EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3144               November 19, 1907
CARMEN AYALA DE ROXAS and PEDRO P. ROXAS, plaintiffs,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA and ROBERT G. DIECK, as city engineer, defendants.
Del-Pan, Ortigas and Fisher, for plaintiffs.
Modesto Reyes, for defendants.

ARELLANO, C.J.:

The defendants' demurred to the amended complaint having been overruled, an answer was presented, and the trial of the case proceeded with.

Briefly, the subject of this action may be stated as follows:

1. That on the 15th of January, 1906, the plaintiff, as owner of the property situated on the Escolta, district of Binondo, city of Manila, the eastern boundary of which adjoins the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon to the extent of 23.50 meters, the total area of the ground being 658.19 square meters, applied to the city engineer, Robert G. Dieck, the defendant herein, for a license to construct a terrace over "the strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her"; but the defendant refused to grant the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace.

2. That a similar petition was addressed to the Municipal Board of the city of Manila on the 30th of said month and year, and it also was denied.

3. That, as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because "the said defendants pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years."

4. That the strip in question was occupied by a two-storey building constructed more than seventy years ago.

It appears from the evidence:

First. That the plaintiff's ownership of the whole ground and of the strip in question is beyond all doubt, both by reason of her title thereto and the entry thereof in the registry of property, and by the acknowledgment thereof made by the city itself when obtaining by means of condemnation proceedings a portion of the same property adjoining the public road.

Second. That as a matter of fact, the license which the plaintiff, using her right of ownership, requested for the construction of a terrace on the strip of 3 meters adjoining the canal of San Jacinto or Sibacon, was denied; both parties agreeing that the denial was due to the intent to reserve the said strip for the establishment of a public easement, although the opposing witnesses did not agree as to the special easement intended to be established.

Third. That it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to had not been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.

Fourth. That according to Engineer Dieck, a defendant, the purpose of the city was to use the said strip of 3 meters as a place for discharging and landing goods, and as a place of shelter for shipwrecked persons and for fishermen, and to devote it also, together with other strips along the canal, by the gradual acquisition of land, to a towpath for craft passing through the canal; that a building line has been established by the Municipal Board along the Sibacon Creek leaving a strip of 3 meters within which, according to ordinances, no constructions would be permitted; that such is the purpose and the intent on which the existing ordinances are based. But John Tuther, the secretary of the Municipal Board, declares that, when Ordinance No. 78 was under discussion, he does not recall having heard any of the members of the board make reference to a towpath nor did he ever hear anything said with reference to the purpose to which the strip of 3 meters mentioned in Ordinance No. 78 was to be devoted, though he believes that, by thus leaving a strip of 3 meters, it would be easier to prevent collisions; that it would facilitate navigation, and that it had never been the intention of the Board to indemnify the owners of such strips of 3 meters by reason of the use which parties landing thereon may make of the same.

Fifth. That, as stated in the brief of the defendants, "the intention of the Municipal Board, when denying the permit asked for by the plaintiff, has never been to establish any way whatever along the Sibacon Creek so that said plaintiff could, if she chose to, close her property with walls or the like perpendicularly to said creek, that is, over the two lines perpendicular to said creek, provided she does not close or build over the 3-meter space running along the creek," which space is subject, as stated in the evidence submitted by the defendants, to the "easement of public use for the general interest of navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage," citing the Law of Waters and the Civil Code.

Sixth. And that the result is, according to No. 19 of the statement of facts of the complaint, "that the plaintiff shall only be able to use said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as the general public, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of said strip of the ground which the plaintiff and the former owners of the same have enjoyed as such owners quietly and peacefully during more than seventy years."

What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to the time when they applied for a license to construct a terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with the intention of establishing a public easement provided for in an ordinance of their own which they consider is pursuant to the provisions of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code in force.

In the decision entered by this court on the 5th of May, 1906, regarding the demurrer, the following was set forth:

The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866, is developed in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on behalf of which the easement is supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for flotation, by article 162; for salvage, by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in all of them the owner of the riverside property supports the easement "upon being previously indemnified for loss and damage." (Folio 41.)

Said zone for public use, the same as a towpath, is solely available for the purposes of navigation, flotation, fishing, and salvage, being closed to any other use which be attempted; therefore, it is erroneous to pretend that the right of the owner of the property bordering upon the stream can be reduced to the level of the public right; on the contrary he should only be called upon to bear those burdens which are in the general interest, but not without prior, or subsequently indemnity. (Folio 43.)

If as affirmed in statement No. 4, and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon Creek is a canal — let us grant that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority — and that under the name of a public wharf, which is the largest in area, it is desired to establish a towpath, which is the smallest, it must be remembered that the law does not grant it along navigable canals (art. 157), and, at all events, the establishment thereof must be preceded by the corresponding indemnity. (Arts. 154 and 157.)

The matter at issue herein being the enforcement of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code, it is not out of place nor untimely, even now, to point out the administrative law which ought to have been applied had this act of the city of Manila been carried out by the late ayuntamiento during the former sovereignty; an administrative law which, owing to its having been so often repeated, is now raised to the rank of an incontrovertible principle of law on the matter.

The powers of the administration do not extend to the establishment of new easements upon private property but simply to preserve old ones, whenever a recent and easily proven usurpation exists. (Decision of January 23, 1866.) lawphil.net

Ayuntamientos are not authorized to impose an easement upon private property; therefore, any order thus given can not be held to have been issued in the exercise of their lawful powers. (Decision of July 28, 1866.)

Administrative action for the recovery of a public easement which has been usurped by a constructive work of private ownership can only be taken when such usurpation is of recent date and easily proven.

When real rights are concerned an ayuntamiento may prosecute such actions as it may consider itself entitled to, for the possession or ownership in accordance with law. (Decision of October 26, 1866.)

This doctrine will be found far more vigorous at present upon reference to the principles of the law now in force.

According to article 349 of the Civil Code, no one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent authority and with sufficient cause of public utility, always after proper indemnity; if this requisite has not been fulfilled the courts must protect, and eventually restore possession to the injured party.

Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the due process of law in order to deprive a person of his property is, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, reserved to the judicial authority. The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance whereby a person may be deprived of property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without previously indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law.1awphil.net

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested. The question involved here is not the actual establishment of an easement which might be objected to by an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it is not simply a measure in connection with building regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due process of law, real rights which are attached to the right of ownership.

When . . . any corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, and the court, on trial, finds the allegations of the complaint to be true, it may, if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts of law, render a judgment granting a peremptory order against the defendant, commanding him, immediately after the receipt of such order, or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the plaintiff. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec 222.)

Therefore, we hereby command the defendants, the city of Manila, and Robert G. Dieck, as city engineer, or whomsoever may now be acting as such, to immediately issue a license in favor of the plaintiff herein, Doña Carmen Ayala de Roxas, to construct the terrace as aforesaid in accordance with the plan and specification as per Exhibit A, the said defendants to pay the costs of these proceedings. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-46963 March 14, 1994
GLORIA A. FERRER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO BAUTISTA, MARIANO BALANAG, AND MAGDALENA DOMONDON, respondents.
Fortunato F.L. Viray, Jr. for petitioner.
Agaton D. Yaranon, Jr., for private respondent.

VITUG, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the order, dated 11 December 1976, of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of La Union, Branch III, dismissing petitioner's complaint for Quieting of Title to Real Property, as well as its order of 03 May 1977, denying the motion for reconsideration.

Pursuant to this Court's Resolution, dated 19 August 1977 (p. 4, Rollo), petitioner was allowed to file the instant petition under Republic Act No. 5440 considering that only questions of law had been raised.

On 03 August 1978, the Court dismissed the petition for lack of interest due to the failure of petitioner's counsel to submit the requisite memorandum in support of the petition (p. 58, Rollo). In a Resolution, dated 28 September 1978 (p. 63, Rollo), however, the Court resolved to reconsider the dismissal and to reinstate the petition.

Under controversy is a strip of land south of Lot 1980 of the Cadastral survey of Aringay, La Union. Petitioner claims its ownership by virtue of accretion, she being the owner of Lot 1980 covered by TCT No. T-3280, which is immediately north of the land in question. On the other hand, private respondents equally assert ownership over the property on account of long occupation and by virtue of Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the name of respondent Magdalena Domondon, pursuant to Free Patent No. 309504 issued on 24 January 1966 (p. 29, Rollo).

On 23 March 1976, petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer filed a complaint with Branch III of the then Court of First Instance of La Union to "Quiet Title to Real Property" against herein respondents Mariano Balanag and Magdalena Domondon. The case was denominated Civil Case No. A-514.

Prior to Civil Case No. A-514, petitioner had also filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch III, a complaint for reivindicacion (Civil Case No. A-86), dated 25 November 1965, against private respondents. Herein respondent Judge, who also handled the case, dismissed, on 10 February 1976, the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the court had no authority to cancel or annul the decree and the title issued by the Director of Lands on the basis of a mere collateral attack (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

On 11 March 1976, private respondents also moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 514-A on the following grounds, to wit:

1) Gloria A. Ferrer's lack of personality to file and prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;

2) Civil Case 514-A is barred by prior judgment;

3) Lack of sufficient averments to constitute a cause of action; and

4) Civil Case No. 514-A, is a collateral attack on the Free Patent Decree No. 309504 and O.C. of Title No. F-168 (Annex "B," pp. 17-21). (p. 66, Rollo.)

On 07 December 1976, Judge Antonio G. Bautista issued an order
(pp. 23-24, Record on Appeal), dismissing petitioner's complaint, ratiocinating, thus —

This has reference to the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants, through counsel. The plaintiff filed an Answer to the Motion to Dismiss also through counsel.

The subject of the present action for Quieting of Title to Real Property, is covered by Free Patent No. 309504 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-168, in the names of the defendants. However, the plaintiff alleged in her Complaint that said Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title were secured through fraud, etc., on January 24, 1966, for which reason, they are null and void. In view thereof, while the plaintiff filed the present action ostensibly to Quiet Title of her alleged real property, it is in reality for the annulment or revocation of the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title of the defendants. The observation of the Court is clinched by prayer (a) of the plaintiff's complaint, i.e., "That Patent Title No. 168 be declared revoked and cancelled as null and void from the Records of the Office of the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, La Union, etc." Consequently, the present action is untenable because it constitute a collateral or indirect attach on the Free Patent and Original Certificate of Title of the defendants. That is so, because it was held in the case of Samonte, et al. vs. Sambelon, et al., L-12964, February 29, 1960, that like a decree, a Patent cannot be attacked collaterally.

Furthermore, the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants because the Patent title issued in favor of the Firmalos (defendants here) by the Director of Lands is by now already indefeasible due to the lapse of one year following the entry of the decree of registration in the records of the register of deeds (Firmalos vs. Tutaan, No. L-35408, October 27, 1973).

WHEREFORE, the Court is constrained to order dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. There is no pronouncement as to damages and costs. (p. 33, Rollo.)

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the court in its order of 03 May 1977 (p. 38, Record on Appeal).

Hence this petition.

Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors on the part of respondent judge:

I. In not finding and declaring that Gloria A. Ferrer has legal personality to prosecute Civil Case No. 514-A;

II. In not finding and declaring that Civil Case No. 514-A has stated sufficient cause of action;

III. In not finding and declaring that petitioner Gloria A. Ferrer's title to the land is beclouded by the contrary claim of the private respondents thereto; and

IV. In outright dismissing Civil Case No. 514-A on the ground of collateral attack on Free Patent Decree No. 309504 being an abuse of judicial discretion and an excess of his jurisdiction. (p. 13, Rollo.)

The petition has merit.

Article 457 of the Civil Code, under which petitioner claims ownership over the dispute parcel of land, provides:

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

Undoubtedly, plaintiff is the lawful owner of the accretion, she being the registered owner of Lot 1980 which adjoins the alluvial property. Parenthetically, the same finding has also been made by the trial court in Civil Case No. A-86 (p. 29, Rollo).

Alluvion gives to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion which is gradually received from the effects of the current of waters (Art. 457, Civil Code; Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37; Cureg vs. IAC, 177 SCRA 313). The rationale for the rule is to provide some kind of compensation to owners of land continually exposed to the destructive force of water and subjected to various easements (Agustin vs. IAC, 187 SCRA 218; Binalay vs. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374).

The Director of Lands has no authority to grant a free patent over land that has passed to private ownership and which has thereby ceased to be public land. Any title thus issued or conveyed by him would be null and void (Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 37). The nullity arises, not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is no longer under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, the latter's authority being limited only to lands of public dominion and not those that are privately owned (Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793).

Herein private respondents, therefore, acquired no right or title over the disputed land by virtue of the free patent since at the time it was issued in 1966, it was already private property and not a part of the disposable land of the public domain.

Although, ordinarily, a title becomes incontrovertible one year after it is issued pursuant to a public grant, the rule does not apply when such issuance is null and void. An action to declare the nullity of that void title does not prescribe (Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra); in fact, it is susceptible to direct, as well as to collateral, attack (Estoesta, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 203).

Private respondents contend that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years. The ten-year prescriptive period is applicable to an action for reconveyance if, indeed, it is based on an implied or constructive trust. Article 1456 of the Civil Code, upon which a constructive trust can be predicated, cannot be invoked, however, since the public grant and the title correspondingly issued to private respondents that can create that juridical relationship is a patent nullity. Even assuming, nonetheless, that a constructive trust did arise, the running of the prescriptive period is to be deemed interrupted when an action is filed in court (Art. 1155, Civil Code) or, obviously, when one is already there pending.

Here, to recall, the Free Patent was issued on 24 January 1966 and OCT P-168 was transcribed in the Registration Book of La Union on 08 February 1966 (pp. 38-39, Rollo). At that time, Civil Case No. A-86 for reivindicacion between the parties was still pending in court. After Civil Case No. A-86 was dismissed, without prejudice, on 10 February 1976 (p. 32, Rollo), petitioner, on 22 March 1976 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), promptly filed Civil Case No. A-514 (now on appeal in this instance).

Neither can private respondents claim ownership of the disputed property by acquisitive prescription. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years if the adverse possession is with a just title and the possession is in good faith. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, this time without need of title or of good faith. (See Art. 1134, Civil Code.)

Given the settings in this case at bench, the applicable period of acquisitive prescription, if at all, would be thirty years. Even assuming, then, that private respondents were in adverse possession of the property from 1966 when the free patent was obtained, or even at the inception of their alleged adverse possession in 1954 ("Comment on Petition for Review," p. 35, Rollo), that possession, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, was deemed interrupted upon their receipt of summons (Art. 1123, Civil Code) in Civil Case No. A-86 pending since 1965, as well as Civil Case No. A-514 filed in 1976 following the dismissal the month previous of Civil Case No. A-86. The prescriptive period of prescription may not be held to commence anew during the pendency of said cases.

The instant petition has merely prayed that respondent court be directed to continue hearing Civil Case No. 514-A. We have repeatedly ruled, however, that where the determinative facts are before this Court, and it is in a position to finally resolve the dispute, the expeditious administration of justice will be subserved by the resolution of the case and thereby obviate the needless protracted proceedings consequent to the remand of the case to the trial court (Heirs of Crisanta Almoradie, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 91385, January 4, 1994; Lianga Bay Logging Co., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 357; Escudero vs. Dulay, 158, SCRA 69). Clearly, the records support the finding that herein petitioner is the true owner of the land subject of the free patent issued to private respondents. The court then, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. may, instead of remanding the case to the trial court, direct the owner to reconvey the disputed parcel to its lawful owner (Limaza vs. IAC, 182 SCRA 855; Agne vs. Director of Lands, supra). Considering, moreover, the length of time that this case has been pending between the parties, not counting petitioner's original action for reivindicacion in Civil Case No.
A-86 filed on 25 November 1956, an order from this Court requiring such reconveyance can certainly be just and warranted.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of dismissal of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 514-A is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING petitioner to be the owner of the disputed parcel of land and ORDERING private respondents to reconvey the same to said petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 82220 July 14, 1995
PABLITO MENESES and LORENZO MENESES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Luisa, Norberto, Jimmy, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), all represented by Atty. Galileo Brion, respondents.
G.R. No. 82251 July 14, 1995
CESAR ALMENDRAL, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, respondent.
G.R. No. 83059 July 14, 1995
EDUARDO QUISUMBING, NORBERTO QUISUMBING, HEIRS OF EMILIO QUISUMBING (Carlos, Manuel and Paz, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF FERNANDO QUISUMBING, (Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing), HEIRS OF MANUEL QUISUMBING, SR. (Petrona, Natividad, Manuel, Jr., Dolores and Lilia, all surnamed Quisumbing) and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO QUISUMBING (Fe, Johnny, Ma. Victoria, Elsa and Oscar, all surnamed Quisumbing), petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PABLITO MENESES, LORENZO MENESES and BRAULIO C. DARUM, respondents.

QUIASON, J.:

For review in these consolidated petitions is the Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 07049 affirming the Decision dated March 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Calamba, Laguna, in Civil Case No. 474-83-C which declared as null and void the original certificates of title and free patents issued to Pablito Meneses over lots found by the court to be accretion lands forming parts of the bigger accretion land owned by Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing.

I

On March 1, 1977, Braulio C. Darum, then the District Land Officer of Los Baños, Laguna, issued to Pablito Meneses Free Patent No. (IV-5) P-12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268 covering Lot 1585 with an area of 417 square meters, and Free Patent No (IV-5) 12808 and Original Certificate of Title No P-1269 for Lot 190 with an area of 515 square meters. Both lots are located in Los Baños, Laguna.

Pablito Meneses acquired said property from Silverio Bautista through a Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights executed on May 5, 1975 in consideration of Bautista's "love and affection" for and "some monetary obligations" in favor of Pablito Meneses (Rollo, p. 45). After the execution of said document, Pablito Meneses took possession of the land, introduced improvements thereon, declared the land as his own for tax purposes and paid the corresponding realty taxes. In turn, Bautista acquired the 900-square-meter land from his aunt, Sergia (Gliceria) M. Almeda. He had been occupying the land since 1956.

On the other hand, the Quisumbing family traces ownership of the land as far back as September 6, 1919 when their matriarch, Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing was issued Original Certificate of Title No. 989 covering a lot with an area of 859 square meters located in Los Baños, Laguna with the Laguna de Bay as its northwestern boundary. The same parcel of land was registered on August 14, 1973 under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33393 in the names of Ciriaca's heirs: Emilio, Manuel, Eduardo, Norberto, Perla, Josefina, Napoleon, Honorato, Remedios and Alfonso, all surnamed Quisumbing.

In 1962, the Quisumbing instituted and accion publiciana in the then Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna to recover possession over a portion of the property from Dominga Villamor and Lorenzo Lanuzo docketed as Civil Case No. B-350. On January 3, 1966, the case was decided in favor of the Quisumbings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the Quisumbings' right over the property.

In LRC Case No. B-327, the Quisumbings applied for registration and confirmation of title over an additional area of 2,387 square meters which had gradually accrued to their property by the natural action of the waters of Laguna de Bay. In its Decision of September 28, 1978, the Court of First Instance of Biñan confirmed the Quisumbings' title thereto which, after it was duly surveyed, was identified as Psu-208327. The additional area was divided into two lots in the survey plan approved by the Director of Lands on November 16, 1964. In ordering the confirmation and registration of title on favor of the Quisumbings, the land registration court said:

. . . There is no doubt that the applicants' right to the property was bolstered by the unappealed decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 of this Court when the properties applied for were classified as accretions made by the waters of the Laguna Lake. . . . (G.R. No. 82229, Rollo, p. 20).

On April 17, 1979, the Quisumbings filed Civil Case No. 07049 before the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, Calamba against Lorenzo and Pablito Meneses, Braulio C. Darum and Cesar B. Almendral for nullification of the free patents and titles issued to Pablito Meneses. They alleged that Lorenzo Menesis, then the Mayor of Los Baños, using his brother Pablito as a "tool and dummy," illegally occupied their "private accretion land" an August 6, 1976, and, confederating with District Land Officer Darum and Land Inspector Cesar Almendral, obtained free patents and original certificates of title to the land.

On March 26, 1984, the trial court rendered the decision finding that the lands registered by the Meneses brothers are accretion lands to which the Quisumbings have a valid right as owners of the riparian land to which nature had gradually deposited the disputed lots. In so holding, the trial court relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350, and quoted the following portions of the appellate court's decision:

Plaintiffs-appellees are titled owners of a (sic) 859 square meters of land under TCT No. 25978 of the Laguna Land Registry, the northwest boundary of which is the Laguna de Bay.

It is ascertained that the northwest portion of Quisumbing's lot is bounded by the Laguna de Bay. The nature of the Laguna de Bay has long been settled in the case of Government of the Philippines v. Colegio de San Jose (55 Phil. 423) when it held that:

Laguna de Bay is a body of water formed in depression of the earth; it contains fresh water coming from rivers and brooks and springs, and is connected with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. According to the definition first quoted, Laguna de Bay is a lake.

Consequently, since Laguna de Bay is a lake, the authorities cited by the appellants referring to seashore would not apply. The provision of the law on waters will govern in determining the natural bed or basin of the lake. And accordingly, to Art. 84 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866:

Accretions deposited gradually upon land contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers and lakes by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands.

Since the title indicate(s) that the northwest portion of the property is bounded by Laguna de Bay, which is a lake, even if the area where Lanuza's house and Villamor's house for that matter is located is not included within the title, it must necessarily be an accretion upon appellees' land by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof which should belong to the owner of the adjacent land. The authorities cited by the appellants treat of the ownership of accretions by water of the sea under Title I. Lakewaters being terrestrial waters, their ownership is governed by Title II of the Law of Waters. As held in the Colegio de San Jose case, the provisions of the Law of Waters regulating the ownership and use of sea water are not applicable to the ownership and use of lakes which are governed by different provisions. As pointed out by the lower court, no act of appropriation is necessary in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation as the law does not require the same (Ignacio Grande, et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962 citing Roxas vs. Tuazon, 9 Phil. 408; Cortez vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567 and 3 Manresa, C.C. pp. 321-326, pp. 4-5) (Records, pp. 80-84).

The trial court also found that the free patents issued to Pablito Meneses had been procured through fraud, deceit and bad faith, citing the following facts as bases for its conclusion: (1) The Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights allegedly executed by Silverio Bautista in favor of Pablito Meneses was a simulated contract for lack of consideration; (2) The said instrument was sworn to before Mayor Lorenzo Meneses who had no authority to notarize deeds of conveyances; (3) Although the lots subject of the deed of conveyance were placed in his brother's name, Mayor Meneses actually exercised rights of ownership thereto; (4) Land Inspector Cesar Almendral admitted having anomalously prepared the documents to support the free patent applications of Pablito Meneses and, having personally filled up the blank forms, signed them in the absence of the persons concerned; (5) Almendral kept the documents in his possession from 1979 to 1980 despite orders from the Director of Lands to produce and surrender the same; (6) District Land Officer Braulio Darum approved the free patent applications and issued the questioned titles without the required cadastral survey duly approved by the Director of Lands and despite the pendency of LRC Case No. B-327 involving the contested lots; (7) Darum represented the Bureau of Lands in LRC Case No. B-327 without authority from the Director of Lands and after he had withdrawn his appearance in said case, persisted in filing a motion to set aside the order for the issuance of a decree in favor of the Quisumbings; (8) Darum and Almendral in bad faith, refused to produce the missing original records of the free patent applications and their supporting documents; and (9) When Darum was not yet an oppositor in LRC Case No. B-327, he admitted in his letter to the Land Registration Commission that the contested lots are portions of the land being claimed by the Quisumbings contrary to his later representation in the joint answer to the petition that the subject lots are not portions of Lots 1 and 2, Psu-208327 owned by the Quisumbings. Accordingly, the trial court disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring that the lands covered by Pablito Meneses' Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 (Exh. "J"), covering Lot No. 1585, consisting of 417 square meters and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808 (Exh. "H"), covering Lot No. 190, consisting of 515 square meters, both located at Los Baños, Laguna, as accretion lands forming parts of a bigger accretion land owned by plaintiffs as declared in a final judgment (Exh. "A"), rendered by the Court of First Instance of Biñan, Laguna, in LRC Case No. B-327, which bigger accretion land is directly adjacent to or at the back of plaintiffs' riparian land, and consequently, declaring as null and void and cancelled Original Certificate of Title No. P-1268/Free Patent No. 12807 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-1269/Free Patent No. 12808;

2. Directing that the Register of Deeds of Laguna or his Deputy at Calamba, Laguna, to make the corresponding entries of cancellation in his Registry of the above mentioned Original Certificate of Titles/Free Patents;

3. Directing defendants Lorenzo Meneses and Pablito Meneses and all persons acting in their behalves to vacate the subject lands and surrender the possession thereof to the plaintiffs immediately; and

4. Directing the defendants to pay jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sums of:

a) P20,000.00, plus P500.00 per month from January, 1977, until the subject property is completely vacated, as actual and compensatory damages;

b) P350,000.00, as moral damages;

c) P70,000.00 as exemplary damages;

d) P40,000.00, as attorney's fees; and

e) the costs (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

Thereafter, the Quisumbings filed a motion for execution pending appeal which the trial court granted in its Order of September 7, 1984 subject to the posting by the Quisumbings of a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for the reconsideration of said order.

The Quisumbings also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against Pablito Meneses, Silverio Bautista, Pablo Silva, Virgilio Cruz and Cesar Almendral for violation of paragraphs (e) and (j), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, for conspiring in the approval and grant of the free patents over portions of Lots 1 & 2 of Psu-208327 owned by the heirs of Ciriaca Arguelles Vda. de Quisumbing. In due course, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the defendants guilty as charged. The case was elevated to this Court but on August 27, 1987, the judgment of conviction was affirmed (Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 [1987]).

Meanwhile, the Meneses brothers and Darum appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 07049 to the Court of Appeals. On August 31, 1987, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit and affirmed in toto the lower court's decision.

The defendants-appellants filed two motions for the reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but it was denied in the Resolution of February 23, 1988 which in pertinent part stated:

However, for humanitarian considerations, and considering the appeal of the defendants-appellants for a reduction of the moral and exemplary damages, We favor the reduction of the moral damages from P350,000.00 to P50,000.00 and the exemplary damages from P70,000.00 to P5,000.00. In all other respects, We find no justification for modifying the dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court (G.R. No. 82220, Rollo, p. 67).

Pablito and Lorenzo Meneses filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 82220. Cesar Almendral filed a motion in G.R. No. 82251 for a 45-day extension within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. After this Court had granted them a 30-day extension, Almendral still failed to file any petition. The Quisumbings also filed a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 83059, solely on the issue of the propriety of the reduction of the amount of damages in the Court of Appeals' Resolution of February 23, 1988. Upon motion of petitioners in G.R. No. 83059, the three petitions were consolidated in the Resolution of August 1, 1988.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 retell the same errors they had raised before the Court of Appeals, contending in the main: (1) that the lands in question were not accretion lands but lands of the public domain; (2) that no conspiracy to commit fraud, deceit and bad faith attended the issuance of the free patent and titles to Pablito Meneses; and (3) that the Deed of Waiver and Transfer of Rights was founded on a valid consideration.

As regards the issue of whether the lands in question are accretion lands, petitioners relied on the Decision of the Court of Appeals in Republic of the Philippines v. Braga, CA-G.R. No. 55390-R, October 23, 1980, holding that the property involved therein was part of the natural bed of the Laguna de Bay and therefore what had to be determined was whether said property was covered by water when the lake was at its highest depth.

Petitioners' assigned errors in G.R. No. 82220 are evidently factual issues which have been thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court (Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 533 [1994]) and they carry even more weight when the Court of Appeals affirms the factual findings of the trial court (Binalay v. Manalo, 195 SCRA 374 [1991]). The jurisdiction of this Court is thus limited to reviewing errors of law unless there is a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion (BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 566 [1941]). We find no such showing in this case.

Petitioners' protestations notwithstanding the final decision of the Court of Appeals in Civil Case No. B-350 has a bearing in the resolution of this case for while the lots occupied by Villamor and Lanuzo may not be the very same lots petitioners are claiming here, the two cases refer to the same accretion lands northwest of the original land owned by the Quisumbings.

In the same vein, the decision of the land registration court in LRC Case No. B-327 ordering the confirmation and registration of title in favor of the Quisumbings over 2,387 square meters of accretion land is binding on petitioners in G.R. No. 82220. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, said decision, being the result of a proceeding in rem, binds the whole world, more so because it became final and executory upon the Bureau of Lands' failure to interpose an appeal.

Since petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 claim that "the foreshore land known as Lots 190 and 1585 are part of Laguna de Bay" and therefore the Quisumbings "have no legal right to claim the same as accretion land," we quote the following pertinent portions of the decision in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 532 (1984) which, although the case deals with the registration of a reclaimed land along the Laguna de Bay, is nonetheless enlightening:

Laguna de Bay is a lake. While the waters of a lake are also subject to the same gravitational forces that cause the formation of tides in seas and oceans, this phenomenon is not a regular daily occurrence in the case of lakes. Thus, the alternation of high tides and low tides, which is an ordinary occurrence, could hardly account for the rise in the water level of the Laguna de Bay as observed four to five months a year during the rainy season. Rather, it is the rains which bring about the inundation of a portion of the land in question. Since the rise in the water level which causes the submersion of the land occurs during a shorter period (four to five months a year) than the level of the water at which the land is completely dry, the latter should be considered as the "highest ordinary depth" of Laguna de Bay. Therefore, the land sought to be registered is not part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay. Neither can it be considered as foreshore land. The Brief for the Petitioner Director of Lands cites an accurate definition of a foreshore land, to wit:

. . . . that part of (the land) which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides.

The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

As aptly found by the Court a quo, the submersion in water of a portion of the land in question is due to the rains "falling directly on or flowing into Laguna de Bay from different sources." Since the inundation of a portion of the land is not due to "flux and reflux of tides" it cannot be considered a foreshore land within the meaning of the authorities cited by petitioner Director of Lands. The land sought to be registered not being part of the bed or basin of Laguna de Bay, nor a foreshore land as claimed by the Director of Lands, it is not a public land and therefore capable of registration as private property provided that the applicant proves that he has a registerable title (at pp. 538-539).

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code requires the concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). While the trial court mainly relied on the findings in Civil Case No. B-350 that the lands in controversy are accretion lands and it has not determined on its own the presence of said requisites, it is too late now for petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 to claim otherwise. Consequently, the lands held to be accretion lands could only benefit the Quisumbings, who own the property adjacent to the lands in controversy (Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 350 [1992]).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 also assert that the principle of indefeasibility of title should favor them as the one-year period provided for by law to impugn their title had elapsed. They also urged that, having been granted by the state, their title is superior to that of the Quisumbings. We hold, however, that in the light of the fraud attending the issuance of the free patents and titles of Pablito Meneses, said assertions crumble. Such fraud was confirmed by this Court in Meneses v. People, 153 SCRA 303 (1987) which held the petitioners therein liable for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in the issuance of the same free patents and titles.

Unlike the petition in G.R. No. 82220, the petition in G.R. No. 83059 (questioning the reduction of the damages awarded to the Quisumbings by the Court of Appeals in the Resolution of February 23, 1988) is meritorious. The task of fixing the amount of damages is primarily with the trial court (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 [1966]). While it is the appellate court's duty to review the same, a reduction of the award of damages must pass the test of reasonableness. The Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded as damages when they are palpably or scandalously and reasonably excessive (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 423 [1993]; Prudenciano v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440 [1987]).

There is no justification for the radical reduction by the Court of Appeals of the damages awarded by the trial court. Its action was premise merely on "humanitarian considerations" and the plea of the defendants-appellants. We may agree with the Court of Appeals in reducing the award after scrutinizing its factual findings only if such findings are diametrically opposed to that of the trial court (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra). But as it is, the Court of Appeals affirmed point by point the factual findings if the lower court upon which the award of damages had been based.

We, therefore, see no reason to modify the award of damages made by the trial court. Respondent Braulio C. Darum in G.R. No. 83059 must also be solidarily liable for said damages in his capacity as a public officer. A public official is by law not immune from damages in his personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions (Vidad v. RTC of Negros, Br. 42, 227 SCRA 271 [1993]).

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 82220 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 83059 is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 1987 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED while its Resolution of February 23, 1988 insofar as it reduces the amount of damages awarded to the Quisumbing family is SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioners in G.R. No. 82220 and respondent Braulio Darum in G.R. No. 83059.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15398           December 29, 1962
J. M. TUAZON & CO., INC., represented by its Managing Partner, Gregorio Araneta, Inc., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODOSIO MACALINDONG, defendant-appellant.
Araneta and Araneta for plaintiff-appellee.
Leandro Sevilla and Ramon S. Aquino for defendant- appellant.

PAREDES, J.:

On September 9, 1958, plaintiff instituted Civil Case No. Q-3303 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Teodosio Macalindong, alleging therein that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land, commonly known as the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision, located at Quezon City and Covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267 (37686-Rizal) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City; that on or about December 5, 1955, the defendant, thru force, strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the possession of some 200 square meters, within said parcel of land, situated at Bo. North Tatalon, Quezon City, and constructed his house thereon; and that because of this act it suffered and will continue to suffer damages at the rate of P60.00 monthly, representing the fair rental value of the portion occupied. Defendant answering, stated among others, that —

. . . prior to 1955 and since time immemorial, he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, adverse, public, continuous and actual possession of the lot in question in the concept of owner and, by reason of such possession, he had made improvement thereon valued at P9,000.00.

As a counterclaim, he asked an award of P25,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages and P600.00 as attorney's fees.

Defendant presented documents tending to show that the portion in question was acquired by him on June 28, 1954, thru purchase from Graciano M. Flores (Exh. 1), who in turn acquired the same from Lucia T. Teotico on April 27, 1954 (Exh. 2). The latter bought the same from Agustin de Torres on April 1, 1950 (Exh. 3), who allegedly derived his title from Telesforo Deudor, a party in the Compromise Agreement, which formed the basis of the joint decisions in Civil Cases Nos. Q-135, 139, 174, 177 and 186, of same court.

The court a quo rendered judgment, the pertinent portions of which read —

. . . In the first place, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this property has been registered under the Torrens System, in the name of plaintiff since 1914, hence, the claim of possession of defendant cannot defeat the efficacy of the title of the plaintiff; in the second place, as testified to by the defendant himself when he was trying to declare the property in question in the Office of the City Assessor he could not . . . so because he was told that there was a question to that. In fine, the documents presented by the defendant cannot be considered by the Court as to vest in him any rights over the property in question as against the title of the plaintiff which has been issued since 1914. . . .

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant by declaring the defendant to have no valid right of possession and title whatever in plaintiff's premises; ordering him and all persons claiming under him to vacate the premises in question and to remove his house and other construction therefrom; ordering him to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30.00 a month from the date of usurpation in 1955 until the plaintiff is restored to the possession of the same; and for him to pay the costs.

Defendant presented a Motion to Reconsider and/or to Set Aside Decision, alleging that the said decision is contrary to the evidence and law. It was contended that while the plaintiff secured title over the land, the portion in question, however, had been in the adverse, open, public and continuous possession of the defendant's predecessor-in-interest, since 1893. Defendant reproduced portions of the Compromise Agreement used in the Civil Cases earlier enumerated, to show the possession of his predecessors-in-interest, to wit: — lawphil.net

SECOND. — That within the perimeter of said land is an area measuring fifty (50) quiñones over which the DEUDORS have claimed possessory rights by virtue of what purports to be an abstract of an "informacion posesoria" covering the latter property, which recites that at the time of issuance thereof in 1893, the Records of the Registry of Deeds of Manila (South District) showed that said property was registered in the name of the old Telesforo Deudor, predecessor-in-interest of the present Deudors who are parties hereto. . . .

THIRD. — That said DEUDORS have been in possession of the land in question and claim to be the owners thereof and during the period of possession have sold their possessory rights to various third persons;

FOURTH. — That in the middle of 1950, DEUDORS, under a mistaken impression of the nature of their rights in said property, began the following suits against the OWNERS in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City: . . . .

The motion for reconsideration having been denied February 21, 1959, defendant appealed directly to this Court, claiming that the court a quo erred —

(1) In not holding that plaintiff-appellee's Torrens Certificate of Title is Null and Void insofar as the property controversy is concerned;

(2) In not holding the plaintiff-appellee's action has ready prescribed or is already barred by laches;

(3) In not holding that defendant-appellant is a possess in good faith and is entitled to retention until reimbursed the value of his improvements;

(4) In ordering defendant-appellant to pay rentals in the sum of P30 per month from 1955 until plaintiff-appellee is restored to the possession of the land in controversy; and

(5) In not dismissing the complaint.

The appellee's cause of action is based on its ownership of the subject land, evidenced by TCT No. 1267 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City (Exhibit A), which was issued in appellee's name on May 29, 1939 (Decree No. 17431 G.L.R.O. No. 7681), and was traceable O.C.T. No. 735 (Rizal, issued on July 8, 1914). Appellant's defense is that he is the owner of the subject premises. His only counter-claim is for attorney's fees a moral and exemplary damages, for appellee's supposedly malicious and frivolous presentation of the complain Nullity of appellee's title and reconveyance were never set up, either as defenses or as counter-claims. Neither prescription of appellee's claim or bar of the action recovery due to laches was averred in appellant's defenses. Appellant cannot raise them now for the first time on appeal. Verily the failure to raise the issue of prescription and laches, amounts to a waiver of such defense (Sec. 10, Rule 9; Maxilim v. Tabotabo, 9 Phil. 39 Domingo v. Osorio, 7 Phil. 405). Moreover, the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not barred under doctrine of laches (Art. 348, Civil Code; Francisco et al. v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G. 5105). On the contra the laws on prescription of actions and on estoppel an laches presently operate against appellant. After many years of inaction - forty-four years, from July 8, 1914 (issuance of O.C.T. No. 735, Rizal), or nineteen (19) years from May 29, 1939 (issuance of T.C.T. No. 1267), appellant should be completely barred from assailing the decree of registration of the subject property (Tiburcio v. PHHC, G.R. NO. L-13429, Oct. 31, 1959; See also J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Bolanos, L-4935, May 28, 1954, and J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-5079, July 31, 1956, involving the same Decree).

We are in accord with appellant's contention that Act No. 496 is not intended to shield fraud and that registration thereunder merely confirms title but does not vest any, when there is none, because registration under the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring ownership. We are not, however, justified to apply these principle to the facts of the case and partially annul appellee's Torrens Title, which, as stated above, is traceable to an original certificate of title issued way back in 1914, or over 44 years ago, and which is now incontrovertible and conclusive against the whole world (sec. 38, Act 496) To sustain an action for annulment of a Torrens Title, for being void ab initio, it must be shown that the land Court which had issued the pertinent decree of registration, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case; and to succeed is an action for reconveyance after the lapse of one year from the decree of registration, actual fraud in securing the title must be proved (Bernardo v. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89 102). The pleadings filed by appellant before the trial court, alleged no such lack of jurisdiction and no evidence whatsoever was adduced or attempted to be adduced on the question of jurisdiction of the said land court and the record also fails to show fraudulent acts or and knowledge of others' adverse rights by the original Tuason registrants in G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 7681, or that the latter knew of Telesforo Deudor's or Agustin de Torres' sup posed right of ownership.

Appellant mentions an informacion posesoria, subject of Compromise Agreement dated March 16, 1953, between Deudor and Tuason & Co., Inc., allegedly issued in 1893 to Telesforo Deudor, who sold a portion of his land to Agustin de Torres, who possessed it until it passed to Lucia T. Teotico, to show that he had a previous title to the land, before the appellee had obtained a Torrens title in 1914. In the first place, the compromise agreement had already been rescinded (Deudor et al. v. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., L-13768, May 30, 1961). In the second place, the records do not indicate that either Telesforo Deudor or Agustin de Torres was in possession of the subjected lot, at the time appellee's predecessor-interest had obtained a Torrens Title thereto in 1914, or at any time before World War II. And there is no finding of the trial court to this effect. On the contrary, it is a fact that in December 1955, appellant entered a portion of 200 square meters of appellee's land, without the consent and knowledge of appellee, and on September 9, 1958, appellee commenced the present action for recovery of possession. To this finding of fact, the parties are bound, because the appeal, according to appellant, would only raise questions of law. Moreover, if We were to give due weight to the compromise agreement which by the way, was not presented in evidence in the case at bar, the appellant will have to concede that "The Deudors had a wrong impression of the nature of their rights" in the subject property, and perforce admit that Telesforo Deudor and Agustin de Torres had no dominical title to the property in question.

Appellant claims that he should have been declared a builder in good faith, that he should have been ordered to pay rentals; and that the complaint should have been dismissed. Again this question is being raised for the first time on appeal. It was not alleged as a defense or counter-claim and the trial court did not make any finding on this factual issue. From the documents submitted, however, it appears that appellant was not a builder in good faith. From the initial certificate of title of appellee's predecessors-in-interest issued on July 8, 1914, there is a presumptive knowledge by appellant of appellees Torrens Title (which is a notice to the whole world) over the subject premises and consequently appellant can not, in good conscience, say now that he believed his vendor (Flores), his vendor's vendor (Teotico) and the latter's seller (De Torres) had rights of ownership over said lot (Francisco, et al. v. Cruz, supra). Appellant, had likewise, a sufficient warning from the fact that the lot, subject of his purchase, is described in his Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, to be a portion of an unnumbered and, therefore, unapproved subdivision plan. Had he investigated before buying and before building his house on the questioned lot, he would have been informed that the land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. If he failed to make the necessary inquiry, appellant is now bound conclusively to appellee's Torrens Title (Sec. 51, Act 496; Emas v. Zuzuarregui, 35 Phil. 144). Moreover, when appellant was trying to declare the property, the Office of the City Assessor told him he could not do so, because there was "a question to that". Lastly, appellant's remedy in this regard, should have been directed against his predecessors-in-interest.

The decision appealed from, is therefore, affirmed, with costs against the defendant-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-40411             August 7, 1935
DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., defendants-appellees.
Arsenio Suazo and Jose L. Palma Gil and Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for appellant.
J.W. Ferrier for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:

The issue in this case, as announced in the opening sentence of the decision in the trial court and as set forth by counsel for the parties on appeal, involves the determination of the nature of the properties described in the complaint. The trial judge found that those properties were personal in nature, and as a consequence absolved the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff.

The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government of the Philippine Islands. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of Davao, Province of Davao. However, the land upon which the business was conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill company and the owner of the land there appeared the following provision:

That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by the party of the second part shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the party of the first part without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; also, in the event the party of the second part should leave or abandon the land leased before the time herein stipulated, the improvements and buildings shall likewise pass to the ownership of the party of the first part as though the time agreed upon had expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are not included in the improvements which will pass to the party of the first part on the expiration or abandonment of the land leased.

In another action, wherein the Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., was the plaintiff and the Davao, Saw, Mill Co., Inc., was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff in that action against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon, and the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff. No third party claim was filed for such properties at the time of the sales thereof as is borne out by the record made by the plaintiff herein. Indeed the bidder, which was the plaintiff in that action, and the defendant herein having consummated the sale, proceeded to take possession of the machinery and other properties described in the corresponding certificates of sale executed in its favor by the sheriff of Davao.

As connecting up with the facts, it should further be explained that the Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., has on a number of occasions treated the machinery as personal property by executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such persons is the appellee by assignment from the original mortgages.

Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According to the Code, real property consists of —

1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;

x x x           x x x           x x x

5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.

Appellant emphasizes the first paragraph, and appellees the last mentioned paragraph. We entertain no doubt that the trial judge and appellees are right in their appreciation of the legal doctrines flowing from the facts.

In the first place, it must again be pointed out that the appellant should have registered its protest before or at the time of the sale of this property. It must further be pointed out that while not conclusive, the characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. In this connection the decision of this court in the case of Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo ( [1923], 44 Phil., 630), whether obiter dicta or not, furnishes the key to such a situation.

It is, however not necessary to spend overly must time in the resolution of this appeal on side issues. It is machinery which is involved; moreover, machinery not intended by the owner of any building or land for use in connection therewith, but intended by a lessee for use in a building erected on the land by the latter to be returned to the lessee on the expiration or abandonment of the lease.

A similar question arose in Puerto Rico, and on appeal being taken to the United States Supreme Court, it was held that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the opinion written by Chief Justice White, whose knowledge of the Civil Law is well known, it was in part said:

To determine this question involves fixing the nature and character of the property from the point of view of the rights of Valdes and its nature and character from the point of view of Nevers & Callaghan as a judgment creditor of the Altagracia Company and the rights derived by them from the execution levied on the machinery placed by the corporation in the plant. Following the Code Napoleon, the Porto Rican Code treats as immovable (real) property, not only land and buildings, but also attributes immovability in some cases to property of a movable nature, that is, personal property, because of the destination to which it is applied. "Things," says section 334 of the Porto Rican Code, "may be immovable either by their own nature or by their destination or the object to which they are applicable." Numerous illustrations are given in the fifth subdivision of section 335, which is as follows: "Machinery, vessels, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenements for the industrial or works that they may carry on in any building or upon any land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works." (See also Code Nap., articles 516, 518 et seq. to and inclusive of article 534, recapitulating the things which, though in themselves movable, may be immobilized.) So far as the subject-matter with which we are dealing — machinery placed in the plant — it is plain, both under the provisions of the Porto Rican Law and of the Code Napoleon, that machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant. Such result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the placing of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having only a temporary right. (Demolombe, Tit. 9, No. 203; Aubry et Rau, Tit. 2, p. 12, Section 164; Laurent, Tit. 5, No. 447; and decisions quoted in Fuzier-Herman ed. Code Napoleon under articles 522 et seq.) The distinction rests, as pointed out by Demolombe, upon the fact that one only having a temporary right to the possession or enjoyment of property is not presumed by the law to have applied movable property belonging to him so as to deprive him of it by causing it by an act of immobilization to become the property of another. It follows that abstractly speaking the machinery put by the Altagracia Company in the plant belonging to Sanchez did not lose its character of movable property and become immovable by destination. But in the concrete immobilization took place because of the express provisions of the lease under which the Altagracia held, since the lease in substance required the putting in of improved machinery, deprived the tenant of any right to charge against the lessor the cost such machinery, and it was expressly stipulated that the machinery so put in should become a part of the plant belonging to the owner without compensation to the lessee. Under such conditions the tenant in putting in the machinery was acting but as the agent of the owner in compliance with the obligations resting upon him, and the immobilization of the machinery which resulted arose in legal effect from the act of the owner in giving by contract a permanent destination to the machinery.

x x x           x x x           x x x

The machinery levied upon by Nevers & Callaghan, that is, that which was placed in the plant by the Altagracia Company, being, as regards Nevers & Callaghan, movable property, it follows that they had the right to levy on it under the execution upon the judgment in their favor, and the exercise of that right did not in a legal sense conflict with the claim of Valdes, since as to him the property was a part of the realty which, as the result of his obligations under the lease, he could not, for the purpose of collecting his debt, proceed separately against. (Valdes vs. Central Altagracia [192], 225 U.S., 58.)

Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, the costs of this instance to be paid by the appellant.

Municipal trial court judges cannot notarize affidavits of cohabitation of parties whose marriage they will solemnize.

x  x x

 
A marriage license is issued by the local civil registrar to parties who have all the qualifications and none of the legal disqualifications to contract marriage.^[27] Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must personally examine the marriage license presented.^[28]

If the contracting parties have cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry, they are exempt from the marriage license requirement.^[29] Instead, the parties must present an affidavit of cohabitation sworn to before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.^[30] The judge, as solemnizing officer, must personally examine the affidavit of cohabitation as to the parties having lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and the absence of any legal impediment to marry each other.^[31] The judge must also execute a sworn statement that he personally ascertained the parties’ qualifications to marry and found no legal impediment to the marriage.^[32] Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:

Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Section 5 of the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary also provides:

Sec. 5. Other duties of solemnizing officer before the solemnization of the marriage in legal ratification of cohabitation. — In the case of a marriage effecting legal ratification of cohabitation, the solemnizing officer shall (a) personally interview the contracting parties to determine their qualifications to marry; (b) personally examine the affidavit of the contracting parties as to the fact of having lived together as husband and wife for at least five [5] years and the absence of any legal impediments to marry each other; and (c) execute a sworn statement showing compliance with (a) and (b) and that the solemnizing officer found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Based on law and the Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, the person who notarizes the contracting parties’ affidavit of cohabitation cannot be the judge who will solemnize the parties’ marriage.

As a solemnizing officer, the judge’s only duty involving the affidavit of cohabitation is to examine whether the parties have indeed lived together for at least five years without legal impediment to marry. The Guidelines does not state that the judge can notarize the parties’ affidavit of cohabitation.

Thus, affidavits of cohabitation are documents not connected with the judge’s official function and duty to solemnize marriages. Notarizing affidavits of cohabitation is inconsistent with the duty to examine the parties’ requirements for marriage. If the solemnizing officer notarized the affidavit of cohabitation, he cannot objectively examine and review the affidavit’s statements before performing the marriage ceremony. Should there be any irregularity or false statements in the affidavit of cohabitation he notarized, he cannot be expected to admit that he solemnized the marriage despite the irregularity or false allegation.

THIRD DIVISION

[ A.M. No. MTJ-14-1842 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2491-MTJ], February 24, 2014 ]

REX M. TUPAL, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE REMEGIO V. ROJO, BRANCH 5, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES (MTCC), BACOLOD CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, RESPONDENT.

 x x x

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,^[63] Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.^[64] Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.^[65]

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
 x x x

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido,^[88] this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse”^[89] under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo^[90] which declared that the Filipino spouse “should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.”^[91]

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013 ]

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.

An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible

[ G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008 ]REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent. FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, Petitioner,vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, Respondent.

An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.^[56] Jose and Felisa's marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license.  According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify.  To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned.  The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.^[50]

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.  A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" - Complaint;^[51] (b) Exhibit "B" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;^[52] (c) Exhibit "C" - Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;^[53] (d) Exhibit "D" - Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;^[54] and (e) Exhibit "E" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;^[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit "1" -- Amended Answer;^[56] (b) Exhibit "2" - Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;^[57] (c) Exhibit "3" - Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;^[58] (d) Exhibit "4" - Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;^[59] and Exhibit "5" -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.^[60]

GRACE J. GARCIA, A.K.A. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, PETITIONER,VS. REDERICK A. RECIO, RESPONDENT. THIRD DIVISION[ G.R. No. 138322, October 02, 2001 ]

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.  Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.