1.On July 18, 1990, petitioner
entrusted for repair his Nissan pick-up car 1988 model to private respondent -
which is engaged in the sale, distribution and repair of motor vehicles.
Private respondent undertook to return the vehicle on July 21, 1990 fully serviced
and supplied in accordance with the job contract. After petitioner paid in full
the repair bill in the amount of P1,397.00,[3] private
respondent issued to him a gate pass for the release of the vehicle on said
date. But came July 21, 1990, the latter could not use the vehicle as its
battery was weak and was not yet replaced. Left with no option, petitioner
himself bought a new battery nearby and delivered it to private respondent for
installation on the same day. However, the battery was not installed and the
delivery of the car was rescheduled to July 24, 1990 or three (3) days later.
When petitioner sought to reclaim his car in the afternoon of July 24, 1990, he
was told that it was carnapped earlier that morning while being road-tested by
private respondent’s employee along Pedro Gil and Perez Streets in Paco,
Manila. Private respondent said that the incident was reported to the police.
Having failed to recover his car and its accessories or the value thereof,
petitioner filed a suit for damages against private respondent anchoring his
claim on the latter’s alleged negligence. For its part, private respondent
contended that it has no liability because the car was lost as a result of a
fortuitous event - the carnapping.
Questions: (a) Is carnapping a
fortuitous event? (b) Can the repair shop be made liable for the value of the
car and pay damages? (c) What do you understand by “the assumption of risk”?
(d) Is this principle applicable in the case at bar?
Answer: It is a not a defense for a
repair shop of motor vehicles to escape liability simply because the damage or
loss of a thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to carnapping.
Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The fact
that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful
possession, as in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a
fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping entails more than the
mere forceful taking of another’s property. It must be proved and established
that the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that
neither the claimant nor the person alleged to be negligent has any
participation.[9]
In accordance with the Rules of evidence, the burden of proving that the loss
was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it[10]-
which in this case is the private respondent. However, other than the police
report of the alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was presented by
private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its fault. A
police report of an alleged crime, to which only private respondent is privy,
does not suffice to established the carnapping. Neither does it prove that
there was no fault on the part of private respondent notwithstanding the parties’
agreement at the pre-trial that the car was carnapped. Carnapping does not
foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on the part of private
respondent.
Even
assuming arguendo that carnapping was duly established as a fortuitous
event, still private respondent cannot escape liability. Article 1165[11]
of the New Civil Code makes an obligor who is guilty of delay responsible even
for a fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery. In this case,
private respondent was already in delay as it was supposed to deliver
petitioner’s car three (3) days before it was lost. Petitioner’s agreement to
the rescheduled delivery does not defeat his claim as private respondent had
already breached its obligation. Moreover, such accession cannot be construed
as waiver of petitioner’s right to hold private respondent liable because the
car was unusable and thus, petitioner had no option but to leave it.
Assuming
further that there was no delay, still working against private respondent is
the legal presumption under Article 1265 that its possession of the thing at
the time it was lost was due to its fault.[12]
This presumption is reasonable since he who has the custody and care of the
thing can easily explain the circumstances of the loss. The vehicle owner has
no duty to show that the repair shop was at fault. All that petitioner needs to
prove, as claimant, is the simple fact that private respondent was in
possession of the vehicle at the time it was lost. In this case, private
respondent’s possession at the time of the loss is undisputed. Consequently,
the burden shifts to the possessor who needs to present controverting evidence
sufficient enough to overcome that presumption. Moreover, the exempting
circumstances - earthquake, flood, storm or other natural calamity - when the
presumption of fault is not applicable[13]
do not concur in this case. Accordingly, having failed to rebut the presumption
and since the case does not fall under the exceptions, private respondent is
answerable for the loss.
It
must likewise be emphasized that pursuant to Articles 1174 and 1262 of the New
Civil Code, liability attaches even if the loss was due to a fortuitous event
if “the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk”.[14]
Carnapping is a normal business risk
for those engaged in the repair of motor vehicles. For just as the owner is
exposed to that risk so
is the repair shop since the car was entrusted to it. That is why, repair shops
are required to first register with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)[15]
and to secure an insurance policy for the “shop covering the property entrusted
by its customer for repair, service or maintenance” as a pre-requisite for such
registration/accreditation.[16]
Violation of this statutory duty constitutes negligence per se.[17]
Having taken custody of the vehicle, private respondent is obliged not only to
repair the vehicle but must also provide the customer with some form of
security for his property over which he loses immediate control. An owner who
cannot exercise the seven (7)
juses or attributes of ownership – the right to possess, to use and
enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover
or vindicate and to the fruits
-[18]
is a crippled owner. Failure of the repair shop to provide security to a motor
vehicle owner would leave the latter at the mercy of the former. Moreover, on
the assumption that
private respondent’s repair business is duly registered, it presupposes that
its shop is covered by insurance from which it may recover the loss. If private
respondent can recover from its insurer, then it would be unjustly enriched if
it will not compensate petitioner to whom no fault can be attributed.
Otherwise, if the shop is not registered, then the presumption of negligence
applies.
2. In case a passenger dies by reason of the negligence
of the driver what are the four possible damages that may be recovered by the
heirs of the victim?
Answer: ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos ( now fifty thousand pesos), even though there
may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:(1) The defendant shall be
liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;(2)
If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent’s
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
3.What is the
effect if the lessor refuses to pay the lessee one-half of the value of the
useful improvements introduced to a land leased?
Answer:
The refusal of the lessor to pay the lessee one-half of the value of the useful
improvements gives rise to the right
of removal.
4. Sometime in
1956, Francisca Cardente, for and on behalf of her grandson, petitioner Ignacio
Cardente, who was then a minor, and now married to his co-petitioner, purchased
from Isidro Palanay one hectare of land. The property purchased is a part of a
9.2656-hectare parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (O.C.T.,
for short) No. P-1380 in Palanay's name. Immediately after the purchase, the
Cardentes took possession of the land and planted various crops and trees
thereon. They have been in continuous possession ever since, adverse to the
whole world. Unfortunately, however, the private document evidencing the sale of the one-hectare lot to petitioner
Ignacio Cardente was lost and never found despite diligent efforts exerted to
locate the same.
Some four years later, on August 18, 1960,
Isidro Palanay sold the entire property covered by O.C.T. No. P-1380, including
the one-hectare portion already sold to Cardente, this time to the private
respondents, Ruperto Rubin and his wife. The deed of sale was registered and a new title, Transfer Certificate of
Title (T.C.T., for short) No. 1173, was issued in favor of the Rubin spouses.
Notwithstanding the second sale, or
because of it, Isidro Palanay, with the written conforme of his wife, Josepha de Palanay, on December 9, 1972,
executed a public document in favor of petitioner Ignacio Cardente confirming
the sale to him (Cardente) in 1956 of
the one hectare portion. The deed of confirmation likewise states that the
subsequent vendee, respondent Ruperto Rubin, was informed by Palanay of the
first sale of the one-hectare portion to
Cardente.
By virtue of having the property titled in
the name of Ruperto Rubin, he now claims that he is the owner of the whole
property in question. Question: (a) Is the claim of Rubin correct? (b) Is this
a case of double sale? (c) In case it is, what principle of law will you apply
regarding double sale? Explain.
Answer: Admittedly, this case involves a double sale.
While the private respondents allegedly bought from Isidro Palanay on August
18, 1960 the entire property comprising 9.2656 hectares and covered by O.C.T.
No. P-1380, the petitioners, on the other hand, lay claim to one hectare
thereof which they undeniably purchased from the same vendor earlier, in 1956.
The conflict, therefore, falls under, and can be resolved by, Article 1544 of
the Civil Code which sets the rules on double
sales.
ART. 1544. If the same thing
should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred
to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it
should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription,
the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
It is undisputed that the private respondents, the second
vendees, registered the sale in their
favor whereas the petitioners, the first buyers, did not. But mere registration
of the sale is not enough. Good faith
must concur with the registration. Bad faith renders the registration nothing
but an exercise in futility. The law and jurisprudence are very clear on this
score.
The heart of the problem is whether or not the private
respondents acted in good faith when they registered the deed of sale dated August 18, 1960 more than six
months later, on March 7, 1961. Inextricably, the inquiry must be directed on
the knowledge, or lack of it, of the previous sale
of the one-hectare portion on the part of the second buyers at the time of
registration. The trial court found that the second vendees had such knowledge.
It is true that good faith is always presumed while bad
faith must be proven by the party alleging it. In this case, however, viewed in
the light of the circumstances obtaining, we have no doubt that the private
respondents' presumed good faith has been sufficiently overcome and their bad
faith amply established.
The "Confirmation Of A Deed Of Absolute Sale Of A Portion Of A Registered Agricultural
Land" executed by the late Ignacio Palanay on December 9, 1972 and which
was exhibited in the trial court below, admitted the sale of the one hectare portion to the petitioners sometime in
1956. The same deed likewise explicitly stated that the "fact of the
previous sale, was well known and
acknowledged by Mr. Ruperto Rubin (the private respondent)." These
recitals were further buttressed by Concepcion Salubo, a daughter of Isidro
Palanay, who testified that she knew of the previous sale of the one-hectare portion to petitioner Ignacio Cardente
and that private respondent Ruperto Rubin was properly informed of the said sale. On this regard, no ill-motive had been
attributed to the vendor Isidro Palanay and to his daughter Concepcion Salubo
for testifying the way they did -- against the private respondents. They were
disinterested persons who stood to gain nothing except, perhaps, the
satisfaction of setting the record straight, or, in the words of the seller,
"for the purpose of giving efficacy to the Deed of Sale I made to Ignacio Cardente which was made in a private
document x x x."
Further, the notorious and continuous possession and full
enjoyment by petitioners of the disputed one-hectare property long (four years)
before the private respondents purchased the same from Palanay bolsters the
petitioners' position. That possession would have been enough to arouse the
suspicion of the private respondents as to the ownership of the entire area
which they were about to purchase. Their failure to inquire and to investigate
the basis of the petitioners' actual occupation of the land forming a
substantial part of what they were buying militates against their posited lack
of knowledge of the first sale. "A
purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon
his guard and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that
there was no defect in the title of the vendor." We have warned time and
again that a buyer of real property which is in the possession of persons other
than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded
as a buyer in good faith.
The private respondents' avowals that they had never
known of the prior sale until the issues
were joined at the trial court, for, before that, they merely tolerated the
continued presence of the original occupants, Francisca and Eugenia Cardente,
and Ignacio, in the premises, out of simple pity for the two old women, is too
pat to be believed. For if these were so, the reason why the private
respondents' continued to tolerate the occupation by the petitioners of the
contested property even after the demise of the two old women escapes us.
Rubin's allegation that this was because they were still in good terms with the
petitioners is too lame an excuse to deserve even a scant consideration. The
private respondents' total lack of action against the actual occupants of a
good portion of the land described in their torrens title can only be construed
as acceptance on their part of the existence of the prior sale and their resignation to the fact that
they did not own the one-hectare portion occupied by the petitioners. Present
these facts, the foisted ignorance of the respondents as to the first sale is an empty pretense. Their seventeen
years of inaction and silence eloquently depict a realization of lack of right.
6.
.X died in 1955 with a will. In her
will, she devised one-half of a big parcel of land to her brothers, Y and Z.
and the other half to the grandniece, A, subject to the condition that upon A’s
death, whether before or after that of the testatrix, said one-half of the
property devised to her shall be delivered to Y and Z, or their heirs should
anyone of them die before X. After the will was admitted to probate, A demanded
for the partition of the property. Y and Z, however, contended that since she
is only a fiduciary heir or a usufructuary she cannot demand for the partition
of the property. Is this contention tenable?
Answer: This contention is untenable.
Art. 865 of the civil code provides that a fidiecomissary substitution shall
have no effect unless it is made expressly either by giving it such a name or
by imposing upon the first heir the absolute obligation to deliver the
inheritance to the second heir. The testamentary clause under consideration
does not cal the institution a fidiecomissary heir nor does it contain a clear
statement that A enjoys only usufructuary right, the naked ownership being
vested in the brothers of the testatrix. The will, therefore, establishes only
a simple or common substitution (substitution vulgar), the necessary result of
which is that A upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of an
undivided half of the property. Being a co-owner, she can therefore demand for
a partition of the property (Crisologo v. Singson, 4 Scra 491).
7.
A died in 1965 with a will. In the
will, he devised a house and lot to B as fiduciary heir to the latter’s son, C,
as fidiecomissary substitute, declaring that said property shall not be
alienated for 100 years. B died in 1975. May C now validly alienate the
property?
No. 3 of Art. 867 of the civil code
provides that provisions which contain a perpetual prohibition to alienate and
even a temporary one beyond the limit fixed in ART. 863 shall not take effect:
except for the two limitations which are (a) that the substitution must no go
beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted and (b) that both the
first heir and the second heir must be living at the time of the death of the
testator. It is evident that in testamentary dispositions which contain a
perpetual or temporary prohibition to alienate, neither one nor the other can
possibly be violated. They only limitation which is violated is that provided
in Art. 870 (i.e. the prohibition to alienate is good for 20 years. Beyond
that, it is void.
In the instant problem, C must
therefore still wait for 1985 before he can validly alienate the property.
8.
X died in 1960 with a will wherein he
instituted his mother, M, as universal heir. His estate consisted of properties
valued at P80,000. In 1962, M died intestate will all of these properties still
intact. There are now two claimants to these properties. They are A, maternal
aunt of X and B, paternal uncle of X. (A) suppose that X had inherited all of
these properties from his father, F, in 1955, to whom shall you adjudicate
them? (b) suppose that one-half of these properties had been acquired by X
through succession from his father, F, in 1955 and the other half through his
own effort or industry from 1955 to 1960, to whom shall you adjudicate them?
(a) one-half undivided share of all
the properties shall be adjudicated to A in accordance with the normal rules of
intestate succession and the other half undivided share to B in accordance with
art 891 of the civil code. The reason is that only one-half undivided portion
of the properties in the instant case is reservable. Under ART. 891, the law
requires that the ascendant-reservista should have inherited the property from
the descendant-propositus “by operation of law”. In testamentary succession,
“by operation of law” applies only to the transmission of the legitime and not
to the free portion. Therefore, only ½ undivided portion in the properties,
which is the legitime of M is reservable., while the other half which is the
free portion is the free property. Consequently, when M died in 1962, the
1/2undivided portion of said properties which is reservable, passed
automatically to B in accordance with Art. 891 while the other half which is
free passed to A in accordance with the normal rules of intestate succession.
(b) when M the reservista died in
1962 only ½ undivided share of all the properties which X originally acquired
from his father F by gratuitous title shall pass automatically and by operation
of law to B in accordance with art. 891 while the other half undivided share of
such properties as well as all of the properties which X originally acquired
through his effort shall pass to A in accordance with the normal rules of
intestate succession.
9. If
“A” buys a car from “B” and issues a check which when presented for payment is
dishonored, is “B” considered a person unlawfully deprived within the meaning
of Art. 559 of the Civil Code? Why?
ANSWER: No, because the subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted
to failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void but
merely allows the aggrieved party to sue for specific performance or rescission
(Ledesma v. CA, Sept. 1, 1992).
10. In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo
(“Pajuyo”) paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a
250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon City. Pajuyo then constructed a
house made of light materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the
house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.
On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and
private respondent Eddie Guevarra (“Guevarra”) executed a Kasunduan or
agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed Guevarra to live in the house
for free provided Guevarra would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of
the house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate the premises on
Pajuyo’s demand.
In September 1994, Pajuyo informed
Guevarra of his need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the house.
Guevarra refused.
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case
against Guevarra with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31
(“MTC”).
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that
Pajuyo had no valid title or right of possession over the lot where the house
stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set aside by Proclamation No.
137 for socialized housing. Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to
September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate with him. Guevarra
insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has valid title to the lot.
QUESTIONS: (1) In your judgment, who
has the better right of possession to the land in question? (2) In essence what
kind of civil law contract was entered between the parties? (3) One of the
defenses made by Guevarra is pari delicto, what is pari delicto? (4) Is pari
delicto applicable in ejectment cases? (5) What is a precarium?
ANSWER: (1) Pajuyo has the better right to possession by virtue of the
agreement. (2) It is not a commodatom, it is more of a landlord-tenancy
relationship (3) Pari Delicto is not applicable in ejectment cases (5)
Precarium is a tolerated use of a property. COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDDIE GUEVARRA, respondents. FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004], the SC decided as follows:”We do not subscribe
to the Court of Appeals’ theory that the Kasunduan is one of commodatum.
In a contract of commodatum, one of the parties delivers to
another something not consumable so that the latter may use the same for a
certain time and return it. An essential feature of commodatum
is that it is gratuitous. Another feature of commodatum is that the use
of the thing belonging to another is for a certain period.
Thus, the bailor cannot demand the return of the thing loaned until after
expiration of the period stipulated, or after accomplishment of the use for
which the commodatum is constituted. If
the bailor should have urgent need of the thing, he may demand its return for
temporary use. If the use of the thing is merely
tolerated by the bailor, he can demand the return of the thing at will, in
which case the contractual relation is called a precarium. Under the Civil Code, precarium is a kind
of commodatum.
The Kasunduan reveals that the accommodation accorded by Pajuyo
to Guevarra was not essentially gratuitous. While the Kasunduan did not
require Guevarra to pay rent, it obligated him to maintain the property in good
condition. The imposition of this obligation makes the Kasunduan a
contract different from a commodatum. The effects of the Kasunduan
are also different from that of a commodatum. Case law on ejectment has
treated relationship based on tolerance as one that is akin to a
landlord-tenant relationship where the withdrawal of permission would result in
the termination of the lease. The tenant’s withholding
of the property would then be unlawful. This is settled jurisprudence.
Even assuming that the relationship between Pajuyo and Guevarra is one
of commodatum, Guevarra as bailee would still have the duty to turn over
possession of the property to Pajuyo, the bailor. The obligation to deliver or
to return the thing received attaches to contracts for safekeeping, or contracts
of commission, administration and commodatum.
These contracts certainly involve the obligation to deliver or return the thing
received. X x x The Principle of Pari Delicto is not
Applicable to Ejectment Cases
The Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principle of pari
delicto to this case.
Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code embody
the principle of pari delicto. We explained the principle of pari
delicto in these words:
The rule of pari delicto is expressed in the maxims ‘ex dolo
malo non eritur actio’ and ‘in pari delicto potior est conditio
defedentis.’ The law will not aid either party to an illegal agreement. It
leaves the parties where it finds them.
The application of the pari delicto principle is not absolute, as
there are exceptions to its application. One of these exceptions is where the
application of the pari delicto rule would violate well-established
public policy.
In Drilon v. Gaurana, we
reiterated the basic policy behind the summary actions of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer. We held that:
It must be stated that the purpose of an action of forcible entry and
detainer is that, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by
strong hand, violence or terror. In affording this remedy of restitution the
object of the statute is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder
which would ensue from the withdrawal of the remedy, and the reasonable hope
such withdrawal would create that some advantage must accrue to those persons
who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of property, resort to
force to gain possession rather than to some appropriate action in the courts
to assert their claims. This is the philosophy at the foundation of all these
actions of forcible entry and detainer which are designed to compel the party
out of possession to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he
claims is his.
Clearly, the application of the principle of pari delicto to a
case of ejectment between squatters is fraught with danger. To shut out relief
to squatters on the ground of pari delicto would openly invite mayhem
and lawlessness. A squatter would oust another squatter from possession of the
lot that the latter had illegally occupied, emboldened by the knowledge that
the courts would leave them where they are. Nothing would then stand in the way
of the ousted squatter from re-claiming his prior possession at all cost.
Petty warfare over possession of properties is precisely what ejectment
cases or actions for recovery of possession seek to prevent.
Even the owner who has title over the disputed property cannot take the law
into his own hands to regain possession of his property. The owner must go to
court.
11. What
is the meaning of the “captain of the ship doctrine”? In one case, it was made
as a defense in a medical negligence case that it has long been abandoned by
U.S. jurisprudence, and hence the Philippines must abandon that too. Will this
defense be valid? Are we bound by American case law?
ANSWER: The Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine
was discussed in McConnell v. Williams (65 A 2d 243 [1949]), where the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that under this doctrine,
a surgeon is likened to a captain of the ship, in that it is his duty to
control everything going on in the operating room. That there is a trend in
American jurisprudence to do away with the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine
does not mean that this Court will ipso facto follow said trend. Due
regard for the peculiar factual circumstances obtaining in this case justify
the application of the Captain-of-the-Ship doctrine. ROGELIO
E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the
minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS, and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DE LOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and
DR. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents. FIRST DIVISION [G.R.
No. 124354. April 11, 2002]
12. Francisco is a 76 year old man, single and
lives in his house with Cirila, who took care of him until he died at the age
of 90. Evidence showed that Cirila is not only a household help, but also
“sleeps” with Francisco, though they never had a child of their own. On January
24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument
denominated “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,” in which he ceded a portion
of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to
Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the
larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of “the faithful services that Cirila
had rendered over the past ten (10) years.” The deed was notarized by Atty.
Juan Luna and later registered by Cirila as its
absolute owner.
Questions: (1) Is the “donation inter vivos”
valid? (2) If in case it is valid, how shall said property be distributed?
Explain.
ANSWER: “Respondents having proven
by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that
the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code”. The property therefore must be distributed pursuant to law in
favor of Francisco’s heirs, his sister and his niece. (CIRILA ARCABA,
petitioner,
vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C.
TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE,
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE,
respondents. SECOND
DIVISION
[G.R. No.
146683. November 22, 2001])
13. PROBLEM: What is the prescriptive period for
reconveyance of registered property based on constructive trust?
ANSWER: Ten years.
‘An action for reconveyance based on
an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not
otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage
at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only
discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, which states that the
prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona v.
de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence
Section 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming into
effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this
juncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have ‘no
counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the
latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive
period for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under
false pretenses.
“An action for reconveyance has its
basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
provides:
‘In all cases of registration
procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies
against the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of
any innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original petition or
application, x x x.’
“This provision should be read in
conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:
‘Article 1456. If property is
acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes.’
“The law thereby creates the
obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144 (2) of the
Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title. In the present
case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235 was filed on June 4, 1975, it
was well-within the prescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of the
issuance of “Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 on September 17, 1970.”
(All Italics Supplied).
‘Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
1) Upon a written contract;
2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment;
PURITA SALVATIERRA, ELENITA
SALVATIERRA NUNEZ, ANSELMO SALVATIERRA, JR., EMELITA SALVATIERRA, and ROMEL
SALVATIERRA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.
LINO LONGALONG and PACIENCIA MARIANO, respondents. FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 107797. August 26, 1996]
14. The original owner of the property
in dispute, Faustino Maningo, is the son-in-law of the original defendant, Jose
Deguilmo. The former is married to Quirina Deguilmo, daughter of said
defendant.
On September 21,
1948, Faustino Maningo sold by pacto de retro the subject
property to spouses Pedro and Teresa Villamor (Exhibit 1).
After the sale,
Faustino and Quirina Maningo left for Mindanao. Sometime in January, 1950,
Faustino returned to Cebu because the Villamor spouses needed money. However,
since Faustino had no money, he requested his father-in-law, Jose Deguilmo, to
buy the land from the Villamors. On January 10, 1950, the Villamor spouses
allegedly sold the land in dispute to defendant Jose Deguilmo in a private
document of sale (Exhibit 2). Immediately thereafter, Jose Deguilmo took
possession of the property, introduced improvements and paid taxes thereon.
Meantime, in 1953, Faustino Maningo
abandoned his wife and lived with a concubine. His wife and their children had
to return to Cebu where they lived and were supported by Jose Deguilmo.
Faustino did not return to Cebu for more than twenty (20) years. A case for
concubinage was filed against him but it was somehow dismissed.
In 1973, Faustino Maningo returned to
Cebu and allegedly tried to forcibly take possession of the property from his
father-in-law although he did not succeed. Nevertheless, Faustino proceeded to
execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff (now petitioner) Marcelino Kiamco.
The latter, a resident of Carmen, Cebu, allegedly knew, at the time of the
sale, that defendant, Jose Deguilmo, had already been in possession of the
disputed property for more than twenty (20) years. After the said sale,
Marcelino Kiamco attempted to take possession of the property but was not
successful because of defendant's refusal to give up the land. He, however, did
not file yet any action for ejectment or unlawful detainer against the
defendant. Seven (7) months after the execution of the alleged sale, Marcelino
Kiamco filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against Jose Deguilmo before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
The trial court ruled, among other
things, that Faustino Maningo was still the owner of the subject property on
October 2, 1973, when he executed the deed of sale in favor of Marcelino
Kiamco; that the deed of sale executed by the Villamor spouses in favor of Jose
Deguilmo is null and void; and that Jose Deguilmo had not acquired the subject
property by acquisitive prescription.
Question: (1)Is the trial court
correct?
(2) When did the New Civil Code take
effect?
(3) Under the old code, what is the
period of acquisitive prescription?
It is undisputed
that after the Deed of Sale (Exh. 2) was executed on January 10, 1950, Jose
Deguilmo immediately took possession of the property in dispute in the concept
of an owner, exercised acts of dominion and introduced improvements thereon,
and enjoyed the fruits thereof, continuously, peacefully, and adversely for
more than twenty years. It is therefore, clear, that such adverse possession
started on January 10, 1950, which is before the effectivity of the New Civil
Code (August 30, 1950). Pursuant to Art. 1116 of the New Civil Code, which
provides for transitional rules on prescription, and which reads: "Prescription
already running before the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by laws
previously in force; but if since the time this Code took effect the entire
period herein required for prescription should lapse, the present Code shall be
applicable, even though by the former laws a longer period might be
required," the law to be applied is the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190).
Inasmuch as here the prescription was already running before August 30, 1950,
it follows that only ten (10) years would be required, because under the Code
of Civil Procedure, regardless of good faith or
bad faith, the period for acquiring land by prescription was only
ten (10) years (Sec. 41, Act 190, Code of Civil Procedure; Osorio vs. Tan
Jongko, 51 O.G. 6221). It therefore follows necessarily that in 1960, Jose
Deguilmo had already acquired the subject property by acquisitive prescription.
Thus, Marcelino Kiamco should have lost the case, unless of course, the land
was covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title. As found by the respondent
Court, the evidence shows that the land is not a titled property.
The period of ten (10) years must
necessarily start from January, 1950, and not from August 1950, since here, the
prescriptive period under the old law was shorter. Had the period under the old
law been longer, it is the shorter period under the New Civil Code that should
apply, but this time, the period should commence from the date of effectivity
of the New Civil Code – August 30, 1950 – in view of the clause "but if
since the time this Code took effect ..."
With the facts obtaining in the
present case, it is immaterial whether the property in dispute was possessed by
Jose Deguilmo in good or bad faith. His adverse possession for more than twenty
years is more than sufficient for purposes of acquisitive prescription under
the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, even if the alleged Deed of Sale executed on
January 10, 1950 (Exh. 2) was void ab initio, as claimed by
petitioner (because Faustino Maningo could still repurchase the property until
1951, thus the Villamor spouses were not yet the owners thereof), what is
important is that Jose Deguilmo immediately took possession of the property and
continuously and adversely possessed and enjoyed it for more than twenty years.
Besides, as correctly found by the respondent court, if Faustino claims that
the Deed of Sale of January 10, 1950 was not authentic and valid, why did he
not disturb Jose Deguilmo from 1950 until 1973; “it is hardly the actuation of
an owner for Faustino Maningo to do what he did for the last 24 years, if as
the Villamor spouses said Faustino Maningo had already repurchased the property
in 1949."
Jose Deguilmo (and now his heirs, the
private respondents), no doubt, had already acquired ownership of the subject
property on the basis of acquisitive prescription. MARCELINO KIAMCO,
petitioner-movant, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUANA DEGUILMO-GRAPE,
QUIRINA DEGUILMO-MANINGO, ANTONIA DEGUILMO, and JUAN DEGUILMO, respondents.
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 96865. July 3, 1992]
15. Is an action for
partition prescriptible? Can it be barred by laches? Is there an exception to
this?
An
action for partition by its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred
by laches x x x. The only exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an
action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the
properties sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner at
which instance the remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action
for partition but for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive
prescription
16.
Miss Y worked in the U.S. for 20
years. She is very generous to her relatives in Davao City. She bought a city
property worth 5 million with an area of 6,000 sq. m., and accommodated her
cousin Mr. X to build his house thereon.
Mr.
X built a house worth 300t. Before the house was built, Miss Y, had them agree
in writing that any relative can use the land for free, build whatever
structure they can afford and that they must maintain a good relationship,
otherwise, they shall all be evicted from the land.
When
Miss Y retired, she returned to the Philippines and lived in the house of Mr.
X. Soon, disagreements arose, to an extent that their relationship turned sour
and irreconciliable.
Miss
Y then demanded that Mr. X vacate her land. Mr. X refused and will vacate only
if he is reimbursed the present market value of his house which had already
been assessed at 500t.
Questions:
(1) In essence, what law governs their relationship? (2) Will you consider Mr.
X as a builder in good faith? (3) Is Miss Y correct in evicting Mr. X from her
land? (4) Is Mr. X correct in demanding that he will not vacate unless he is
reimbursed the value of his house? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. The Law on Usufruct particularly Article 579 of the
NCC shall govern the relationship Miss Y and Mr. X.
“
Art.
579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful
improvements or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he
does not alter its form or substance; but he shall have no right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property. (487) “
2. Mr. X cannot be considered a builder in good faith
because he knew that has no title of ownership over the land where he built the
house.
3. Yes, Miss Y is correct in evicting Mr. X because he
violated the conditions of the usufruct.
4. No, Mr. X cannot demand for reimbursement of the value
of the house because he is not a builder in good faith. Pursuant to Article 579
of the New Civil Code. The usufructuary shall have no right to be indemnified
on the improvements on the property held in usufruct. He may however remove
such improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the
property.
10.
Tuatis bought a 300 square meter land
from Tuatis for P10,000 on installment basis. She paid only P4,000. The
condition of the sale is that she will pay a down payment of P3,000 and the
balance shall be paid on monthly installment until the whole consideration is
paid.
Meanwhile, Tuatis built a P500,000
worth of house on said strip.
As Tuatis did not pay the whole
amount, Visminda the owner of the lot, demanded that Tuatis should vacate the
land, and remove her concrete house thereon.
Tuatis on the other hand, demanded
that she will pay the balance price of P6,000 but Visminda refused to receive
the amount, as another buyer is willing to buy the land at P300,000.
Accordingly, Vizminda has two
options. What are these two options under the law? Discuss each option.
ANSWER:
Taking
into consideration the provisions of the Deed of Sale by Installment and
Article 448 of the Civil Code, Visminda has the following options:
Under the first option, Visminda may
appropriate for herself the building on the subject property after indemnifying
Tuatis for the necessary and useful expenses the latter incurred for said
building, as provided in Article 546 of the Civil Code.
Under the second option, Visminda may choose
not to appropriate the building and, instead, oblige Tuatis to pay the present
or current fair value of the land. The P10,000.00 price of the
subject property, as stated in the Deed of Sale on Installment , shall no
longer apply, since Visminda will be obliging Tuatis to pay for the price of
the land in the exercise of Visminda’s rights under Article 448 of the Civil
Code, and not under the said Deed. Tuatis’ obligation will then be statutory,
and not contractual, arising only when Visminda has chosen her option under
Article 448 of the Civil Code.
Still under the second option, if the present
or current value of the land, the subject property herein, turns out to be
considerably more than that of the building built thereon, Tuatis cannot be obliged
to pay for the subject property, but she must pay Visminda reasonable rent for
the same. Visminda and Tuatis must agree on the terms of the lease; otherwise,
the court will fix the terms.
17. Mr.
X is an owner of a land fronting the Sulu Sea. By the action of the waves of
the sea, sand and silt were deposited, increasing his land area to about 2,000
square meters. Mr. X then planted coconut trees on said land, and applied for
registration of said land before the DENR. Questions: (1) What law shall govern
this accretion caused by the action of the sea? (2) Per jurisprudence, what
kind of “owner” is Mr. X with respect to the alluvial deposit? (3) Shall you
consider X as the owner ipso facto of the accretion? (4) In essence, who owns
the accretion? (5) Is there a possibility for X to own the accretion? Explain.
ANSWERS:
1. The
Spanish Law Of Waters of 1866 shall govern the accretion caused by the actions
of the sea.
2. Per
jurisprudence, Mr. X is considered as a littoral owner .
3. X
cannot be considered as ipso facto owner of the accretion.
4. The
accretion in this case is owned by the state because land added to the shores
by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part
of the public domain.
5. Yes,
there could be a possibility for X to own the accretion. When the accretion are
not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for establishment of special
industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare them to be
property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment
thereof.
18. What is a “forced lease”? Of
what relevance is this under Art. 448 of the civil code? How is the fairness of
Art. 448 explained by Manresa?
ANSWER:
A “ forced lease” is a mandatory
lease. It is a lease contract between parties created by operation of law where
one is required to pay rent for a certain property owned by another.
Under article 448, if the value
of the land is more than the value of the building, the builder in good faith cannot
be forced by the owner to buy the land. The remedy is a forced lease.
The rationale of Article 448,
NCC is that where the builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners, and it becomes necessary to protect
the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the
land. In view of the impracticability of creating a state of forced
co-ownership, the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the
land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of proper indemnity,
or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower the
proper rent. He cannot refuse to exercise the option, because his right is
older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.
19.
Is a provision in a foreigner’s wills
to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not with his national law valid?
Problem No. 5. On 25 October 2004, Maria
Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito
R. Pimentel docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On
7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and
trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v.
Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36
of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On
11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that
since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
20. Explain the latin
maxim: Genus nunguan perit. What is the relevance of this latin maxim to the
“obligation to deliver a generic thing”?
ANSWER: Under Article 1263 of the Civil Code, “[i]n an obligation to
deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind
does not extinguish the obligation.” If the obligation is generic in the sense
that the object thereof is designated merely by its class or genus without any
particular designation or physical segregation from all others of the same
class, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind even without the
debtor’s fault and before he has incurred in delay will not have the effect of
extinguishing the obligation. This rule is based on the
principle that the genus of a thing can never perish. Genus nunquan perit. An
obligation to pay money is generic; therefore, it is not excused by fortuitous
loss of any specific property of the debtor. (Gaisano
Cagayan v. Insurance Company of North America,June 8, 2006)
21. “The plaintiff
rented on March 22, 1985 the Safety Deposit Box No. 54 of the defendant bank at
its Binondo Branch located at the Fookien Times Building, Soler St., Binondo,
Manila wherein he placed his collection of stamps. The said safety deposit box
leased by the plaintiff was at the bottom or at the lowest level of the safety
deposit boxes of the defendant bank at its aforesaid Binondo Branch.
During the floods
that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into the defendant bank’s
premises, seeped into the safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff and
caused, according to the plaintiff, damage to his stamps collection. The
defendant bank rejected the plaintiff’s claim for compensation for his damaged
stamps collection, so, the plaintiff instituted an action for damages against
the defendant bank.
The defendant bank
denied liability for the damaged stamps collection of the plaintiff on the
basis of the ‘Rules and Regulations Governing the Lease of Safe Deposit Boxes’
(Exhs. “A-1”, “1-A”), particularly paragraphs 9 and 13, which reads (sic):
‘9.
The liability of the Bank, by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise
of the diligence to prevent the opening of the safe by any person other than
the Renter, his authorized agent or legal representative;
x x x
13.
The Bank is not a depository of the contents of the safe and it has neither the
possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no interest whatsoever in
said contents, except as herein provided, and it assumes absolutely no
liability in connection therewith.’
The
defendant bank also contended that its contract with the plaintiff over safety
deposit box No. 54 was one of lease and not of deposit and, therefore, governed
by the lease agreement (Exhs. “A”, “L”) which should be the applicable law;
that the destruction of the plaintiff’s stamps collection was due to a calamity
beyond its control; and that there was no obligation on its part to notify the
plaintiff about the floodwaters that inundated its premises at Binondo branch
which allegedly seeped into the safety deposit box leased to the plaintiff.
The
bank contends further that it is not a depository of the contents of the Safe
and it has neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no
interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein provided, and it assumes
absolutely no liability in connection therewith,”are valid since said
stipulations are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy; and
d) there is no concrete evidence to show that SBTC failed
to exercise the required diligence in maintaining the safety deposit box; what
was proven was that the floods of 1985 and 1986, which were beyond the control
of SBTC, caused the damage to the stamp collection; said floods were fortuitous
events which SBTC should not be held liable for since it was not shown to have
participated in the aggravation of the damage to the stamp collection; on the
contrary, it offered its services to secure the assistance of an expert in
order to save most of the stamps, but the appellee refused; appellee must then
bear the loss under the principle of “res perit domino.”
Questions: (1) Is the
bank liable to plaintiff for damages? (2) What kind of contract is the “rental
of a safety deposit box”? (3) Are provisions “9” and “13” valid under the
provisions of the Civil Code? (4) what do you understand by res perit domino?
(5) Is the argument of the bank that it cannot be held liable since the flood
somehow is a fortuitous event? Explain.
Answer: LUZAN
SIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
respondents. THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 102970. May 13, 1993]
22.
Can the adopter rescind the adoption of the adopted? How about the adopted can
it file an action to have his adoption rescinded? ON what grounds?
ANSWER: There is no more provision of law which allows the rescission of
adoption by the. However the adopted may file a petition to rescind the
adoption on grounds of
1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite
having undergone counseling;
2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3) sexual assault or violence; or
4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
23. Amos G.
Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he
had five legitimate children; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived
him, he had three legitimate children and finally, he had three illegitimate
children.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in
trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and
(c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go
to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward
A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The law of Texas did not provide for
legitimes for illegitimate children.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that
they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Question: What law is applicable on the matter? Will you grant the
shares for the illegitimate children?
ANSWER: It is basic that successional rights, amount of succession and
intrinsic validity of the will shall be governed by the national law of the
decedent, hence Texas law shall govern. There being no legitimes under Texas
law, then the shares of the illegitimate children cannot be granted.
Problem No. 14. Is a provision in a foreigner’s wills to the effect that
his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not
with his national law valid?
24. Petitioner
and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and
respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel[4] at the Manila City Hall, and
through a subsequent church wedding[5] at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong
Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.[6] Out of their union, a child
was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to
respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on
Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted
that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated
and still subsists up to the present.[8]
As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity,
petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people
around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or
things.
QUESTIONS: (a) Define psychological incapacity as contemplated in Art.
36
(b) What are the so called “Molina guidelines”?
(c) given the above premises, will you declare the marriage as null and
void? Explain.
Psychological incapacity, which a ground for annulment of marriage
(which is different from divorce), contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;
not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of
the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.
Among the grounds for annulment of marriage, psychological incapacity is
the more (if not the most) commonly used. It is also one of the more
controversial provisions of the Family Code (Article 36). The guidelines
(shortened here) in the interpretation and application of Article 36 were
handed down by the Supreme Court in Molina:
1. The plaintiff (the spouse who filed the petition in court) has burden
of showing the nullity of the marriage. Our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family, so any doubt is resolved in favor of the
existence/continuation of the marriage.
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven
by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like
the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts”
cannot be accepted as root causes.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
8. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
In Antonio vs. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006), the
Supreme Court sustained the nullity of the marriage based on the psychological
incapacity of the wife (respondent). As concluded by the psychiatrist, the
wife’s repeated lying is abnormal and pathological, and amounts to
psychological incapacity
25. What is a
prejudicial question? What are its elements? Is there an existence of a
prejudicial question in the above-stated problem? Explain.
ANSWER: A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
There is no prejudicial question in the above-stated problem. The
elements of parricide are not similar to declaration of nullity.
27. Can the
adopter rescind the adoption of the adopted? How about the adopted can it file
an action to have his adoption rescinded? ON what grounds?
ANSWER: There is no more provision of law which allows the rescission of
adoption by the. However the adopted may file a petition to rescind the
adoption on grounds of
1) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite
having undergone counseling;
2) attempt on the life of the adoptee;
3) sexual assault or violence; or
4) abandonment or failure to comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interests of the child, shall not be subject
to rescission by the adopter. However, the adopter may disinherit the adoptee
for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
28. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June
1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose
parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim
registered the children to make it appear that they were the children's
parents. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude
P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the
clinic of petitioner. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought
to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.[3] Michael was 11
days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner's clinic. His date of birth is 1
August 1983.[4]The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were
their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the surname
"Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28
November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario
(Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter,
petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty[5] given
under Republic Act No. 8552[6] (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the
birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions
for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL
PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the
petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle
and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent.[7] Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as
shown in his Affidavit of Consent.[8] Petitioner's husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
Given
the above facts, as judge will you grant the adoption? Explain.
ANSWER: The adoption shall not be granted. Under the law, adoption should
be made JOINTLY by the husband and wife. IN this case, the husband only
executed the affidavit of consent, which is not the JOINT ADOPTION contemplated
by law.
29.
Can the SB declare
a property as nuisance per se and order its condemnation?
Respondents
can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v.
Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is
a legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a
nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary
abatement without judicial intervention.
The provincial governor,
district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy
private property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any
judicial proceedings whatever under the pretense that such private property
constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in navigable rivers is
not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per
accidens where it endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property
by causing water to become stagnant. (Monteverde v. Generoso, supra).
While
the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local
Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so
adjudged by judicial determination.
[Municipal councils] do
not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when
such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra
judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its
nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the
ordinary courts of law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the
plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry . . . .
If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question
cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is
entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo
Cold Storage v. Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).
Petitioner
was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit
from the Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was
effected. It was not squatting on public land. Its property was not of trifling
value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to
decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was
no compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent
public officials of the Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their
authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building. They had deprived
petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner
filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure
the defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a
fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to demolish without a
judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
For
the precipitate demolition, therefore, petitioner should be entitled to just
compensation, the amount of which is for the Trial Court to determine. We are
not inclined to grant petitioner damages, however, as it simply ignored the
demand to remove or relocate its quonset building.
G.R. No. 95279 July
25, 1991
ESTATE OF GREGORIA
FRANCISCO, herein represented by SILVESTRE F. TAN, Administrator, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SALVADOR A. MEMORACION, in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan Province,
Branch 2, MUNICIPALITY OF ISABELA, Basilan Province, herein represented by
BENJAMIN VALENCIA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, Isabela, Basilan
Province, ROGELIO L. IGOT, FELICISIMO PIOQUINTO, DANIEL PADINAS, ANTONIO
CABANGON, FELIX ROXAS, BENJAMIN FERRER, GREGORIO TABADA, EFREN DELOS REYES,
FLORENCIO HUGO, JESUS FRANCISCO, ALFREDO TUBILAG, PABLO ANDRES, respondents.
30.
