Wednesday, September 26, 2012

maninang v. ca (1982) disinheritance/preterition


FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. L-57848, June 19, 1982 ]

RAFAEL E. MANINANG AND SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL AND BERNARDO S. ASENETA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N


MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

A Petition to Review the Decision of April 28, 1981 of respondent Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 12032-R entitled "Rafael E. Maninang and Soledad L. Maninang vs Hon. Ricardo Pronove, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch XI, and Bernardo S. Aseneta". Pertinent to the controversy are the following antecedental facts:
On May 21, 1977, Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81.  She left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
"x x x
"It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City, Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shall be inherited upon my death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously for around the last 30 years now.  Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have been kind to me.  x x x I have found peace and happiness with them even during the time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion.  I am not incompetent as Nonoy would like me to appear.  I know what is right and wrong.  I can decide for myself.  I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son.  He has made me do things against my will."
"x x x"
On June 9, 1977, petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304, hereinafter referred to as the Testate Case).
On July 25, 1977, herein respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal (Sp. Proc. No. 8569, called hereinafter the Intestate Case, for brevity).
On December 23, 1977, the Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch XI, presided by re­spondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.  In support of said Motion to Dismiss, respondent Bernardo cited the cases of Neri vs. Akutin (72 Phil. 322); Nuguid vs. Nuguid (17 SCRA 449), and Ramos vs. Baldovino (2 CA Rep. 2nd, 878).[1]
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will; and that re­spondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.[2]
On September 8, 1980, the lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case in this wise:
"For reasons stated in the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Bernardo S. Aseneta which the Court finds meritorious, the petition for probate of will filed by Soledad L. Maninang and which was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-23304 is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs."
On December 19, 1980, the lower Court denied reconsideration for lack of merit and in the same Order appointed Bernardo as the administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Clemencia Aseneta "considering that he is a forced heir of said deceased while oppositor Soledad Maninang is not, and considering further that Bernardo Aseneta has not been shown to be unfit to perform the duties of the trust."
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a Certiorari Petition before respondent Court of Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case (September 8, 1980) and denial of reconsi­deration (December 19, 1980).
On April 28, 1981, respondent Court[3] denied Certiorari and ruled that the trial Judge's Order of dismissal was final in nature as it finally disposed of the Testate Case and, therefore, appeal was the proper remedy, which petitioners failed to avail of.  Continuing, it said that even granting that the lower Court committed errors in issuing the questioned Orders, those are errors of judgment reviewable only by appeal and not by Certiorari.
Thus, this Petition before us.
We find that the Court a quo acted in excess of its juris­diction when it dismissed the Testate Case.  Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
"No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court."[4]
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.[5]
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
"x x x The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills.  It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication.  The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated x x x"[6]
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."[7]
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the pronounce­ment in Nuguid vs. Nuguid[8], reading:
"In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law.  The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.  However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the Court should meet that issue.  (Underscoring supplied)
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez[9] had a similar thrust:
"The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established.  The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.  Where practical consi­derations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue."
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule.  The intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate because "practical considerations" so demanded.  Moreover, for the parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic validity of the Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator.  In the instant case, a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance.  Preterition and disinheritance are two diverse concepts.
"x x x Preterition 'consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.' (Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325).  Disinheritance, in turn, 'is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.' (Justice J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, 'An Outline of Philippine Civil Law', 1956 ed., Vol. III, p. 8, citing cases) Disinheritance is always 'voluntary'; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be 'in­voluntary' (Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil 2nd edition, Volumen 2.o, p. 1131)."[10]
The effects of preterition and disinheritance are also totally different.
"x x x The effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.  Preterition under Article 854 of the New Civil Code 'shall annul the institution of heir.' This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies.  In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also 'annul the institution of heirs', but only 'insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited', which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition (III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172).  Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived."[11]
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered.  We gather from the assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo has been preterited.  We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will, that conclusion is not indubitable.
As held in the case of Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso[12].
"x x x it is as important a matter of public interest that a purported will is not denied legalization on dubious grounds.  Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation.  x x x"
Coming now to the procedural aspect, suffice it to state that in view of our finding that respondent Judge had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in dismissing the Testate Case, Certiorari is a proper remedy.  An act done by a Probate Court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by Certiorari.[13]And even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, we harken to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for Certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief.
WHEREFORE, the Decision in question is set aside and the Orders of the Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, dated September 8, 1980 and December 19, 1980, are nullified.  Special Proceeding No. Q-23304 is hereby remanded to said Court of First Instance-Branch XI, Rizal, therein to be reinstated and consolidated with Special Proceeding No. 8569 for further proceedings.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Relova,
and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Vasquez, J., no part.



[1] pp. 23-33, CA Rollo. [2] pp. 34-36, ibid.
[3] Special Fifth Division composed of Justices B. S. de la Fuente, Oscar R. Victoriano and Onofre A. Villaluz, ponente.
[4] Art. 838, Civil Code.
[5] Guevarra vs. Guevarra, 74 Phil. 479 (1943).
[6] Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676 (1909).
[7] Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220.
[8] 17 SCRA 449 (1966).
[9] 64 SCRA 452 (1975).
[10] Nuguid vs. Nuguid, supra.
[11] ibid.
[12] 46 SCRA 538 (1972).
[13] Llamas vs. Moscoso, 95 Phil. 599 (1954).




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seango v. reyes (2006) disinheritance


SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. NOS. 140371-72, November 27, 2006 ]

DY YIENG SEANGIO,BARBARA D. SEANGIO AND VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. AMOR A. REYES, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 21, MANILA, ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO, ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS AND JAMES D. SEANGIO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION


AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari[1] with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petition for probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, and entitled, "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and "In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."

The facts of the cases are as follows:

On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the RTC, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, was filed by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 because testate proceedings take precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.[2]

The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana

Tantunin ng sinuman

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi siya makoha mana.

Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995 sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. [3]

(signed)
Segundo Seangio

Nilagdaan sa harap namin

(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi

(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396 were consolidated.[4]

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings[5] primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on preterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.[6]

On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order, dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al., clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court [155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position clear: "for ... respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when, on its face, the will appears to be intrinsically void ... would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (underscoring supplied).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99-93396 is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC in its order dated October 14, 1999.

Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST 1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999 (ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF) CONSIDERING THAT:

I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR'S WILL IS VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR'S TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;

II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE FACE OF THE TESTATOR'S WILL THAT NO PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,

III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent's will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an heir;

Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity of the document.

The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, unmistakably showed Segundo's intention of excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.

For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in his document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code:
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child or descendant;[8]

(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction.
Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.[10]

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.[11]

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator.[12] In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated,[13] the disinheritance cannot be given effect.[14]

With regard to the issue on preterition,[15] the Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir [16] to the exclusion of his other compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory.[17]

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.[18]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge is directed to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.



[1] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

[2] Records, p. 20.

[3] Id. at 17.

[4] Id. at 63.

[5] Id. at 65.

[6] Id. at 82.

[7] Id. at 96.

[8] Emphasis supplied.

[9] Article 783 of the Civil Code states: "A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."

[10] Tolentino, Arturo M., "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines," Volume III, p. 30.

[11] Id. at 38.

[12] Id. at 37-39.

[13] In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: 1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament; 2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; 3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, 4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedents. As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. However, in exceptional circumstances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Ajero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994, 236 SCRA 488).

[14] Supra note 10.

[15] Article 854 of the Civil Code states: "The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation."

[16] Article 841 of the Civil Code states: "A will is valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.

In such cases the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs."

[17] Maninang v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57848, June 19, 1982, 114 SCRA 478.

[18] Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, No. L-24742, October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 360.




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pecson v. mediavillo (1914) disinheritance


[ G.R. No. 7890, September 29, 1914 ]

FILOMENA PECSON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF FLORENCIO PECSON ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

D E C I S I O N


JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that some time prior to the 17th day of September, 1910, the last will and testament of Florencio Pecson was presented to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay for probate, Mr. Tomas Lorayes, an attorney at law, opposed the legalization of the will on the ground that it had not been authorized nor signed by the deceased, in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. After hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Percy M. Moir, judge, found that the will had been signed and executed in accordance with the provisions of law, and denied the opposition on the 17th day of September, 1910. On the 18th day of September, 1910, the said Tomas Lorayes, representing Basiliso Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, presented a motion in the words following:
"1. That Rosario Mediavillo is and Joaquin Mediavillo was a legitimate child of the deceased Teresa Pecson, who also was a daughter of the testator, Florencio Pecson, and therefore the first mentioned is and the second was a grandchild of the latter.
"2. That the said granddaughter, Rosario Mediavillo y Pecson, was disinherited by her grandfather, the testator Florencio Pecson, according to clause 3 of the will, because she failed to show him due respect and on a certain occasion raised her hand against him.
"3. That the interested party did not commit such an act, and if perhaps she did, it was due to the derangement of her mental faculties which occurred a long time ago and from which she now suffers in periodical attacks.
"By reason of all the foregoing and because the disinheriting clause 3 of the will is unfounded, the undersigned prays the court to annul the said clause and to make the testator's grandchildren, Rosario and Joaquin Mediavillo (the latter died without succession, but is represented now by his father, Basiliso Mediavillo), participants in the estate left by their grandfather; and, finally, that the court grant such other relief as it may deem just and equitable."
After a consideration of the question presented by said motion, the lower court, on the 22d day of September, 1911, rendered the following decision:
"This case has come up today for a hearing on the declaration of heirs of the deceased Florencio Pecson, who died in Daraga, about the year 1910.
"From the evidence it appears that the deceased had eight children by his wife Nicolasa Manjares, likewise deceased, which children are those named Emerenciano, Teresa, Filomena, Asuncion, Rufino, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, all surnamed Pecson. It also appears that Rufino Pecson absented himself from these Islands twenty-five years ago, going to Australia, and that nothing has been heard of him for the past twenty years. The said Rufino Pecson left no children in the Philippines and was unmarried when he emigrated. As nothing has been heard of him for twenty years, it is presumed that he died and it is held that the part of this estate to which he was entitled must be divided among the other heirs.
"It also appears from the evidence that Teresa Pecson married Basiliso Mediavillo', by whom she had two children, Joaquin and Rosario Mediavillo. Teresa also died, leaving these two children and her husband, Basiliso Mediavillo. Her son Joaquin died, unmarried and childless, before the death of the testator, Florencio Pecson. Rosario is the only living daughter of Teresa and the latter's husband, Basiliso Mediavillo, is also living. The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather.
"The court therefore decrees that this part of the will is contrary to law and sets it aside as being of no force or value whatever. The court further holds that Rosario Mediavillo, the daughter of Teresa Pecson, is the heiress of the one-half of the share of this estate pertaining to the said Teresa, and that her father, as the heir of his son Joaquin, also. Teresa's son, is the heir of the other one-half of the said share pertaining to Teresa—that is, of the one-seventh of this estate that pertains to the latter. Moreover, the court decrees that, besides the two heirs just above mentioned, Emerciano, Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emiliano, and Perfecto, surnamed Pecson, and the children of Teresa, are also heirs of the estate of Florencio Pecson."
From that decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:
"FIRST ERROR.
"The lower court erred in finding' that the part of the will which disinherits Rosario Mediavillo is contrary to law, and in setting it aside as being of no force or value whatever.
"SECOND ERROR.
"The lower court erred by decreeing that Basiliso Mediavillo, the father of Joaquin Mediavillo, is the heir by representation of the one-half of the one-seventh of this estate pertaining to Joaquin Mediavillo."
With reference to the first assignment of error it may be said that from the record it appears that during the lifetime of Florencio Pecson he had been married to Nicolasa Manjares, with whom he had eight children, named Filomena, Asuncion, Zoila, Emerenciano, Emiliano, Perfecto, Rufino and Teresa Pecson; that before the death of Florencio Pecson he executed and delivered the will in question. The will made no provision for the said Rufino Pecson, neither was there any provision in the will for the said Teresa. All of the other children were named as heirs in said will. It appears that Teresa had been married with one Basiliso Mediavillo, and that some time before the making of the will in question she died, leaving her husband and two children, Joaquin Mediavillo and Rosario Mediavillo, as her heirs. It also appears from the record that Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs, leaving as the only heirs of the said Teresa Pecson, her husband, Basiliso Mediavillo and the said Rosario Mediavillo. The said Joaquin Mediavillo died before his grandfather, Florencio Pecson, and probably before the will in question was made.
Paragraph 3 of the will disinherited Rosario Mediavillo in the following language:
"I declare that one of my daughters, named Teresa, now deceased, left a legitimate daughter named Rosario Mediavillo. I also declare that I disinherit my granddaughter, the said Rosario Mediavillo, because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore, it is my will that the said Rosario Mediavillo shall have no share in my property."
The defendant, Rosario Mediavillo, in the motion which she presented and which is copied above, alleges that she was disinherited without cause, Upon a consideration of that question, the lower court found that she had been disinherited without cause and annulled said paragraph 3 of the will. That order of the lower court constitutes the error complained of by the appellant in her first assignment of error.
By reference to said paragraph 3 above quoted, it will be seen that Florencio Pecson disinherited the said Rosario Mediavillo "because she was grossly disrespectful to me and because on one occasion, when it was I do not remember, she raised her hand against me. Therefore it is my will that she, the said Rosario Mediavillo, shall have no share in my property."
The lower court admitted proof upon the question of the responsibility of the said Rosario Mediavillo at the time she offered the offense to her grandfather, Florencio Pecson. After hearing the proof, the lower court reached the following conclusion:
"The evidence shows that this girl Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the third paragraph of his will, he disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been disinherited by her grandfather."
The first assignment of error presents the question whether or not the courts, when a parent disinherits his children, may inquire into the cause of the disinheritance and decide that there was or was not ground for such disinheritance. The Civil Code (art. 848) provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law. In accordance with the provisions of that article (848) we find that articles 756 and 853 provide the cases or causes for disinheritance; or, in other words, the cases or causes. in which the ancestors may by will disinherit their heirs. Article 849 of the Civil Code provides that the disinheritance can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for such disinheritance. If it is true that heirs can be disinherited only by will, and for causes mentioned in the Civil Code, it would seem to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The right of the courts to inquire into the causes and whether there was sufficient cause for the disinheritance or not, seems to be supported by express provisions of the Civil Code. Article 850 provides that "the, proof of the truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should the disinherited person deny it." It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof. The right of the court to inquire whether or not the disinheritance was made for just cause is also sustained by the provisions of article 851, which in part provides that :
"Disinheritance made without statement of the reason, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, should not be proven * * * shall annul the designation of heirship, in so far as it prejudices the person disinherited."
It seems clear from the above-quoted provisions, that the courts may inquire into the justice of a disinheritance such as was attempted in the present case, and if they find that the disinheritance was without cause, that part of the testament or will may be pronounced null and void. It remains, however, to be seen whether the evidence adduced during the trial of the present cause was sufficient to show that the disinheritance made in paragraph 3 of the will was made for just cause. It appears from the record that when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some attentions from a young man—that she had received a letter from him—and that her grandfather, Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. The record shows that very soon after said event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very brief periods, up to the present time. The lower court, taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather in the year 1894 or 1895.
After a careful consideration of the record, we are inclined to believe that the same supports the conclusions of the lower court and that he did not commit the error complained of in the first assignment of error.
With reference to, the second assignment of error, it will be remembered that Teresa Pecson, the mother of Rosario Mediavillo, at the time of her death left two children, Rosario and Joaquin, and her husband Basiliso Mediavillo, and that the said Joaquin Mediavillo died without heirs. The lower court gave one-half of the inheritance of the said Teresa Pecson to Rosario Mediavillo and the share that would have gone to Joaquin Mediavillo, to his father Basiliso Mediavillo. In that conclusion of the lower court we think error was committed. The appellant relies upon the provisions of article 925 of the Civil Code, in his contention that the lower court committed an error. Article 925 provides that:
"The right of representation shall always take place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending. In collateral lines, it shall take place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of the whole or half blood."
The appellee, in support of the conclusions of the lower court, cites articles 935 and 936 of the Civil Code. Article 935 provides that:
"In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collaterals."
Article 936 provides that:
"The father and mother, if living, shall inherit share and share alike. If one of them only survive, he or she shall succeed to the son's entire estate."
It will be remembered that the whole argument of the appellants with reference to the first assignment of error was that Rosario Mediavillo had been disinherited and the court evidently believed that there were no "legitimate children, descendants of the deceased, surviving," and that therefore the father or mother of said legitimate children would inherit as ascendants. Inasmuch, however, as there was a descendant in the direct line, surviving, the inheritance could not ascend, and for that reason the lower court committed an error in declaring that Basiliso Mediavillo was entitled to inherit that share of the estate that would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been living. Therefore, and for all of. the foregoing, that part of the judgment of the lower court nullifying and setting aside paragraph 3 of the will is hereby affirmed, and that part of said judgment which decrees to Basiliso Mediavillo one-half of the estate of Florencio Pecson, belonging to Teresa Pecson and which would have been given to Joaquin Mediavillo, had he been surviving, is hereby revoked. And without any finding as to costs, it is hereby ordered that the cause be remanded to the lower court, with direction that judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and that such further proceedings be had as the interested parties may deem necessary, for the purpose of disposing of that part of the inheritance of Teresa Pecson which would have belonged to Joaquin Mediavillo, hud he been surviving.
Torres, Carson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING
ARELLANO, C. J.
I agree with the second part of the decision reversing the judgment appealed from.

DISSENTING
ARAULLO, J.
I do not agree with that part of the decision which affirms the judgment appealed from.





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zaldarriaga v. ca (1996) reserva troncal


[SYLLABUS]

[ G.R. No. 90215, March 29, 1996 ]

ERNESTO ZALDARRIAGA, JESUS ZALDARRIAGA, JR. AND GUADALUPE ZALDARRIAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILIA ZALDARRIAGA; ANTONIA ZALDARRIAGA ON HER BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY, EDGARDO, ROMEO, JESUS, RONALDO; WILLIAM, MIGUEL AND REBECCA, ALL SURNAMED ZALDARRIAGA; NIDA AND JOSE, ALL SURNAMED ZALDARRIAGA; JOSE, JR., ALICIA, PEDRO, MELBA, NELLY AND ALFREDO, ALL SURNAMED ZALDARRIAGA, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N


ROMERO, J.,:


This is the sixth time that an issue or incident spawned by opposing claims of two sets of first cousins and, earlier, their respective mothers, over the Hacienda Escolastica in Mabini, Cadiz, Negros Occidental has been elevated to this Court for resolution. We resolve the instant petition for review on certiorari in the hope that, as one of them[1] says, "peace and tranquility to all parties" may at last be attained.

Hacienda Escolastica, consisting of Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941, originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539, has an area of 228.54 hectares. It belonged to the conjugal partnership of Pedro Zaldarriaga and Margarita Iforong. During their marriage, the couple begot four sons named Jesus, Jose, Manuel and Julio.

On May 17, 1919, Margarita died leaving one-half (1/2) or four-eighths (4/8) of the hacienda to her husband as his conjugal share and one-eighth (1/8) share to each of her sons. Thereafter, Manuel and Julio died single and without issue.  Their combined two-eighths (2/8) shares therefore passed by legal succession to their father, Pedro, who consequently became the owner of six-eighths (6/8) or three-fourths (3/4) share of the hacienda.

In 1944, Jose died survived by his wife, Basilia, and their seven children, named Carlos,[2] Jose, Alicia, Melba, Nelly, Pedro and Alfredo. Two years later or in 1946, Jesus also died. He was survived by his wife, Consuelo, and three children: Ernesto, Guadalupe and Jesus, Jr. Hence, Pedro outlived his four children.

On June 5, 1953, Basilia vda. de Zaldarriaga, acting as the judicial administratrix of the estate of Jose, filed Civil Case No. 2705 against the said surviving children of Jesus before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, for the partition of the hacienda and for accounting of its rents, profits, produce and fruits. During the pendency of the case or on January 14, 1956, Pedro, the Zaldarriaga patriarch, executed a "deed of definite sale" conveying his 6/8 share in the hacienda to his grandchildren by Jesus, the defendants in the case. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-20122, T-19141, T-20143 and T-20124 corresponding to Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941 were issued to said grandchildren.  This turn of events also resulted in the amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2705 in order that the nullification of the said sale would be made an integral part thereof.

On March 30, 1957, the lower court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 2705 (1) declaring as null and void the order of the intestate court in Special Proceedings No. 483 which approved the project of partition and declaration of heirs made by Jesus’ children, and cancelling the sugar quotas listed in their names in the Sugar Quota Office; (2) declaring null and void the deed of sale of 6/8 portion of the hacienda which was executed by Pedro in favor of Jesus’ children; (3) ordering Pedro to account for and pay the intestate estate of Jose the amount of P94,586.00 representing rentals, profits and other claims, and to pay said estate every crop year P3,794.00 as rentals and P500.00 as profit, and (4) ordering the partition and distribution of the hacienda consisting of Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941 as follows: (a) to Pedro, 6/8 of the land or 172.68 hectares, 3/5 of the entire sugar quota of the hacienda for A sugar or 4479 piculs and 3/5 of the entire sugar quota for the hacienda for B and C sugar; (b) to the intestate estate of Jose or his heirs 28.78 hectares of the hacienda, 1/5 of the entire sugar quota for the hacienda for A sugar or 1493 piculs, and 1/5 of the entire sugar quota for B and C sugar; (c) to the legitimate heirs of Jesus, 28.78 hectares of the hacienda, 1/5 of the entire sugar quota for the hacienda for A sugar and 1/5 of the entire sugar quota for B and C sugar.

Since the boundaries of the respective shares of the co-owners had not yet been delineated and marked, the court appointed clerk of court Jose Azcona and Segundo Hipolito as commissioners pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71[3] of the Rules of Court.  The court also ordered Pedro to pay the intestate estate of Jose P15,000 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages and the heirs of Jesus to pay the same estate P5,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Both Pedro and the heirs of Jesus were ordered to pay the said estate P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.  The court also dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim.

Two months later or on May 29, 1957, Pedro died. Consuelo vda. de Zaldarriaga, the widow of his son Jesus, was appointed judicial administratrix of his estate.  As such administratrix, Consuelo filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal from the said decision of March 30, 1957. Basilia, Jose’s widow, opposed the appeal contending that Consuelo had not really filed said requirements for an appeal but merely a motion asking for leave to adopt her (Basilia’s) appeal bond and record on appeal.  The lower court sustained Basilia’s opposition, thereby prompting Consuelo to file a petition for mandamus before this Court. Docketed as L-13252, the petition was decided on April 29, 1961[4] against petitioner Consuelo with the Court holding that "a decision or order directing partition is not final because it leaves something more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case." Hence, the Court therein denied the petition but instructed the lower court "to proceed in Civil Case No. 2705 in accordance with this decision and the procedure provided in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court."

For her part, Basilia appealed the decision in Civil Case No. 2705 to this Court. It was docketed as L-13424. On May 31, 1961, the Court dismissed the appeal[5] on the ground that it was taken prematurely as, consonant with its ruling in L-13252, the decision appealed from was merely interlocutory because the lower court still had to go through the proceedings outlined in Rule 71.

Accordingly, the appointed commissioners began to partition the hacienda. On December 1, 1962, they submitted their report which the court approved on May 3, 1963.  The respective shares of the parties were raffled among them and that of the plaintiffs (Basilia and her children) was accordingly adjudicated to them by the lower court.

Clearly dissatisfied with the final decision of the lower court, Consuelo and her children appealed to this Court through L-21888. In the decision of June 26, 1967,[6] this Court, for lack of jurisdiction over the amount in controversy (totalling P156,886.00), remanded the case to the Court of Appeals as this Court at that time could take jurisdiction only over claims on properties valued at more than P200,000.00.

Thus, taking jurisdiction over the appeal, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. No. 39743-R on September 30, 1971.[7] It found that the hacienda had been "partitioned in 1919 among the heirs" of Margarita; that Pedro and his four sons entered into an extrajudicial agreement assigning unto themselves definite portions of the hacienda; that except for Jose, each of them took possession of his share and cultivated it; that Jose tilled and planted his portion only in 1942 to 1944 and thereafter it was left idle; that from 1919 until his death in 1944, Jose never asked for his share in the produce of his father and brothers; that while the 7/8 portion of the hacienda was tilled and developed, its southern portion corresponding to the 1/8 share of Jose was left uncultivated;[8] that, by the number of years that defendants (Consuelo and her children) had been openly and adversely in possession of the 7/8 portion, they had acquired exclusive ownership thereof and prescription had cured whatever defects there might have been in title or acquisition; that from 1919 to 1953 or for 34 years, plaintiffs (Basilia and her children) did not claim the fruits of the hacienda nor demand its partition, and that Basilia herself was guilty of laches in waiting for almost a decade before bringing an action in court. In view of these facts, the Court of Appeals resolved to "forego discussion of the other errors raised by defendants which are thereby rendered academic" and reversed the decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. 2705.

However, the finality of said decision on January 4, 1972[9] did not deter Basilia from elevating the same decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari docketed as L-34557.[10] On February 3, 1972, this Court promulgated minute resolution:

"L-34557 (Basilia F. Vda. de Zaldarriaga, etc. v. Pedro Zaldarriaga, deceased, substituted by Consuelo Tan Vda. de Zaldarriaga, etc., et al.). - Considering the allegations of, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, THE COURT RESOLVED to deny the petition for being factual (insufficient showing that findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence) and for lack of merit. The manifestation of counsel for petitioner, dated January 28, 1972, is NOTED."[11]


Basilia filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution. On May 8, 1972, this Court denied it in the following resolution:

"Upon consideration of the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner in G.R. No. L-34557, Basilia F. Vda. de Zaldarriaga, etc. vs. Pedro Zaldarriaga, etc., et al., and the opposition thereto of respondents, and it appearing that without considering the offer of evidence, assuming that this should not have been taken into account by the Court of Appeals (even if its holding that the so-called dead-man’s statute’ does not apply to this case) is correct, there is substantial evidence to sustain the appellate court’s conclusion that the properties herein involved had already been previously partitioned before the death of petitioner’s husband, Jose Zaldarriaga, and that it is clear that neither her deceased husband during her lifetime, nor the petitioner ever laid claim to the sugar quotas alleged in the complaint for over 33 years, for which reason, the present action has prescribed, and considering that it is indisputable, at this stage, that there is a specific 1/8 portion of the Hacienda share belonging to petitioner in the estate of her husband’s mother, and if it has remained uncultivated and unproductive, it is because petitioner, and her husband before her, have failed to work on the same, and that, as held by the Court of Appeals, the other causes of action of petitioner have already become academic, the same being premised on the nonexistence of the partition found by the appellate court as having been effected during the lifetime of petitioner’s husband, the Court resolved to DENY the motion for reconsideration without prejudice to whatever action not yet prescribed, that the children, if any, of the late Jose Zaldarriaga may have for the recovery of their share in the lands in question as part of the estate of the now deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga." (Italics supplied.)[12]

Acting on cue, the following year, or on June 19, 1973, Basilia and her children filed Civil Case No. 117-V against Consuelo and her children before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. Claiming three-eighths (3/8) or one-half (1/2) of Pedro’s six-eighths (6/8) share in the hacienda which allegedly was "fictitiously conveyed" to Consuelo’s children, they prayed that the deed of sale executed by Pedro as regards said portion of the hacienda be declared void ab initio; that 3/8 or 1/2 of the said estate of Pedro be reconveyed to them, and that said property be partitioned with accounting of its produce plus moral damages.[13]

In their answer with counterclaim, the defendants alleged that the action was barred by res judicata.[14] They further alleged lack of personality to sue on the part of the plaintiffs, no cause of action and prescription. Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing under Sec. 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court at the same time seeking the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of res judicata.[15] The plaintiffs opposed this motion.

On September 4, 1973, the lower court, through Judge Victoriano C. Teleron, issued a resolution dismissing the complaint and sustaining the defendants’ theory of res judicata.[16] On the plaintiffs’ contention that assuming that all the requisites for the application of the principle of res judicata were obtaining in the case, the same principle was nevertheless inapplicable considering the "reservation" made by this Court in the May 8, 1972 resolution in G.R. No. 34557 that the heirs of Jose may file "whatever action, not yet prescribed, that they may have for the recovery of their shares in the lands in question as part of the estate" of Pedro, the lower court said the reservation should "refer to some rights of the children of the late Jose Zaldarriaga other than the subject-matter now litigated in instant case" otherwise it would be assumed that "the appellate Courts were being deliberately inconsistent in its judgments and, against its established doctrines, encouraging multiplicity of suits affecting the same causes of action over the same subject-matter between the same parties."

Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on the ground that the said lower court resolution was contrary both to the actual facts of the case and to law.[17] Defendants countered with a motion to strike off the record and/or to dismiss the said motion for reconsideration on the ground that the same was a mere scrap of paper which should not be acted upon by the court.[18] Acting on said motions of the parties, on April 30, 1974, the court[19] denied defendants’ motion, granted plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration and reconsidered and set aside its resolution of September 4, 1973.[20]

As expected, the defendants filed a motion for the reconsideration of the April 30, 1974 order but the court denied the same. Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03164-R, the petition raised as principal issue the applicability of the principle of res judicata, stressing that the plaintiffs’ action to nullify the deed of sale dated January 14, 1956 had been barred by the judgment in CA-G.R. No. 39743-R. On the other hand, plaintiffs-respondents invoked once again the significance of the reservation clause in this Court’s resolution in L-34557 which, they believed, "defoliates the legal posture of the defendants."

On July 21, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[21] dismissing the petition for certiorari and rejecting the res judicata theory.  The appellate court reasoned in this wise:

"Even assuming, arguendo, that another case, Civil Case No. 2705 between the parties herein, which case is interrelated with the principal case, Civil Case No. 117-V, had already been decided by the Supreme Court in L-34557, the ground of res judicata as raised in the motion to dismiss the complaint cannot be sustained by virtue of the Supreme Court’s ruling in L-34557 to the effect that its decision is without prejudice to whatever action, not yet prescribed, that the children, if any, of the late Jose Zaldarriaga may have for the recovery of their share in the lands in question as part of the estate of the now deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga."


Petitioners therein filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision but it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Their second motion for reconsideration met the same fate.  Undaunted, they brought the matter to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari docketed as L-42177 and entitled "Ernesto Zaldarriaga v. Court of Appeals, et al." This Court denied the petition for lack of merit in the minute resolution of February 11, 1976.[22] Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on March 31, 1976.[23]

Meanwhile, in the lower court, the plaintiffs (Basilia and her children) filed on July 25, 1975 a motion for leave to amend their complaint citing as reason therefor oversight in alleging in the complaint "the distribution of the estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga."[24] Annexed to the motion was the amended complaint itself.[25] In due course, the parties filed a partial stipulation of facts and trial on the merits of the case ensued. On September 9, 1986, the lower court[26] rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 117-V in favor of the plaintiffs.[27] It decreed thus:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) - declaring null and void the ‘Deed of Definite Sale’ executed on January 14, 1956 by the late Pedro Zaldarriaga in favor of defendants Ernesto Zaldarriaga, Guadalupe Zaldarriaga and Jesus Zaldarriaga, Jr.;

(2)     - ordering the cancellation of transfer certificates of title Nos. T-20122, T-19141, T-20123 and T-20124 covering Lots 936, 937, 940 and 941 of Cadiz Cadastre, respectively and the reinstatement of transfer certificates of title Nos. T-6536, T-6537, T-6538 and T-6539 covering aforesaid lots, respectively;

(3)     - ordering the partition of Lots Nos. 936-B, 937 and 941-A of Cadiz Cadastre, constituting the estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga under the 1919 oral partition, with one-half (1/2) thereof to belong to plaintiffs and the other one-(half) (1/2) to appertain to defendants and ordering defendants to execute a formal deed of conveyance in favor of plaintiffs covering their shares in said Lots Nos. 936-B, 937 and 941-A of Cadiz Cadastre. For this purpose, Atty. Fe Las Piñas-Gicano and Mr. Edilberto Y. Empestan are hereby appointed as commissioners (Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court) who, after having qualified by taking their oath, shall make and effect an equitable separation, delineation and partition of aforesaid lots in accordance with this decision and, thereafter, shall make a full report to this Court of the proceedings respecting the partition.

(4) - ordering the defendants to execute a formal deed of conveyance covering Lots Nos. 940 and 941-B in favor of plaintiffs who are now actually possessing said lots;

(5) - ordering the defendants to cause the titles of plaintiffs, after partition, to be free from the liens particularly the mortgage encumbrances, constituted by the defendants on Hda. Escolastica;

(6) - ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs the sum of P2,935,693.40 plus interest at the legal rate from the date of filing of the complaint until the amount is fully paid and to pay the plaintiffs the money equivalent of 4,095.95 piculs a year from 1977-1978 crop year up to the time that the shares of plaintiffs in the estate of the late Pedro Zaldarriaga are delivered to them by defendants, to be computed on the basis of the price fixed by the PHILSUCOM;

(7) - ordering the defendants to account for all lease rentals paid by Hanil Development Co., Ltd. for its use of the land for its crusher site and batching plant and to deliver to plaintiffs one-half (1/2) of said rentals;

(8) - ordering the defendants to pay, jointly and severally, the plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of P30,000.00 plus P500.00 for every court appearances; and

(9) - ordering the defendants to pay the costs of suit.

Defendants’ counterclaims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED."


Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the lower court was barred by prior judgment as regards the validity of the deed of sale executed by Pedro in their favor and that the award of damages was without basis in fact and in law (CA-G.R. No. CV No. 14450).

On July 14, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision[28] affirming in toto the lower court’s decision of September 9, 1986. In holding that the principle of res judicata was inapplicable, the Court of Appeals said that "(T)he issue of the nullity or validity of the sale by the late Pedro Zaldarriaga to the herein appellants (his grandchildren), was not resolved by this Court in CA-G.R. No. 39743-R" because what was resolved therein was the issue of partition. As regards the validity of the deed of sale, the Court of Appeals noted that the defendants-appellants significantly "did not present any evidence at all to show that the deed of sale x x x was not simulated" and repeated the lower court’s reasons for finding that the deed of sale was simulated and fictitious.[29] On the "reservation clause" in this Court’s resolution in L-34557, it said:

"Appellants further put forth the thesis that the reservation clause in the SC resolution dated May 8, 1972 encompasses only the reservable property to be inherited by the children of the late Jose Zaldarriaga; and that it should not be interpreted to include the property of the late Pedro Zaldarriaga under the deed of sale declared as fictitious by the trial court.

Again, the appellants have misinterpreted the full import and meaning of the reservation clause. The resolution of the Supreme Court does not say that the reservation clause should be confined to only the property subject of reserva troncal. As can be gleaned from the reservation clause, it speaks of the children’s share ‘in the lands in question as part of the estate of the now deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga.’ The entire estate of the deceased Pedro Zaldarriaga was ‘sold’ by him to the appellants (his other grandchildren). To recover their shares in the estate of their grandfather, appellees necessarily have to institute proceedings for the nullification of the simulated ‘deed of sale."

With respect to the award of damages, the Court of Appeals held that since the damages claimed by appellees "consist mainly of the fruits of their shares from the time of the death of Pedro Zaldarriaga (Art. 777 of the Civil Code) until the delivery to them of their respective shares," the lower court correctly awarded them.

Appellants filed a motion for the reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit on September 19, 1989.[30] Thus, the children of Jesus filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.  They contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in interpreting the so-called "reservation clause" as a ground to relitigate issues which should have been barred by established jurisprudence and doctrines; (b) when it held that the issue of prior judgment had been laid to rest by the Court of Appeals decision of July 21, 1975 in CA-G.R. No. 03164-R which affirmed both orders of June 30, 1974 and June 11, 1974; (c) in not finding that the complaint below lacks cause of action; (d) in declaring void the deed of definite sale on badges of fraud, and (e) in dismissing their counterclaim.

The several complaints, petitions and appeals arising from the same controversy which were filed by the parties in the court below, the Court of Appeals and this Court within a span of forty years creates a dizzying labyrinth of unresolved issues.  Considering however, that the cases are centered on the 6/8 share of Pedro Zaldarriaga in Hacienda Escolastica which appears to be his whole estate, the core problem to be solved is: who owned said property upon Pedro’s death - Pedro himself, in which case the property shall pass by intestacy to his descendants in accordance with the law on succession, or the children of Jesus by virtue of the deed of sale in their favor, to the exclusion of the heirs of Jose?  Since two complaints had been filed by the heirs of Jose, the ultimate solution to the problem may be found only upon a close examination of the proceedings had and the issues resolved in said cases.  Thus, delving deeply into the allegations of both parties, the issue for resolution in the instant petition for review on certiorari is quite simple: may the principle of res judicata be applied vis-a-vis the "reservation clause" enunciated by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1972 in L-34557?

At the outset, it should be made clear that the inapplicability of the principle of res judicata had been ruled upon by this Court in favor of private respondents in L-42 177 in affirming the decision in CA-G.R. No. 03164-R.

Moreover, considering the peculiar circumstances in this case, we find that res judicata does not find application in the instant petition as it would not serve the interest of substantial justice.  The principle of res judicata is a fundamental component of our judicial system but, as this Court has time and again held, it should be disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.[31] If the principle should be applied at all, it should be in the context of its less familiar concept which the Court expounded in Vda. de Cruzo v. Carriaga, Jr.[32] as follows:

"(The) less terminological usage of res judicata as a rule on conclusiveness of judgment refers to the situation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined therein or which were necessarily included therein. Consequently, since other admissible and relevant matters which the parties in the second action could properly offer are not concluded by the said judgment, the same is not a bar to or a ground for dismissal of the second action."


The issue of the validity of the deed of sale had been offered for resolution in Civil Case No. 2705.  But, even after the Court of Appeals had implicitly considered it in CA-G.R. No. 34793-R, this Court predicated the resolution of May 8, 1972 in L-34557 upon the issue of partition notwithstanding the private respondents’ vigorous espousal of the nullity of the deed of sale in their petition before this Court wherein they" correctly contended:

"Again, on another cause of action in plaintiff’s (sic) the court a quo had held that the sale by defendant Pedro Zaldarriaga of his entire share (6/8) of the hacienda, including the sugar quota, to his co-defendants was fictitious and fraudulent, hence it was annulled and set aside. Certainly, said portion of the trial court’s decision - we humbly submit - cannot be passed over by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the matter had become academic because of the finding that there was partition. Indeed, how could the matter of the annulment of the sale become academic, especially with the death of Pedro Zaldarriaga his share in the property becomes part of his estate to be inherited by Jesus and Jose (represented by their children and his surviving spouse) (Art. 986, Civil Code of the Philippines). In other words, the question as to whether the sale was null and void, on the ground that it was fictitious and fraudulent, is a material issue which is not resolved by the mere fact that the court had made a finding that there was already a partition of the property."[33]


Nonetheless, in the same May 8, 1972 resolution, the Court, exercising its discretion, considered the issue of the validity of the deed of sale as a matter which should be litigated in another action pertaining to the estate of Pedro.  In this regard, it should be underscored that when Civil Case No. 117-V was filed, the action to nullify the deed of sale had not yet prescribed considering that the issue was raised in Civil Case No. 2705 as soon as the lots involved were sold and registered in petitioners’ name.[34] The amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 2705 to include the prayer for the nullity of the deed of sale amounted to the filing of an action thereon which interrupted the running of the prescriptive period.[35]

Thus, by appending the "reservation clause" in the resolution of May 8, 1972, this Court in effect waived the applicability of the principle of res judicata. A "reservation" for the filing of another action in a decision which is usually preceded by the phrase "without prejudice" imports the contemplation of further proceedings. When said phrase appears in an order or decree, it implies that the judicial act is not intended to be res judicata on the merits of the controversy.[36] While in Gatus v. Court of Appeals[37] the Court held that a reservation not falling within the provisions of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court[38] is a "mere surplusage, for, whenever the law gives a party the right to bring an action, he may do so without the necessity of any judicial reservation," the reservation made by this Court in L-34557 in the exercise of its discretion was aimed at giving the private respondents another opportunity to ventilate their valid claims to Pedro’s estate.

Worth noting is the fact that in both Civil Cases Nos. 2705 and 1 17-V. the lower court arrived at the same conclusion regarding the nullity of the deed of sale.  That fact, considered with the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the decision in Civil Case No. 1 17-V, deters this Court from examining further the other conclusions of said courts on the merits of the case, which, after all, are sound and based on law.

The protracted controversy over the estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga has gone through an extraordinary and circuitous route. It is high time the controversy is laid to rest and his descendants allowed to peacefully enjoy the estate in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The July 14, 1989 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14450 and that of the lower court in Civil Case No. 117-V are AFFIRMED.  This decision is immediately executory.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., on leave.


[1]
Private respondent Alicia Zaldarriaga-Lim, in her ex-parte motion for an early decision (Rollo, p. 486).

[2] Carlos Zaldarriaga died on December 19, 1970 survived by his wife Antonia and children Eduardo, Romeo, Jesus, Ronaldo, William, Miguel and Rebecca (Rollo, p. 269).

[3] Now Rule 69 (Partition) of the 1964 Rules of Court.

[4] 1 SCRA 1188.

[5] 2 SCRA 356.

[6] 20 SCRA 432.

[7] Penned by Associate Justice Eulogio S. Serrano and concurred in by Associate Justices Cecilia Muñoz Palma and Lourdes P. San Diego.

[8] According to Jose’s daughter, Alicia, their family resided in Iloilo City where she was born in 1926 (Rollo, p. 26).

[9] Exh. "7-A"; Records, p. 1030.

[10] The timeliness of this petition is not extant on the records.

[11] Exh. "9", Record, Vol. II, p. 1048.

[12]  Exh. "11", Ibid., at p. 1060.

[13] Rollo, p. 86.

[14] Ibid., p. 99.

[15] Ibid., p. 108.

[16] Ibid., p. 134.

[17] Ibid., p. 149.

[18] Ibid., p. 165.

[19] Presided by Judge Oscar R. Victoriano.

[20] Rollo, p. 184.

[21] Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo P. Ramos and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres Reyes and Mama D. Busran.

[22] Attached to the inside back cover of the rollo.

[23] Exh. "X".

[24] Rollo, p. 227.

[25] Ibid., p. 229.

[26] Presided by Judge Romeo S. Habaradas.

[27] Rollo, p. 267.

[28] Penned by Associate Justice Antonio M. Martinez and concurred in by Associate Justices Floreliana Castro-Bartolome and Jesus M. Elbinias.

[29] The lower court’s reasons are:"(1) the filing of Civil Case No. 2705 must have angered Pedro Zaldarriaga and the sale was his retaliatory act to deprive his other grandchildren, represented by his daughter-in-law, of their legitimate (sic) in the estate; (2) the sale executed by Pedro Zaldarriaga purports to convey his entire estate or property consisting of 6/8 share in Hda. Escolastica consisting of four parcels of land designated as Lots Nos. 936, 937, 940 and 941 of Cadiz Cadastre. But, the entire Lots Nos. 940 and 941-B of Cadiz Cadastre are admitted by defendants to have been adjudicated to the heirs of Jose Zaldarriaga under the 1919 oral partition; (3) the vendees (defendants) are the grandchildren of the vendor and they are all living in one house before and at the time of the sale, and even thereafter; (4) Pedro Zaldarriaga continued to be in possession and in cultivation of Hda. Escolastica; (5) the purchase price of P100,000.00 stated in the deed of definite sale is grossly disproportionate to the market value of the property declared for taxation purposes at P1,893,650.00. The fact that defendants were able to mortgage this property for a total of P4,122,400.00 only underscores this disparity; (6) at the time of the sale, Pedro Zaldarriaga was already old and there is no evidence at all, because defendants never presented any, to show that he was in need of so much money that he had to sell all his property, and especially, if viewed in the light that he was earning from the lands sold to defendants; (7) there was no evidence showing that at the time, vendees have lucrative means of livelihood to enable them to purchase the estate of Pedro Zaldarriaga. They do not have any property registered in their names. In fine, the sale by Pedro Zaldarriaga is void and of no effect since it is violative of Art. 221 of the Civil Code. It was a simulated alienation of property with intent to deprive the plaintiffs, as compulsory heirs, of their legitime." (Decision in Civil Case No. 1 17-V. pp. 18-19; Rollo, pp. 284-285).

[30] Rollo, p. 357.

[31] Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 31, 1962,5 SCRA 304, 312, cited in Republic v. De los Santos, L-30240, March 25, 1988, 159 SCRA 264,285 and in the concurring opinion of Justice Florenz D. Regalado in Sumaoang v. Judge, RTC, Br. XXXI, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, G.R. No. 78173, October 26, 1992, 215 SCRA 136, 150-151

[32] G.R. Nos. 75109-10, June 28, 1989, 174 SCRA 330,339 cited in De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85450, July 3, 1990, 187 SCRA 165, 171-172 and Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, G.R. No. 76265, April 22, 1992,208 SCRA 215,224.

[33] Exh. "8", Record, Vol. II, p. 1031 & 1044-1045.

[34] An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Heirs of Jose Olviga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104813, October 21, 1993,227 SCRA 330,334-335).

[35] Art. 1155, Civil Code. See: Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106646, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 175,177.

[36] 50 C.J.S. 70 citing Public Service Commission of Missouri v. Brashear Freight Lines, Mo., 61 S. Ct. 784,312 U.S. 621,85 L. Ed. 1983 and other cases.

[37] L-34425, January 28, 1980,95 SCRA 530,531.

[38] The pertinent provision of Rule 17 states:

"Sec. 2. Dismissal by order of the court. - Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff" s motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice."





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