SEC. 20. If at any time after
the approval of the application and before patent is issued the applicant shall
prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that he has complied with
all the requirements of the law, but cannot continue with his homestead, through
no fault of his own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and
improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the conveyance is not made
for purposes of speculation, then the applicant, with the previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, may transfer his rights to the land
and improvements to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead, and
immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file a homestead
application to the land so acquired and shall succeed the original homesteader
in his rights and obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said
application of the purchaser. Any person who has so transferred his rights may
not agan apply for a new homestead. Every transfer made without the previous
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce shall be null and void
and shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the
patent. (C. A. 141).
SEC. 118. Except in favor of the
Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under
free patentor homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of
five years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant, nor
shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to
the expiration of said period, but the improvements or crop on the land may be
mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any
homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance of title
shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal
grounds. (Id.).
The legislative policy or intent
is to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired under the Public Land
Law, as above stated, for him and his heirs. The legislative policy is so strong
and consistent that the original period of five years from the issuance of the
patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the homesteader or
his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended to 25
years if no approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is secured.
(Sec. 118, par. 2, C. a. No. 141, as amended by C. A. No. 456.) Provision has
also been inserted authorizing the repurchase of the homestead when properly
sold by the homesteader within five years from the date of the sale. (Sec. 119,
C. A. No. 141.) This legislative intent and policy is also sought to be carried
out in Section 20, as may be seen from the fact that transfer of homestead
rights from a homesteader can only be justified upon proof satisfactory to
the Director of Lands that the homesteader cannot continue with his homestead
through no fault of his own. This is not the only requirement; a previous
permission of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce should first be
obtained, as it is also expressly provided that any transfer made without
such previous approval is null and void and shall result in the
cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the patent." (C. A. 141). As
the conveyances now in question are claimed to have been and were evidently
made under the provisions of section 20 of the Public Land Act, the important
question to be determined is whether said conveyances satisfy requirements of
said section 20 of the Act.
The stipulation of facts on this point is as
follows:
That the heirs of Sergio Nicolas
executed in or about 1947 a transfer of homestead rights over the land in
question in favor of the defendants, which transfer was approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on March 9, 1948; that with the approval
of said transger of homestead rights, the defendants caused the issuance of a
homestead patent in their favor, the title being evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-558 of the land records of Nueva Ecija.
The above stipulation does not
state expressly that the Director of Lands had, after investigation, been
satisfied that the applicant or homesteader "has complied with all the
requirements of the law, but cannot continue with the homestead through no
fault of his own." Furthermore, according to the stipulation, the transfer
was made in 1947 and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture in 1948 so that
the conveyances were not made without the previous approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce. So neither of the requirements of section 20 has
been complied with.
But it is suggested that in
accordance with the presumption of regularity of official acts the Director of
Lands must have recommended the approval of the transfer. Admitting arguendo
that such is the case, the conveyances still suffer from at least one fatal
defect in that it does not appear that they had to be made because the
homesteader could not continue with his homestead through no fault of
his own. We may not and cannot indulge in presumptions on this necessary
requirements, because the order for the issuance of the patent states just the
opposite. The order for the issuance of the patent states expressly that the
homesteader had already complied with all the requirements of the law with
respect to cultivation, possession and otherwise, thus:
(5) That an investigation for
the purpose of verifying the statements contained in the final proof papers was
conducted by a representative of the Bureau of Lands, who found that the
applicant has fully complied with the residence and cultivation requirements of
the law; and
xxx
xxx xxx
. . ., the undersigned is of the
opinion that the applicant has complied with the requirements of law
preliminary to the issuance of patent to the land applied for and already
surveyed." (Exhibit A.).
The order for the issuance of a
patent as well as the statements of fact therein contained, as above-quoted,
conclusively disprove the existence of the requirement that the homesteader
could not continue with the homestead through no fault of his own.
In a legal sense, furthermore,
when the Director of Lands issues the order for the issuance of a patent, after
the approval of the final proof, the right of the homesteader to the patent
becomes absolute and then it becomes the ministerial duty of the corresponding
officials of the Government to issue said patent. To all intents and purposes
the order for the issuance of a patent is the same in effect as the issuance of
a patent itself (Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 499). And if the law (section
118, C. A. No. 114) prohibits the sale or conveyance of a homestead after the
issuance of a patent, the prohibition should be extended, in view of the
apparent policy of the law, to the date on which the order for the issuance of
the patent is issued, which in this case is June 13, 1943.
Resuming what we have stated
above, we find that the conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the
defendants heren in the year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of
section 20 of the Public Land Act that the Director of Lands is satisfied from
proofs submitted by the homesteader that he (homesteader) could not continue
with his homestead through no fault of his own, and with the second that a
conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that from the date of an order for the
issuance of a patent for a homestead the homesteader to all intents and
purposes is considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so
far as the prohibition contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act,
otherwise the intent and policy of the law may be avoided by the homesteader by
postponing the getting of his patent.
In accordance herewith the
conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the defendants are hereby declared
null and void, the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the
defendants (P-558 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija)
ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the plaintiffs
upon return to the defendants of the amounts received as price for the sale. No
damages or costs. So ordered.
NIEVES TINIO, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs.GREGORIO FRANCES, ET AL., defendants and
appellees. EN BANC G.R. No. L-7747 ,November 29, 1955
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Question:
1. What is the effect of a homestead patent sold within the five year prohibitory period?
It appears that the patent covering the tract of land which includes the
portion now disputed in this appeal was issued to the late Julio
Sarabillo on December 9, 1938, and the sale of the portion of two
hectares to the Roman Catholic Church took place on December 31, 1940.
This shows that the sale was made before the expiration of the period of
five years from the date of the issuance of the patent and as such is
null and void it being in contravention of section 118 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141. The fact that it was expressly stipulated in the deed of
sale that it was subject to the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the approval was sought and obtained on March
26, 1949, or more than ten years after the date of the issuance of the
patent, or the fact that the deed of sale was registered in the Office
of the Register of Deeds only on March 29, 1950, and was annotated on
the back of the title on that date, cannot have the effect of validating
the sale for the reason that the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources does not have any valid curative
effect. That approval is merely a formality which the law requires if
the sale is effected after the term of five years but before the
expiration of a period of 25 years for the purpose of testing the
validity of the sale on constitutional grounds. But, as was ruled by
this Court, the absence of such formality will not render the
transaction null and void (Evangelista vs. Montaño,1
G.R. No. L-5567).
What is important is the period within which the sale
is executed. The provision of the law which prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead within five years after the grant of the
patent is mandatory. This cannot be obviated even if official approval
is granted beyond the expiration of that period, because the purpose of
the law is to promote a definite public policy, which is "to preserve
and keep in the family of the homesteader that portion of public land
which the State has gratuitously given to him." [Pascua vs. Talens,2 45 Off. Gaz., No. 9, (Supplement) 413.]
CATALINA DE LOS SANTOS, in her capacity as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decased Julio Sarabillo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MIDSAYAP, Most Rev. LUIS DEL ROSARIO and Rev. GERARD MONGEAU, defendants-appellants.EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6088 February 25, 1954
The claim that the sale can be validated because it
was made with the avowed aim that the property would be dedicated solely
to educational and charitable purposes is likewise unmeritorious even
considering the law invoked by counsel for appellants in favor of its
validity. It is true that under section 121, Commonwealth Act No. 141, a
corporation, association, or partnership may acquire any land granted
as homestead if the sale is done with the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and is
solely for commercial, industrial, educational, religious, or charitable
purposes, or for a right of way, and apparently there is no limitation
therein as to the time within which such acquisition may be made. But
this provision should be interpreted as a mere authority granted to a
corporation, association or partnership to acquire a portion of the
public land and not as an unbridled license to acquire without
restriction for such would be giving an advantage to an entity over an
individual which finds no legal justification. It is our opinion that
the authority granted by section 121 should be interpreted as subject to
the condition prescribed in section 118, namely, that the acquisition
should be after the period of five years from the date of the issuance
of the patent.
But appellants now contend that even if it be
declared that the sale made to them by the homesteader is null and void
yet its immediate effect would be not the return of the land to appellee
but rather its reversion to the State wherein the Government is the
interested party. (Section 124 of the Public Land Act). Appellants
further claim that the present action cannot be maintained by the
appellee under the principle of pari delicto.
The principles thus invoked by appellants are correct
and cannot be disputed. They are recognized not only be our law but by
our jurisprudence. Section 124 of the Public Land Act indeed provides
that any acquisition, conveyance or transfer executed in violation of
any of its provisions shall be null and void and shall produce the
effect of annulling and cancelling the grant or patent and cause the
reversion of the property to the State, and the principle of pari delicto has
been applied by this Court in a number of cases wherein the parties to a
transaction have proven to be guilty of having effected the transaction
with knowledge of the cause of its invalidity. (Bough & Bough vs. Cantiveros & Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216; Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun,3 G.R. No. L-1411; Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan vs. Uy Hoo, et al.,4 G.R. No. L-2207; Caoile vs. Yu Chiao Peng,5 G.R. No. L-4068; Talento, et al. vs. Makiki, et al.,6
G.R. No. L-3529.) But we doubt if these principles can now be invoked
considering the philosophy and the policy behind the approval of the
Public Land Act. The principle underlying pari delicto as known
here and in the United States is not absolute in its application. It
recognizes certain exceptions one of them being when its enforcement or
application runs counter to an avowed fundamental policy or to public
interest. As stated by us in the Rellosa case, "This doctrine is subject
to one important limitation, namely, "whenever public policy is
considered advanced by allowing either party to sue for relief against
the transaction." (Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hu, supra.)
The case under consideration comes within the
exception above adverted to. Here appellee desires to nullify a
transaction which was done in violation of the law. Ordinarily the
principle of pari delicto would apply to her because her
predecessor-in-interest has carried out the sale with the presumed
knowledge of its illegality (8 Manresa 4th ed., pp. 717-718), but
because the subject of the transaction is a piece of land, public policy
requires that she, as heir, be not prevented from re-acquiring it
because it was given by law to her family for her home and cultivation.
This is the policy on which our homestead law is predicated (Pascua vs. Talens, supra).
This right cannot be waived. "It is not within the competence of any
citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to preserve"
(Gonzalo Puyat & Sons, Inc. vs. Pantaleon de las Ama, et al.,
74 Phil., 3). We are, therefore, constrained to hold that appellee can
maintain the present action it being in furtherance of this fundamental
aim of our homestead law.
As regards the contention that because the immediate
effect of the nullification of the sale is the reversion of the property
to the State appellee is not the proper party to institute it but the
State itself, that is a point which we do not have, and do not propose,
to decide. That is a matter between the State and the Grantee of the
homestead, or his heirs. What is important to consider now is who of the
parties is the better entitled to the possession of the land while the
government does not take steps to assert its title to the homestead.
Upon annulment of the sale, the purchaser's claim is reduced to the
purchase price and its interest. As against the vendor or his heirs, the
purchaser is no more entitled to keep the land than any intruder. Such
is the situation of the appellants. Their right to remain in possession
of the land is no better than that of appellee and, therefore, they
should not be allowed to remain in it to the prejudice of appellee
during and until the government takes steps toward its reversion to the
State. (See Castro vs. Orpiano, G.R. No. L-4094, November 29, 1951.)
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It is important to keep in mind in this connection that the warrant of
approval of the sales by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources did not, in our opinion, invalidate the sales. Upon the facts
upon the instant case, the required approval may be regarded as
directory. Section 118 of Commonwealth Act. No. 141, as amended,
specifically enjoins that the approval by the Department Secretary
"shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal grounds." There
being no allegation that there were constitutional or legal impediments
to the sales, and no pretense that if the sales had been submitted to
the Secretary concerned they would have been disapproved, approval was a ministerial duty, to be had as a matter of course and demandable if
refused. For this reason, and if necessary, approval may not be applied
for and its effect will be to ratify and adopt the transaction as if
they had been previously authorized.
JUAN EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
vs.GUILLERMO MONTAÑO, FLORENCIO TAYTAY, and TITO PAZ, respondenTEN BANC G.R. No. L-5567 May 29, 1953
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In several cases1 the doctrine has been set that the
requirement for the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources prescribed in Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141 (Public
Lands law) is merely directory and its absence does not invalidate any
alienation, transfer or conveyance of the of the homestead after 5 years
and before 25 years from the issuance of the title. Upon the other
hand, we find no provision of law, and none has been cited, which
prohibits the encumbrance of the homestead by the purchaser thereof
during the statutory period of 5 years within which the
vendor-homesteader may repurchase the same as provided in Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act 141. The prohibition against such encumbrance or
alienation, as prescribed in Section 118 of the same law, refers to
those constituted by the homesteader himself within the term of 5 years
from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant. In the
present case, the Original Certificate of Title obtained by Rosillosa as
homesteader was issued in 1933 long before he sold the land in 1944 and
the encumbrance thereof by the purchaser Abel in 1947. It must be
observed, of course, that such encumbrance or alienation, is subject to
the right of the homesteader to repurchase the land within 5 years from
the date of conveyance.
MERCEDES RAFFIÑAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.FELIPE L. ABEL, defendant, and FORTUNATO ROSILLOSA, defendant-appellant.EN BANC,G.R. No. L-17082 ,April 30, 1962
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