to when Que and Nicolas were still in amicable terms. In July and August
of 1975, Nicolas ordered from Que certain amounts of canvass strollers which were delivered to and accepted
by Nicolas, who issued five checks therefore to Que worth
P7,600. Nicolas, however,
ordered the bank to stop payment because
of defects in the articles
sold which Que had not corrected. Que for his part argued that the allegedly
defective articles were never returned to him until after he had filed the
charge for estafa and that Nicolas had earlier merely ignored his complaints
about the dishonored checks.
Que
filed a complaint for estafa against
Nicolas in the office of the city fiscal of Caloocan City for the issuance of several dishonored checks upon presentment. The charge was dismissed
for lack of merit, the investigating fiscal holding that the controversy was an
accounting matter that did not necessarily involve deceit on the part of
Nicolas. Subsequently, Nicolas filed
his own complaint for damages against Que with the CFI-Bulacan, for what he
claimed was his malicious prosecution by the latter. Que now claims harassment.
In his counterclaim, he
averred that Nicolas had maliciously
filed the complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan City;
that the private respondent was really indebted to him in any case and that it
was he who had suffered damages as a result of the unwarranted suit.
Originally, the lower court held in
favor of Antonio and awarded him the total amount of P80,500.00 in moral,
exemplary, and nominal damages plus a P4,000.00 attorney's fee and the costs of
the suit, finding was that Que had acted maliciously in filing the estafa
charge and in alleging that the plaintiff had issued the dishonored checks with
deceit.
Que’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. A second motion for reconsideration was filed after a motion to stay
the running of the period of appeal was filed. This second motion found merit,
and reversed the original decision, awarding Que 10,000 as moral damages.
On appeal,
the IAC reinstating the original
decision of the trial court in favor of Nicolas.
Issue: Had Magtanggol Que instituted a malicious prosecution against Antonio Nicolas?
Held: The high Court ruled in the negative. It is evident
that Que was not motivated by ill feeling
but by anxiety to protect
his rights when he filed the criminal
complaint for estafa
with the fiscal's office.
If he averred that the Antonio had no funds in the bank when he issued
the postdated checks
and intended to cheat him, it was because the circumstances of the case as
Que saw them led him to this conclusion. Even if the fiscal found that no
deceit was involved and that the petitioner's claim was unfounded, the mistaken
charge was nonetheless, in the legal sense, not malicious. As previously held
in Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, “To constitute malicious
prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and
groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable
for malicious prosecution.”
The criminal complaint filed by the
petitioner was not a mere ploy to enforce the payment of his account by
Nicolas. There was here a genuine protest over the abrupt and suspicious order
to stop the encashment of the checks issued to him by the private respondent.
On the contrary, there is a stronger suggestion of malice on the part of
Nicolas when he filed his suit for damages against Que in Bulacan,
notwithstanding that the place of business was in Caloocan. However, inasmuch
as good faith is presumed, and applying this presumption both to the petitioner
and the private respondent, we hereby rule that, absent sufficient rebuttable
evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice in their mutual relations.
Drilon vs CA
G.R.
No. 107019 (March 20, 1997)
Facts: Drilon and company seek the
reversal of the C.A. resolution affirming the orders of Judge Macli-ing denying
their motion to dismiss the complaint of malicious prosecution filed by
Homobono Adaza.
General Renato de
Villa on March 20, 1990 requested the DOJ to order the investigation of several
individuals, including Adaza, which he believed participated in the fail
December 1989 coup d’état. Such was referred to the Special Composite Team of
Prosecutors for inquiry. Said team from sufficient basis for Adaza’s
prosecution and their report became the basis for the filing of a complaint for
the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder on April 18, 1990
before the RTC of Quezon City. Adaza then filed a complaint for damages on July
11, 1990 alleging that the information filed against him was a clear case of
wilful and malicious prosecution and that the crime of rebellion with murder
and frustrated murder was non-existent in the statute books.
Drilon and company
filed a Motion to Dismiss Adaza's complaint on the ground that it states no
actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action on October 15, 1990. On
February 8, 1991, Judge Macli-ing denied petitioners' Motion to Dismiss.
Drilon and Company
then filed on June 5, 1991 a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals; alleging Judge Macli-ing had
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss
Adaza’s complaint on the ground that the later had sufficient cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not Adaza’s complaint has sufficient
cause of action.
Held:
No, Adaza’s complaint does not
have a sufficient cause of action. In fact his complaint suffers a fatal
infirmity as it does not state a cause of action on its face and must thus be
dismissed.
Malicious
prosecution has been defined in the Philippine jurisdiction as, “An action for
damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or
other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable
cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in
favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal
process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury”
(Cabasaan v. Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).
The statutory basis
for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the
provisions of the New Civil Code on
Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32,
33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To prove malicious prosecution the all the following
elements must be proven and concur: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further
fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and
(3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by
improper or sinister motive.
None of the above
requisites were shown in the complaint of Adaza, thus rendering it dismissible
under Sec. 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. The fact that Adaza was
granted bail on account of a writ of habeas corpus is not sufficient ground for
the filing of his complaint.
Moreover a
complaint for malicious prosecution can only be filed if legal prosecution has
been carried out without probable cause. Probable cause has been proven by the
special composite team of prosecutors, and thus malicious prosecution has not
been committed.
The prosecutors’
decision not to apply the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez which enunciates that murder and common crimes committed as a
necessary means for rebellion must be complexed, cannot be held as malicious as
the prosecutors’ believed that the case against Adaza could be differentiated.
The prosecutors believe that said acts of murder and frustrated murder
committed by Adaza were not necessary for the
rebellion.
Adaza’s error of
failing to allege sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for
malicious prosecution on the face of his complaint should have been painfully
obvious to Judge Macli-ing. The judge’s failure to notice such and denying the
motion to dismiss the said complaint for said reason is indeed a grave abuse of
discretion.
Public
Humiliation
Patricio vs. Leviste
G.R.
No. L-51832 (April 26, 1989)
Facts: Fr. Rafael Patricio, director
general of the 1976 town fiesta of Pilar, Capiz was was slapped in public by
Bienvenido Bacalocos, who was then the president of the association of barangay captains
of Pilar, Capiz.
The incident occurred
on May 16, 1976 at about 10 p.m. during
the benefit dance
at the public auditorium. Bacalocos was then drunk and hand injured
his hand after smashing his bottle of alcohol on the table. Bacalocos then
approached Fr. Patricio and suddenly hit the latter’s face with his bloodied hand.
A criminal
complaint for slander
by deed was filed, but was subsequently dismissed. Fr. Patricio
then filed a complaint for damages which was decided
in his favor on April 18,
1978 resulting in the award of moral damages of P 10,000, exemplary damages of
P 1,000 and attorney’s fees of 2,000. Fr. Patricio filed for a motion of
execution of judgement on June 9, 1978, but was informed that such could not be
done as a pending motion for reconsideration was apparently filed. Fr. Patricio
then replied that the filing of said motion was without notice to him nor was there proof of service, thus the case had become
final and unappealable. Bacalocos replied stating
that a copy of the motion had been served by ordinary
mail to the petitioner.
On August 3, 1979
the trial court ordered the dismissal of Fr. Patricio’s complaint stating that
the motion for reconsideration must be given due course and that the award of
moral and exemplary damages was not proper as compensatory or actual damages
have not been proven. Fr. Patricio then filed this petition for review on
certiorari, contenting that he had not been served notice of the motion for
reconsideration, nor was there proof of such service, that the sending of the
copy of said motion by regular mail did not cure said defect and finally that
actual damages need not be proven before moral damages are given. Bacalocos
replied that the order of the court a quo worked to inform Fr. Patricio of the
motion and gave the latter opportunity to be heard; curing the defect.
Bacalocos also reasoned that moral damages cannot be given as his act of
slapping the priest was an accident cause by drunkenness and is absent of any
bad faith.
Issue: Whether Bacalocos is liable for damages?
Held:
Yes, he is liable for damages.
With respect to the deficiency in the notice for the motion of reconsideration,
the court deems the defect cured. Despite the fact that the notice was mailed
via regular service and not registered mail, such technicality may be set aside
because ultimately Fr. Patricio was able to appear before the court and have
his side heard. Such is the spirit and purpose of the rule on notice and
hearing.
As regards to the
complaint for damages, the lower court’s theory that moral damages may only be
awarded when actual damages are proven is untenable. Moral damages may be
awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the chapter on human relations of
the Civil Code (Articles 19 to 36), without need of proof that physical injury
was caused upon the complainant. There is no question that moral damages may be
recovered in cases where a defendant's wrongful act or omission has caused the
complainant physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury; as is, in the case at bar.
Bacaloco’s assertion that bad faith was not present when he hit the
priest is also wanting, due to the fact that it was proven that a long time
feud existed between their families.
Further, Bacalocos cannot hide behind the fact that he was drunk as he
should be held responsible for all his actions.
Thus, Fr. Patricio may be awarded
moral and exemplary damages, together with attorney’s fees for Bacaloco’s acts which are violation of article 21 in relation
to article 2219 of
the New Civil Code.
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc.
vs. Espino
Gr
No. L-48250 (December 28, 1979)
Facts: Jose J. Espino a civil engineer and an executive at
Proctor and Gamble was shopping at South Supermarket in Makati on the morning
of August 22, 1970. He had picked up a “rat tail” file from one of the shelves,
placed it in his shirt pocket, with a good part of it exposed, and forgot to
pay for it when he got to the cashier. As he and his wife and daughters were
leaving the supermarket with their shopping bags, a security guard of the store
approached Espino and informed him that he had an item in his pocket which he
did not pay for. Espino immediately apologised and started to walk towards the
cashier to pay for the item. He was then stopped by the guard and asked to go
to the back of the supermarket to write an incident report as this was
supposedly the procedure of the establishment.
Espino stated
on the report that he put the item in his pocket
as he was talking with his helper
while in the store and that he merely forgot
to present it to the cashier. Espino was
then lead into the Supermarket and the report was given to Nelia Santos-Fandino
who was seated at a desk beside the first checkout counter. Nelia after reading
the report remarked that this was another case of theft, to which Espino
explained that he merely forgot the “”rat tail” in his pocket and that he had
the intention to pay for it. Neilia then replied to the effect that that was
the same thing all shoplifters say when they are caught. This was done while
people were lining up and paying for the items they shopped. Espino was then
made to pay a fine of 5 pesos, which Nelia reasoned was a prize for the guard
who apprehended him. Espino then paid the fine and was made to line up at the
cashier to pay for the item. As he waited in line he was stared at and people
were talking about him. Extremely humiliated by the incident he immediately
left the premises after paying.
Espino filed a
complaint on October 8, 1970 founded on article 21 in relation to article 2219
of the New Civil Code and prayed for damages. The CFI of Pasig, Rizal dismissed
the complaint; but the Court of Appeals reversed such. Espino was granted moral
damages at P 75,000, exemplary damages of P 25,000 Pesos, attorney’s fees at P
5,000 and the return of the P 5 fine.
Grand Union Supermarket now appeals said decision citing
that Espino was guilty of theft and that their action of apprehending and fining him was merely
an exercise of their right to protect their property
as enunciated in article 429 of the New Civil Code. They also stated that there
was probable cause for his apprehension, that it was not done with malice or bad faith and the proximate cause for such was Espino’s
own actions. They also argued
that even if damages were in order,
the amounts awarded
were unconscionable.
Issue: Whether the act of apprehending Espino in such a
manner would render the supermarket liable?
Held:
Yes, such actions do render the
supermarket liable. The court believes Espino committed an honest mistake when
he forgot to pay for his item. This was proven by the fact that he put it in his pocket
while he was preoccupied and that he apologised and immediately moved
to pay for such at the instance
the guard alerted
him. The fact that he was an engineer, an executive of Proctor and Gamble, an esteemed member of society
and a regular customer of the supermarket also belies motive
to steal an item of an insignificant amount, which he was
more than capable of paying for. Further, he was also in the company of his
family, a deterrent from criminal activity.
It is also evident
from the facts of the case that Espino was falsely accused of being a
shoplifter in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy and
thus may be awarded damages. His being identified as a shoplifter in the incident
report, being called such by Nelia and being made to pay a fine with a threat to call the police and report the incident
if he would not do so, truly caused him humiliation and embarrassment.
However, the amount
of damages should be modified. Espino’s forgetfulness was the proximate cause
of the incident, and such contributory negligence would work to reduce the damages
awarded, as enunciated in article 2214 of the New Civil Code. The court also considers the fact that the presence
of shoppers in the premises
was merely coincidental as it is a public place and their presence was
not actively called for by the management in order to humiliate Espino. The
court also believes that the management’s policy to have Espino brought to the
back of the supermarket to make a report and to present him to one of the
officers was not intentionally done to humiliate him because the supermarket’s
business success would be compromised if it was seen that their public
relations with customers were intentionally such. Moral damages are reduced to
P 5,000, exemplary damages are deleted, attorney’s fees are reduced to P 2,000
and the P 5 fine must be returned.
Unjust
Dismissal
Singapore Airlines vs. Pano Gr No. L-47739 June 22,
1983
Melencio-Herrera,
J.
Facts: Carlos E. Cruz accepted employment as Engineer
Officer with Singapore Airlines on August 30, 1974. His contract included a
bond binding him for five years. He signed the contract with B.E. Villanueva as surety.
Later on Singapore
airlines claimed that Cruz had breached the contract by going on unauthorized
leave without pay without the requisite approval of his superiors. The airline
sought payment of liquidated damages of $53,968.00 or (P161,904.00); $883.91 or
(P2,651.73) as overpayment in salary; $61.00 or (P183.00) for cost of uniforms
and accessories supplied by the company plus $230.00, or (P690.00), for the cost of a flight manual;
and $1,533.71, or (P4,601.13) corresponding to the vacation
leave he had availed of but to which he was no longer entitled; exemplary
damages attorney's fees; and costs.
Cruz argued that
there could not be any breach of contract as he was not actually required to
serve for five years straight. He further posited that he had left the company
on valid grounds which was accepted by the company, and thus no damages may be
awarded. Villanueva on the other hand filled a cross-claim against Cruz for any
damages the former
may
be held liable against the airline. Villanueva argued that he was not a surety
but a mere guarantor.
On October 28,
1977, Judge Pano dismissed the complaint, counterclaim and cross-claim for lack
of jurisdiction; stating that the issue stems from an employer-employee
relationship and thus jurisdiction is vested exclusively with the Labor Arbiter
as enunciated in article 216 of the Labor Code. Singapore airlines filed for
reconsideration, which was subsequently denied, thus their recourse to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the case is cognizable by the Civil Courts
or the Labor Arbiter?
Held:
The Civil Courts hold jurisdiction
over the case at bar. The case is actually grounded on the breach of contract
by Cruz and not on his employer-employee relationship with the airline. This
was clearly manifested by Cruz’s refusal and failure to report for duty without
just cause and with malice and bad faith when he took his unauthorized leave
which was in contravention with the stipulations of his contract. It is evident
that the complaint was anchored on the effects of Cruz’s abandonment of work,
which entitled the airline to damages.
Singapore Airlines
does not seek the application of Labor laws but of the Civil Code regarding
liquidated damages for the breach of a contract. Secondarily, the assertion of
Villanueva that he is a mere guarantor is definitely a civil issue outside of
the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction.
Thus, the case must be remanded to the proper Regional Trial Court.
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome
G.R.
No. L-59825 (September 11, 1982)
Facts: On December 20, 1977 at about 1 in the afternoon Cosme de Aboitiz,
the president and chief executive
officer, went to the Pepsi-Cola plant in Muntinlupa and shouted at Ernesto
Medina, the former plant manager and Jose G. Ong, the former plant comptroller.
De Aboitiz did so in front of all the employees, exclaiming:
“GOD
DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME!
YOU ARE FIRED (Medina). YOU TOO ARE FIRED! '(Ong)”
Medina and Ong
filed a joint complaint for oral defamation on January 9, 1978 but the judge
dismissed the complaint during the preliminary investigation on the ground that
such expletives were said not as an insult or to cause humiliation, but merely
as an expression of anger and displeasure on the part of de Aboitiz. Medina and
Ong subsequently filed a petition for review which reversed the earlier
resolution.
Apparently de Aboitiz was angry because
the Muntinlupa plant had been delayed in the use of promotional crowns. Medina reasoned
in his complaint that his plant was not that only
one which was delayed and thus there was no cause for his humiliating dismissal. Further he opined that such removal
was calculated in order to bring about the most humiliation as it was done in front of all of his
subordinates hours before the Christmas party; the dismissal was executed by de
Aboitiz himself and not another lower ranking officer, that it was made just after they were awarded loyalty
rings for their long service
with the company
and that it was done just five days before Christmas.
The court awarded
Medina and Ong P 300,000 in moral damages, P 100,000 in exemplary damages, P
5,000 in litigation expenses and P 10,000 and P 200 per appearance as
attorney’s fees. De Aboitiz moved to dismiss said complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction, but was subsequently denied because the case was declare
to be a civil case for damages and not one regarding their employer-employee
relationship, which would in the latter case be cognizable by the Labor
Arbiter.
On January 23, 1981
de Aboitiz again filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground that P.D. No.
1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and Batasan
Pambansa Bldg. 70 which took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of the
Labor Code vested exclusive jurisdiction to the Labor Arbiter and included Art.
248, thereof ... "which may include claims for damages and other
affirmative reliefs." Thus, the case was regarded by the court a quo as
now being within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Said court also ruled
that because said presidential decree was a curative statute, it could be
applied retroactively and thus the case was dismissed.
Issue: Whether the promulgation of P.D. No. 1691 did
indeed remove the case from the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts?
Held: No, said law did not do so. The Labor Code has no
relevance in the case as it does not provide the reliefs sought for by Medina
and Ong. Said reliefs could only be granted by the Civil Code as it is an
action for torts and damages. Medina and Ong did not allege any unfair labor
practice in their complaint. Thus this case is governed by the Civil Code and
not the Labor Code. The petition is granted and the case reinstated to be
decided on the merits.
Derelection
of duty
Amaro vs. Sumanguit
Gr
No. L-14986 (July 31, 1962)
Facts:
On October 5, 1958 Jose amaro was
assaulted and shot near the city government building of Silay, Negros
Occidental by a police officer. He, together with his father and witnesses went
to the office of Ambrosio Sumanguit, the chief of police of the city to
complain. However instead of gaining assistance they were harassed terrorized
and were forced to give up prosecuting the crime. Amaro still persisted and
obtained the aid of the city attorney who was about to file an information for
the illegal discharge of firearm against one of the police officers. Because of this,
the harassment by the chief
of police continued, trying to force
the Amaros to give up and sign prepared affidavits exculpating the police
from dereliction of duty with
regard to the above said crime.
The complaint was dismissed upon Sumanguit’s motion, on the ground that
it does not it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Issue: Whether such dismissal is valid on such ground?
Held:
No, such dismissal was invalid.
Although the complaint did not specifically allege so, it was an action
predicated on articles 21 and 27 of the Civil Code. The facts presented
although vague do constitute an actionable dereliction of duty as enunciated in
article 27 as the chief of police refused to give them assistance without just
cause, when it was said officer’s duty to perform such.
Although the
complaint was imperfectly drafted, ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain, such
are not grounds for dismissal of the case under Rule 8. The proper procedure
would be to ask for a bill of particulars under Rule 16 to fix said curable
defects.
The Amaros
have recourse to file their
complaint for illegal
discharge of firearm
directly with the city attorney
and/or file an administrative complaint against the chief
of police. Both of which do
not preclude an action for damages under article 27 of the Civil Code. Thus,
the dismissal is set aside and the case remanded to the appropriate court for
further proceedings.
Violation
of human dignity and Privacy
St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. C.A.
GR No L-46061 (November 14, 1984)
Facts: St. Louis Reality Corp. caused to be published on
the December 15, 1968 Sunday Times an advertisement featuring the house of Dr.
Conrado J. Aramil. Said advertisement was entitled
“Where the Heart is”, showed
a picture of Dr. Aramil’s
house but with the family of Arcadio
S. Acradio depicted
as the owners. It also had written
text stating that the Arcadios
had purchased such house in Brookside Hills village at an affordable rate. Such
was done without the permission of Dr. Aramil.
Upon seeing a
reprint of the advertisement on the same paper on January 5, 1969, Dr. Aramil
immediately wrote said reality corporation stating that the latter did not
obtain permission to post his house in the advertisement and depict it as being
owned by another family. Dr. Aramil explained that it has caused him
humiliation as his colleagues and friends who recognize his house or have been
to such have uttered remarks questioning the ownership of his house, his
integrity, if he rented the house from the Arcadios and even that his wife was
that of another husband. He then warned the corporation that he would pursue
legal action if such acts were not explained satisfactorily to him within one
week of receipt of the letter.
Said letter was
received and answered by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of said corporation who
was in charge of advertising. He immediately stopped its publication and
contacted Dr. Aramil to apologise. However no rectification or apology was ever
published. Dr. Aramil’s counsel demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages of
P 110,000 from the corporation on February 20, 1969. The corporation answered
by claiming that it was an honest mistake and that a rectification will be
made.
The corporation
published a new advertisement on March 18, 1969 which again portrayed the
Arcadio family, but this time with their real house. However no apology or
rectification was included. This led to the filing of a complaint for damages
against the said corporation on March 29, 1969. The lower court and appellate
court ruled in favor of Dr. Aramil; awarding him P 8,000 as actual damages, P
20,000 as moral damages and P 2,000 for attorney’s fees.
Issue: Whether the case is covered by article 26 of the
Civil Code?
Held: Yes,
the case falls under said article which warrants the award of damages to Dr.
Aramil. Said article provides that "every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and
"meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another" and "similar acts",
"though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause
of action for damages, prevention and other relief". Such article was
violated when the corporation released an advertisement depicting Dr. Armil’s
home to be that of another, without Dr. Aramil’s permission. Further, bad faith
and negligence was evident as the corporation refused to publish a rectification
or apology despite demands.
The damages awarded are proper being enunciated by Articles 2200, 2208
and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts
mentioned in Article 26.
Concepcion v. CA
Gr
No 120706 (January 31, 2000)
Facts: Nestor Nicolas and family were leases of an apartment owned by Florence
Conception located at San Joaquin,
Pasig City. Nestor
was engaged in the business
of supplying office equipment, appliances and other fixtures to government agencies. He had convinced
Florence to join in by inputting capital
in exchange for an equal division of profits earned.
The problem started
when Florence’s deceased husband’s brother, Rodrigo Conception, suddenly
confronted Nestor at his apartment on the second week of July 1985. He accused
Nestor of being an adulterer, receiving P 100,000 from Florence to go to Baguio
with his family, but secretly returning to Manila to have a tryst with
Florence. Nestor even accompanied Rodrigo to ask the relatives whom the rumor
allegedly came from,
they however denied
any knowledge. Rodrigo
again accused Nestor
of being an adulterer when they met Florence at the terrace of her
residence when the two confronted her about the rumor. Both Nestor and Florence
denied such. Rodrigo continued to harass Florence via phone, even saying that
he would kill her if anything should happen to his mother.
As a result Nestor
felt ashamed and embarrassed to face his neighbors as they had heard or had been present during
Rodrigo’s confrontation. His business was also in decline as Florence discontinued her capital
input. Moreover, his wife, Allem started to distrust him and constant fighting
ensued due to the rumor spread by Rodrigo. Nestor then demanded that Rodrigo
make a public apology and pay damages. Rodrigo refused to do so and reasoned
that he was only protecting his family’s reputation. The RTC and Court of
Appeals ruled in favor of Nestor,
awarding him P 50,000 for moral damages,
P25,000 for exemplary
damages, P 10,000 for attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.
Issue: Whether the awarding is with basis or not?
Held: Yes, such decision is with legal and factual basis.
First, Rodrigo’s claim that the awarding was without legal basis is bereft of
merit. His actions of confronting Nestor in the latter’s apartment and hurling accusations
that Nestor was an adulterer within view and hearing range of the public is
indeed a violation of articles 26 and 2219 of the Civil Code as such an act is
indeed a form of defamation and intrudes into the privacy of Nestor’s home and
family life. Further, under article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which
include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar
injury, although incapable
of pecuniary computation, may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act
or omission. Such was manifest when Nestor was so humiliated that he could not
face his neighbours, his constant quarrels with his wife and the decline of his business.
Rodrigo’s second
contention that the facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly
overlooked misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if
considered, would change the verdict. The court sees no such error. The
totality of the evidence and facts presented truly show that Rodrigo had
defamed Nestor. The minor inconsistencies of the testimonies and affidavits of
witnesses do not debunk Nestor’s case; in fact they are a badge of its
authenticity as experience would dictate that minor inconsistencies are to be
expected.
Rodrigo’s final contention is that the appellate court did not take into account the fact that the lower court’s judge who penned
the decision was not the original judge who heard his case; and is thus not in a
position to properly weigh the facts and circumstances of the case leading to a
flawed decision. The court finds this untenable. First off the Supreme Court as
a rule respects the finds of the lower court and shall not disturb such unless
it finds good reason to do so. No such reason in this case exists or has been
proven. The mere fact that the lower court judge who penned the decision was
not the one who heard the case does not destroy the presumption of regularity of
the judge’s performance. The judge is presumed and held to have made his decision
after reviewing the facts and circumstances which are kept in the records of the case.
Thus the totality
of the facts and circumstances lead the court to believe that indeed Rodrigo
had defamed Nestor and is thus liable for damages. The damages previously
awarded are affirmed.
Concept
of Damages
Heirs of Borlado vs. Vda. De
Bulan
G.R.
114118 (2001)
Facts:
A parcel of land owned by Serapio
Borlado, grandfather of petitioners, was sold for consideration to Francisco
Bacero who in turn sold it to the Spouses Bienvenido Bulan and Salvacion Borbon,
respondents herein. The respondents had been in continuous, peaceful,
uninterrupted, adverse and exclusive possession of the lot until petitioners forcibly entered and wrested physical possession thereof
from them.
Respondents filed
an ejectment suit against petitioners, which was decided in their favour. The
court ordered petitioners to vacate the land and to pay to respondents a total
amount of One Thousand One Hundred (1,100) cavans of palay as well as attorney’s
fees and the cost of suit.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in declaring the respondents
as owners of the lot.
Held:
The petition was denied since the
issue involved was factual and did not fall under the exceptions that the SC
may not review factual findings of the CA on appeal via certiorari. However, the court
modified the judgment
with respect to the award
of the cavans of palay
as a form of damages
in the absence of legal basis since
"Palay" is not legal tender
currency in the Philippines.
Lazatin vs. Twano
GR
No. L-12736 (July 31, 1961)
Facts: Properties of appellant Lazatin were levied
and sold in public auction
to satisfy a judgment in favour of herein appellees Twaño and Castro.
Lazatin deposited the redemption price with the Sheriff before
the expiration of the redemption period. To ensure
payment of claim in the present action,
Lazatin secured a writ of attachment on the amount
deposited.
Issue: Whether the estate of Lazatin is liable to pay
damages for the alleged malicious attachment
Held: The defendants, Twaño and Castro, are not
entitled to moral damages. The law on damages is found on Title XVII of the
Civil Code but rules governing damages laid down in other laws, and the
principles of the general law on damages are adopted in so far as they are not
in consistent with the Code.
Moral damages may be recovered, among others, in
cases of malicious prosecution. But in order that moral damages may be
recovered in connection with a writ of attachment, malice must exist.
The Rules of Court
requiring the attachment plaintiff to provide a bond from which the costs and
all damages are to be enforced should the court find that the plaintiff is not
entitled to the attachment merely provides recovery
on the bond based on the undertaking and not from any tortious
act. Consequently, the appellees may recover only the actual damages
and not moral damages.
Actual
or Compensatory Damages
Algarra vs. Sandejas
GR
No L-8385 (March 24, 1914)
Facts: Plaintiff filed a civil
action against defendant for injuries resulting from an automobile collision due to the latter’s
fault. At the time of the accident, plaintiff sold the products of a
distillery and made an average of P50 per month. As a result of the collision,
plaintiff incurred medical expenses, and suffered business losses with only
four out of his twenty regular customers remaining.
The lower court refused to grant plaintiff’s claim
for injuries to his business due to his enforced absence therefrom.
Issue: Whether plaintiff is entitled to damages for
injuries to his business
Held: An action for damages is based on Article 1902,
which provides:
“A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to
another where there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the
damage so done.”
Actual
damages include not only loss already suffered, but loss of profits which
may not have been realized. Under both American
Law and the Spanish Civil
Code, actual damages
for a negligent act or
omission include those foreseen at the time of the injury or its necessary
consequence. Evidently, plaintiff is entitled to recover damages resulting from
his actual incapacity. With respect to the damage to his business the court
ruled that “the profits of an established business may be considered in
calculating the measure of damages for an interruption of it”.
Kinds
of Actual Damages
Integrated Packaging Corp. vs. CA
GR
No. 115117 (June 8, 2000)
Facts:
Petitioner, Integrated Packaging,
and private respondent, Fil-Anchor Paper Co., Inc., entered into a contract
whereby private respondent would deliver 3450 reams of printing paper on specified schedules to be paid within a maximum period
of ninety days. Private respondent delivered 1097 out of 3450 reams to petitioner, but the latter
failed to pay the amount due causing private respondent to
file a collection suit against petitioner.
In its counterclaim
petitioner contends that by reason of respondents failure to deliver the 3450
reams as agreed upon, it was unable to complete its printing obligation with
Philacor resulting to actual damages and unrealized expected profits.
Issue: Whether private respondent is liable for
petitioner’s breach of contract with Philacor.
Held: Private respondent was justified in suspending
its deliveries when petitioner failed to pay within ninety days from receipt of
the goods as agreed upon. Neither may private respondent be held liable for the
breach of contract committed by petitioner against Philacor when respondent was
not a party thereto.
Indemnification for
damages includes loss suffered or actual damages (damnum emergens) and profits which the obligee failed to obtain or
compensatory damages (lucrum cessans); however,
it is necessary to prove actual amount
of loss. The court ruled that it was erroneous to conclude that petitioner would have earned
a profit of P 790, 324.30 since these
were based on speculation and were hypothetical. Neither is petitioner entitled to moral
damages in the absence of bad faith,
or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
Attorney’s
fees
Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 73886
(January 31, 1989)
Facts: On June 18, 1983, herein
petitioner Quirante filed
a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney's fees. According to him, there
was an oral agreement between
him and the late Dr.Casasola with regard to his attorney's fees, which
agreement was allegedly confirmed in writing by the widow, Asuncion Vda. De
Casasola, and the two daughters of the deceased, namely Mely C. Garcia and Virginia C. Nazareno. Petitioner avers that pursuant
to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as follows:
A.
In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney's fees of the undersigned counsel
(Atty. Quirante) shall be P30,000.00.
B. In case the Honorable Court awards damages
in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided
equally between the Heirs of I. Casasola,
Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty.
Dante Cruz.
The trial court granted the motion for confirmation
in an order dated March 20, 1984, despite an opposition thereto. It also denied
the motion for reconsideration of the order of confirmation in its second order
dated May 25, 1984. The Court of Appeals set aside the two orders and made the
previous restraining order permanent.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Quirante is allowed to
recover his attorney’s fees even if the case has not yet been decided?
Held: What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by
petitioners is, however, different from attorney's fees as an item of damages
provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in
favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel,
is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by
14
execution. Here, the petitioner's
claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as
the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
Since the main case
from which the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise has not yet become
final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof
should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of
the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney's fees as an incident of the
main action may be availed of only when something is due to the client. Thus,
it was ruled that:
...
an attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been
decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. The
issue over attorney's fee
15
only arises when something has been
recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
As regards to the effect of the alleged
confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the heirs of the deceased. We
are of the considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise
determined by the court a quo inasmuch
as it also necessarily involves
the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney's fees by both
petitioners herein. The court below will be in a better position, after the
entire case shall have been adjudicated, inclusive of any liability of
PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs
of Dr.Casasola in the award,
to determine with evidentiary support
such matters like the basis
for the entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz and as to whether the agreement allegedly
entered into with the late Dr.Casasola would
be binding on all his heirs, as contended by petitioner Quirante.
We, therefore, take
exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court
which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's fees should not
adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also premised on the
eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the same objection of
prematurity obtains and such a holding may be pre-emptive of factual and
evidentiary matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent court
subject of the present recourse is hereby AFFIRMED.
Interest
Crismina Garments, Inc. vs. CA
G.R.
No.128721 (March 9, 1999)
Facts: Petitioner (Crismina Garments) contracted the
services of the respondent (D’Wilmar Garments) for sewing 20,762 pairs of
denims. The total of which amounted to 76,410.
Petitioner failed
to pay the aforesaid amount. As a result, Respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for the collection of payment. Trial Court ruled in favor of the
respondent and ordered the petitioner to pay the sum of 76,140 with interest at
12% per annum. CA affirmed the trial Courts ruling. Hence, a Petition for
review was filed.
Petitioner submits
that the interest
rate should be 6% pursuant
to Art. 2209 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand private
respondent maintains that the interest
rate should be 12%
per annum in accordance with Central bank Act, since the money
sought to be recovered by her is in the form of forbearance.
Issue:
Whether or not it is proper to
impose interest at the rate of 12% per annum for an obligation that does not
involve a loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the
parties.
Held: Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract
for a piece of work, not from a loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum should be
applied.
Furthermore, since the amount of the demand could be established with certainty when the complaint
was filed, the six percent
(6%) interest should
be computed from the filing of
the said complaint. But after the judgment becomes
final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should
be reckoned at twelve percent
(12%) per year.
Private respondent
maintains that the twelve percent (12%) interest should be imposed, because the
obligation arose from a forbearance of money. This is erroneous. In eastern
Shipping, the Court observed that “forbearance” in the context of the usury law
is a “contractual obligation of lender or creditor to refrain, during a given
period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay a loan or debt
then due and payable.” Using this standard, the obligation in this case was
obviously not a forbearance of money, goods or credit.
Mitigation
of Liability
Cerrano vs. Tan Chuco
38
Phil 392 (August 1, 1918)
Facts: Tan Chuco, who was then the owner of casco No. 1033, rented it to Vicencio
Cerrano at a monthly rental
of P70. Tan Chuco notified
Vicencio Cerrano that in the following month it
would be necessary
to send the casco to Malabon for repairs. Cerrano
then informed Tan Chuco that he would like to rent the casco again after repairs
had been completed. Tan Chuco indicated
that he was willing to rent it, but would expect P80 a month for it, by which
Cerrano acceded to the demand. About one week before the end of the repair
period, Tan Chuco sold the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. Santos, the man
who had been employed by Cerrano, upon hearing of the said sale went to the
office of Siy Cong Bieng & Co. and asked for employment in the same capacity. Cerrano,
claiming that he was entitled
to the possession of the casco under his contract
with Tan Chuco,
regardless of its sale to Siy Cong Bieng & Co.
induced Santos to refuse to take orders from the new owners.
As a result Siy
Cong Bieng & Co. were obliged to bring an action of replevin against Santos
for the recovery of the possession of their casco. Upon this judgment was
entered for the delivery of casco to Siy Cong Bieng& Co. and for damages.
Cerrano, paid the judgment in favor of Siy Cong Bieng& Co. in the replevin
suit, for which he had become liable under the terms of the delivery bond.
Issue: Whether
Tan Chuco is liable for damages for breach of contract.
Ruling: Yes. Under the terms of his contract Tan Chuco was
bound to deliver the casco to Cerrano for one month from the date upon which
the repairs were ended, but was under no obligation to renew the contract at
the end of the month. By selling the casco to Siy Cong Bieng & Co. he broke
his contract with Cerrano and is responsible for the damages caused by
his failure to give Cerrano
possession of the casco for the term of one month. The Court is of the opinion that Cerrano is entitled to recover damages
for the breach
of contract, the profit
by which he would have been able to make had the contract been performed.
Article 1106 of the
Civil Code establishes the rule that prospective profits may be recovered as
damages, while article 1107 of the same Code provides that the damages
recoverable for the breach of obligations not originating in fraud (dolo) are
those which were or might have been foreseen at the time the contract was
entered into. Applying these principles to the facts in this case, we think that it is unquestionable that defendant must be deemed to have foreseen at the time he made contract that in the event of his failure
perform it, the plaintiff
would be damaged by the loss of the profit he might reasonably have expected to
derive from its use.
Moral
Damages
Kierulf vs. CA
G.R.
No. 99301 (March 13, 1997)
Facts: The Pantranco bus was traveling along EDSA from Congressional Avenue
towards Clover Leaf,
Balintawak. The driver
lost control of the bus along the way, causing
it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island
occupying the east-bound lane of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the front
portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi. Damages to both vehicles occured
and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila
Kierulf, both of whom were treated at the Quezon City General Hospital. The bus
also hit and injured a pedestrian who was then crossing EDSA. Despite the
impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against
a Caltex gasoline station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing
equipment. As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries. The
injuries sustained by Lucila required major surgeries like "tracheotomy,
open reduction, mandibular fracture, intermaxillary repair of multiple
laceration" and prolonged treatment by specialists. Legaspi also suffered
injuries.The front portion of the pickup truck, owned by Spouses Kierulf, was
smashed to pieces. The cost of repair was estimated at P107,583.50.
Pantranco in its
petition alleged that it was driven by Jose Malanum. While cruising along EDSA,
a used engine differential accidentally and suddenly dropped from a junk truck
in front of the bus. Said differential hit the under chassis of the bus,
throwing Malanum off his seat and making him lose control of said bus. The bus
swerved to the left, hit the center island, and bumped the pickup of the
spouses.
The plaintiffs
alleged that the moral damages awarded by Respondent Court are "clearly
and woefully not enough." The established guideline in awarding moral
damages takes into consideration several
factors, some of which are the social and financial
standing of the injured parties
and their wounded
moral feelings and personal pride.
The Kierulf spouses
add that the Respondent Court should have considered another factor: the
loss of their conjugal fellowship and the impairment or destruction of their
sexual life and that the moral damages awarded in favor of Lucila should be
increased to P1,000,000.00, not only for Lucila but also for her husband Victor
who also suffered "psychologically." Pantranco rebuts that Article
2219 of the Civil Code provides that only the person suffering
the injury may claim moral damages. Additionally, no evidence was adduced to show that the consortium had indeed been impaired and the Court cannot presume
that marital relations disappeared with the accident
Issue: How much moral, exemplary and actual damages are
victims of vehicular accidents entitled to?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in this case that “the Rodriguez
case clearly reversed
the original common law view first
enunciated in the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not recover for the loss of her
husband's services by the act of a third party. Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that
he/she is no longer capable of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual
relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real
personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and
unforeseeable; it is personal to the spouse and separate and distinct from that
of the injured person.
Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to
support the award of moral damages to Victor and/or LucilaKierulf for
"loss of consortium," however, cannot be properly considered in this
case.
Victor's claim for
deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent
Court, is not supported by the evidence on record. His wife might have been
badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence thereof, his right to marital
consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila)
had failed to make out a case for
loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse.
Again, we emphasize that this claim is factual
in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence
presented but also in the findings of the Respondent Court. For lack of
factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time. The
social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral
damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that no
"rude and rough" reception, no "menacing attitude," no
"supercilious manner," no "abusive language and highly scornful
reference" was given her.
The social and financial standing of a
claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if
he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's
knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.
Be that as it may,
it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner Lucila for her physical
sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She
sustained multiple injuries on the scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her
teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments. Despite
treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has
not fully recovered from her injuries. She even had to undergo a second
operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered sleepless nights
and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident. In this light and
considering further the length of time spent in prosecuting the complaint and
this appeal, we find the sum of P400,000.00 as moral damages for Petitioner
Lucila to be fair and just under the circumstances.
Proof and Proximate Cause
Miranda-Ribaya vs. Carbonell
G.R.
No. L-49390 January 28, 1980
Facts: Mrs. Niceta Miranda-Ribaya was engaged sometime in
1968 in the pawnshop business and in the buying and selling of jewelry.
Prior to April 23, 1968 one of her agents, Mrs. Josefina Roco-Robles,
informed her that a millionaire logger by the name of Marino Bautista was
interested to buy big diamond
stones.
Mrs. Ribaya accompanied by her agent, Mrs. Robles dropped by the house of
Mr. and Mrs. Marino Bautista on April 23, 1968 at La Salle Street, Greenhills
Mandaluyong, Rizal.
Mrs. Ribaya was convinced that the Bautistas were
millionaires as represented by her agent. On that occasion both Mr. and Mrs.
Bautista were present together with Gloria Duque, the secretary of Mr.
Bautista, and the couple's daughter, Teresita.
Mrs. Ribaya sold to
the Bautistas 10 pieces of jewelry for the price of P222,000.00 (originally
priced at P224,000.00). Mr. Bautista acknowledged the receipt of the jewelry as
well as the agreed purchase price by signing the receipt and Mrs. Ribaya in
turn was paid in the form of the two (2) Equitable Banking Corporation checks
Nos. 10767485-A for P112,000.00 (Annex B of the complaint) and No. 10755100-A
for P110,000.00, both checks postdated June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya then executed
a voucher evidencing said payment
Mrs. Ribaya,
accompanied by Miss Narcisa Gosioco, went back the next day to request Bautista
to break up the Equitable Banking Corporation Check No. 10755100-A for
P110,000.00 into separate
check inasmuch as part of the jewelry
sold to Bautista
the previous day belonged to Mrs. Gosioco.
Bautista accommodated them with four (4) Bank of Amerca checks DD-8112 for P14,000.00,
DD-8113 for P34,000.00, DD- 8114 for P12,000.90 and DD-9115 for P50,000.00
P110,000.00, all postdated June 23, 1968. Mrs. Ribaya delivered Account Nos.
8113 and 8114 to Miss. Gosioco and kept for herself checks Nos. 8115 and 8112.
On the same day, she also sold to the Bautistas 4 pieces worth P94,000.00.
Bautista issued Bank of America Checks
Nos. DD-8106 forP12,000.00, DD-8111 for P12,000.00, DD-8110 for P35,000.00, and DD-8107 for P35,000.00, all post dated
June 23, 1968.
As some of the
owners of the jewelry sold to the defendants by Ribaya on April 23, 1968 and
April 24, 1968 wanted to get back their jewelry, Mrs. Ribaya on May 15, 1968
went back to the house of the Bautistas accompanied by Gloria Duque bringing
with her 3 pieces of jewelry in exchange for some pieces previously sold to
defendant Bautista. She left the jewelry with Bautista but instead of
exchanging the jewelry Bautista issued to Mrs. Ribaya another Bank of America
check No. DD-8130 for P45,000.00 postdated July 17, 1968.
Ribaya tried to contact
Bautista when the checks matured,
but were unable
to do so. She deposited the checks to her account
but they were dishonored by the bank for the reason
that the accounts of the defendant were closed.
Suspecting that the Bautistas might
have pawned the pieces of jewelry purchased from her, she went to the pawnshop
section of the Manila Police Department and discovered that most of the jewelry
she had sold to the defendants were pledged to various pawnshops in Manila.
Mrs. Ribaya
confronted Marino Bautista, who assured her that he would pay her their
obligation. After failing
to comply, Mrs. Ribaya demanded
from Bautista the surrender of the
pawnshop tickets covering
the pledge of the jewelry
he obtained from her. She was able to redeem part of the jewelry
she delivered to the Bautistas.
It was computed that Bautista's obligations amounted to P125,460.79.
The trial court rendered judgment sentencing the Bautistas to pay
petitioners the sum of P125,460.79 with interest and 25% thereof for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation.
The
claim for moral and exemplary damages was denied on the ground that the evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs [was] insufficient to warrant its grant.
ISSUE: Are petitioners entitled to moral and exemplary
damages?
HELD: Yes. In Francisco vs. Government Service
Insurance System, the Court had sustained
the trial court's
appealed decision denying
the therein prevailing plaintiff's claim for moral
a nd exemplary damages
"not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to take the witness
stand and testify
to her social humiliation, wounded
feelings, anxiety, etc.,
but primarily because a breach of contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not warrant
the award of moral damages.
Here, the facts and circumstances are
totally different. In that case, therein plaintiff failed to take the witness
stand and defendant's breach of contract was held to be not malicious and
fraudulent. In the present case,
petitioner took the witness stand and established by uncontradicted testimony
that due to respondents' deceitful and malevolent acts of defraudation, she had
suffered "extreme" anguish and "could not sleep for three months,"
since she was forced to close her pawnshop, sell some of her personal jewelries
and borrow money in order to pay off the owners of the jewelries wrongfully
gotten by respondents from her. The evidence of record shows the magnitude of
respondents' wanton, fraudulent and malevolent acts of defraudation.
Petitioners' testimonial
evidence to the effect that she suffered "extremely" and that for
three months she could not sleep was a clear demonstration of her physical
suffering, mental anguish and serious anxiety and similar injury, resulting
from respondents' malevolent acts that show her to be clearly entitled to moral
damages.
Petitioners having
established the more damages, are entitled in addition thereto,
to exemplary damages.
The wantonness and malevolence through
which respondents defrauded petitioners, deceitfully
incurring and then evading settlement of their just liability certainly
justifies the award of exemplary damages by way of example and correction for
the public good and also to serve as a deterrent to the commission of similar misdeeds
by others, even if the transaction were viewed as a breach
of civil contract.
Del Rosario vs. CA
G.R.
No. 118325 (January 29, 1997)
Facts: In selling to the public
roofing materials known
as "Banawe" shingles, Metal Forming Corporation (MFC) made representations on the durability of the product
and the sturdiness of its installation, characterizing the shingles
as "STRUCTURALLY SAFE AND STRONG" and that the "BANAWE METAL
TILE structure acts as a single unit against wind and storm pressure due to the strong hook action on its overlaps". It prompted the Del Rosarios
to buy the "Banawe" shingles
and have them installed at their residence.
Two months
after installation, portions
of the roof of the Del Rosarios
were blown away by the typhoon "Ruping", and the same acted in parts (instead
of as a single unit)
when strong winds blew, a part remaining while another part was blown off.
The Del Rosarios'
filed a complaint on November 21, 1990, charging MFC with a violation of
Section 3 of Act No. 3740, "An Act to Penalize Fraudulent Advertising,
Mislabeling or Misbranding of Any Product, Stocks, Bonds, etc." After due
proceedings, the DTI rendered judgment sentencing MFC to pay an
"administrative fine of P10,000.00".
MFC however
declined to concede liability for the other damages claimed by the Del Rosario
Spouses to have been caused to the interior of their home. The spouses sought
to recover from MFC, damages resulting from the events just narrated,
contending that aside from the destruction of the roof of their house, injury
was also caused to its electrical wiring, ceiling, furtures, walls, wall paper,
wood parquet flooring and furniture. They reckoned their actual damages at
P1,008,003.00 and prayed for an award to them of moral damages in the sum of
P3,000,000,00, exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, and attorney's
fees in the sum of P1,000,000.00.
MFC moved to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, alleging that it had no
contractual relationship with the Del Rosarios since the contract for the
purchase and installation of the roofing, upon which the latter's claims were
based, was actually entered into between it and another person, Jesus M. Puno
(an engineer identified as the Del Rosarios' contractor).
Judgment was rendered in favor of the Del Rosarios.
Issue: Are the Spouses entitled to moral damages?
Held:
Yes. It is indisputable that (1)
the tiles were delivered to the Del Rosarios and used in fabricating the roof
of their home, and (2) that it was the employees and workers of MFC who (a) delivered the shingles or metal tiles to the construction site of the Del Rosarios'
home, and (b) undertook and completed the installation thereof.
These they did in bad faith, using inferior materials and assembling them in a manner contrary
to MFC's express
representations in its brochures and advertisements circulated and broadcast to the general
public — which representations had, in the first place,
induced the Del Rosarios to choose the metal tiles in question
for their roofing.
In fine, since MFC, in bad faith and with gross negligence, infringed the express warranty made by it to the general public
in connection with the "Banawe" tiles brought to and set up in the
house of the Del Rosarios who had relied on the warranty, and thereby caused them considerable injury, the identity
of the individual who actually
dealt with MFC and asked the latter
to make such delivery and installation is of little
moment.
That MFC did in
truth act with bad faith, in flagrant breach of its express warranties made to
the general public and in wanton disregard of the rights of the Del Rosarios
who relied on those warranties, is adequately demonstrated by the recorded
proofs. The law explicitly authorizes the award of moral damages "in
breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith." There being, moreover, satisfactory evidence of the psychological and mental trauma
actually suffered by the Del Rosarios, the grant to them of moral
damages is warranted. In Makabili v.
Court of Appeals, the court held that:
It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must have
satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of
the damages and its causal connection to
defendant's
acts. This is so because moral damages though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant
for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer (Enervida v. De la Torre, 55 SCRA 340 [1974.]
and are allowable only when specifically prayed for in the complaint. (San
Miguel Brewery, Inc. v. Magno, 21 SCRA 292 [1968])
Raagas vs. Traya
G.R.
No. L-20081, February 27, 1968
Facts: Spouses Melquiades Raagas and
Adela Laudiano Raagas filed on April 1, 1960, a complaint with the Court of
First Instance of Leyte against Octavio Traya, his wife, and Bienvenido
Canciller, alleging in essence that on or about April 9, 1958, while the latter
was "recklessly" driving a truck owned by his co-defendants, along
the public highway in MacArthur, Leyte, the said vehicle ran over the
plaintiffs' three-year old son Regino causing his instantaneous death. The
plaintiffs ask for actual damages in the sum of P10,000, moral, nominal and
corrective damages in a sum to be determined by the court, P1,000 as attorney's
fees, P1,000 for expenses of litigation, plus costs.
Defendants
specifically denied that Canciller was "driving recklessly" at the
time of the mishap, and assert that the truck "was fully loaded and was
running at a very low speed and on the right side of the road"; that it
was the child who "rushed from an unseen position and bumped the truck so
that he was hit by the left rear tire of the said truck and died", and
consequently the defendants are not to blame for the accident which was
"entirely attributable to an unforeseen event" or due to the fault of
the child and negligence of his parents; that the defendant-spouses have exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of their driver Canciller, whom they hired in 1946 only after a thorough
study of his background as a
truck driver; and that each time they allowed him to drive it was only after a check of his physical condition and the mechanical fitness of the truck assigned
to him.
On June 24 it
rendered a judgment on the pleadings, condemning the defendants, jointly and
severally, to pay "to the plaintiffs the sum of P10,000 for the death of
their child Regino Laudiano Raagas, P2,000 for moral damages, P1,000 actual
damages, P1,000 for attorney's fees, and the costs."
On May 4 the
plaintiffs' moved for a judgment on the pleadings, upon the claim that the
defendants' answer not only "failed to tender an issue" but as well
"admitted material allegations" of the complaint.
The court reasoned that the denial
in the answer of the charge of reckless driving
"did not affect
the plaintiffs' positive
allegation in their complaint that the truck . . . did not have a
current year registration plate . . . for the year 1958 when the accident
occurred that "this failure . . . has the effect
of admitting hypothetically that they operated
... the said truck without proper license . . . when the accident
occurred," and that "unless there
is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation (article 2185, new Civil
Code)." The court went on to conclude that under the circumstances a
judgment on the pleadings was "irremediably proper and fitting."
Issue: Did the court act correctly in rendering judgment
on the pleadings?
Held:
No. The plaintiffs' claim for
actual, moral, nominal and corrective damages, was controverted by the averment
in the answer to the effect that the defendants "have no knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations" as to such damages, "the truth of the matter being that
the death of Regino Raagas was occasioned by an unforeseen event and/or by the
fault of the small boy Regino Raagas or his parents." Such averment has
the effect of tendering a valid issue.
The court has previously held that we held even if the allegations regarding
the amount of damages in the complaint
are not specifically denied in the answer,
such damages are not deemed admitted. It has also
declared in no uncertain terms that actual damages must be proved, and that a
court cannot rely on "speculation, conjecture or guesswork" as to the
fact and amount of damages, but must depend
on actual proof that damage
had been suffered
and on evidence of the actual amount.
Moreover, in Malonzo vs. Galang et. al., L-13851,
July 27, 1960, the court reaffirmed the rule that although an allegation is not necessary in order
that moral damages
may be awarded, "it
is, nevertheless, essential
that the claimant
satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual
basis of the damage and its causal
relation to defendant's acts."
There is a need of a full-blown trial on the
merits.
Enervida vs. Dela Torre
G.R.
No. L-38037 (January 28, 1974)
Facts:
Petitioner, Roque Enervida, filed
a complaint against the defendant-spouses de la Torre, praying that the deed of
sale executed on December 3, 1957 by his deceased father, Ciriaco Enervida,
over a parcel of land covered by a Homestead Patent be declared null and void
for having been executed within the prohibited period of five years, in
violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public Land Law) and that he
be allowed to repurchase said parcel of land for being the legitimate son and
sole heir of his deceased father.
The defendants
filed their answer, stating that the plaintiff has no cause of action against
them as his father, Ciriaco Enervida, is still living, the petitioner is not
only son of Ciriaco Enervida as he has also four other living children and that
the sale of the property in question did not take place within the prohibited
period provided for in Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the sale having
taken place on November 20, 1957, although ratified and acknowledged on
December 3, 1957, before a Notary Public.
During the
pre-trial conference, petitioner admitted that his father is still living and
that he has four other living brothers and sisters who were not joined as
party-plaintiffs. He also admitted that the sale of the land in question
actually took place on November 20, 1957, but was formalized only on December
3, 1957. He likewise admitted that the homestead patent was issued on November
17, 1952 to his father, which was beyond the prohibited period of 5 years. The
CFI ruled that petitioner has no cause of action and was prompted with malice
and bad faith in taking his action to court by alleging false statement in his
complaint. The court dismissed the case and ordered the petitioner to pay the
defendants P2000 as actual moral and exemplary damages and pay also the
attorney’s fees. On appeal to Court of Appeals, it certified the case to the
Supreme Court for it involved purely question of law.
Issue: Whether or not it is proper to award the defendant
an actual moral and exemplary damages when plaintiff filed unfounded civil
case.
Held:
NO. The Supreme Court ruled that
with regard to the award of TWO THOUSAND PESOS "in concept of actual,
moral and exemplary damages ...", the same is not proper for it would ran
counter to the decision of this Court in Deogracias Malonzo vs Gregoria Galang
where it was ruled:
It
will be observed that unlike compensatory or actual damages which are generally
recoverable in tort cases as long as there is satisfactory proof thereof (Art.
2202), the Code has chosen to enumerate the cases in which moral damages, may
be recovered (Art. 2219). A like enumeration is made in regard to the recovery
of attorney's fees as an item of damage (Art. 2208). But the two enumerations
differ in the case of a clearly unfounded suit, which is expressly mentioned in
Art. 2208 (par. 4), as justifying an award of attorney's fees, but is not
included in the enumeration of Art. 2219 in respect to moral damages. It is true that Art. 2219 also provides
that moral damages may be awarded in "analogous cases" to those
enumerated, but we do not think the Code intended" a clearly unfounded
civil action or proceedings" to be one of these analogous cases wherein
moral damages may be recovered, or it would have expressly mentioned it in Art.
2219, as it did in Art. 2208; or else incorporated Art. 2208 by reference in
Art. 2219. Besides, Art. 2219 Specifically mentions "quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries", as an instance
when moral damages may be allowed, thereby implying that all other
quasi-delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded (Strebel vs. Figueras,
96 Phil. 321), excepting, of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309,
par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, and 34, 35 on the
chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).
Furthermore, while no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the
amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court (Art. 2216), it
is, nevertheless, essential that the claimant satisfactorily prove the existence
of the factual basis of the damage (Art. 2217) and its causal relation to
defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer (Algara vs. Sandejas, 27 Phil. 294).
The trial court and
the Court of Appeals both seem to be of the opinion that the mere fact that
respondent were sued without any legal foundation entitled them to an award of
moral damages, hence they made no definite finding as to what the supposed
moral damages suffered consist of. Such a conclusion would make of moral
damages a penalty, which they are not, rather than a compensation for actual
injury suffered, which they are intended to be. Moral damages, in other
words, are not corrective or exemplary damages.
People vs. Bugayong
G.R.
No. 126518 (December 2, 1998)
Facts:
Alberto Cauan and Leticia Yu Cauan
got married on May 14, 1978. Out of this marital union they begot 3 children:
Albert, Honeylet and Arlene. They separated in 1983. Albert and Arlene stayed
with their mother Leticia while Honeylet stayed with her grandmother Anita Yu.
Leticia cohabited with the accused Rodelio Bugayong and had one child,
Catherine Bugayong.
On October 15, 1994
Bugayong had Arlene hold his penis inside the room he shared with Leticia. At
that time, Catherine Bugayong, who was 6 years old was also inside the same
room and her father, the accused was letting her sleep. Bugayong threatened to
maim Arlene if she did not hold his penis. When the penis was already hard and
stiff, he placed it inside the mouth of Arlene and a white substance came out
from the penis. Catherine saw this incident.
On the basis of a
medico-legal examination conducted by the NBI, and testimonies, Bugayong was
convicted. Upon appeal, among other issued involving the defects of the
information, he questions the award of PhP50,000.00 in damages ex-delicto in
favor of the offended party:
Issue: Does the award damages by the trial court have
basis?
Held: The court affirmed
his conviction. The trial court correctly awarded
P50,000 as indemnity
ex delicto, an amount which is automatically granted to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the
fact of the commission of rape.
Consistent with recent jurisprudence, appellant should also be ordered
to pay the victim the additional amount
of P50,000 as moral damages.
In People v. Prades, the Court resolved
that "moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim
in the criminal proceeding, in such amount
as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof
as has heretofore been the practice."
Francisco vs. GSIS
7
SCRA 577 (March 30, 1963)
Facts: Trinidad Francisco, in consideration of a loan in the amount of P400,000.00, mortgaged
in favor of the GSIS a parcel
of land with twenty-one (21) bungalows, known as Vic-Mari Compound, located at Baesa, Quezon City, payable within ten (10) years in monthly installments and with interest
of 7%per annum compounded monthly.
Because
of her failure to comply with the mortgaged, GSIS extra-judicially foreclosed
the mortgage. GSIS itself was the buyer of the property in theforeclosure sale.
On 20 February
1959, the Trinidad’s father, Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, sent a letter to the
general manager of the GSIS offering a compromise that P30,000 which GSIS owes
him be credited to Trinidad’s unpaid monthly installments and that GSIS would take over the administration of the mortgaged
property and collect
all monthly installments amounting to about P5,000
of more than 31 lots and houses
until the debt is fully
covered. This was approved by GSIS through
Andal.
Remittances were
made, totaling P698,726.10 sent by Trinidad to GSIS through Andal, all of which
were received and duly receipted for. However, GSIS sent 3 letters, all of
which were signed by Andal, asking Trinidad for a proposal for the payment of
her indebtedness, since according to GSIS the one-year period for redemption
had expired.
Atty. Francisco
protested against the GSIS’ request for proposal of payment because of the
existence of the agreed offer dated 20 February 1959. However, GSIS countered
stating that the telegram should
be disregarded in view of its failure
to express the contents of the board resolution due to the error of its minor employees in couching the correct wording of the telegram which provides that approval of the compromise is “subject to the condition
that Mr. Vicente
J. Francisco shall pay all expenses incurred
by the GSIS in the foreclosure of the
mortgage.”
GSIS moved for the consolidated the
title to the compound in its name, and gave notice thereof to the plaintiff and
to each occupant of the compound. Hence, the plaintiff instituted the present
suit, for specific performance and damages.
After
trial, the court below found the following:
(a)
Declaring null and void the consolidation in the name of the
defendant, Government Service Insurance System, of the title of the VIC-MARI
Compound; said title shall be restored to the plaintiff; and all payments made
by the plaintiff, after her offer had been accepted by the defendant, must be
credited as amortizations on her loan; and (b) Ordering the defendant to abide
by the terms of the contract created by plaintiff's offer and it's
unconditional acceptance, with costs against the defendant.
Both
parties appealed. GSIS appealed the decision of declaring null and void the consolidation of the lots, while Trinidad
appealed because the trial court did not award the P535,000.00
damages and attorney's fees she claimed.
Issue: Is the lower court correct in not awarding damages
to plaintiff?
Held: YES. The court a quo correctly refused
to award such actual or compensatory damages
because it could not determine
with reasonable certainty
the difference between
the offered price and the
actual value of the property, for lack of competent evidence. Without proof we
cannot assume, or take judicial notice, as suggested by the plaintiff, that the
practice of lending institutions in the country is to give out as loan 60% of
the actual value of the collateral.
There was no error
also denying moral damages, not only on account of the plaintiff's failure to
take the witness stand and testify to her social humiliation, wounded feelings,
anxiety, etc., as the decision holds, but primarily because a breach of
contract like that of defendant, not being malicious or fraudulent, does not
warrant the award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
There is also no basis for awarding
exemplary damages either, because this species of damages is only allowed in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, none of
which have been allowed in this case.
As to attorneys' fees, we agree with the trial court's
stand that, in view of the absence
of gross and evident bad faith in defendant's refusal
to satisfy the plaintiff's claim,
and there being none of the
other grounds enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, such absence
precludes a recovery. The award of attorneys' fees is essentially discretionary
in the trial court, and no abuse of discretion has been shown.
Expertravel & Tours, Inc.
vs. Court Of Appeals
309
SCRA 141 (June 25, 1999)
Facts: On 07 October 1987, Expertravel& Tours, Inc., ("Expertravel"), a domestic corporation engaged in the travel agency business, issued
to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-
trip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel accommodations and
transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay
the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages.
Respondent Lo
explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had already been
fully paid. The outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its
then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega, who was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte
de Piedad Check
for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920
in favor of Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation
"placement advance for Ricardo Lo, etc." Per its
own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987.
The trial court, affirmed
by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo was valid awarding moral
damages, attorney’s fees and cost of the suit in favor
of Lo. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Can moral damages be recovered in
a clearly unfounded suit? Can moral damages be awarded for negligence or
quasi-delict that did not result to physical injury to the offended party?
Held:
NO. Although the institution of a
clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award
of attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.
The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose
a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered
by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil
suit would be no different
from the usual
worry and anxiety
suffered by anyone
who is haled to court,
a situation that cannot by itself
be a cogent reason for the award of moral damages. If the rule were otherwise,
then moral damages must every time be awarded in favor of the prevailing
defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
NO. An award of
moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First,
there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission
of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
(4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219.Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach
of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad
faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach
of contract itself
is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
By special rule in Article
1764, in relation
to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage.
In culpa aquiliana,
or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b)
where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be
recovered. This rule also applies,
as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully
due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest,
illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a
claim for moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis
rule, must be held similar
to those expressly
enumerated by the law.
Unfounded
suits
Editha and Glicerio Mijares vs. CA and Metro Drug,
Inc.
G.R.
No. 113558 (April 18, 1997)
Facts:
Petitioners Editha Mijares and
Glicerio T. Mijares owners of Aklan Drug had been buying pharmaceutical
products from private respondent Metro Drug since 1976. Editha Mijares, aside
from being the operator of Aklan Drug, was also an officer of the Ospital Ng
Maynila Consumers Cooperative, a concessionaire of a small area right inside
the hospital compound where it operated a drugstore. The Ospital ng Maynila Cooperative
also had some transactions with Metro Drug as supplier of pharmaceutical
products. Subsequently, the Cooperative was dissolved and stopped its
operations in October 1986.
On November 1,
1986, a Contract of Lease was entered into between the City of Manila as lessor
and Solomon Silverio, Jr. as lessee. Silverio, Jr. as the new lessee, put up a
drugstore on the same area occupied by the Cooperative. On November 26, 1986,
Metro Drug delivered pharmaceutical products to the said store thru Dioscoro Lamenta,
its salesman/collector. More deliveries of pharmaceutical products
were made in the same place by Metro Drug,
the total value
of which amounted
to P32,034.42. In partial payment
of these receivables, a check
was drawn by Silverio, Jr. under the account name Farmacia delos Remedios
amounting to P14,180.46. The check however was subsequently dishonored due to
insufficient funds.
Metro Drug filed a
telegram addressed to Aklan Drug demanding full payment of outstanding account
for P27,938.06. Lamenta tried to collect from Editha Mijares for the disputed
claim, but Editha referred him to Mr. Silverio as the new operator and
concessionaire of the drugstore. She informed him verbally that they have no
more business inside the Ospital ng Maynila
as the cooperative drugstore has already stopped
operations. Despite said verbal notice,
the demand telegram
addressed to Aklan
Drug was still sent to Editha Mijares. On Lamenta's follow-up of said telegram, Editha again directed
Lamenta to see Solomon Silverio,
the new owner of the drugstore.
Thereafter, Metro Drug filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for a sum of money against petitioners Editha Mijares and Glicerio T. Mijares. Petitioners in their "Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,"
denied Metro Drug's allegations and interposed a counterclaim for malicious
prosecution and prayed for moral damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of suit.
The RTC concluded that the Mijareses
were not the owners of said drugstore when the deliveries were made and the absence
of any privity of relations between the parties
at the time of the deliveries
precludes any cause of action in favor of Metro Drug against the Mijareses.
Thus, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Metro Drug to pay the
petitioners P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and the costs of suit. The Court of Appeals however
reversed the decision
of the RTC.
Issue: Whether the award of moral damages in favor of the
Mijareses was proper.
Held: No. The Mijareses have failed
to show that Metro Drug was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. In China Banking
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, we held that:
x x x Malicious
prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two
elements, to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause. Moreover, there
must be proof t hat the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex
and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the
charge was false and baseless (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100
SCRA 602 [1980]). Hence, mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable
for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law c ould not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate (Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377 [1992]; Saba v. Court of
Appeals, 189 SCRA 50 [1990]); Rubio v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]).
Settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that moral damages cannot
be recovered from a person
who has filed a complaint against another in good faith,
or without malice or bad
faith (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433 [1988]; R
& B Surety and Insurance v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 736
[1984]). If damage results from the filing of the complaint, it is damnum absque injuria
(Ilocos Norte Electrical Company v. Court of Appeals,
179 SCRA 5 [1989]).
For
the same reasons, the award for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must
likewise be deleted.
De la Pena vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 81827 (March
28, 1994)
Facts:
Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24
hectare parcel of land in Davao Del Norte for which he filed a Homestead
Application. At the same time, a certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an
application for the same lot.
Reducto later transferred his possessory right over the 6 hectares
of the lot to petitioner Pantaleon de la Pena. After it was ascertained in a field verification that de la Pena had a
better right to acquire the portion claimed
by him being its actual
occupant and cultivator, the Director of Lands directed
de la Pena to apply
for the portion himself within
sixty (60) days after its survey or else "lose
his preferential right thereto." However, no such application was filed.
Meanwhile, Ciriaco transferred his rights over another 1 ½ hectare
portion of the lot to Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights to Ricardo Tan
(private respondent’s father).
When a survey of
the lot was conducted, it was found out that the lands occupied by de la Pena
was bigger by ¾ hectare than what he actually bought and paid for from Ciriaco
and the land sold to Doble’s (later
acquired by Tan) was very much smaller
than what he actually bought.
Although the 3/4-hectare portion was part of the area acquired
by Doble, it was
de la Peña who cultivated the same without
objection from Doble.
However, when Ricardo
Tan acquired the lot, he built a fence to reclaim the portion, but de la Pena kept destroying it; hence, the start of a boundary dispute.
On April 1977, de la Pena then filed a complaint
for forcible entry against Tan. The MTC which ruled in favor of de la Pena concluded that de la Pena had prior possession of the land. The
decision was affirmed by the CFI.
On July 1977, during
the pendency of the forcible
entry case, de la Pena instituted the present action for reconveyance with damages against
Tan with the RTC. De la Pena alleged
that Tan fraudulently registered the ¾ hectare portion which was actually
cultivated by the former. The trial court ruled in favor of the Tan since the
disputed ¾ hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for by de
la Pena. De la Pena was declared a mere trespasser and planter in bad faith.
His prayer for damages was likewise denied. Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the lower court, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the award for attorney's fees, moral
damages and expenses of litigation against the petitioner are proper.
Held:
It is well-settled that
reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to
be erroneously titled in another's name. In the case at bench, de la Pena does
not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is
only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of
his actual occupation since January 1947. However, de la Pena's possession is
not one that could ripen into ownership. Title to alienable public lands can be
established through open, continuous, and exclusive possession for at least thirty
(30) years. It must be noted that the dispute
regarding the 3/4-hectare portion started even before a free patent
and OCT could be issued to private
respondent in 1975. As
early as 1956, the controversy already began between
de la Pena and Tan's father. Hence,petitioner's possession falls short of the required period.
Not being the owner, de la Pena cannot
maintain the present suit.
An award for
attorney's fees and moral damages on the sole basis of an action later declared
to be unfounded in the absence of a deliberate intent to cause prejudice to the
other party is improper. The right to litigate is so precious that penalty
should not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.
J Marketing vs. Sia
285
SCRA 580 (January 29, 1998)
Facts:
J Marketing, herein petitioner, a
company engaged in the business of appliances and motorcycles, received on
April 24, 1983 from Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) a brand new Kawasaki motorcycle,
color Blue, Mode HD-11 (1985) with Engine No. G7E-04848 and Chassis No.KG-805535.
Upon receipt, petitioner’s representative placed motorcycle in the bodega of
YKS Bldg.. However, petitioner found out that the motorcycle unit was missing
in the bodega and the loss immediately reported to the police authorities
specifically to the Headquarters Constabulary Highway
Patrol District. Petitioner upon tracing found
the motorcycle in possession of FelicidadSia Jr., herein respondent, who bought a motorcycle from one
Renato Pelande, Jr.
Petitioner’s
representative went to the house of the private respondent and examined the
chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle and found out that the chassis and
motor numbers of the motorcycle in private respondent’s possession have been
tampered to jibe with the chassis and motor numbers of the motorcycle unit
previously purchased by Renato Pelande, Jr. from petitioner. When petitioner’s
representative confronted private respondent at the Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group office anent the questionable motorcycle, private respondent refused to
return the said motorcycle to petitioner and instead told petitioner’s
representative to file a case in court. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint for
replevin with damages against private respondent Felicidad C. Sia, Jr. before
the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 8.
Private respondent filed a third party complaint against Renato Pelande
Jr., Said third party complaint was declared in default.
After trial,
the lower court rendered a decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint but awarded damages
and attorney’s fees to private
respondent. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision
of the court a quo.Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the award of damages and attorney’s fee is
proper?
Facts: Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI)
extended loans in various amounts
to Guevent Industrial Development Corp., (GIDC).
However, GIDC failed
to pay on the dates
the loans became due. For this reason, GIDC agreed to mortgage several
parcels of land to SITI. When GIDC again defaulted, SITI foreclosed the
mortgages and it acquired the properties as the highest bidder.
Thereafter, GIDC
filed a case alleging that there were irregularities in the foreclosure of the
mortgages. The case was eventually settled through a compromise agreement. A
dispute later arose concerning the interpretation of the said agreement, as Honeycomb Builders,
Inc. (HBI) offered
to purchase from GIDC the lot covered
by the agreement and the latter
agreed but SITI as mortgagee refused to give its consent to the sale. The trial
court directed SITI to accept the offer of HBI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the same
Meanwhile,
respondent HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) for
a permit to develop the property in question. Its application was granted, on
account of which respondent HBI built a condominium on the property. When
respondent HBI applied for a license to sell the condominium units it was
required by the HLURB to submit an Affidavit
of Undertaking which in effect
stated that the mortgagee (SITI)
of the said property to be developed agrees to release
the mortgage on the said property as soon as the
full purchase price of the same is paid by the buyer.
Respondent HBI submitted the required affidavit purportedly executed by Cometa as president of SITI (mortgagee).
Petitioner Cometa denied that he
ever executed the affidavit. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) found
Cometa's signature to be forgery on the basis of which a
complaint for falsification of public document
was filed against
HBI president Guevara.
However, the Rizal
Provincial Prosecutor's Office
found no probable
cause against Guevara
and accordingly dismissed the complaint.
On appeal,
Secretary Drilon reversed the decision of the prosecutor and ordered it to file
information against Guevara. The trial court dismissed the criminal case.
Thereafter, Guevara and HBI file a complaint for malicious prosecution against
Cometa and SITI.
Issue: Whether or not the case for malicious prosecution
states a cause of action.
Held:
A complaint for malicious
prosecution sates a cause of action if it alleges that (1) the defendant was
himself the prosecutor or that at leas he instigated the prosecution; (2) the
prosecution finally terminated in the plaintiff's acquittal; (3) that in
bringing the action the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) that
the prosecutor was actuated by malice,
i.e. by improper and sinister motives.
The mere allegation in a complaint for malicious prosecution that an information was filed after
preliminary investigation and that a warrant of arrest was there after
issued does not by itself
negate allegations in the same complaint that the prosecution was malicious.
All criminal prosecutions are by direction and control of the public
prosecutor. To sustain petitioners' stand that an allegation in a complaint for
malicious prosecution that the information in the criminal case was filed after
appropriate preliminary investigation negates a contrary allegation that the filing of the case was malicious would result in the dismissal
of every action
for malicious prosecution.
Triple Eight Integrated
Services, Inc vs. NLRC
299
SCRA 608 (December 3, 1998)
Facts: In August 1992, private respondent Osdana was recruited by petitioner for employment with the latter’s
principal, Gulf Catering
Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Under the original
employment contract, Osdana was engaged to work as “Food Server” for a period
of thirty-six (36) months with a salary of five hundred fifty Saudi Rials.
Osdana claims she
was required by petitioner to pay a total of P11,950.00 in placement fees and
other charges, for which no receipt was issued. She was likewise asked to
undergo a medical examination conducted by the Philippine Medical Tests System,
a duly accredited clinic for overseas workers, which found her to be “Fit of
Employment.”
Petitioner asked
Osdana to sign another “Contractor. Employee Agreement” which provided that she
would be employed as a waitress for twelve (12) months with a salary of two
hundred eighty US dollars ($280). It was this employment agreement which was
approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration(POEA).
Osdana left for
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and commenced working for GCC. She was assigned to the
College of Public Administration of the Oleysha University and, contrary to the
terms and conditions of the employment contract, was made to wash dishes,
cooking pots, and utensils, perform janitorial work and other tasks which were
unrelated to her job designation as waitress. She was made to work a gruelling
twelve-hour shift, without overtime pay.
Osdana suffered
from numbness and pain in her arms. The pain was such that she had to be confined
at a housing facility of GCC from June 18 to August 22, 1993, during which period, she was not paid her salaries.
Osdana was allowed to resume work,
this time as Food Server
and Cook at the Hota Bani Tameem
Hospital, where she worked seven
days a week from August
22 to October 5, 1993.
Again, she was not compensated. Then, from October 6 to October 23, 1993,
Osdana was again confined for no apparent reason. During this period, she was
still not paid her salary.
On October 24,
1993, she was re-assigned to the Oleysha University to wash dishes and do other
menial tasks. Osdana worked long hours and under harsh conditions. She was
diagnosed as having Bilateral Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, a condition precipitated
by activities requiring “repeated flexion, pronation, and supination of the
wrist and characterized by excruciating pain and numbness in the arms.”
Osdana underwent
two surgical operations. Between these operations, she was not given any work
assignments even if she was willing and able to do lightwork in accordance with
her doctor’s advice. Again, Osdana was not paid any compensation for the period
between February to April 22, 1994.
Osdana was
discharged from the hospital on April 25,1994. The medical report stated that
“she had very good improvement of the symptoms and she was discharged on the
second day of the operation.” Four days later, however, she was dismissed from
work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay
nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work.
Upon her return to the Philippines, Osdana sought the help of petitioner,
but to no avail. She was thus constrained to file a complaint before the POEA.
ISSUES: Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion for the following reasons: (a) ruling in favor of Osdana even if
there was no factual or legal basis for the award; and
(b) holding petitioner solely liable for her claims
despite the fact that its liability is joint and several with its principal, GCC.
HELD: The decisions of both the labor arbiter and the
NLRC were based mainly on the facts and allegations in Osdana’s position paper
and supporting documents. We find these sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence to support the questioned decisions.
Generally, findings
of facts of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are accorded great respect
and, at times, even finality if supported by substantial evidence. This Court,
therefore, upholds the finding of herein public
respondents that the facts and the evidence
on record adduced
by Osdana and taken in relation to the answer
of petitioner show that indeed there was breach of the employment
contract and illegal dismissal committed by petitioner’s principal.
Article 284 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter of termination by
reason of disease or illness, viz:
Art.
284. Disease as a ground for termination – An employer may terminate the
services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited bylaw or prejudicial to his health as
well as the health of his co-employees: x x x
Specifically, Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for
dismissal – Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health
of his co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless
there is a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of
such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six
(6) months with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be
cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee
but shall ask the employeeto take a leave. The employer
shall reinstate such employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions,
the manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in violation of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Osdana’s continued employment
despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her
health, as well as that of her co-employees.
In fact, the medical report issued after her second
operation stated that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides,
“Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.
Petitioner has not presented
any medical certificate or similar document
from a competent public health authority in support of its claims.
If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have
easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health
authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal
dismissal. The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the
Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the
unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer
of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness
and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
As regards
the monetary award of salaries
for the unexpired portion of the employment contract, unpaid salaries
and salary differential granted by public
respondents to Osdana, petitioner assails the same for being contrary to law, evidence
and existing jurisprudence, all of which therefore constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Although this
contention is without merit, the award for salaries for the unexpired portion
of the contract must, however, be reduced. Paragraph 5, Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, applies in this case, thus:
“In case of termination of overseas employment without just,
valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be
entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.”
While it would appear that the
employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelvemonths,
Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred,
therefore, that the employer renewed
her employment contract
for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract
should have been US$1,260 (US$280
x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos,
not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
As for the award
for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven
months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper
because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana,
the “no work, no pay” rule relied
upon by petitioner does not apply
in this case. In the first place,the fact that she had
not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from
January 24 to April 29,1994, was due to her illness which was clearly
work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993,Osdana actually worked
as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital,
but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to
October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for
no reason at all.
With respect
to the award of moral
and exemplary damages,
the same is likewise proper
but should be reduced. Worth
reiterating is the rule that moral damages
are recoverable where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an
act oppressive to labor, or was done in amanner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
Finally, petitioner alleges grave abuse
of discretion on the part of public
respondents for holding
it solely liable
for the claims of Osdana
despite the fact that its liability with the
principal is joint and several.
Petitioner misunderstands the decision in question. It should be noted that contrary to petitioner’s interpretation, the decision of the labor
arbiter which was affirmed by the NLRC did not really.
Petitioner was the only one held liable for Osdana’s monetary claims because it
was the only respondent named in the complaint and it does not appear that petitioner took steps to have its principal included
as co-respondent. Thus, the POEA, and later the labor arbiter, did not acquire
jurisdiction over the foreign principal.
People of the Philippines vs.
Pirame
G.R.
No. 121998 (March 9, 2000)
Facts: Teodorico Cleopas and Florencio Pirame
were both convicted by the trial
court for murder,
the eye-witness Cipriano
Supero saw them killing one Pedro Torrenueva by hitting him with iron pipe while being held by the
accused Florencio Pirame. The trial court ordered to indemnify the surviving
spouse of the deceased victim Pedro Torrenueva in the amount of P50,000.00 each
and the amount of P23,214.00 representing burial and incidental expenses and
P50,000 representing moral and exemplary damages and in all instances without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Pirame appealed the trial
court’s decision denying his participation in the crime and alleging that the
evidence against him was weak to begin with as the eye-witness’ testimony was unbelievable, improbable and unreliable, as he claims
that Supero’s testimony were inconsistent and that he only volunteered to testify two months after the crime. And so the
case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred regarding the
conviction and awarding of damages
Held:
The Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the trial court. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor
details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of
the assailants. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
sincerity of the witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. They
are safeguards against memorized perjury. As to the delay, it was a result of
the fear that was instilled upon him upon seeing the killing with his own eyes.
Regarding the amount of the damages
awarded, the order to pay the widow of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P23,214.00 as actual damages,
as well as the costs was
AFFIRMED, but the award of P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages
was DELETED, there being no legal and factual basis. The award of P50,000.00 from each accused
as moral and exemplary
damages, however, is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify on
any mental anguish or emotional distress, which she suffered as a result of her
husband's death. The absence of any generic aggravating circumstance attending
the crime likewise disqualified the award of exemplary damages. The attendance
of evident premeditation in the commission of the crime, though alleged in the
information, is not supported by the evidence, as there is no showing as to
when appellant and his co-accused determined to kill the victim. Likewise,
abuse of superior
strength, being absorbed
by treachery, cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
Arcona vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No. 134784 (December 9, 2002)
Facts:
In the evening of June 27, 1986,
Napoleon Ong and Edgardo Talanquines were walking along the national highway at
Barangay Labog, Brooke’s Point, Palawan, on their way home after coming from a
birthday party. When they were near the house of Jerry Boston, Edgardo heard a
loud thud. He turned around saw Napoleon slump to the ground. Suddenly, someone hit Edgardo from behind with a piece of bamboo,
causing him to fall. He saw no one in the immediate
premises except Carlos
Arcona, the petitioner. Edgardo then stood up and ran towards the house of Cesar Umapas
to ask for help.
Petitioner
voluntarily surrendered. In his defense, petitioner alleged that in the evening
of June 27, 1986, he was walking alone when he met Napoleon Ong and Edgardo
Talanquines. Without any provocation, Napoleon suddenly drew his bolo and swung
the bolo at him twice but missed him. He then drew out his knife and stabbed
Napoleon. When he saw Edgardo Talanquines rushing towards him, he grabbed
a piece of bamboo from the newly
constructed culvert and hit the former on the left arm. Talanquines ran away. Petitioner also left the premises and went home. On the way, he met his
brother, Benito, and together they proceeded to their house. After trial, the
court a quo rendered judgment convicting Carlos of Homicide and acquitting
Benito Arcona and ordered that the former pay the amount of 30,000 pesos for
the death of Napoleon Ong and 10,000 pesos moral damages. For the charge of
Slight Physical Injuries Benito Arcona was found guilty and Carlos was
acquitted. On appeal, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court but
increased the civil indemnity to the heirs of Napoleon Ong to 50,000 pesos.
Petitioner Carlos
Arcona y Moban and his brother Benito Arcona y Moban were charged with Murder
and Frustrated Murder in separate informations. The charges arose from the
death of Napoleon Ong after he was attacked and stabbed by Carlos and Benito
Arcona y Moban.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in
increasing the civil indemnity due to the heirs of Napoleon Ong.
Held:
Yes. The Court of Appeals was
correct in increasing the amount of civil indemnity to P50,000.00, in line with
existing jurisprudence. In cases of murder, homicide, parricide and rape, civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically granted
to the offended party or his heirs in case of his death, without
need of further
evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.
On the other hand,
the award of moral damages in the sum of P 10,000.00 must be increased to
P50,000.00. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death
invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part
of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain
and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing.
Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling
that an injustice
has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages must be awarded
even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional
suffering.
Factors
in determining amount
Philippine
National Bank vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116181 (April 17, 1996)
Facts: Carmelo H. Flores
(Flores) purchased from petitioner at its Manila
Pavilion Hotel unit, two (2) manager's checks
worth P500,000.00 each.
A receipt for said amount
was issued by the
petitioner. Subsequently, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio
Hyatt Casino unit of petitioner. Petitioner refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks. However,
it deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be
broken down to five (5) manager's checks of P100,000.00 each. Furthermore,
petitioner refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is cleared
by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit. Having no other option, Flores agreed to
such an arrangement. However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to PNB through
its Malate Branch
so that the check may be encashed
but to no avail. Flores,
thereafter, wrote a letter to his
counsel informing the latter
of the aforementioned events. A Formal Demand was made by private
respondent's counsel but petitioner persisted
in its refusal to honor the check.
Left with no other choice,
Flores filed a case with the Regional Trial Court which ruled in his favor
ordering PNB, among others, to pay the amount of the checks dishonored plus
moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000.00 pesos. The same was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the award of P1,000,000.00 moral
damages in addition to actual claim of inordinately disproportionate and
unconscionable
Held:
YES. We concur with the findings
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the award of moral damages,
however the amount of P1,000,000.00 for moral damages in addition to Flores'
actual claim of P100,000.00 is "inordinately disproportionate and
unconscionable." The following factors were taken into consideration:
First, Flores' contention that he lost
the opportunity to purchase a house and lot in Baguio City due to petitioner's
gross negligence is based solely on his own testimony and a mere general
statement at that. The broker he named during his cross-examination, Mr. Nick
Buendia was not even presented to confirm the aforementioned allegation.
Second, the award of moral damages
in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is obviously not proportionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00 sustained
by Flores. The moral damages
awarded must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered. Moral
damages though incapable of pecuniary estimations, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not
intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversion or amusements that will serve
to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante, and it must be proportional to the suffering
inflicted.
Gregorio
Fule vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112212 (March 2, 1998)
Facts: Gregorio Fule, a corporate secretary of Rural Bank of
Alaminos and also a jeweler on the side, acquired a 10-hectare property in
Tanay, Rizal. The property used to be under the name of Fr. Antonio Jacobe. Fr.
Jacobe had mortgaged it earlier to the Rural Bank of Alaminos to secure a loan,
but the mortgage was later foreclosed and the property was offered for public auction.
Fule, as
corporate secretary of the bank, asked Remelia Dichoso and Oliva Mendoza to
look for a buyer who might be interested in the Tanay property. The two found a
buyer in private respondent Dr. Ninevetch Cruz. At the same time, it so
happened that Fule had shown interest in buying a pair of emerald-cut diamond
earrings owned by Dr. Cruz. Subsequently, negotiations for the barter of the
jewelry and the property ensued. However, it was later on found out that no
barter was feasible because the 1-year period of redemption had not yet
expired. To get over this legal impediment, Fule executed a deed of redemption
on behalf of Fr. Jacobe, the latter purportedly sold the property to Fule.
One day,
Fule arrived at Atty. Belarmino’s (private petitioner’s lawyer) residence with
Dichoso and Mendoza to execute a deed of absolute sale. Fule issued a
certification stating that the actual consideration of the sale was
Php200,000.00 and not Php80,000.00 as indicated in the deed. Since the earrings
were appraised at only Php160,000.00, the remaining Php40,000.00 was to be paid
later in cash. This was done apparently to minimize the capital gains tax which
Fule would have to shoulder.
Fule later
headed for the bank to meet Cruz and pick up the earrings. There, Dr. Cruz and
the bank cashier then opened the safety deposit box. Dr. Cruz retrieved a
transparent plastic or cellophane bag with the jewelry inside and handed the
same to Fule. The latter took the jewelry from the bag, went near the electric
light at the bank’s lobby, held the jewelry against the light and examined it
for ten to fifteen minutes. After a while, Dr. Cruz asked, “Okay na ba iyan?”
Petitioner expressed his satisfaction by nodding his head. When asked if the
jewelry was ok, Fule nodded to express his satisfaction. Fule paid the agents
$300 and some pieces of jewelry.
On the
evening of the same day, Fule arrived at the residence of Atty. Belarmino
complaining that the jewelry given to him, as proven by a tester, was fake.
Fule then accused Dichoso and Mendoza of deceiving him which they, however,
denied. They countered that Fule could not have been fooled because he had vast
experience with jewelry. Nevertheless, Fule took back the $300 and the jewelry
he paid them.
Fule filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court against Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino
praying, among other things, that the contract of sale over the Tanay property
be declared null and void on the ground of fraud and deceit. The lower court
issued a temporary restraining order directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal
to refrain from acting on the pertinent documents involved in the transaction.
However, the same court lifted its previous order and denied the prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
After trial,
the lower court rendered its decision in favor of Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino. In
awarding damages to the defendants, the lower court found that Fule acted in
bad faith. The court awarded Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino moral damages and
exemplary damages. The court also granted both P25,000.00 each as attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses. A petition with the Court of Appeals yielded the
same result, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether
or not the appellate court erred in awarding damages.
Held: No.
In the instant case, the trial court awarded damages analogous to malicious
prosecution under Article 2219(8) of the NCC for the following reasons:
The malice with which
Fule filed the case is apparent. As an experienced jeweler who thoroughly
examined the earrings himself and went so far as to sketch
them
earlier, it is illogical that he would fail to exert extra effort to check its
genuineness at the precise moment of the exchange. His acts thus failed to
accord with what an ordinary prudent man would have done in the same situation.
As an
experienced businessman and banker, he was shrewd enough to bloat the
property’s price from Php25,000.00 to Php75,000.00 only a few days after he had
purchased it for a far lower cost, the value of which still fell short of the
diamond earrings’ price.
Also, it
took him 2 hours of unexplained delay before complaining that the earrings were
counterfeit—a period in which anything could have happened while Fule was in
possession of the jewelry.
Given this,
it would appear that the cause of action in the instant case was contrived by
Fule himself in hopes of obtaining a favorable outcome in his complaint to take
the real jewelry, return a fake, and get back the property. This is plain and
simple, unjust enrichment. All that considered the damages prayed for were
reasonably proportionate to the sufferings Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino underwent.
Petitioner
filed a malicious and unfounded case all the while dragging down private
respondents, whose reputations had been soiled by Fule’s coming to court with
unclean hands. Because of the falsity, malice and baseless nature of the
complaint, Cruz and Atty. Bellarmino were compelled to litigate and are thus
also entitled to the awarding of attorney’s fees under Article 2208.
Philippine Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R.
No. 120262 (July 17, 1997)
Facts: Pantejo, then City Fiscal of Surigao City, boarded
a PAL plane in Manila and disembarked in Cebu City where he was supposed to
take his connecting flight to Surigao City However, due to typhoon Osang, the connecting flight to Surigao
City was cancelled.
To accommodate the
needs of its stranded passengers, PAL initially gave out cash assistance and,
the next day for their expected stay of two days in Cebu. Pantejo requested
instead that he be billeted in a hotel at PAL's expense because he did not have
cash with him at that time, but PAL refused. Thus, respondent Pantejo was
forced to seek and accept the generosity of a co-passenger. when the flight for
Surigao was resumed, respondent Pantejo came to know that the hotel expenses of
his co-passengers, were reimbursed by PAL. At this point, respondent Pantejo informed Oscar
Jereza, PAL's Manager
for Departure Services
at Mactan Airport
and who was in charge
of cancelled flights,
that he was going to sue the airline
for discriminating against him. It was only then that Jereza offered to pay
respondent Pantejo P300.00 which, due to the ordeal and anguish he had
undergone, the latter decline. The Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
rendered judgment in the action for damages filed by Pantejo against Philippine
Airlines, Inc., ordering the latter to pay Pantejo among others, P150,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the court a quo, but with the exclusion of the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Issue: WON the award of P 150,000.00 as moral damages was
proper.
Held:
Yes. Moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to allow the former to obtain means,
diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone due to the defendant's culpable
action and must, perforce, be proportional to the suffering
inflicted. However,
substantial damages do not translate into excessive damages.
Under the peculiar
circumstances of this case, the awards for actual, moral and exemplary
damages granted in the judgment of respondent court, for the
reasons meticulously analyzed and thoroughly explained in its decision, are
just and equitable.
Valenzuela vs. CA
G.R. No. 115024
(February 7, 1996)
Facts: Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving along Aurora Blvd. when
she realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the sidewalk, put on her
emergency lights, and opened the car’s trunk. She was at the left side of the
rear of her car. While she was talking to a man who will help her fix the tire,
she was suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant Richard Li which was
registered in the name of Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Because of
the impact, Valenzuela was thrown against the windshield of Li’s car and fell
onto the ground. The car’s windshield on the other hand, was also destroyed,.
Valenzuela's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some
skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was confined in the
hospital for 20 days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. She then
filed a claim for damages against Li.
Li’s
alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when he was suddenly confronted with a
speeding car coming from the opposite direction. He instinctively swerved to
the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped Valenzuela's
car. He claimed to not have seen the car due to its midnight blue color. He
argued that there was no parking light or an early warning device, and that the
area was poorly lighted. Li and Alexander Commercial, Inc. counterclaimed for
damages, alleging that Valenzuela was the one who was reckless or negligent.
The RTC found Li and Alexander Commercial, Inc. solidarily liable. CA absolved
Alexander Commercial, Inc.
Issue: Whether nor not the damages should be mitigated due to the
contributory negligence of Valenzuela for parking along Aurora Blvd, which
happens to be a no parking zone.
Held: Contributory negligence is a conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. The "emergency rule," on the other hand, as adopted by
this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, is where an individual who suddenly
finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time
to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger,
is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought
by his own negligence.
While the
emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought or the
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct
which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated not exclusively by
the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoughtful care, but by
the over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly
crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a
point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to
other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for
a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no
one to help her.
As a result
of the accident, Valenzuela underwent a traumatic amputation of her left lower
extremity at the distal left thigh just above the knee. Because of this,
Valenzuela will forever be deprived of the full ambulatory functions of her
left extremity, even with the use of state of the art prosthetic technology.
Well beyond the period of hospitalization (which was paid for by Li), she will
be required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the
shrinkage of the stump from the process of healing. The damage done to her
would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing
and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The
replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive
physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been
documented, are painful.
The
foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the
resulting damage because it would be highly speculative to estimate the amount
of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device,
however technologically
advanced, will only allow a
reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower
limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety,
sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
As the
amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the
opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent
driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
Aurelio Sumaplong vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 123404
(February 26, 1997)
Facts: Sumalpong shot Ramos after the former slapped Ramos’s wife.
Before the incident, the accused called upon the spouses and inquired if they
knew the person who stoned his house. During the conversation, Sumalpong
accused Ramos of throwing stones at his house. Because of this, Leodarda, the
wife of Ramos, remarked that Sumalpong should first confirm the information he
received before accusing anyone. after hearing Leonarda’s remark, Sumalpong
shot her at the back of her head (though apparently, Leonarda was not harmed).
Ramos rushed towards Sumalpong who then shot Ramos twice but missed. They
wrestled and in the act, Sumalpong bit on Ramos’ ear, causing its mutilation.
The trial
court conviicted Sumalpong of attempted homicide. It awarded Ramos P 16,800.00
for the loss of his crops due to his failure to attend to his farm due to the
injuries inflicted upon him by Sumalpong. The court also awarded Ramos
P2,000.00 for hospitalization expenses, and P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
On appeal, the CA affirmed Sumalpong’s conviction. It however removed the award
for loss of crops and hospitalization expenses, increased moral damages to
P10,000.00, and awarded nominal damages in the same amount.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty and liable for
damages.
Ruling: In view of the foregoing, this Court cannot but concur with
the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Anent the award of damages,
however, this Court upholds the Court of Appeals' ruling on the matter.
Eliminating the award of actual or compensatory damages in the form of
hospitalization expenses and loss of income, the Court of Appeals cited the
failure of the complainant to offer any proof of the same. To justify a grant
of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable
degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss.
Anent the
increase in the amount of moral damages awarded, suffice it to state that the
nature of the injuries and the degree of physical suffering endured by the
complainant warrants the same. The tragic incident caused a mutilation of
complainant's left ear and a permanent scar on his right forearm. These
injuries have left indelible marks on the complainant's body and will serve as
a constant reminder of this traumatic experience. The Court finds the award of
nominal and moral damages both in the amount of P10,000.00 justified under the
circumstances.
Lopez vs. Pan-American World Airways
G.R. No. L-22415 (March
30, 1966)
Facts: Sen.
Fernando Lopez, his wife, son-in-law, and his daughter made reservations,
through their agency, for first class accommodations in the Tokyo – San
Francisco flight of PAN-AM. PAN-AM's San Francisco head office confirmed their
reservations. Subsaquently, first class tickets were issued, with the total fare
having been previously
paid.
As
scheduled, they left Manila and as soon as they arrived in Tokyo, they
contacted PAN-AM's Tokyo office regarding their accommodations. PAN-AM's Tokyo
office informed them that the first class seats were all already booked and
that they could not take the flight unless they took the tourist class. Due to
pressing engagements in the US, they were constrained to take PAN-AM's flight
as tourist passengers.
Sen. Lopez
filed a suit for damages alleging breach of contracts done in bad faith by
PAN-AM out of racial prejudice against Orientals. He asked for actual and moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees plus costs. PAN-AM asserted
that its failure to provide first class accommodations to Sen. Lopez and his
family was due to honest error of its employees.
Issue: Whether or not the award for moral damages and exemplary
damages could be increased.
Held: The Court ruled in favor of Sen. Lopez and his family and
increased the amounts of moral and exemplary damages.
Moral
damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220). While exemplary or corrective damages
may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in breach of
contracts where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner (Art. 2229, 2232). Written contracts for an
attorney's services, on the other hand, shall control the amount to be paid
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule
138, ROC).
Factors in determining amount for moral damages:
The amount
of damages awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately considering
the official, political, social, and financial standing of the offended parties
on one hand, and the business and financial position of the offender on the
other. The present rate of exchange and the terms at which the amount of
damages awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars has also been
considered.
MORAL DAMAGES
As a
proximate result of PAN-AM’s breach in bad faith of its contracts, Sen. Lopez
and his family suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety
and mental anguish. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers;
it is humiliating to be compelled to
travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the
contractual undertaking.
Sen. Lopez
was then Senate President Pro Tempore.
International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such an office. For
the Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the Philippine Congress, but the
nation's treaty-ratifying body. He was also former Vice-President of the
Philippines. Mrs. Maria Lopez, as wife of the Senator, shared his prestige
and therefore his humiliation. In addition, she suffered physical
discomfort during the 13-hour trip; her reason for going to the US was
actually for medical check-up and relaxation. The fact
that the seating spaces in the tourist class are quite narrower than in first
class will suffice to show that she indeed experienced physical suffering
during the trip. Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as
immediate members of the family of Sen. Lopez. Even if they initially wanted to
change their seat reservations from first class to tourist class, they
eventually paid for first class seats. Hence, they also suffered social humiliation.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
In view of its
nature, it should be imposed in such an amount as to effectively deter similar
breach of contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.
Producers
Bank of the Philippines vs. CA and Spouses Chua
G.R. No. 111584
(September 17, 2001)
Facts: Salvador
Chua was originally a depositor of Pacific Banking Corporation. He was offered
by the manager of Producers Bank of the Philippines to transfer his account
with them. The manager assured Chua that if he was to transfer his account the
latter would enjoy longer loan terms and lower interest rates. Chua later on
decided to transfer his account to Producers Bank. There, he maintained
substantial savings and current deposits with the bank’s Bacolod branch. He
also obtained various loans, one of which amounted to P 2,000,000.00 which was
secured by a real estate mortgage.
Later on,
unfortunate events started to happen to Chua as a client of Producers Bank. The
amount which he deposited into his savings account was never credited. It was
discovered that the branch manager absconded with the money of the bank’s
depositors. The bank also dishonored the checks drawn by Chua on the ground of
insufficient funds despite the fact that there was a balance deposit sufficient
to cover the amount of the checks.
These events
prompted Chua and his wife to request for copies of their ledgers covering
their savings and current accounts. However, the bank refused to grant their
request. Due to the bank's refusal, the couple instituted an action for damages
against the bank. The bank, on the other hand, filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage which covered Chua’s
previous loan. As a result, spouses Chua’s filed a complaint for injunction and
damages, alleging that the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure was without
basis and was instituted maliciously in order to harass them. The trial court
and the appellate court ruled in favor of Spouses Chua, hence awarding damages.
Issue: Are
Spouses Chua entitled to moral, exemplary, and actual damages?
Held: The Court held that Spouses Chua are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages. Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss. In awarding both, the court shall take into account the
circumstances surrounding the case and assess damages according to its
discretion.
The dishonor
of Chua’s checks and the foreclosure case initiated by the bank against Chua
adversely affected his credit standing, as well as his business dealings.
Article 2217, in relation to Article 2220, entitles Spouses Chua to moral
damages. Obviously, the bank's wrongful acts caused serious anxiety,
embarrassment, and humiliation to Chua.
The acts of
the bank (the malicious and unwarranted application for extrajudicial
foreclosure done by the bank to harass, embarrass, annoy, and ridicule Chua, as
well as the bank's failure to credit the deposit of Chua which constituted
gross negligence in the performance of the bank’s contractual obligation) were
accompanied by bad faith and done in wanton, fraudulent and malevolent manner
warranting the award of exemplary damages in favor of Chua, in accordance with
Article 2232 of the Civil Code.
Of course, a
plaintiff need not prove the actual extent of exemplary damages, for its
determination is addressed to the sound discretion of the court upon proof of
the plaintiff's entitlement to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages
(Article 2234, Civil Code).
Anent the
award of actual damages, the injured party must prove his case in order to
recover. When the existence of a loss is established, absolute certainty as to
its amount is not required. The benefit to be derived from a contract which one
of the parties has absolutely failed to perform is of necessity to some extent,
a matter of speculation, but the injured party is not to be denied for that
reason alone. He must produce the best evidence of which his case is
susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been
damaged by the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have
anticipated but for the defendant's wrongful act, he is entitled to recover (Cerreno vs. Tan Chuco, 28 Phil. 312
[1914] quoted in Central Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 431 [1975]).
Applying the
foregoing test to the instant case, the Court finds the evidence of Chua
insufficient to be considered within the purview of "best evidence."
The bare assertion of Salvador Chua that he lost an average of P18,000.00 per
month is inadequate if not speculative and should be admitted with extreme
caution since it is not supported by independent evidence. Chua could have
presented evidence as reports on the average actual profits earned by their
gasoline business, their financial statements, and other evidence of
profitability which could aid the court in arriving with reasonable certainty
at the amount of profits which private respondents failed to earn. Thus there
can be no award of exemplary damages.
Who
may recover?
Strebel vs Figueras
96
PHIL 321 (December 29, 1954)
Facts:
Emilio Strebel seeks to recover
damages against Figueras (acting Secretary of Labor), Jose (Dir. of labor) and
Ruperto (Asst. City Fiscal of Manila) alleging as ground, three causes of
action:
1.
That out of spite against him and
his family, defendants used their political influence in attempting to build a
drainage through a gasoline station operated by a partnership, to which Strebel
is a partner.
2.
That defendants, by making
use of their official and political connections, was able to induce the Secretary of Justice to transfer one Dr. Hernandez
from being an officer of the Bureau of Immigration to that of
the Bureau of Prisons. Strebel claims that Dr. Hernandez is his son-in-law,
being the husband of his (Strebel’s) step-daughter.
3.
Defendants caused the laborers of
Strebel’s gasoline station to file false cases against him for violation of a
Commonwealth Act prohibiting compulsion of vwork beyond eight (8) hours. While the case was dismissed, Defendants issued a press conference questioning the dismissal besmirching his reputation nonetheless.
Issue: Is plaintiff entitled to damages?
Held: No, on all causes of action. As to the first cause
of action, the Supreme Court ruled that the drainage project has not begun,
therefore, no damage was suffered by plaintiff.
As to the third
cause of action, the court ruled that since no information has been filed by
the Fiscal, the charge of malicious prosecution cannot prosper. While plaintiff
also maintains that at any case, defendants are liable under their misconduct
via tortuous act, the old civil code, which was the law in effect at the time
of the commission of the crime, moral damages may not be recovered in cases of
crime or tort unless it results from “physical injuries”.
NOTE: FOCUS on this--
As to the second cause
of action, Strebel
claims that by reason of the malicious transfer of Dr. Hernandez to the Office
of the Bureau of Prisons,
he has suffered moral and
mental suffering and therefore entitled to moral damages. As to the alleged
press conference, no mention of the case number of a specific person was made,
hence, there could be no damage suffered.
The Supreme Court
elucidates "As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering
resulting from bodily injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the
bodily hurt, and there can be no recovery for distress caused by sympathy for
another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong against a third person. So
the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in personal
peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration” It furthered by
saying that “damages are not recoverable for fright or shock even when
sustained as result of willful act, unless such act was directed toward person
or property or person seeking recovery.”
The rule on this point,
as stated in the American
Jurisprudence, is: "In law mental anguish
is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an injury or
wrong to the person himself,
as distinguished from that form of mental
suffering which is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow
for another's suffering or which
arises from a contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another.
Pursuant to the rule stated, a husband or wife cannot recover for mental
suffering caused by his or her sympathy for the other's suffering." It
should be noted that plaintiff is not even related to Dr. Hernandez. The
latter's wife is a daughter of Mrs. Strebel by a previous marriage. Hence Dr.
Hernandez is merely related by affinity, not to Strebel, but to a relative by
affinity of said plaintiff.
ABS-CBN vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.
No. 128690 (January 29, 1999)
Facts: In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS-CBN
an exclusive right to exhibit
some Viva films. ABS-CBN shall have the right
of first refusal to the next twenty-four (24) Viva films for TV telecast under such terms as may be agreed
upon by the parties hereto,
provided, however, that such right shall be exercised
by ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing.
Viva, through
defendant Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN, through its vice-president Charo
Santos-Concio, a list of three(3) film packages (36 title) from which ABS-CBN
may exercise its right of first refusal. ABS-CBN,
however "can tick off only ten (10) titles" (from the list) "we can purchase" and therefore did not accept
said list. Subsequently, Del Rosario
approached ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio, with a list consisting of 52 original
movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on television) including
the 14 titles subject of the present
case, as well as 104 re-
runs (previously aired on television) from which ABS-CBN may choose another 52
titles, as a total of 156 titles, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights
over this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs.
Del Rosario and
ABS-CBN general manager, Eugenio Lopez III, met at the Tamarind Grill
Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package proposal of Viva. Mr. Lopez
testified that he and Mr. Del Rosario
allegedly agreed that ABS-CRN was granted exclusive
film rights to fourteen (14) films for a total
consideration of P36 million; that he allegedly put this agreement as to the price and number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it and gave it to Mr. Del Rosario.
On the other hand,
Del Rosario denied having made any agreement with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva
films; denied the existence of a napkin in which Lopez wrote something; and
insisted that what he and Lopez discussed at the lunch meeting was Viva's film
package offer of 104 films (52 originals and 52 re-runs) for a total price of
P60 million. Mr. Lopez promising to make a counter
proposal which came in the form of a proposal
contract. Thereafter, Del Rosario and Mr. Graciano
Gozon discussed the terms and conditions of Viva's offer to
sell the 104 films, after
the rejection of the same package by ABS-CBN. On April 07, 1992, defendant Del Rosario received
through his secretary, a handwritten note from Ms. Concio,
which reads: "Here's the draft of the contract. I hope you find everything in order," to which was attached a draft exhibition agreement a counter-proposal covering 53 films, 52 of which
came from the list sent by defendant
Del Rosario and one film was added by Ms. Concio, for a consideration of P35 million.
The said counter
proposal was however rejected by Viva's Board of Directors on the evening of
the same day, April 7, 1992, as Viva would not sell anything less than the
package of 104 films for P60 million pesos and such rejection was relayed to Ms.
Concio. After the rejection of ABS-CBN and following several negotiations and
meetings defendant Del Rosario and Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in
consideration of P60 million, signed a letter of agreement granting RBS the
exclusive right to air 104 Viva-produced and/or acquired films including the
fourteen (14) films subject of the present case.
Thereafter, ABS-CBN
filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against
private respondents Republic
Broadcasting Corporation, Viva Production and Del Rosario.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and against ABS-CBN,
ordering the latter to
pay, among others,
P5 million as and by way of moral damages.
On appeal, respondent court found reasonable basis for the award of moral damages
holding that RBS's reputation was debased by the filing of the complaint
and denied VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was "RBS and not VIVA
which was actually prejudiced when the complaint was filed by ABS-CBN."
Issue: Whether or not ABS-CBN is entitled to the award of
moral damages.
Held: No. As to moral damages,
RBS's claim for moral damages
could possibly fall only under
item (10) of Article 2219,
thereof which reads: “(10) Acts and actions referred to
in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.”
Moral damages are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered. and not
to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense
of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate
then moral suffering
he has
undergone. It is aimed at the
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against
the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and
measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice,
or corruption on the part of the trial court.
The award of moral damages
cannot be granted
in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person
and having existence only in legal
contemplation,
65
it has no
feelings, no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical
suffering and mental anguish, which call be experienced only by one having a
nervous system. The
statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation
may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased,
resulting in social humiliation" is an obiter
dictum. On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since
RBS is a corporation.
National Power v. Philipp Brothers
G.R.
No 126204 (November 20, 2001)
Facts:
The National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply and delivery of 120,000
metric tons of imported coal for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in
Calaca, Batangas.
The Philipp
Brothers Oceanic, Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to participate as
one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was
accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed in a letter dated July 8, 1987,
which was received by PHIBRO on July 15, 1987. On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent
word to NAPOCOR
that industrial disputes might soon
plague Australia, the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously hamper
PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal. From July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again apprised
NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia, particularly informing the latter that the ship owners therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-free"
clause is incorporated in the charter
party or the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the transfer of coal,
PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR that they equally share the burden of a
"strike-free" clause. NAPOCOR refused. Consequently, in October 1987,
NAPOCOR once more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca thermal
plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this subsequent bidding.
On November
24, 1987, NAPOCOR
disapproved PHIBRO's application for pre-qualification to bid for not meeting
the minimum requirements. Upon further inquiry,
PHIBRO found that the real reason for the disapproval was its purported
failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for damages due to the delay in the
delivery of the first coal shipment. This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for
damages with application for injunction against NAPOCOR. In its complaint,
PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding and in all subsequent biddings
was tainted with malice and bad faith
and prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Trial court
rendered a decision in favor
of PHIBRO, ordering NAPOCOR among others, to pay PHIBRO actual, moral,
exemplary damages and costs.
Issue: Whether or not PHIBRO is entitled to the award of moral
damages.
Held: No. Moral damages
are not, as a general
rule, granted to a corporation. While it is true that besmirched reputation is included in moral damages,
it cannot cause mental anguish
to a corporation, unlike in the case of a natural
person, for a corporation has no reputation in the sense that an individual has, and besides,
it is inherently impossible for a corporation to suffer mental
anguish. In LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, it was ruled that "Moral damages are granted in recompense
for physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury. A corporation, being an artificial person and having existence only in
legal contemplation, has no feelings,
no emotions, no senses; therefore, it cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish.
Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows, and griefs of life — all of which cannot
be suffered by respondent bank as an artificial person."
Nominal
Damages
Ventanilla
vs. Gregorio Centeno
G.R. No. 14333 (January
28, 1961)
Facts: Ventanilla instituted this action to recover damages
against his lawyer,
Atty. Centeno for neglecting to perfect within
the reglementary period
his appeal from an adverse
judgment rendered by the CFI of Manila. Trial court’s facts showed that
the required appeal bond was not filed by Atty. Centeno. The fact that the
record on appeal was admitted for filing is the best evidence that Atty.
Centeno had not in fact filed any appeal bond. The record on appeal was
disapproved because it was filed out of time and no appeal bond had been filed
by the plaintiff. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Ventanilla ordered
Centeno to pay Ventanilla the sum of P200 as nominal damages and the costs.
Ventanilla appealed to the Court of Appeals and claimed
that the trial court erred,
among others, in ordering Centeno
to pay only the sum of P200, and not P2,000 as nominal damages.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in the amount
of the award of nominal damages.
Held: No. Relative to the sufficiency of the sum of P200 as nominal
damages awarded by the trial
court to the appellant, article
2221 of the new Civil Code provides: “Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.”
The assessment of
nominal damages is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of the case. Considering the circumstances, as found by the trial
court, and the degree of negligence committed by the appellee, a lawyer, in not
depositing on time the appeal bond and filing the record on appeal within the
extension period granted by the court, which brought about the refusal by the
trial court to allow the record on appeal, the amount of P200 awarded by the
trial court to the appellant as nominal damages may seem exiguous. Nevertheless, considering that nominal
damages are not for indemnification of loss suffered
but for the vindication or recognition of a right
violated or invaded;
and that even if
the appeal in civil case No. 18833 had been duly perfected, it was not an assurance
that the appellant would succeed in recovering the amount he had claimed
in his complaint, the amount of P2,000 the appellant seeks to
recover as nominal damages is excessive. After weighing carefully all the
considerations, the amount awarded to the appellant for nominal damages should
not be disturbed.
Robes-Francisco Realty and
Development Corp. vs.CFI
G.R.
No. L-41093 (October 30, 1978)
Facts: On May 1962, private respondent Millan bought a lot
from petitioner corporation Robes-Francisco Realty and Development Corporation
(Robes-Francisco for brevity). Millan paid the installments in full on December
22, 1971, but it was only on March 2, 1973 that a Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in her favor. Notwithstanding the lapse of almost three
(3)
years since she made her last payment, Robes-Francisco still failed to convey the corresponding transfer
certificate of title
(TCT) to Millan.
Due to this, Millan was compelled to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against
Robes-Francisco in 1974. One of the prayers
in the complaint include the payment of damages, corrective and actual in the sum of
P15,000.00.
The trial court
ruled in favor of Millan and ordered Robes-Francisco to pay her nominal damages
in the amount of P20,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and
costs. Robes-Francisco now questions the award for nominal damages of P20,000.00
and attorney’s fees of P5,000.00 which are allegedly excessive and unjustified.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court was correct in
awarding nominal damages?
Held: The trial court did not err in awarding
nominal damages. However,
the circumstances of the case warrant a reduction of the amount
granted to Millan.
There can be no dispute
that Robes-Francisco was guilty of delay, amounting to nonperformance of
its obligation, in issuing the TCT to Millan who had fully paid her
installments. Article 1170 of the Civil Code expressly provides that those
who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages. However, Millan submitted
her case without
presenting evidence on the actual damages suffered
by her as a result of the non-performance of Robes-Francisco’s obligation
under the deed of sale. NONETHELESS,
the facts show that the right of the vendee to acquire title over the lot was
violated by Robes-Francisco. This entitles her at the very least to nominal damages.
Nominal damages are not intended
for indemnification of loss suffered
but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence
fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the case.
In the situation before
Us, We are of the view that the amount
of P20,000.00 is excessive. The admitted fact that Robes-Francisco failed to furnish
Millan the TCT because said lot
was mortgaged to GSIS does not in itself show that there was bad faith. Bad faith cannot
be presumed. Millan’s
contention that the P20,000.00 award may be considered in the nature of
exemplary damages cannot be upheld because in case of breach of contract, exemplary
damages may be awarded if the guilty party acted in wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
People vs Gopio
G.R.
No. 133925 (November 29, 2000)
Facts: Agustin Gopio was accused of committing statutory
rape on Ma. Princess Millano y, San Diego, an 11 year-old girl, against her
will.
The incident was
said to have taken place while the Brgy. San Pascual, Obando Bulacan, was
celebrating its town fiesta. The victim allegedly went to Gopio’s store to buy
cooking oil around 10:00 am but instead was taken to the bedroom where she was
raped. The victim kept silent about the incident for fear of Gopio and of what
her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim was ashamed and worried that her friends
would spread the news regarding her unfortunate experience.
On two other occasions, also in 1995, the victim
related that she was again raped by Gopio but remained silent
about it.
It was only when the victim
was examined Municipal Health Clinic for complaints of pain in her navel that her mother, Luzviminda, discovered that her daughter was no longer a virgin. Upon inquiry, Princess
admitted that Gopio had raped her.
The trial court
convicted Gopio guilty of statutory rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The court
further ruled that Gopio is liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of P3,727.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00, as moral damages, and to pay
the costs of the suit.
Issues: (1) Whether Gopio is liable of statutory rape and
(2) whether Gopio is liable to pay the heirs of the victim actual and moral
damages
Held: (1) The Court affirmed the ruling of the trial
court convicting the accused of statutory rape. The testimony of the victim was
clear and categorical, positively identifying the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime.
(2) However, with respect to the award
of actual damages, the court ruled that the award of actual damages in the
amount of P 3727.00 was deleted in the absence of proof as required in Article
2199.
“To be entitled to
actual and compensatory damages, there must be competent proof constituting
evidence of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts showing the expenses
incurred on account of the rape incident”.
Among the evidence presented by the mother
to establish a claim for actual damages,
only the laboratory fee in the amount of P350.00 was duly receipted, the rest were merely a doctor’s prescription and a handwritten
list of expenses.
Nevertheless, the
court ruled that under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, the complainants were
entitled to nominal damages. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose
of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
proper.”
As
has been held, “whenever there has been
a violation of an ascertained legal right, although no actual damages resulted
or none are shown, the award of nominal damages is
The victim’s
family evidently incurred
expenses due to the crime
committed and the victim also suffered pains in her navel. Hence,
the court awarded
them P2,000 for nominal
damages
and increased the moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Dr. Armovit, et al. vs. CA and Northwest Airlines,
Inc.
G.R.
No. 88561 (April 20, 1990)
Facts: Dr. Herman Armovit, a Filipino physician residing
in the United States, along with his family, came home to the Philippines for a
Christmas visit.
They
purchased three round plane tickets
from Northwest Airlines,
and was confirmed as “OK” by a Northwest Airlines’ ticket sales agent.
The Armovits even reconfirmed their date of departure through
their representative Ernesto
Madriaga who personally presented the three (3) tickets
at the Northwest Airlines’ Roxas Boulevard office.
For
their return flight,
the Armovits arrived
in the airport at 9:15 in the morning for their 10:30 AM flight,
only to be rudely informed
that they cannot
be accommodated because the 10:30 AM flight was erroneous
and that the 9:15 AM flight was already taking
off.
The family was bumped off at the Manila
International Airport. Dr. Armovit complained that as a result of the “bump
off” he was not able to keep his appointments with his patients and that the
family suffered anguish, wounded feelings, and serious anxiety day and night
until they were informed that seats were available for them the following day.
The
trial court awarded the Armovits actual, moral, exemplary and nominal damages;
but on appeal the Court of Appeals deleted the award of moral and nominal
damages.
Issue: Whether the Armovits are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages arising from the breach of the contract of carriage
Held:
The deletion of the moral damages
on the ground that petitioners did not take the witness stand to testify on
"their social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, and that the
breach of contract was not malicious or fraudulent" was improper. Northwest Airlines was found
guilty of gross
negligence in the issuance of the tickets
with the erroneous entry of date of departure and
its failure to change the same when the Armovits had reconfirmed their flight.
The gross negligence of the airline amounted to malice and bad faith and
tainted the breach of air transportation contract.
There was sufficient
indicia of malice and bad faith on
the part of the airline when it issued the tickets, failed to correct the dates
and rudely informed the Armovits that they were not to be accommodated.
The petitioners are evidently entitled
to moral damages.
Their failure to testify is of no moment since
it was explained the assassination of Senator Benigno
Aquino, Jr. resulting to turmoil in the country
refrained the Armovits from coming back to testify; nevertheless, Atty.
Raymundo Armovit who was with the complainants at the time of the incident,
took the witness stand. By the same token to provide an example for the public
good, an award of exemplary damages is also proper. Nevertheless, the deletion
of the nominal damages by the appellate court is well-taken since there is an award of actual damages. Nominal
damages cannot co-exist
with actual or compensatory damages.
Temperate
Damages
People vs. Singh
G.R. No. 129782 (June 29, 2001)
Facts: Dilbang Singh, the
private compalinant in the frustrated murder case, recalled that while he was
cleaning his motorbike in front of his appartment, Dalvir, Balwinder, Gurmok,
Jarnail, Amarjit, Mohinder, Dial, Kuldip --all surnamed Singh-- Johander Singh Dhillon,
and Malkit Singh Dhillon arrived, shouting foul remarks in
their native language and
demanded Surinder Singh to come out of the apartment. When Surinder Singh came
out of his apartment, Dalvir Singh tried to stab him but Surinder was able to
move away. Dalvir Singh told his companions to hold Surinder Singh and thereafter,
Dial and Johinder each held the arms of Surinder, while Kuldip pushed Surinder.
Dalvir Singh then stabbed Surinder on the right side of his stomach, causing
the latter to fall.
Dial Singh said that Surinder failed to give money and if
others will also refuse, the same fate will happen to them. As Surinder Singh
tried to get up, Malkit and Jarnail started hitting him with lead pipes, while
Johinder and Dial punched and kicked him. Amarjit, who was holding a gun,
warned everyone not to help Surinder or else he will shoot.
While all
these things were going on, private complainant Dilbag Singh tried to stop them
but Balwinder Singh stabbed him on his back. Gurmok likewise stabbed him with a
bolo, but he was not hit as he was able to move to one side. After that, the
ten (10) accused Indians left. Thereafter, Dilbag Singh and Surinder Singh,
were brought to the hospital. Surinder was pronounced dead on arrival.
Issue: Whether or not the court
a quo erred in awarding excessive damages against accused-appellants.
Held: In the criminal case for frustrated murder, the trial court
awarded private complainant Dilbag Singh the amount of P16,000.00 representing
his hospitalization and medical expenses, and P 30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
For his hospitalization and medical expenses, the receipts submitted to support
said claim amounted only to P370.50. Hence, Dilbag Singh is entitled only to
the said amount. The award of attorney’s fees is hereby deleted. Nonetheless,
private complaint is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for
the suffering he endured from appellants’ felonious acts.
In the
criminal case for murder, only the following expenses were proven to recover
actual damages: funeral expenses and air ticket/freight of the cadaver. The
amounts for hospitalization expenses are deleted since it is not supported by
evidence. Attorneys’ fees and the compensation for loss of earning capacity,
are likewise deleted for lack of basis. However, the trial court’s award of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 moral damages are affirmed.
Awards for
loss of earning capacity partake of damages which must be proven not only by
credible and satisfactory evidence, but also by unbiased proof. The testimony
of Balwinder Singh Gill, first cousin of the deceased, on the alleged income of
the deceased, is not enough. The best evidence to substantiate income
earned by foreigners while in the
Philippines is the payment of taxes with the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Absent
such proof, bare allegation is insufficient. Nevertheless, considering that the
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered, and the fact of loss has
been established, appellants shall pay the heirs of Surinder Singh temperate damages.
People of the Philippines vs. Edison Plazo
G.R.
No. 120547 (January 29, 2001)
Facts:
Leonor Fabula went out of her
house in May-anao, Tigaon, Camarines Sur to buy sugar at a nearby store. When
she reached the store, she saw appellant boxing her son Romeo Fabula and
banging his head on the post of the store, while asking him why he told the
police about his brother and the location of appellant's house. When Leonor
sought to intervene, appellant got angry at her.
She became afraid
and asked for help but nobody went near them. Romeo freed himself from the hold
of appellant and ran away. Appellant chased Romeo with a small bolo known locally
as "gatab." Leonor
shouted at appellant to stop but the latter
did not heed her pleas.
Appellant caught up with Romeo and stabbed
him at the back causing
Romeo to fall on
the ground. Appellant continued to stab Romeo
in the upper and lower
chest area. Leonor
continued shouting for help and eventually someone
came to help.
However, when she saw her son
no longer moving,
she told the people not to touch or move him because
she was going to the Poblacion of Tigaon to get a policeman.
When Patrolmen
Virgilio Azucena and Jose Madera arrived at the scene of the crime, they saw
the fallen body of Romeo with a small bolo imbedded on his chest and the
detached handle of the bolo on the ground near his body. On June 10, 1991,
appellant was charged with the crime of murder After trial, the trial court
rendered its decision finding appellant guilty of the crime of murder and ordered
Plazo to indemnify
the heirs of the late Fabula for the latter's
death the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); the sum of Fifteen
Thousand Seven Hundred Twelve Pesos (P15,712.00) as actual damages;
and the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in the award
of actual damages.
Held:
The trial court correctly awarded
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. However, the award of actual damages in
the amount of P15,712.00 was based solely on the bare assertions of the mother
of the victim. The Court can only grant such amount for expenses if they are
supported by receipts. In the absence thereof, no actual damages can be
awarded. However, in lieu of actual
damages, TEMPERATE DAMAGES under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code may be recovered
where it has been shown that the victim's family suffered some
pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot be proved with certainty. We find the award of P15,000.00 as temperate
damages reasonable. Moral damages cannot be awarded in the absence of any
evidence to support its award.
PNB vs.
CA
G.R. No. 108630 (April 2, 1996)
Facts: private respondent
Loreto Tan is the owner of the land which has been expropriated by the
government. After the proceedings, Tan requested the release to him of the
expropriation price of P32, 480.00. The trial court ordered the PNB to release
the same to Tan as deposited in it by the government. Petitioner’s Asst.branch
manager, Juan Tagamolilia, issued managers check for the said amount and
delivered it to Sonia Gonzaga without Tan’s knowledge. As a consequence, Tan
demanded the payment from PNB which refused on the ground that they had already
paid the same based on the SPA allegedly executed in her favour by Tan. Tan
therefore executed an affidavit contending that he had never executed such SPA
nor authorized Gonzaga to receive it. PNB, on the other hand, failed to produce
the SPA as directed by the court. The TC ruled against the PNB. CA affirmed the
same but deleted the award of P5, 000.00 for exemplary damages and P5, 000.00
for attorney’s fees.
Issues: (1) Whether or not an SPA existed. (2) Whether or not the
award of attorney’s fees and exemplary damages is proper.
Held: (1) No. Under the best evidenced rule, only the original
document is the best evidence of the fact as to whether the creditor authorized
a third person to receive the payment from the debtor and in the absence of
such document, the debtor’s argument regarding due payment must fail.
In this case, since
PNB failed to prove the SPA as an evidence, its contention that they paid
petitioner must fail.
(2) The award of attorney’s fees is proper under Art. 2208 of
the CC since Tan is forced to litigate to protect his rights, but the award of
exemplary damages is properly deleted. Under Art. 2232 of the CC, exemplary
damages may be awarded if a part acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent manner. However,
they cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court has yet to decide
whether or not they should be adjudicated. In the case at bar, while there is a
clear breach of petitioners obligation to pay private respondents, there is no
evidence that it acted in a fraudulent, wanton, reckless or oppressive manner.
Furthermore, there is no award to compensatory damages which is a prerequisite
before exemplary damages may be awarded.
Basconcillo • Batungbacal • Base • Buenaventura •
Clareza •Daganta •David •Escucha •Lingao •Llave• Lucaylucay•Malvar •Mangrobang•
Porquez • Quesada • Rigor • Rosal • Salud
San Beda
College Alabang- Academic Bar Operations 2011
